

KHAZAR UNIVERSITY

School: Graduate School of Science, Arts and Technology

Department: Political Science and Philosophy

Specialty: Area Studies (European Studies)

MASTER'S THESIS

Theme: EU- Azerbaijan relations: Energy and The Armenian -Azerbaijan conflict

Student: Nahida Rasulzada Sakhavat

Supervisor: Dr. Vasif Huseynov Maharram

Baku – 2024

XƏZƏR UNIVERSİTETİ

Fakültə: Təbiət elmləri, Sənət və Texnologiya Yüksək Təhsil

Departament: Siyasi elmlər və fəlsəfə

İxtisas: Regionşünaslıq (Avropaşünaslıq)

MAGİSTR TEZİSİ

Mövzu: Aİ-Azərbaycan münasibətləri: Enerji və Ermənistan-Azərbaycan münaqişəsi

Magistrant: Nahidə Səxavət qızı Rəsulzadə

Elmi rəhbər: s.e.ü.f.d. Vasif Məhərrəm oğlu Hüseynov

Bakı – 2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| INTRODUCTION | 4 |
| CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW | 9 |
| CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY | 13 |
| CHAPTER 3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF AZERBAIJAN-EU RELATIONS | 15 |
| 3.1. Chronology and dynamics of relations | 15 |
| 3.3. EU Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership | 16 |
| CHAPTER 4. ENERGY POLICY ACCOMPANIED BY THE PROBLEM OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AZERBAIJAN | 19 |
| 4.1. EU Energy Security and Diversification | 21 |
| 4.2. Energy cooperation of Azerbaijan with EU member countries | 24 |
| 4.3. Strategic Energy Projects | 26 |
| 5.1 Reactions of EU Member States to the Second Karabakh War | 38 |
| 5.2. The Results of the Second Karabakh War and the Mediation Efforts of the European Union | 39 |
| 6.1. Energy Cooperation Prospects | 49 |
| 6.2. Unresolved Issues in the Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict | 52 |
| CONCLUSION | 57 |
| REFERENCES | 58 |

INTRODUCTION

The South Caucasus region, with its strategic geopolitical location and abundant natural resources, has long been a focal point of international interest and conflict. Azerbaijan, in particular, stands out due to its significant energy reserves, which have positioned it as a player in both regional and global energy markets. The European Union (EU), driven by its need to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependence on Russian energy, has turned to Azerbaijan as a vital partner. This energy relationship significantly influences the dynamics of the long-standing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, particularly regarding the disputed Karabakh region.

Azerbaijan holds a crucial position as an energy ally of the European Union. The EU's interest in Azerbaijan stems from its abundant reserves of oil and gas, particularly in the Caspian Sea area. A major initiative, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), is underway to broaden Europe's energy sources and lessen dependence on Russian gas. Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role in this endeavor by supplying natural gas to Europe through pipelines such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). The EU and Azerbaijan have a partnership pact that includes commerce, economic growth, democracy, and human rights. However, the EU has expressed concern about human rights issues in Azerbaijan, including limits on free expression, assembly, and judicial independence. The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Karabakh territory is a long-standing problem in the South Caucasus. Karabakh is internationally acknowledged as part of Azerbaijan, however, it has a mostly Armenian population. The conflict began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the area declared independence, resulting in a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The violence has had enormous humanitarian effects, including displacement, fatalities, and infrastructure devastation. Armenia carried out many war crimes and ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis residing in the Karabakh region and nearby areas.

This thesis examines the intricate relationship between EU-Azerbaijan energy cooperation and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The central aim is to understand how the EU's energy needs and strategic interests affect its involvement in the conflict and to what extent this relationship fosters regional stability or exacerbates tensions. The analysis is framed around the hypothesis that the EU's strategic importance of Azerbaijan's energy resources has intensified its involvement in the conflict, leading to a bias towards Azerbaijan, and that this interdependence has created a complex landscape of opportunities and challenges for the energy policies of the involved parties and the resolution of the conflict.

Azerbaijan's role as a key energy supplier is vital to the EU's strategy for energy diversification and security. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), a major pipeline project, exemplifies this strategic partnership by aiming to transport Caspian gas to Europe, thereby reducing reliance on Russian gas supplies. Scholars such as Cornell (2021) and Roberts (2014) emphasize the importance of Azerbaijani energy in achieving the EU's diversification objectives, highlighting how energy security concerns drive the EU's foreign policy decisions in the region.

The EU's energy partnership with Azerbaijan has significant geopolitical implications, particularly in the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The EU's need for stable energy supplies has influenced its diplomatic and political stance, often aligning more closely with Azerbaijan. This is evident in the EU's relatively muted response to the Second Karabakh War in 2020, where strategic energy interests appeared to take precedence over normative commitments to human rights and conflict resolution (Buzard et al., 2020).

The interdependence between EU-Azerbaijan energy relations and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict presents a complex landscape of both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, energy cooperation has the potential to foster economic development and enhance regional stability by integrating energy markets and infrastructure. On the other hand, the conflict with Armenia poses significant risks to the security of energy infrastructure and complicates the EU's broader geopolitical strategy. The involvement of major powers such as Russia and Turkey further adds to the complexity of the situation, creating a volatile environment where energy security and political stability are deeply intertwined (Guliyev and Akhmedov, 2016).

This thesis aims to provide a nuanced analysis of how the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict influences energy relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. By exploring historical contexts, current dynamics, and future prospects, this research will offer insights into the multifaceted relationship between energy security and geopolitical stability in the South Caucasus. Through a qualitative examination of relevant documents, scholarly literature, and policy statements, the study will illuminate the broader implications of EU-Azerbaijan energy cooperation for regional peace and conflict resolution.

Relevance of the research. The research on the dependence between energy issues in EU-Azerbaijan relations and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict is highly relevant due to its multifaceted implications for regional stability, international relations, and energy security. This relevance can be articulated as follows:

Regional Stability: Understanding how energy dependencies influence the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict can provide insights into the broader geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus, a region marked by historical tensions and strategic importance.

International Relations: The EU's involvement in the region, driven by its energy needs, impacts its foreign policy and diplomatic relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. This research can shed light on the EU's role and effectiveness as a mediator in regional conflicts.

Diversification of Energy Supply: As the EU seeks to reduce its reliance on Russian energy, Azerbaijan emerges as a key alternative supplier. Analyzing this dependence is crucial for assessing the EU's energy security strategy and its implications for long-term stability.

Energy Policy Formulation: Insights from this research can guide policymakers in developing balanced energy policies that consider both economic interests and geopolitical risks.

Impartial Mediation: By exploring the opportunities and problems created by energy dependencies, the research can inform strategies for more effective and impartial mediation in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, contributing to sustainable peace efforts.

Economic Incentives: Understanding how energy revenues and dependencies affect conflict dynamics can help in designing economic incentives and policies that promote conflict resolution rather than exacerbate tensions.

Investment and Growth: The research can highlight how energy relations with the EU impact Azerbaijan's economic development and its ability to attract foreign investment, which in turn influences its domestic and foreign policy decisions.

Resource Management: For both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the findings can provide guidance on managing energy resources and revenues in a way that supports economic stability and peace-building efforts.

Policy Implications:

EU Energy Strategy: The research can contribute to the EU's broader energy strategy by identifying potential risks and benefits associated with increased reliance on Azerbaijani energy, helping to shape more resilient and adaptive energy policies.

Regional Cooperation: By highlighting the interconnectedness of energy issues and conflict dynamics, the research can encourage regional cooperation and dialogue, promoting a more integrated approach to energy and security policies.

In conclusion, this research addresses critical questions at the intersection of energy policy, international relations, and conflict resolution, making it highly relevant for policymakers,

scholars, and stakeholders interested in the stability and development of the South Caucasus region and the EU's energy security.

Goals of Research. The goal of the research is to better comprehend the intricate behavior, difficulties, and possibilities that exist in the relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan. It includes:

- The study of historical, political, economic, and social factors that shape bilateral interactions and regional dynamics;
- Identify and analyze the dependence between energy issues in EU-Azerbaijan relations and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict;
- Assess the opportunities created by these dependencies for energy policy and conflict resolution;
- Evidence-based recommendations and policy proposals will be presented to policymakers, stakeholders, and practitioners involved in EU-Azerbaijan relations;
- It aims to increase skills and experience among stakeholders, politicians, and practitioners involved in EU-Azerbaijan relations.

Research Questions:

- What is the dependence between the energy issues in the relations between the EU and Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict?
- What opportunities and problems have these dependencies created for the energy policy of the sides and the resolution of the conflict?

Independent and Dependent Variables.

Independent Variables: EU Policies and Initiatives, Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy Options, International Mediation Efforts, Global Energy Market Dynamics.

Dependent variables: EU-Azerbaijan Relations, Energy Cooperation, Dynamics of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Regional Stability and Security.

Unit of Analysis.

The units of analysis in this study are relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union. It will be determined based on survey data to better assess these relationships.

Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: The strategic importance of Azerbaijan's energy resources to the European Union has intensified its involvement in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, leading to a more pronounced bias towards Azerbaijan, because the EU's energy diversification goals, align with maintaining stable and cooperative relations with Azerbaijan, which is a key energy supplier.

Hypothesis 2: The interdependence between EU-Azerbaijan energy relations and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict has created a complex landscape of opportunities and problems for the energy policies of the involved parties and the resolution of the conflict.

CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW

Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the Caspian basin as a major energy supplier to Europe has garnered significant scholarly attention in recent years. This review highlights key studies and perspectives on Azerbaijan-EU energy relations, strategic partnerships, and the evolving landscape of energy security.

Almammadov (2019) underscores Azerbaijan's strategic significance for the EU in meeting energy demands and ensuring security. The author emphasizes the foundational role of the "Treaty of the Century" in establishing Azerbaijan as a key energy partner for Europe. Through pipelines like BTC and BTE, Azerbaijan has assumed a crucial role in supplying oil and gas to Europe, thereby enhancing energy security in the region.

The energy dimension emerges as a cornerstone of EU-Azerbaijan relations, as noted by Asker (2020). The author highlights the inclusion of energy cooperation in various agreements and initiatives between the EU and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's participation in events focused on European energy security underscores its commitment to initiatives like the Southern Corridor project. The TANAP pipeline project is highlighted as a significant step towards enhancing Europe's energy security by diversifying its gas sources.

Asker (2020) further explores the multifaceted partnership between Azerbaijan and the European Alliance (AI). The author emphasizes the robust economic ties between Azerbaijan and AI member states, underpinned by strategic partnerships and investments. Azerbaijan's position as a leading trade partner within AI and its attractiveness for investments highlight the depth of economic cooperation between the two entities.

The aftermath of the Homeland War and Azerbaijan's efforts to develop energy infrastructure in liberated territories are examined by Popescu (2023). The author sheds light on Azerbaijan's rapid development of water and electricity stations in recently liberated areas, signaling a commitment to harnessing energy resources for reconstruction and development. Collaborations with international entities like BP underscore Azerbaijan's efforts to leverage its energy potential for sustainable development in liberated territories.

Azerbaijan's energy resources, particularly its natural gas and oil reserves, are critical to the EU's strategy for energy diversification. The EU has long sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies due to geopolitical tensions and the desire for energy security. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), a network of pipelines that transport Caspian gas to Europe, exemplifies this strategy. Scholars such as Cornell (2021) and Roberts (2014) emphasize the pivotal role of Azerbaijan in the EU's energy diversification efforts, noting that the SGC is a

cornerstone of the EU's energy policy aimed at ensuring a stable and reliable supply of natural gas from non-Russian sources.

The EU's vested interest in Azerbaijani energy has influenced its stance on the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Research indicates that the EU's engagement in the region has been marked by a pragmatic approach that often aligns with Azerbaijan's interests. This is particularly evident in the EU's diplomatic and political responses during periods of heightened conflict. For example, Buzard et al. (2020) argue that the EU's relative silence on human rights issues during the Second Karabakh War can be attributed to its strategic energy interests. Similarly, Petersen (2016) suggests that the EU's energy needs have led to tacit support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity to ensure the stability of energy supplies.

The interdependence between EU-Azerbaijan energy relations and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict creates a complex landscape of opportunities and challenges. On one hand, the strategic partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan offers significant economic benefits and enhances regional energy security. This partnership facilitates large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which are crucial for the EU's energy diversification strategy (Roberts, 2014).

Additionally, the geopolitical dynamics involving Russia and Turkey further complicate the EU's position. Russia's historical influence in the South Caucasus and Turkey's support for Azerbaijan add layers of complexity to the EU's efforts to balance its strategic interests with regional stability (De Waal, 2021).

The EU's engagement in the conflict also raises questions about its commitment to human rights and democratic values. Scholars like Rzayeva (2018) critique the EU's tendency to prioritize strategic interests over normative principles, suggesting that this approach undermines the EU's credibility as a promoter of human rights and democracy in the region. The balancing act between strategic interests and normative commitments remains a contentious aspect of the EU's foreign policy.

The literature underscores the strategic importance of Azerbaijan's energy resources to the EU and the resultant bias towards Azerbaijan in the context of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. This relationship highlights the EU's pragmatic approach to energy security, which often prioritizes strategic interests over normative values. The interdependence between EU-Azerbaijan energy relations and the conflict creates both opportunities for economic cooperation and challenges related to regional stability and security.

Understanding this dynamic is crucial for policymakers and stakeholders as they navigate the complexities of energy and geopolitics in the South Caucasus. Future research should continue to explore the implications of this interdependence, particularly in the context of evolving geopolitical landscapes and the EU's broader foreign policy objectives.

Hypotheses based on the literature review.

Based on an in-depth review of the existing literature, two hypotheses are proposed to guide the analysis of the intricate relationship between EU-Azerbaijan energy cooperation and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. These hypotheses aim to provide a structured framework for understanding how energy security concerns influence the EU's foreign policy and regional stability in the South Caucasus.

Hypothesis 1:

The strategic importance of Azerbaijan's energy resources to the European Union has intensified its involvement in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, leading to a more pronounced bias towards Azerbaijan. This bias is rooted in the EU's energy diversification goals, which align with maintaining stable and cooperative relations with Azerbaijan, a key energy supplier.

Azerbaijan's role as a significant energy supplier is crucial to the EU's strategy for reducing dependency on Russian gas and diversifying its energy sources. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), exemplifies this strategic partnership aimed at enhancing the EU's energy security (Cornell, 2021; Roberts, 2014). The literature suggests that the EU's need for a reliable energy partner has led to a pragmatic approach that sometimes favors Azerbaijan's stance in the regional conflict. Buzard et al. (2020) argue that the EU's muted response to the Second Karabakh War in 2020 reflects a strategic choice to prioritize energy security over normative commitments to human rights and conflict resolution. This hypothesis posits that the EU's energy security concerns have resulted in a foreign policy that implicitly supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and its position in the conflict with Armenia.

Hypothesis 2:

The interdependence between EU-Azerbaijan energy relations and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict has created a complex landscape of opportunities and challenges for the energy policies of the involved parties and the resolution of the conflict.

The relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan, heavily influenced by energy considerations, presents both opportunities and challenges. Energy cooperation offers significant economic benefits and enhances regional energy security by integrating energy markets and

infrastructure (Roberts, 2014). However, the ongoing conflict with Armenia poses substantial risks to the security of energy supplies and infrastructure. Guliyev and Akhmedov (2016) highlight that the security of energy transport routes is a major concern, given the volatile nature of the conflict. The potential for renewed hostilities or sabotage poses continuous threats to stability and reliability. Additionally, the involvement of major powers such as Russia and Turkey further complicates the EU's strategic calculus in the region (De Waal, 2021). This hypothesis explores how the intertwined nature of energy and conflict influences the policies of the EU, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and assesses the resultant implications for conflict resolution and regional stability.

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY

This thesis employs a qualitative research methodology to explore the complex relationship between EU-Azerbaijan energy cooperation and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The research design is structured around an in-depth literature review and document analysis, supported by qualitative data collection techniques such as expert interviews and case studies.

Literature Review and Document Analysis: The foundational basis of this thesis involves a comprehensive review of existing literature, including academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles, policy papers, and official EU and Azerbaijani government documents. The literature review aims to synthesize existing knowledge on the strategic importance of Azerbaijani energy resources to the EU, the EU's energy diversification goals, and the geopolitical dynamics of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Document analysis is a systematic method of examining and interpreting texts to uncover patterns, themes, and insights relevant to the research questions. This approach allows for a detailed understanding of the historical context, current policies, and strategic interests shaping EU-Azerbaijan relations.

Qualitative Data Collection: To supplement the literature review and document analysis, qualitative data will be gathered through semi-structured interviews with experts in energy policy, international relations, and South Caucasus geopolitics. These interviews will provide first-hand insights into the motivations and perceptions of key stakeholders, including policymakers, analysts, and academic scholars. Additionally, case studies of specific energy projects, such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, will be conducted to illustrate the practical implications of EU-Azerbaijan energy cooperation.

Data Analysis: The qualitative data analysis will follow a thematic approach, involving coding and categorizing data to identify significant patterns and themes. The analysis will consist of five stages: data collection, data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification. This method ensures a rigorous examination of the data and facilitates the identification of key factors influencing the interplay between energy cooperation and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Research Design: The research process will proceed as follows:

1. Selection of the research topic and formulation of research questions and hypotheses.
2. Conducting a comprehensive literature review to establish a theoretical framework.
3. Determining the research method and approach, focusing on qualitative techniques.
4. Collecting and analyzing data through document analysis, expert interviews, and case studies.

5. Drawing conclusions and providing policy recommendations based on the findings.

By employing these qualitative research methodologies, this thesis aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the strategic importance of Azerbaijan's energy resources to the EU, the resulting bias in the EU's involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, and the broader implications for regional stability and energy policy.

By completing an in-depth literature review on the research topic, information that will serve as the foundation for the thesis will be gathered utilizing the document analysis technique, one of the qualitative research methodologies, within the limits and restrictions of the study. Qualitative research is a research approach that seeks to comprehend, explain, and interpret people's actions, attitudes, experiences, and views in detail, allowing for in-depth analysis. Rather than using numerical criteria, it aims to comprehend people and facts by asking "how and why". Documents, observations, and interviews are used to collect data for qualitative research. Qualitative data analysis consists of five stages: data collection, data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification.

The document analysis methodology is a qualitative research approach for methodically and thoroughly analyzing the content of textual materials. This method is a systematic approach to reviewing and evaluating all papers, particularly electronic and printed information. Document analysis, like other qualitative research methodologies, entails studying and interpreting data to infer meaning, get an understanding of the relevant subject, and generate empirical information. The primary sources for this research include books, journals, theses, declarations, articles of agreement, and information gathered by searching online sites. The study design will be as follows: selecting the subject and objective, doing a literature review, determining the method and approach, collecting and analyzing data, and providing suggestions.

CHAPTER 3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF AZERBAIJAN-EU RELATIONS

3.1. Chronology and dynamics of relations

Before discussing the energy dimension of Azerbaijan and EU relations, it is important to mention the historical perspective of the relations and especially the mutual expectations of the parties. To understand how relations have developed, first, Azerbaijan will be evaluated within the scope of neighborhood policy, why it is important for the EU will be tried to be revealed, and the EU's attitude towards Azerbaijan will be examined. Within the framework of the European Union Neighborhood Policy, relations with Azerbaijan Following the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991 and the Soviet Socialist Republics' proclamation of independence, the EU established diplomatic ties and security-based relationships with these unstable areas. It developed a political agenda for Azerbaijan under the Common Foreign and Security Policy during this time. In this regard, the 1996–1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement inked with Azerbaijan has significant importance for growing bilateral business ties (Gurbanov, I. 2019).

In addition, there are plans for collaboration between the EU and Azerbaijan in such including natural gas, technology, human rights, democracy, and the environment. EU-Azerbaijan ties were expedited when the European Commission published the EU Neighborhood Policy Strategy in 2004, just after ten member nations joined. Six of the 16 nations included in the EU Neighborhood Policy are neighbors to the east: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. However, the bulk of these nations are Mediterranean nations. At the time, lobbying efforts in the Caucasus region were successful in getting Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to participate. However, Russia declined to take part, opting instead to establish more "equal" collaboration with the EU and to create four (Bielecki, J. 2022).

3.2. Economic Partnership and Trade Agreements

The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Program was launched in 2007 and the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) Program was launched in 2014 with the goal of regulating financial matters for the participating nations in the policy. The EU and Azerbaijan have been in talks to amend the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement since 2017. The unfair distribution of energy resources in the world regarding their distribution and use increases the importance of controlling energy resources. EU countries, which have limited natural resources but high consumption rates, consider the Caspian Region, especially

Azerbaijan, as an important alternative to Russia in energy imports. To limit Russia's influence in this region, it supported the independence of the countries in the region and helped the countries establish their democratic order (ENP). The EU, which signed action plans with the South Caucasus countries within the framework of the Neighborhood Policy as of 2006, envisaged establishing relations and aiding all three countries in the context of similar issues. However, Azerbaijan's expectations of the European Neighborhood Policy do not coincide with the expectations of Armenia and Georgia. While Georgia considers the Neighborhood Policy as a preparation period for the EU membership process; Armenia, which is dependent on Russia in its foreign policy, focuses on economic cooperation with the EU. Unlike these two countries, Azerbaijan does not need assistance within the scope of the European Neighborhood Policy (Kakachia, K. 2019). Azerbaijan, which has significant amounts of oil and natural gas resources compared to other countries and can export these resources independently from Russia, has an energy dialogue with the EU through channels other than the Neighborhood Policy. Instead of using its strategic position in the energy field as a tool of pressure, Azerbaijan, to increase the country's interests and solve the Karabakh problem, has chosen to cooperate with global and regional actors in the field of energy. In the problem that started with the dissolution of Tsarist Russia in Karabakh, where Armenian and Azeri Karabakh people live; Azerbaijan pursues policies aimed at preserving its territorial integrity, while Armenia pursues policies aimed at expanding its territory. The issue has closely affected not only both sides of the incident but also the policies of Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the EU. The European Commission sought a solution to the Karabakh problem, and in 2002, it advocated that the problem be resolved peacefully. In 1994, the EU supported the Minsk Group process formed by the USA, Russia, and France to resolve the Karabakh conflict. However, it was not active in the conflicts that took place in 2016, and in the statements made, it was seen that a ceasefire was called for the parties, it was stated that the work of the OSCE Minsk Group was supported, and it was emphasized that the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict should be resolved by peaceful methods, not by force (EEAS). After the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in September 2020, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia under the mediation of Russian President Putin (Ismayilov, M. 2021).

3.3. EU Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership

It is seen that the issue of territorial integrity in Azerbaijan is mentioned in the Action Plans Published for Azerbaijan within the scope of the European Neighborhood Policy. This situation shows that the Union interprets the statements made differently within the framework

of the policies of the countries. The EU, which sees Armenia as a part of European civilization within the scope of the European Neighborhood Policy, has not chosen to side with a particular party on the issue, as it has commercial relations with Azerbaijan in the field of energy. Russia's interests in the region prevent the Union from acting towards the solution of the problem by guaranteeing its interests, causing it to focus on the humanitarian and civilian aspects of the problem instead.

Therefore, the goal of the Union is to implement a policy that is acceptable to both parties by reconciling within the framework of Armenia's self-determination principle and Azerbaijan's territorial integrity principle. The issue of at what political level the Union's relations with Azerbaijan will be carried out after the resolution of the Karabakh conflict will be a new research topic. As globalization and interdependence phenomena began to take an important place in world politics, countries began to look for ways to reduce the burden of interdependence. EU countries acted in this direction, worked to break the Russian monopoly in the face of increasing energy needs, and considered Azerbaijan as an alternative (Stern, D. 2021).

Following the end of the Cold War, the transfer of energy resources to global markets and the Karabakh War shaped Azerbaijan's foreign and domestic policies. Thus, it may be concluded that the nation's foreign policy is effectively shaped by geopolitical variables as well as its natural resources. The assessment of the Karabakh issue is based on geopolitical considerations, but Azerbaijan's abundant energy resources also play a role in the development of strong ties with the West and the notion of serving as one of their energy suppliers (Roberts, J. 2018).

Azerbaijan chose to end its dependence on Russia by following a different policy than other states that gained independence in the Caspian Region. Azerbaijan, which was dependent on the central system for energy transfer during the Soviet Union period, was less influenced by Russia in geopolitical terms after gaining its independence since it is in the west of the Caspian Region, which does not have access to the open seas and tried to continue its energy policy independently of Russia. This situation broke Russia's monopoly in the distribution of energy resources in the Caspian Region. Therefore, Azerbaijan has begun to strengthen its strategic position in world politics as a regional and global alternative energy source. Most of the rich energy resources of the Caspian Region are located on the coasts of Azerbaijan. In addition, the concerns of other countries about energy security because of Russia's policies stemming from being the world's largest energy importer have enabled Azerbaijan to become an important alternative (Cornell, Svante E. 2019).

The fact that Azerbaijan, located in the Caspian Region, does not have access to the high seas has caused difficulties in bringing the country's energy resources to world markets. To overcome these difficulties, Azerbaijan tried to create alternative transportation corridors, developed relations with transit countries, and aimed to increase its export potential. In addition to the action plans signed within the framework of the Neighborhood Policy in 2006, by signing the 'Memorandum of Agreement on Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy', efforts were initiated to develop relations in the field of energy (European Commission, in the Field of Energy). It can be said that the memorandum, which has objectives such as harmonizing Azerbaijani laws with the EU acquis, ensuring energy supply security, and creating an energy demand management policy that includes energy saving and climate change measures, forms the basis of today's Azerbaijan-EU energy cooperation. When the EU's policy towards the Caspian Region is examined, it is seen that the Union follows both common and individual policies. EU programs such as TACIS TRACECA and INOGATE are evaluated within the scope of common policies, but no pipeline project among them will enable the transportation of Caspian oil and natural gas to the EU. As a result of the technical, environmental, and cost calculations made in this context, it has been determined that the cheapest way of transporting the energy resources in the Caspian Region to the EU is to transport the energy resources to Union countries overseas via tankers from the Straits after reaching Georgia. However, within the framework of the security of the Straits and environmental laws, the passage of tankers has already reached its limit. Another alternative is to ensure that energy resources coming to Georgia reach the EU market via Romania and Bulgaria. However, this situation also has political obstacles. Therefore, transportation via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is seen as the most suitable way (Almammadov, V.2019).

CHAPTER 4. ENERGY POLICY ACCOMPANIED BY THE PROBLEM OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AZERBAIJAN

The energy policy of Azerbaijan is intricately linked to the issue of its territorial integrity, particularly in the context of the long-standing conflict with Armenia over Karabakh. Azerbaijan's vast reserves of oil and natural gas have made it a significant player in the global energy market and a crucial partner for the European Union (EU) in its quest for energy diversification and security. However, the ongoing conflict has implications for the stability and security of energy supply routes. The construction and operation of critical pipelines, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which includes the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), are influenced by geopolitical considerations tied to the territorial disputes. This dynamic creates a dual challenge for Azerbaijan: leveraging its energy resources to gain political and economic support internationally while managing the risks associated with the unresolved conflict with Armenia. The EU's reliance on Azerbaijani energy supplies also complicates its role as a neutral mediator in the conflict, as it must balance its energy security interests with its commitment to promoting regional stability and conflict resolution. (Roberts, J)

The European Union is among the largest economic centers in the world, along with North America (NAFTA) and East Asia (ASEAN). The EU alone produces 24%, or 17 trillion dollars, of the world's gross product, which is approximately 72 trillion dollars, and this data places it at the top of the list. Based on this data, the European Union stands out as the largest economy globally. Ensuring stable access to energy, which is the fundamental input of both the EU and the global economy, is crucial for the functioning stability of the European Union's economic system and consequently, the global economic system. Today, the EU provides 40% of the energy required for its economy from oil, 25% from natural gas, 17% from coal, 12% from nuclear power, 4% from hydroelectric power plants, and 2% from other sources... The fact that the EU does not have these energy resources and remains dependent on foreign sources in this regard causes it to have to obtain these resources from international markets (Cornell, Svante E. 2019). The most important factor that negatively affects the EU's energy security is that it does not have energy independence and remains dependent on external sources in this regard. This issue causes the EU's economy to have a fragile structure. Considering these conditions, it is of great importance that the EU has access to energy resources under "uninterrupted" and "free market" conditions. This situation has brought the issue of energy security to the top of the EU's agenda. When we do a historical review, we see that the issue of energy security is not new for

the EU. This issue first emerged for the EU (then the European Community) with the oil crisis in the 1970s. When we evaluate energy security from the perspective of the European Union, we mean that energy should be delivered to European and international markets freely and uninterruptedly, in the required quantities, from reliable and various suppliers, and at affordable prices, as well as access to clean energy resources, ensuring high efficiency in energy use, and diversifying resources in energy use. Researching domestic energy production opportunities and protecting the environment in connection with all these are of great strategic importance for the EU in terms of energy security. Today, the EU is the world's largest energy importer. (Özerdem, F.2021).

The Caspian Basin has also been tapped by the EU to supply its energy demands. Among the nations in the Caspian Basin, Azerbaijan occupies a key strategic position for satisfying the EU's energy requirements and guaranteeing energy security. Given its geopolitical significance in the Caspian region's oil and gas production and transit to Europe, it would be accurate to describe Azerbaijan as a crucial state for the EU. For many years, Azerbaijan has been crucial to maintaining the energy security of the European Union; the basis for this has been established by the September 20, 1994, signing of the "Treaty of the Century". (Hasanov, A. 2015).

As a result, Azerbaijan began to supply the oil and gas it produced in accordance with the terms of the international agreements it had made with Europe via the BTC oil pipeline and the BTE natural gas pipeline, taking on a crucial strategic role in guaranteeing the energy security of Europe. Examining the relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan reveals that energy is the most crucial aspect of cooperation. All agreements made by the EU with Azerbaijan and all initiatives in which Azerbaijan takes part address the energy problem separately.

However, in terms of Europe's energy security, Azerbaijan took part in three significant events between 2006 and 2007, and the country hosted the fourth, which began in Baku in November 2008. These actions made it possible for Azerbaijan to take part in the "Southern Corridor" energy project, which was proposed to guarantee Europe's energy security. (Şahbazov, R. 2015). The EU produced a paper on May 28, 2014, called Europe's Energy Security Strategy, which outlined the goals of establishing new sources and strengthening ties with current providers. In this regard, a key element in guaranteeing Europe's energy security is the installation of the TANAP natural gas pipeline inside the framework of the "Southern Corridor" energy project. Its goal is to use the TANAP natural gas pipeline to move natural gas collected from the Shah Deniz-2 line to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. It is anticipated that the pipeline

will open in 2018 and that 16 billion m³ of natural gas will flow through it in 2020. In addition, it seeks to achieve a 23 billion natural gas flow.

4.1. EU Energy Security and Diversification

The world's energy resources are not equally distributed; natural gas is concentrated in a few areas, but not as much as oil and oil. The Persian Gulf's dense oil deposits have long raised questions about supply stability. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of nations experienced physical interruptions that resulted in economic issues, in addition to oil shortages and high costs. Energy importers worry that these kinds of incidents may happen again. The first significant incident that raised awareness of energy security occurred during World War I when Winston Churchill sought to convert British military ships from coal to oil in order to outperform German warships. The Royal Navy was compelled to rely on unstable oil because of this predicament.

Thus, while energy security became a national problem, Churchill's answer was: "The safety and security of oil lies only in diversity." This answer is in line with solutions to increase energy security, such as diversifying the countries from which energy is supplied or the use of different types of energy (solar, wind energy). Energy security has been brought back to the agenda with various events throughout history and has begun to be discussed as an important element of foreign policies (Agayev, T., 2020).

The closure of the pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to Haifa during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948-1949 and the delay in the approval of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline; the nationalization and subsequent closure of Iranian oil facilities by Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh during the period 1951-1953; In 1956, II. There were important crises such as the closure of the Suez Canal during the attack on Egypt during the Arab-Israeli War, Syria's bombing of Iraqi pipelines to show solidarity with Egypt, causing the danger of oil shortage in Europe, and the Arab oil embargo in 1967.

OPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries, saw the support of Western countries to the Jews as the reason for the establishment of Israel as a result of the victories of the Jews in the wars and the expansion of their territory in the Middle East, used oil as a means of punishing these oil-dependent countries. used it as a trump card. There were two major oil crises in 1973 and 1979. In January 1973, a military attack was launched against Israel by Egypt and Syria; OPEC imposed an embargo on countries it thought were sympathetic to Israel. In the early 1970s, OPEC producers gave up on stable oil prices based on long-term contracts and began to unilaterally export oil at higher prices (Hüseynova, 1998).

Although it is claimed that the military conflict caused production cuts and increased oil prices, it is thought that a political-military decision lies behind the oil crisis in question. Six years after this crisis, in 1979, the oil price increase created by the political panic caused by the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini, who returned from exile in France to establish a state based on strengthening Islamic values, led to the second major oil crisis.

These crises have caused significant contractions in the economic growth rates of countries dependent on oil imports. For example, while the EU growth rate was 6% in 1973, it fell to 3.1% in 1974; In 1975, the EU economy shrank by 0.6% due to the ongoing impact of the oil crisis (Süleymanov, 2019).

Since energy use and especially foreign dependency on energy affect the economic performance of countries, it is seen that political and military problems have significant effects on energy-importing countries. Energy security was viewed in the early 1970s as reducing dependence on oil consumption and imports, particularly in OECD countries and other major oil-importing countries, but significant changes in oil and other energy markets have changed the landscape. With the availability of reserves and stocks, suppliers have increased and prices, determined by market power rather than cartel agreements, have become flexible and transparent; Trade has expanded and grown more liberalized, while tensions throughout the world and in particular have diminished. Since the early 1980s, suppliers have not enforced oil restrictions, and there are now no significant shortages anywhere in the globe. Even some oil exporters have been subject to sanctions by the UN and other parties, but these actions have not had an impact on global oil commerce or led to shortages. Due to the OECD nations' heavy reliance on oil imports from OPEC members and high fuel costs, which altered the cost structure and decreased competitiveness in energy-intensive industries, energy efficiency initiatives gained widespread acceptance in the 1970s and early 1980s. (Hasanov, A. 2000).

Between 1986 and 1999, there was a fall in public support for energy efficiency initiatives in several OECD countries, a decline in the world energy price, a decline in the OECD nations' reliance on energy imports, and a slowdown in the Kyoto Protocol implementation negotiations. The world energy balance is also changing as a result of China's and India's significant increases in energy consumption, as well as the growing importance of fossil fuels in global commerce. The recent robust economic expansion in these two nations has led to marked rises in energy consumption, which is being satisfied by rising imports (Valiyev, A. 2021).

It is expected that energy prices will not be lower in the future due to the increasing energy demand of rapidly industrializing China and India, which the supply is insufficient to

meet. This situation increases the EU's energy security risk. Developments in Europe's energy policy have been around for a long time; Rising energy dependency, rising prices, and EU enlargement took place within the framework of disruptions in gas supply. As a result, the European Commission started to determine policies on "energy security". Especially in the 2004-2007 period, when the EU expanded from 15 countries to 27 countries, it is thought that the high dependence of the newly joined countries on Russian gas and historical suspicions about Russian energy and Russian foreign policy contributed to the European Commission accelerating its initiatives on this issue. With rising prices and the inclusion of countries with higher energy import dependence on the Union during EU enlargement, it has been realized that Russia is an "energy security threat" to the EU rather than a guarantor. At the meeting on European-Russian relations in Berlin in June 2005, Russian politician Dmitry Rogozin stated that "oil phobia" about Russia had developed in Europe. With this statement, Rogozin means that Europe perceives the growth of Russia's share in energy imports as a danger. Europe appears to have both oil and gas "phobia" towards Russia, as Russia is the largest supplier to European markets. Based on the relations with the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, there was concern that the EU would use Russia's energy exports as a political weapon to exert negative pressure on them, due to their energy import dependence on Russia. In this picture, as European domestic oil and gas production continues to decline and oil and gas fuel imports continue to rise, the "Finnishization of Europe" is inevitable. This phobia has become a real problem in public discourse in various European countries, including Germany, and has begun to spread into the political environment at the EU level in Brussels. Such concerns have led the EU to search for countries that could be alternatives to the energy provided by Russia. Russia, which is especially geographically close to the EU, frequently experiences diplomatic problems with EU countries, especially the Crimea issue. Despite the possibility that this situation may pose a future threat to energy security, the dependence of the Russian economy on energy exports limits the drastic steps that both sides of this trade will take. However, since EU countries do not purchase Russian energy products in bulk and each has a different level of dependence on Russian energy, Russia can use its energy power to intimidate EU countries, especially those that are smaller and located in Eastern Europe (Abbasli, 2016).

By making a gas agreement with Western European countries, he called on Norway to increase its gas production as a substitute for Soviet gas, to prevent it from becoming dependent on Russia and prevent these countries from being under pressure in a future political crisis. Since this period, Norway has been an important exporter of the EU. However, looking at the data, it

does not seem possible to say that the EU has reduced its energy import dependence on Russia. According to UN Comtrade (2021) data, while the import value of code 27 energy products imported from Russia and Norway is close to each other, the value of energy products imported from Russia in 2018 is twice that of Norway. Dependence on energy imports reduces "energy security". Major oil-exporting nations are now vulnerable to internal political upheaval including terrorism and civil conflict. OPEC has little authority to regulate. Politically motivated supply interruptions affect more than just the Middle East. Three extremely susceptible regions are found in Asia (Indonesia), Africa (Nigeria, Sudan), and Latin America (Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador). Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate regional disruptions, underinvestment, and perhaps exorbitant pricing demands. In terms of reliance on oil imports, this is a severe issue. An inadequate supply of natural gas increases the possibility of power outages. Issues with natural gas imports have a cascading effect and can make it more difficult to fulfill the demand for power because of the growing reliance on natural gas for the production of electricity (Çelikpala, M.ə 2019).

4.2. Energy cooperation of Azerbaijan with EU member countries

Azerbaijan has focused its efforts on oil production and exploitation in four Caspian Sea fields: "Guneshli," "Chirag," "Azeri," and "Kepez." Nevertheless, Azerbaijan lacked new industries and technologies for manufacturing throughout this time. Because it employed rudimentary technologies, it therefore encountered the issue. This issue became apparent when oil output dropped from 14.7 million tons in 1980 to 12.5 million tons in 1990, 9.2 million tons in 1995, and 9.1 million tons in 1996. In September 1992, Azerineft and Azneftkimya, two state businesses, amalgamated to form the State Oil Company of The Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), which was created to manage Azerbaijan's oil reserves. Only by utilizing contemporary technologies and creating new projects could oil output be increased and current reserves developed. But as we have stated, Azerbaijan's freshly gained independence does not have the economic capacity or technological know-how to handle the deposits. Due to these shortcomings, Azerbaijan has partnered with significant oil unions. (Hüseynova, H.1998).

Azerbaijan's vast energy resources and strategic geographical location have made it a pivotal partner for several European Union (EU) member countries. These partnerships are vital for the EU's strategy to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependency on Russian supplies. Here is an overview of Azerbaijan's energy cooperation with key EU member countries:

Italy is one of the largest importers of Azerbaijani energy, primarily through the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is the final segment of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). TAP

transports natural gas from the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan to Italy, significantly enhancing Italy's energy security. This cooperation has not only reduced Italy's dependency on Russian gas but also bolstered its position in the EU's energy network. The completion of TAP in 2020 marked a significant milestone in Italy-Azerbaijan energy relations, ensuring a steady and secure supply of natural gas to Italy. Italy is a major consumer of Azerbaijani oil, with the BTC pipeline playing a pivotal role in this relationship. The oil transported through the BTC pipeline reaches Italian refineries, contributing significantly to Italy's energy supply (Roberts, 2014).

Germany plays a critical role in the EU's energy diversification strategy and has actively supported the development of the SGC. German companies like Uniper have invested in Azerbaijani energy projects, underscoring the importance of Azerbaijani gas in diversifying Germany's energy imports. German energy companies have invested in Azerbaijan's oil sector, and the stable supply of oil from Azerbaijan supports Germany's energy diversification strategy (Cornell, 2017). The cooperation between Germany and Azerbaijan also includes technical and financial support for energy infrastructure projects, which are crucial for ensuring a stable energy supply to Germany and the EU (Shaffer, 2009).

Greece serves as a key transit country for Azerbaijani gas via TAP. This pipeline not only strengthens Greece's energy security but also enhances its role as an energy hub in Southeast Europe. The bilateral energy cooperation has economic and strategic benefits, with Greece gaining from transit fees and improved energy infrastructure. Additionally, the partnership with Azerbaijan supports Greece's goal of diversifying its energy sources and reducing reliance on Russian gas (Cornell, 2017).

Bulgaria, which is heavily dependent on Russian gas, views Azerbaijani gas as a crucial element for its energy diversification. The Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) pipeline, which connects with TAP, enables Bulgaria to receive gas from Azerbaijan, thereby reducing its energy dependency on Russia. This cooperation is a strategic move to enhance Bulgaria's energy security and aligns with the EU's objective to create a more resilient and diversified energy market (Guliyev & Akhmedov, 2016).

Romania has engaged in energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, focusing on potential LNG supplies from the Caspian region. This cooperation aims to enhance Romania's energy security and diversify its energy mix, consistent with the EU's broader energy strategy. The partnership includes exploring opportunities for joint ventures and investments in energy infrastructure, further solidifying the energy ties between the two countries (Roberts, 2014).

France's involvement in Azerbaijan's energy sector is marked by significant investments from French energy companies like Total. These investments highlight the importance of Azerbaijani resources in meeting France's energy needs and contributing to the EU's energy security goals. France's cooperation with Azerbaijan also includes technical collaboration and support for energy infrastructure projects, reinforcing the bilateral relationship (Shaffer, 2009).

Spain has shown interest in Azerbaijani energy through investments and strategic partnerships. Spanish companies are involved in various sectors of Azerbaijan's energy market, including renewable energy projects. This cooperation supports Spain's efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependency on fossil fuels, aligning with the EU's green energy transition goals (Cornell, 2017).

Poland, seeking to diversify its energy imports and enhance energy security, has engaged in dialogue with Azerbaijan regarding potential energy supplies. The cooperation includes exploring options for importing Azerbaijani gas and participating in joint energy projects. This partnership is part of Poland's broader strategy to reduce its reliance on Russian energy and integrate more diversified and secure energy sources (Guliyev & Akhmedov, 2016).

In summary, Azerbaijan's energy cooperation with EU member countries is multifaceted and strategically significant. These partnerships not only contribute to the EU's energy security and diversification goals but also enhance Azerbaijan's role as a key energy supplier. The mutual benefits of these collaborations are evident in the strengthened economic ties, improved energy infrastructure, and enhanced geopolitical stability they foster.

4.3. Strategic Energy Projects

With its strategic location and natural resources, Azerbaijan drew the attention of the major powers in the South Caucasus and went on to become the area's shining light via its independence fights. Today, it is becoming an energy hub in the Caspian region. In addition to giving Azerbaijan significant political and economic advantages in the face of international threats, a diversified energy policy is crucial for guaranteeing the energy security of allies and Europe. The Caspian Basin is becoming a desirable hub for collaboration between Asian and European nations, mostly due to this approach.

From an immediate standpoint, Azerbaijan keeps up its methodical research to bring the idea of "green energy" to life and make efficient use of its energy potential in both Nakhchivan and the areas that have been freed from occupation. The nation's large investments during the past three decades have facilitated the development of trade, logistics, transportation, and economic ties between Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian, and Central Asia.

Azerbaijan's greatest ally in the international arena was the Republic of Turkey, even though the country valued collaboration above regional rivalry. As a result, a number of tripartite cooperation arrangements, including those between Azerbaijan and Georgia, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Russia, have developed in the area (Pashayeva, G. 2020).

The transmission of Azerbaijan's energy resources to the West is mostly handled by Turkey, which is beneficial for the development of bilateral ties. The TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline) project is one example of how Azerbaijan and Turkey have collaborated on energy-related initiatives. Because it can carry natural gas collected from other gas sources in Azerbaijani territory in addition to the Shah Deniz field, the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, or TANAP, has significant commercial worth. Furthermore, by establishing the quickest and most direct path for natural gas export from Azerbaijan to European markets, the TAP (Trans Adriatic Gas Pipeline) project significantly contributes to the EU's efforts to diversify its energy supplies. (Adomanis, 2021).

The EU views Azerbaijan as a crucial energy partner. The European Union (EU), which seeks to guarantee energy supply security and lessen its reliance on Russian energy, might benefit politically and economically from the Azerbaijan option. Azerbaijan has demonstrated that it is a "reliable partner" in the eyes of its friends, despite the tumultuous military and political processes in the globe and the region. Azerbaijan's prosperity may be attributed to both the prompt performance of its responsibilities and the political stability that exists in the nation.

Conducted in Moscow "VI. In his remarks at the "International Russia Energy Week" Forum, Parviz Shahbazov, the energy minister of Azerbaijan, made the following claims: The existing energy system, which is composed of 85% hydrocarbons and 55% oil and gas, has to be transformed. Total removal of oil and gas is not a short-term answer. The energy transition is a protracted process that takes cost, environmental sustainability, and energy security into account. Expanding the use of renewable energy sources at the same time as maintaining investments in the oil and gas industry is crucial for achieving a balanced energy system. The nations that have guaranteed energy security for themselves and their allies are those that are most suited to carry out a sensible and accurate energy transition program."

Thus, as a nation rich in oil and gas, Azerbaijan gains from the export of both energy and hydrocarbon resources.

Azerbaijan's requirement for transportation and a variety of energy resources is growing along with the global demand for energy in industry and daily life. In order to overcome the global crises of energy, food, and raw material shortages, the energy sector must come first,

followed by peace and stability. Because of this, Asian and European nations have an alternative to Azerbaijan's energy strategy (Babayev, R. 2019).

Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline. The project has remarkable legal and technical features. For the project to be carried out properly, a valid legal regime (PLR) has been established, and within this scope, the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), the Host Governments Agreement (HGA), the BTC Human Rights Commitment, a series of environmental protection documents, and security protocols have been signed. Extensive studies have been carried out in the pipeline area in the context of respecting property rights, protecting the environment, and improving social and economic conditions, and our country has received many benefits from these. The pipeline route poses many difficulties due to its geographical features. The line passes at an altitude of 2800 m in some places. It intersects with highways and railways at 1600 points (800 of which are in Turkey) and with rivers at 1500 points (600 of which are in Turkey) (Mammadov, 2021).

When the amount of oil shipped from the line increases to 50 million tons per year, approximately 1/3 of it (15 million tons per year) is expected to be used by Turkey. The real impact of BTC is observed in the geopolitical field. Beyond being an investment, this line means Turkey's strengthening of its ties with the Caspian Basin and the Turkish World. Unfortunately, our relations with this region have remained at the social and cultural level so far, and economic ties have not been strengthened sufficiently. However, this is one of the richest regions in the world in terms of economic potential, especially in terms of oil and natural gas resources. On the other hand, the region is a large market for Turkey with a surface area of 4 million km², 55 million people, and an underdeveloped economy (Hamzaoglu, 2020).

The Caucasus is especially important because it is an important crossing point between the Russian Federation and the Mediterranean and because of its rich underground resources. With the pipeline, for the first time, the resources of the Caspian Basin and the Turkish World are opened to world markets independently of the Russian Federation.

Russia, which is aware of the situation, is trying to prevent the projects of connecting Kazakhstan's oil to this line and transporting Turkmenistan's natural gas to the Mediterranean through a new line to be built parallel to this line. On the other hand, Russia, whose production is increasing, needs the Turkish Straits, and therefore Turkey, more to supply oil to the markets. In a large-scale accident, thousands of people may die, and environmental pollution will occur to the extent that it is difficult to repair. In addition, buildings of great historical and economic value on the coastline may be damaged, and the straits may remain closed to traffic for a long

time. Therefore, navigational safety in the straits is of great concern not only to Turkey but also to Russia and other Black Sea countries, which do not have many alternatives to going to the open seas. This situation has put Russia in new pursuits. One of these is the Thrace pipeline project, which is still in the thought stage. With this line, the aim is to flow the oil, which will be transported from the Black Sea to Kırıkkoy (Kırklareli) by tankers, to the Saros Gulf (Aegean Sea) via Thrace. Additionally, a new pipeline is being built between Samsun and Ceyhan (Aslanov, K. 2020).

Southern Gas Corridor. "Southern Gas Corridor" a line providing natural gas connection between the Caspian Region and Europe has been completed as of December 31, 2020, and commercial gas flow has been provided. This line consists of three parts.; The Expanded South Caucasus Natural Gas Pipeline is the TANAP Natural Gas Pipeline and the TAP (TransAdriatic Pipeline) Natural Gas Pipeline. It would be appropriate to examine these three natural gas pipelines separately first. Picture 1 shows the Southern Gas Corridor as a whole.



Picture 4.1. Southern Gas Corridor

Expanded South Caucasus (SCPX) Pipeline. The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) is a 690 km long natural gas pipeline that transports natural gas from the Shah Deniz Region in the Caspian Sea from the Sangachal Terminal in Baku to Turkey via Georgia. The line consists of two parallel lines. ~105 cm (42 in) pipes are used from the lines and have an annual capacity of 7.4 billion m³ the first line is used to meet the natural gas needs of Turkey and Georgia.

The pipeline, described as the Expanded South Caucasus (SCPX) Line, is a ~120 cm (48 in) pipeline and is laid parallel to the first. Thus, the natural gas transportation capacity is 16 billion m³ per year. It has been increased up to. There are two "Compressor Stations" and a

TAP. The TAP (TransAdriatic Pipeline) Natural Gas Pipeline starts from the Turkish Border in Ipsala, passes through Greece, crosses the Adriatic Sea through Albania, and connects to Southern Italy. 550 km of the TAP gas pipeline is in Greece, 215 km in Albania, 105 km in the Adriatic Sea, and 8 km in Italy.

Approximately nine thousand pipes have been installed in the segment of this pipeline that runs beneath the Adriatic Sea, which is located at a depth of 810 meters. Twenty percent of the TAP Pipeline's shares are owned by SOCAR, BP, and Snam; the remaining nineteen percent are held by Fluxys, Enagas, and Axpo. The TAP gas pipeline is estimated to have cost 4.5 billion euros in total.

The practical case for an energy policy that garners attention at every turn, no matter where in the globe, is the pipeline transportation of reserves situated in energy resource zones. If it is desired to express the development of the project chronologically; In addition to the SCP (South Caucasus) Pipeline, a contract was signed for the SCPX (Expanded South Caucasus) Pipeline on February 07, 2014, and the project was completed in 2017. On December 24, 2011, Azerbaijan and Turkey prepared a "Memorandum of Understanding" regarding TANAP, and on June 26, 2012, an "Intergovernmental Agreement" was signed between the two countries. In this regard, the TANAP "Groundbreaking Ceremony" took place in Kars on March 17, 2015, and on January 23, 2018, the pipeline received its first delivery of test gas. Commercial activities commenced on June 30, 2018, following the June 12, 2018, Official Opening Ceremony. At a ceremony held at the TANAP MS4 Metering Station in Edirne-İpsala Sarıcaali Village on December 02, 2019, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey participated in ensuring the pipeline's European link.

The TAP Pipeline was completed on October 13, 2020, after 4.5 years of construction. On December 31, 2020, the commercial gas flow began. Thus, the Southern Gas Corridor (SCPX-TANAP-TAP Pipeline, as a whole) is completed and put into service.

This situation is important in two ways. First, with the participation of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries in the starting countries, the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor may increase considerably over time. Therefore, communication between these countries will increase and new partnerships can be added to the existing ones in all respects following the cooperation in terms of energy policy. In this context, especially for Turkey, the strategic cooperation between the Turkic States will be much more important than it is now.

Second, the demands of more severe nations for natural gas will be satisfied as the intake of natural gas grows. For instance, the line may extend to nations like Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia, Serbia, and Malta, among others, in addition to the nations on the Southern Gas Corridor. (In actuality, high-ranking officials from North Macedonia, Bulgaria, the EU, and the Southern Gas Corridor nations—Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Italy, and Greece—as well as from Bosnia and Herzegovina attended the Opening Ceremony for the completion of TANAP.) The degree to which the Southern Gas Corridor is strategically important for energy politics is evident in all of these problems (Ehtisham, R. 2019).

Another issue is that in the context of future projection, the feeding of the Southern Gas Corridor (from the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish Stream, etc.) with different inputs can be carried out in a coordinated manner. The realization of such an option is likely to create a very different energy political metaphor for the Balkans and the EU. Such a situation will make Turkey a key country in terms of energy politics.

This situation has a quality that can change the balance in the increasing energy competition in the world, and it can play a role not only in energy politics but also in regulating world politics and making Turkey's geopolitics even more effective. In the coming time, this influencing feature will show itself much more clearly (Taras, K. 2021).

If it is desired to be stated in essence; The Southern Gas Corridor (SCPX, TANAP, and TAP pipelines) originating from the Caspian region is of strategic importance for the relevant countries as well as possible branching countries, but it has the feature that will strongly affect both domestic and foreign energy politics for Turkey. However, such a position also suggests that ruthless competition, which is often encountered in energy politics, can be experienced through this line and can be targeted. In this case, It can be considered as a good solution to go to a formation structure such as the "Caspian Region and Front Asia Gas Forum" of a formation similar to the "Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum", which has been tried to be established recently and in which Turkey and the TRNC are tried to be excluded, without the condition of being riparian.

4.4 The Problems and Opportunities Created by the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict in the Relationship Between the EU and Azerbaijan

Relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are developing in a zigzag pattern in relation to long-term regional strategies and energy requirements, as well as current political interests and political attitudes which has created distrust from both sides to each other. (Hajiyeva, 2020).

The mutual expectations that drive the relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are highly inconsistent. This partnership is described as "a tale of mismatched objectives and ambitions" by Adam Hug (2012, 2). It is not apparent that either party is taking any action to resolve the inconsistencies or even to try to solve issues. This eventually brings the partnership to a standstill and causes an increasing number of mistakes.

The dynamics and content of EU policy, which are shaped by the EU's objectives, are also seen to differ. More accurately, there is a growing absence of policy. The deteriorating state of relations between Azerbaijan and the EU is one sign of this. This is happening against the backdrop of Azerbaijan's relations with the West in general, which includes the USA, and began with them. Relations with the USA have been chilly, which has led to an untrustworthy attitude. This raises doubts about the EU's ability to make independent political decisions for the region, which includes Azerbaijan.

The EU's policies are seen as erratic tactical maneuvers that follow the US's strategic trajectory in the area and operate against the backdrop of US policy. Given that a number of eminent US specialists have declared that the US approach in the region is acknowledged to be a failed one on all fronts, one can easily envision how problematic an EU policy that adopts this approach would be. This is the reason why writers refer to the contemporary political approach as Western policy. (Starr et al., 2015)

Conceptual Problems of EU. As we've previously stated, the EU's stance and policies are what ultimately determine how the EU and Azerbaijan interact. Moreover, regrettably, the EU lacks an Azerbaijan-specific strategy. On the other hand, the political stance put forth by the European Commission is consistent with the agenda and conduct policy. The statement suggests that the present EU strategy towards Azerbaijan (EEAS. Azerbaijan) is built upon three pillars: the European energy security question, the Eastern Partnership (Schäffer S and Tolksdorf D, 2009), and the ENP (EEAS. Azerbaijan Action Plan). Notwithstanding the distinction brought about by Azerbaijan's natural resources and energy strategy, which promotes European energy security, the study's findings may be applied to all of the Eastern Partnership nations.

Problems of relations between the Azerbaijan Government and the EU

One of the primary issues here is that the West, notably the EU, is funding some NGOs and "democratic" individuals in order to further a political agenda at the expense of civil society's development and democracy. Working with multiple people and supporting NGOs is not, in my opinion, a solution that can provide fruitful outcomes. Conversely, they don't cultivate a favorable reputation in the neighborhood. Everyone can already see that forming a civil society

through a variety of individuals and tiny NGOs is a poor strategy that never produces positive outcomes. Although the initial goals of this type of policy may have been noble (Alieva, 2006), the majority of its outcomes have been unfavorable. This stance has harmed the standing of powerful states and international organizations in our region, including Azerbaijan, as well as ties between the government and donor nations. The concept was flawed, but so was the strategy. Additionally, the selection criteria pertaining to the activists were incorrect. It is better to conduct business with cosmopolitan individuals. However, there is a lower likelihood that they will be regarded as dear to the people and accepted by society. When it comes to matters of national importance and significance, to which they have a sensitive approach, these people cannot be with the public.

They closely monitor those issues and pay attention to the advice of their foreign donors, who undoubtedly do not wish to go beyond what is best for their own countries. For instance, in Azerbaijan, these "democrats" remain silent and lack a clear stance on the nation's most pressing issues, which pertain to the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Karabakh conflict. These issues include the return of captives, the daily losses suffered by those fighting on the front lines, and the sending of 1.2 million refugees and internally displaced people home. However, they are handling the legal affairs of people with strange behavior and then working to compile a report that is as disparaging as possible about the actions of the government in the public domain, which they then send to other governments and institutions. People in Azerbaijani society do not support such "democrats," regardless of how they feel about the government's actions and internal policies (Bottger K & Falkenhain M, 2011). NGOs are currently the subject of a phobia, a fear, and a syndrome of mistrust in the government and in many spheres of society. This poses obstacles and issues for the institutions of civil society as well as the overall development of civil society. (Hajiyeva, 2020).

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, particularly over Karabakh, presents both significant problems and opportunities in the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Azerbaijan. One of the primary challenges is the instability that the conflict introduces to the region, which poses risks to the security of energy infrastructure and investment. For instance, the proximity of vital energy pipelines, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), to conflict zones raises concerns about potential sabotage and operational disruptions (Shaffer, 2009). This instability can deter investment from EU companies, wary of the geopolitical risks involved in such a volatile region.

Conversely, the conflict also creates opportunities for Azerbaijan to leverage its energy resources to gain political and economic support from the EU. The EU's need for diversified energy sources, to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, positions Azerbaijan as a crucial partner. This dynamic allows Azerbaijan to secure more favorable terms in its energy agreements and bolster its diplomatic standing within the EU (Cornell, 2017). Furthermore, the EU's investment in Azerbaijani energy projects, like the TAP and BTC pipelines, demonstrates a commitment that can translate into political support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity (Roberts, 2014).

Additionally, the conflict underscores the strategic importance of the EU's engagement in the South Caucasus. By supporting Azerbaijan's energy exports, the EU not only enhances its energy security but also promotes regional stability through economic development and integration. However, this relationship requires a delicate balance, as the EU must navigate its role as a mediator in the conflict while also being a significant beneficiary of Azerbaijan's energy supplies. Thus, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict shapes the EU-Azerbaijan relationship through a complex interplay of risks and strategic opportunities.

CHAPTER 5. ENERGY AND SECURITY ISSUES OF THE TERRITORIES IN THE POST-CONFLICT ERA

The resolution of the Second Karabakh War through the 2020 ceasefire agreement has brought about significant changes in the South Caucasus, particularly in the context of energy and security. This chapter delves into the complexities of these issues in the territories affected by the conflict, examining the reconstruction efforts, strategic energy projects, security challenges, and the broader geopolitical implications.

Reconstruction of Energy Infrastructure. The conflict inflicted severe damage on the infrastructure in the affected areas, necessitating extensive reconstruction efforts. Azerbaijan has prioritized the rebuilding of energy infrastructure to restore normalcy and facilitate the economic integration of these territories into the national framework. This includes the repair of power plants, reconstruction of transmission lines, and the development of new energy projects to support the region's economic revival.

Rebuilding energy infrastructure is critical for ensuring reliable power supply, which is essential for the resettlement of displaced populations and the revitalization of local economies. The restoration of these facilities not only supports immediate recovery but also lays the groundwork for long-term economic development (International Crisis Group, 2021).

Strategic Energy Projects. Azerbaijan's regained control over the territories presents opportunities to expand its strategic energy projects. One of the significant projects is the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which includes the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). These projects are crucial for transporting Caspian gas to Europe, thus enhancing energy security for EU countries and reducing their dependency on Russian gas (Roberts, 2014).

The expansion of these energy corridors through the regained territories can improve logistical efficiency and increase Azerbaijan's capacity to supply energy to European markets. This strategic enhancement is expected to bolster Azerbaijan's position as a key energy supplier and further integrate it into the global energy market (Cornell, 2021).

Maintaining Stability and Security. Ensuring the security of the newly regained territories remains a primary concern. The presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) poses significant risks to civilians and reconstruction workers. Demining efforts are crucial for safe resettlement and development activities. The deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces as part of the ceasefire agreement has added a layer of complexity to the security dynamics, influencing local and regional stability (De Waal, 2021).

Moreover, the need to protect energy infrastructure from potential threats, including sabotage and renewed hostilities, is a significant security challenge. Ensuring the security of these strategic assets is essential for maintaining investor confidence and the uninterrupted flow of energy supplies to international markets (Guliyev & Akhmedov, 2016).

Geopolitical Implications. The resolution of the conflict has significant geopolitical implications. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan has strengthened its influence in the South Caucasus, while Russia's role as a mediator and peacekeeper reinforces its strategic interests in the region. This dual influence necessitates a delicate balance to prevent renewed conflict and ensure regional stability (OSCE Minsk Group, 2020).

The geopolitical landscape is further complicated by the EU's interest in the region's energy resources. The EU's investment in Azerbaijani energy projects demonstrates a commitment that can translate into political support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. This interplay between energy diplomacy and geopolitical interests highlights the strategic importance of the South Caucasus (Roberts, 2014).

Long-term Economic Integration and Development. The post-conflict reconstruction offers a significant opportunity for economic development through the integration of the regained territories into Azerbaijan's broader economic framework. Developing infrastructure, including roads, railways, and energy facilities, is crucial for fostering economic growth and stability. These efforts are expected to enhance regional connectivity and support broader economic integration within the South Caucasus (Cornell, 2021).

The ceasefire agreement's provision for reopening transit routes, such as the corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan, holds potential for enhancing regional trade and cooperation. This development could lead to improved economic ties and stability in the South Caucasus, benefiting all parties involved (International Crisis Group, 2021).

The post-conflict era in Karabakh presents a complex interplay of energy and security issues that are crucial for the region's stability and growth. Azerbaijan's efforts to rebuild and integrate the regained territories, coupled with the strategic importance of energy projects, highlight the potential for both economic development and ongoing security challenges. The involvement of regional powers such as Turkey and Russia further complicates the geopolitical landscape, necessitating a balanced approach to ensure long-term peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus.

5.1 Reactions of EU Member States to the Second Karabakh War

The Second Karabakh War in 2020, a violent resurgence of the long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, elicited a range of reactions from European Union (EU) member states. These responses were shaped by various factors, including geopolitical interests, energy dependencies, and the commitment to regional stability and human rights. This chapter examines the differing reactions of key EU member states and the broader implications for EU foreign policy in the South Caucasus.

Germany's reaction to the Second Karabakh War was characterized by calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. As Europe's largest economy and a significant consumer of Azerbaijani energy, Germany emphasized the importance of maintaining regional stability to safeguard energy security. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas urged both parties to adhere to the ceasefire agreements and engage in constructive dialogue to resolve the conflict peacefully (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). Germany's response was also influenced by its broader foreign policy principle of promoting peace and stability through diplomatic means.

France, a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, played a proactive role in mediating the conflict. French President Emmanuel Macron condemned the outbreak of violence and accused Turkey of exacerbating the conflict by providing military support to Azerbaijan. France's stance was partly motivated by its historical ties with Armenia and the significant Armenian diaspora in France. Macron's administration called for an immediate ceasefire and reiterated the need for a negotiated settlement based on international law and previous agreements (Le Monde, 2020).

Italy, one of Azerbaijan's key energy partners in Europe, adopted a more balanced stance, calling for an end to the hostilities and a resumption of negotiations without explicitly condemning either side. Italy's response was influenced by its significant economic interests in Azerbaijani energy, particularly through the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which includes the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that supplies Azerbaijani gas to Italy. Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio emphasized the importance of stability in the South Caucasus for the security of energy supplies to Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2020).

Greece's reaction was strongly influenced by its historical and religious ties with Armenia. Greek officials expressed solidarity with Armenia, condemning Azerbaijan's military actions and Turkey's involvement in the conflict. Greece's support for Armenia was also a reflection of its strained relations with Turkey, a key supporter of Azerbaijan. The Greek government called

for international intervention to stop the aggression and protect the rights of Armenians in Karabakh (Kathimerini, 2020).

Poland, another significant player in Eastern European politics, called for peace and stability in the region. The Polish government stressed the importance of respecting international law and urged both Armenia and Azerbaijan to return to negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group framework. Poland's response was guided by its broader interest in ensuring stability in the post-Soviet space and supporting EU efforts to mediate conflicts in the region (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020).

Spain's reaction to the conflict was relatively low-key compared to other EU member states. The Spanish government called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to peaceful negotiations. Spain's response was largely in line with the EU's overall position, emphasizing the importance of dialogue and diplomacy in resolving the conflict. Spain's interest in the region is primarily driven by its commitment to EU foreign policy and the promotion of stability and security in neighboring regions (El País, 2020).

The European Union as a whole reacted by calling for an immediate end to hostilities and a return to negotiations facilitated by the OSCE Minsk Group. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, issued multiple statements urging both sides to cease military actions and engage in dialogue. The EU's response highlighted the importance of maintaining regional stability and preventing the conflict from escalating into a wider regional war (European External Action Service, 2020).

The diverse reactions of EU member states to the Second Karabakh War reflect their individual geopolitical interests, historical ties, and economic dependencies. While some countries like France and Greece took a more vocal stance supporting Armenia, others like Italy and Germany adopted a more balanced approach, emphasizing the need for stability and dialogue. This variation in responses underscores the complexity of the EU's collective foreign policy approach in the South Caucasus, balancing between promoting regional stability, securing energy supplies, and adhering to principles of international law and human rights.

5.2. The Results of the Second Karabakh War and the Mediation Efforts of the European Union

On September 27, 2020, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia once again grossly violated the norms of international law, using various types of weapons, including heavy artillery, and firing at the residential areas and military positions of the Republic of Azerbaijan

from several directions. As a result of another military provocation, civilians and soldiers were killed and injured, and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan started counter-offensive operations in order to prevent and neutralize real and potential military threats against the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan. According to the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with international legal norms and principles, the Republic of Azerbaijan reserves the right to use all necessary means, including military force, to restore its territorial integrity due to the occupation of a part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Republic of Armenia and its refusal to liberate the occupied lands within the political settlement of the problem. As an independent, democratic, legal, secular, unitary state capable of ensuring the national interests of the people and the country, the Republic of Azerbaijan determines and implements the national security policy for the sake of its development. A meeting of the Security Council was immediately held under the chairmanship of Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and certain tasks were given to provide an adequate response to the aggressor.

As a result of the counter-offensive operations launched by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, several districts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as other strategically important territories, were freed from occupation from the first day. To this end, on September 29, 2020, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan signed the Decree "On the organization of a temporary special administration in the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan liberated from occupation." Based on the decree, temporary commandant's offices were established in the liberated territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the administrative-territorial division of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which carries out special management for each district. Under the temporary commandant's offices, operational headquarters including representatives of relevant state bodies (institutions) have been established and their duties have been defined. As a result of the counter-offensive operations launched by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, several districts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as other strategically important territories, were freed from occupation from the first day. To this end, on September 29, 2020, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan signed the Decree "On the organization of a temporary special administration in the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan liberated from occupation." Based on the decree, temporary commandant's offices were established in the liberated territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the administrative-territorial division of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which carries out special management for each district. Under the temporary

commandant's offices, operational headquarters including representatives of relevant state bodies (institutions) have been established and their duties have been defined.

On 27 September 2020, an entrenched dynamic of escalation culminated in an all-out war between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the contested territory of Nagorny Karabakh. As many as 7,000 were killed in action on all sides. More than 170 civilians, a majority of them Azerbaijanis, were also killed. On 9 November, a Russian-brokered ceasefire declaration was signed, mandating the deployment of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the region. Through a series of interviews and articles, our South Caucasus Programme Director, Laurence Broers, analyzed the developing conflict, the humanitarian crisis, the ceasefire declaration, and what's next for relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Dr. Laurence Broers, 2021)

The conflict ended with a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement on November 10, 2020, which stipulated substantial territorial gains for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan regained control over several districts surrounding Karabakh, which had been occupied by Armenian forces since the early 1990s. These territories include Aghdam, Lachin, and Kalbajar, among others, marking a major shift in the regional balance of power (Cornell, 2021).

The war also had profound implications for regional geopolitics. Turkey's active support for Azerbaijan, through both political backing and military assistance, strengthened its influence in the South Caucasus, while Russia maintained its role as a key mediator by deploying peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone. This arrangement allowed Russia to assert its influence while preventing complete Turkish dominance in the region (De Waal, 2021).

Economically, the ceasefire agreement opened up new opportunities for regional cooperation, particularly in terms of restoring transportation and communication links. The planned reopening of transit routes, such as the corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan, could enhance regional trade and economic integration (International Crisis Group, 2021).

However, the conflict also exacerbated humanitarian issues, with significant civilian casualties and displacement on both sides. The war highlighted the urgent need for a comprehensive peace settlement to address the underlying issues of the conflict, including the status of Karabakh and the rights of displaced persons (OSCE Minsk Group, 2020).

In summary, the Second Karabakh War resulted in decisive territorial gains for Azerbaijan, shifted the regional power dynamics, and opened up economic opportunities while also underscoring the need for lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

EU's challenges in the South Caucasus

One of the main shortcomings of the EU's foreign policy, in most cases, has been the lack of a robust hard-power component. One area where the EU has fallen short in supporting its contacts with the regional countries in Georgia's case, to resist Russia is the South Caucasus. It has not been possible for the EU to decisively oppose the powers that oppose it, despite the fact that its use of soft power and normative elements has allowed it to mobilize pro-European sentiments among certain local populations and urge them to seek pro-Western orientation in their states' foreign policies. This has demoralized pro-Western organizations in the area and undercut the EU's regional aspirations.

One such instance that showed the EU's reluctance or incapacity to take on a significant geopolitical role in an area near its borders that is crucial to its bigger geoeconomic and security interests was the Second Karabakh War. The conflict marked a turning point in South Caucasus affairs and, in this regard, is comparable to the conflicts between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine in 2014.

Without consulting or involving the EU, they altered the geopolitical boundaries of the area, and the new status quo is probably here to stay for the foreseeable future. Still, there remained another possible outcome. Any EU-affected breakthrough in the conflict would have stopped the region's geopolitical position from further deteriorating after the 44-Day War. Rather than taking this stance, the EU opted for unwarranted neutrality between Armenia, the occupier, and Azerbaijan, the victim. As a result, all it could do was observe the conflict drag on. The EU was forced to acknowledge the new post-war regional realities after failing to contribute to the conflict's settlement.

It is very significant that in all of the EU officials' subsequent visits to the South Caucasus countries, they have not raised any concerns about Russia's military deployment in the Karabakh region under the pretext of "peacekeepers." All three of the region's countries' foreign policy will be affected by Russia's almost uncontested domination in the South Caucasus, especially when it comes to decisions pertaining to matters that serve Russia's interests.

Instead of countering its rival, the EU seems to acknowledge Russia's "zone of privileged interests". Not only does this further diminish the EU's image in the region, but it is also gradually undoing the positive developments it has achieved. (Vasif H. 2021).

Opportunities for the European Union in the South Caucasus

The European Union is confronted with formidable obstacles in its relations with the countries of the South Caucasus, which are unlikely to be solved anytime soon. Nonetheless, if managed well, a number of opportunities exist that might significantly impact the growth of the

EU's relations with the nations in the region. The EU's significant portion of the region's foreign trade, its vital role as an investor in the region's economies, the regional states' desire to counterbalance other major powers through close partnerships with the EU, and the local population's persistent pro-European aspirations are a few of these.

The West (i.e., the EU together with the USA) has traditionally been seen in the region as an indispensable geopolitical force for counterbalancing the pressure of other powers, particularly Russia and Iran. Although not as explicitly as Georgia, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been supportive of this policy line and, for this purpose, occasionally made significant attempts to deepen cooperation with the West. However, the regional power dynamics, coupled with the EU's reluctance to confront other powers, forced Armenia and Azerbaijan to reconsider their strategies, while Georgia, being in a deadlock with Russia, could not help but continue to strive for Euro-Atlantic membership. The Armenian government led by Nikol Pashinyan has tacitly rejuvenated Armenia's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration even though his country, being overly dependent on Russia in well-nigh all spheres, including economy and security, has limited room for maneuvering in foreign policy. Russia's further rise in regional dominance in the wake of the Second Karabakh War makes a comprehensive partnership with the EU even more important for the regional countries.

The European aspirations among the people living in the South Caucasus constitute another factor that should be taken into account. Public opinion polls in the region have consistently demonstrated generally strong (though to varying degrees) public support in the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia,¹² Azerbaijan,¹³ and Georgia¹⁴) for the intensification of the relations between their states and the EU. The EU's image is, however, often damaged by the shortcomings of its regional policies. For example, the Azerbaijani people are disillusioned with the lack of consistency in the EU's policies towards territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space. While the EU put a strong emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity for Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine in their conflicts with Russia, it has avoided taking a clear stance based on that principle in Azerbaijan's territorial conflict with Armenia. The EU can better its image in the region by addressing these problems and making proper amendments to its policies wherever possible. Based on this principle, the EU should play a more active role in the post-conflict peace process between Baku and Yerevan and should encourage the sides to sign a peace treaty recognizing each other's internationally recognized territorial integrity. Towards this end, Azerbaijan expects political support from the EU in the demarcation and delimitation of its state borders with Armenia. Yerevan should be persuaded and, if necessary,

pressured by its European partners to launch negotiations on the demarcation of state borders with Baku through international mediation. The reluctance of some European states to recognize the post-war realities and the attempts to question Azerbaijan's sovereignty over the Karabakh region or to make it subject to international negotiations are helpful neither for peace in the South Caucasus nor for the EU's image in the region. (Vasif H. 2021).

In 2020, the 44-day war marked a turning point in the EU's involvement. Since December 2021, the EU has considerably stepped up its engagement by acting as a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan – a role that also arose as Russia increasingly focused on its war against Ukraine. The high-level tripartite meetings organized under the auspices of the president of the European Council Charles Michel offered a platform for Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss a comprehensive settlement of the conflict – one that addressed the status of Karabakh, the security of the Armenian population there, the process for the delimitation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, issues of connectivity including the so-called Zangezur corridor, a connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan via the Southern Armenian province Syunik, as well as demining and the fate of prisoners of war. In addition, the EU intensified its presence through the active involvement of the Special Representative for the Caucasus and the deployment of a civil monitoring mission in Armenia on the border with Azerbaijan (European Union Advisory Mission - EUAM). The latter was initially staffed with personnel deployed from the EU monitoring mission in Georgia and became a fully-fledged mission in early 2023. In less than two years, the EU's engagement in Karabakh approached that of other conflicts in the region (Meister, Stefan, and Laure Delcour).

CHAPTER 6. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Since Azerbaijan re-established its state independence in 1991, it has determined integration and cooperation with the EU as one of the strategic directions of its foreign policy. Azerbaijan's economic integration interests towards Europe are determined by the country's geopolitical and geoeconomic situation and socioeconomic development. The EU and Balkan countries recognized the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1991, and official diplomatic relations have been established between the parties since 1992. Further improvement of the investment environment will make Azerbaijan more active in energy projects, reflecting its strong position in the energy security of the Balkan countries. As a result, relations with the European Union, that is, when we go deeper, between the Balkan countries and Azerbaijan, are rapidly intensifying. As a result of the end of the war with Armenia in 1994 and the successful economic policies of Heydar Aliyev, who came to power in 1993, Azerbaijan drew a different picture in energy production after 1994. In this process, Azerbaijan became the center of attention of foreign energy companies after the war with Armenia ended. In this context, the number of agreements signed between SOCAR and foreign companies in the period covering the years 1994-2015 was recorded as 25. As of 2016, Azerbaijan's current oil reserves were measured as 7,503 kilotons, while oil production was measured as 7,522.40 kilotons/year (SOCAR, 2019). Azerbaijan exported gas to Armenia and Georgia until the 1990s. In 1995, Azerbaijan stopped importing gas from these countries and started importing gas from Russia. According to the agreement made in this context, it continued to import gas until the end of 2006. In this context, natural gas took its place among Azerbaijan's most important export items in 2018. Azerbaijan could only meet its domestic needs until natural gas deposits were found in the Shah Deniz region and production started. After the discovery in question, the country became self-sufficient in natural gas (Suleymanov & Hasanov, 2013: 78-79). Large gas fields were discovered in the research conducted around the Caspian Sea, and with the exploitation of these fields, Azerbaijan became a gas exporting country from a gas importing country in 2006. Azerbaijan's position regarding its role in the energy security of the Balkan countries can be summarized in several points: First, this position of Azerbaijan is due to a strong and effective European energy policy, global competition, security of energy resources, and diversity of energy resources. Second, energy policy is at the heart of national sovereignty, so ensuring adequate energy security within the framework of national security is a top priority for the EU. Third, all member states, including the Balkan countries, support the current energy policy. However, none of these mean the integration of the common energy market. Each member state,

including the Balkan countries, has its own national interests and foreign policy. In addition, the consumption and import rates of European countries are different. Fourth, after the failed Nabucco project, the EU is taking more serious steps. The Southern Gas Corridor is the most important project in terms of alternative energy sources. Fifth, when looking at the energy relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan is a reliable and strategic partner due to the economic, geopolitical, and security interests of the EU and the Balkan states. In today's world, where control over energy resources has become so important, Russia's influential position both in its geography and in the neighboring natural gas transmission region particularly worries the EU. As a result of this concern, the EU had to mobilize its efforts to reach various gas resources. In this regard, in addition to the shale gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects that have been experienced in recent years in gas markets, especially in the Caspian Sea, natural gas from the Mediterranean and the Middle East is also gaining importance for the EU as an alternative source to Russia. It is known that the European Commission, with its strategic initiative, developed the concept of the "Southern Gas Corridor" in 2008 to absorb resources and balance the external impact on the neighboring geography.

The project creates an energy security environment for the EU and Turkey. It is envisaged that this project will enable Turkey, which continues its economic growth, to use energy resources at a reasonable cost. TANAP is described as the most important point of SGC, which will create the first direct energy line from the Caspian Sea to Europe. In addition, TAP, which will transport Shah Deniz natural gas from the Turkish border to Europe, will create an alternative route for European Union countries to search for new resources. TANAP; It is a natural gas pipeline project that aims to transport the natural gas produced in the Shah Deniz 2 field in Azerbaijan to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. The Turkish part starts in Ardahan and ends in Edirne (on the Greek border). It is also known that 80% of the mainline pipes in the construction of the TANAP project were produced domestically in Turkey. The importance of TANAP for Europe, which is dependent on Russian natural gas and moving on a different path, is increasing day by day. On the other hand, Turkey's role in TANAP and between the EU and Azerbaijan will strengthen its hand in terms of joining the EU. In this sense, it is hoped that energy will be opened to negotiations with such an agreement, under the title of "Chapters to be Negotiated in the EU Council in Turkey's EU membership negotiations". BOTASH and TPAO, known as energy companies operating in Turkey, are expected to cooperate in production, exploration, and pipeline research. In this sense, these two companies, Gazprom, and Sokar, need to be integrated into a single company and sit at the table for energy contracts on behalf of

Turkey. For these companies, which must operate mainly in foreign markets, establishing dominance in the Balkans will be one of the important steps taken for the country. In addition, it is seen that today most of the Balkan countries have become dependent on Russian natural gas. For this reason, Turkey's investments in these regions are also gaining importance. A plan dubbed RE Power EU has been put up as part of the European Commission's activities against Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with the goal of reducing the EU's reliance on Russian fossil fuels by two-thirds by the end of 2022 and eliminating it entirely by 2030.

The aforementioned legislation serves as a marker of a significant shift in the way the European Union addresses energy-related issues. This project is expected to have a significant influence on the Balkans' energy industry as well. Accelerating the switch to sustainable energy sources, making investments in liquefied natural gas terminals and other gas infrastructure, and diversifying the energy supply are all intended outcomes of this strategy. TAP, which is essentially TANAP extended, is the most significant option in this area in Europe.

Trans-Adriatic Natural Gas Pipeline (TAP); It is a natural gas pipeline project that begins connecting to TANAP in Turkey/Ipsala with a 478 km pipeline from the north of Greece and then ends in Italy via Albania and under the Adriatic Sea. An investment of 35 billion dollars was envisaged for the project, which was signed by the Shah Deniz Consortium on September 19, 2013. TAP is part of the Southern Gas Corridor. The project parties believe that the pipeline will increase Europe's energy security and reduce Europe's dependence on Russia.

In addition to increasing electricity consumption due to the measures taken in Kyoto. In this way, the significance of TAP for European nations becomes clear in light of the growing reliance on natural gas in EU member states. (Özerdem, F. 2021).

The European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership Program, and the Southern Gas Corridor are the main contributors to Azerbaijan's integration into Europe. Thus, the European Union has taken an important step towards a common energy policy after many years. With its TAP and TANAP projects, it provides energy to many regions of Europe and pioneers the essential aspect of ensuring Europe's energy security by reducing dependence on a single source. Russia, on the other hand, is trying to prevent the EU from purchasing natural gas from new sources. Russia's obstacles vary depending on the course of events in the geopolitical arena. Azerbaijan plays a key country role in this regard and is of great importance in increasing the diversity of energy resources of the Balkan countries. In this respect, Russia is trying to damage the reputation of the Southern Gas Corridor with the negative statements it made in the first stage. At the same time, it is stated that the Trans-Caspian oil pipeline, which will form the basis

of the energy export infrastructure of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, is against Russia's interests. While the Southern Gas Corridor is significant for the EU, it raises concerns for Russia. For instance, amidst discussions about the Western-backed Nabucco project, Russia launched the South Stream pipeline initiative to transport its natural gas to Bulgaria along the Black Sea coast. However, this project was abandoned due to EU competition regulations, and subsequently, the Turkish Stream pipeline proposal by Russian Gazprom also faltered. In reality, Russia is unlikely to undertake gas transportation projects in this region without Azerbaijani involvement in ensuring the energy security of the Balkans. The latest development related to the project is the commencement of natural gas transportation. In October 2020, the TAP pipeline stretching from the Greece-Turkey border to the receiving terminal in southern Italy began transporting natural gas. Finally, on November 15, 2020, the TAP pipeline, marking the final segment of the Southern Gas Corridor, was completed, and commercial operations commenced. TAP and the Iran-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (ITE) are designed not to compete but to complement each other. It defines Southern European countries as markets for both projects. Because the EU is focused on getting rid of its dependence on Russia. In addition to its energy corridor targets, Turkey wants to connect TAP and ITE to the Balkans with a different policy. In this way, it targets the natural gas market of Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, which is expected to reach 20 billion m³/year by 2030.

The Western Balkan area can contribute significantly to the energy security of the EU and vice versa because of its position. Leaders from Southeastern Europe praised the new gas pipeline, the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector (IGB), at the October Energy Forum in Sofia. IGB will use the Southern Gas Corridor to transport gas from Azerbaijan to Bulgaria. North Macedonia and Serbia will also gain from the development of the gas transmission network. This is a critical step in reducing Europe's reliance on Russian gas. Two nations with tense political histories got the chance to talk about energy cooperation at the Energy Forum. The potential of exporting Bulgaria's excess power to its neighbor North Macedonia was considered.

This act of solidarity will improve energy supply security and lessen issues related to shortages of electricity. It is yet unknown, though, if this cooperation will take place. To survive the consequences of price hikes, the governments of the EU and WB6 should pursue additional bilateral agreements and potential market connections. (Stanislav, H., 2021).

Various suggestions for broader energy cooperation have been made by the EU-supported Regional Cooperation Council. These consist of shared interconnectors, cross-border sharing, and even a regional energy strategy. By creating collaborative investment proposals on

renewable energy and the integration of the gas and electricity markets, Western Balkan nations will also need to strengthen their collaboration with one another. This would lessen the uncertainty around the availability of electricity and avoid the need for emergency measures like Kosovo's summertime power shortages.

They may also think about creating green hydrogen using their enormous potential for solar and wind energy. For Turkey, natural gas is a very valuable resource. Turkey does not want to be seen as just another transit nation like Ukraine, as it is in a prime location for the passage of natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. Turkey is a consumer-driven nation that wants to save expenses because natural gas prices would rise following TANAP. Our nation is currently positioned as an energy transit country. The current state of affairs presents Turkey with significant prospects to become a regional player in the energy industry and to bring the West and the East together. With the assistance of consortium firms and Azerbaijan, the Southern Gas Corridor is being constructed.

An infrastructure for gas transportation between the EU and Turkey's surrounding nations to the Caspian area will be available for many years to come, as long as natural gas pipelines remain in place. Such a pipeline would not exist without Azerbaijan, and the growing demand for imported gas would force the EU to invest billions of euros in building a new pipeline infrastructure. Put differently, the establishment of strategically significant pipeline infrastructure would have required billion-dollar investments from the EU and European businesses, but the Southern Gas Corridor has spared them.

6.1. Energy Cooperation Prospects

The potential energy transmission route has faced obstruction from Armenia due to its occupying stance, leading to heightened cooperation among Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. The Baku-Supsa, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipelines not only hold geostrategic significance but also impact the global energy market. Among these, TANAP and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway projects stand out as crucial endeavors for the three nations involved. The partnership between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey has gained international recognition thanks to these initiatives, particularly in terms of channeling regional resources to Europe, thereby enhancing their collaboration's importance.

Ensuring the security of energy and commercial routes in the region remains a significant challenge that strongly influences the determination to sustain cooperation among Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Despite the increasing closeness among these three nations driven by geostrategic concerns, Armenia and Russia are actively devising policies to impede this

collaboration. Among the regional players, Armenia displays the least favorable view towards the tripartite cooperation mechanism, as it seeks to avoid worsening relations with Georgia. One of the weak points in regional security is once again highlighted by the worsening Georgian-Armenian ties and the potential for this to result in the border between the two nations being closed. States are related in matters like trade continuity and regional borders.

Stability in the region is desired by international corporations investing there, particularly in light of the discovery of Azerbaijan's energy resource deposits. Still, stabilization appears to be achievable with the resolution of the Karabakh issue. Because of its poor ties with its neighbors (occupying Azerbaijani territory, territorial claims against Georgia, charges of genocide, and territorial claims against Turkey), Armenia stayed out of any regional projects during this time. Armenia has lost out on significant geopolitical and economic benefits as a result of its exclusion from all of these programs.

Transportation corridors are another issue in the region that calls for strategic collaboration. The region's high topographical layout makes these roads crucial. Projects that can be developed in a way that will benefit all the states in the region include the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway link, which connects the railways of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and the TRASEKA program, which focuses on transit between Europe and Central Asia. To Armenia's detriment, Azerbaijan must realize this potential.

Armenia therefore bears the price of Karabakh's occupation by losing out on intraregional cooperation. Mutual commerce is not permitted due to the closed border with Turkey. With the help of border commerce with Iran, the diaspora's economic assistance, and Russia's military backing, it is attempting to maintain its economy. iv. Relationships of Friendship and Enmity Among Regional Countries: The regional security complex is shaped in part by historical interactions of friendship and hostility, wars, shared foes, and comparable demands. A shared sense of threat or a shared history are prerequisites for an area to be classified as a security complex. These two factors, which are also prevalent in the South Caucasus, are evident in the fighting in Karabakh. (Stefan, M. 2019).

The first is Russia's deliberate policy of settling Armenians in the region in the 19th century. The second is that Armenia cannot form its domestic and foreign policy independently of the so-called genocide claim. After Russia began to occupy the Caucasus in the 19th century, it pursued a settlement policy in the region by deliberately migrating Armenians. It shows that Armenians, whose numbers were very few until the 1800s, constituted approximately 25% of the Karabakh population at the beginning of the 19th century. In the Turkmenchay treaty signed

between Iran and Russia in 1828, there is an article stating that Armenians can freely migrate to the Russian Tsardom. In this way, it was facilitated for Armenians to migrate to Azerbaijani lands, which are geographically closest to Iran. Furthermore, Russia encouraged Armenians, who were subjects of Iran and the Ottoman powers, to relocate to the Caucasus on the basis of the agreement's conditions. The so-called genocide accusations and the Armenian Constitution's designation of the east of Turkey as "Western Armenia" prevent Armenia from establishing diplomatic or economic ties with Turkey.

For this reason, Armenia cannot take part in Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan's energy and trade-oriented projects and is exposed to isolation in the region. Although this policy provides the diaspora Armenians with a sense of belonging and financial aid, it disrupts their relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and pushes them into conflict. Due to its geographical location, Armenia is the country that needs regional cooperation the most. Despite this, its hostile attitude towards Turkey limits it from being realistic in its regional policies. Presenting the problem as a religious struggle also complicates the Karabakh problem. This religious distinction was also used as the basis of immigration policies. Although this was shown as a reason in the years when the problem first started and in the 1990s, religion-based reasons could not find their answer in the reality of the 20th century. Iran's support for Armenia and the cooperation of Georgia with Turkey and Azerbaijan makes the religious discourse weak. Another important element in the region is the special and close relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The "one nation, two states" discourse of the two states is frequently expressed by politicians and they support each other on international platforms. The fact that two states speak the same language and the existence of emotional ties in bilateral relations makes it easier for this relationship to turn into strategic cooperation (Taras, K. 2021).

Evaluation and Conclusion in the Light of Latest Developments The conflicts that started on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in July 2020 turned into war at the end of September. The actual situation of Karabakh after the ceasefire in 1994 has caused conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan many times. In fact, after the 1994 Ceasefire Agreement, the largest-scale conflicts to date took place in April 2016. During those conflicts, Azerbaijan not only saved some of its territory from Armenian occupation by inflicting great losses on the other side but also gained psychological superiority for the first time in the 30-year war. In the war in 2020, Azerbaijan started to take back its occupied lands and achieved military superiority. At this stage, Azerbaijan received high-level support from Turkey. According to the news in the Azerbaijani press, many weapons were transported from Russia to Armenia using the airspace

of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran between July 17 and September 1. Russia announced that these transported cargoes were to change the soldiers of Russia's 102nd Military Base, located on the Turkey-Armenia border. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, claims that the reason why it uses the airspace of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, which is the longer route, rather than the airspace of Georgia, which is the shortest route, for cargo transportation is because these cargoes are weapons. Even so, Russia did not make a clear distinction between the parties throughout the war. Russia is trying to maintain the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This policy also results in the continuation of the status quo in the Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenia. However, recent developments have drawn attention to the fact that Russia's performance is lower than expected. Until recently, despite Russia, the outbreak of a serious conflict and one side gaining a serious advantage over the other was always considered a slim possibility. However, with Pashinyan's election as prime minister in 2018, the potential for change in Russia's influence over Armenia emerged. It has been observed that the potential change at the macro level has no effect on the Karabakh issue, and the Armenian political elite tends to maintain the status quo. The occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia has been the main factor shaping regional security in the South Caucasus since the 1990s. As mentioned above, regional, and extra-regional states use the Karabakh issue to carry out their regional policies. The problem has been politics itself since the 1990s.

The Karabakh conflict continues to exist as one of the most important factors affecting the security policies of the regional states. Recent developments make it possible to make faster progress towards solving the problem. However, it is also obvious that the solution will not be easy due to the multidimensional nature of the relationship between the states of the region, the intense relations of friendship and hostility, and the geographical structure of the region that does not make it possible to act independently of each other.

6.2. Unresolved Issues in the Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict

"The 2020 Karabakh War" has found a lot of coverage in both the Turkish press, the European press, and the world press. "In interviews with the Russian news agency TASS and as reported by the press on Tuesday, October 20, 2020, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia said that they were prepared to begin peace talks in Karabakh. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that he was ready to stop the conflict if Armenia accepted the basic principles determined by the Minsk Group. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that the agreement should be based on "compromise, not surrender". Arguing that the latest conflict was encouraged by Turkey, Pashinyan claimed that Ankara was trying to remove Russia from the

South Caucasus. The Armenian side, trying to take advantage of all opportunities, has tried to pursue a policy that tries to pit Turkey and Russia against each other, especially in the Karabakh Problem. Pashinyan's policy, which tries to involve global powers in the problem instead of solving the problem as a two-country problem, has not achieved its goal. The rational diplomacy carried out by both Turkey and Azerbaijan throughout the process was the main reason for this situation. Many problems experienced by Russia during the pandemic (economic, health, border security, etc.) have reshaped the agenda of Russian foreign policy. In this process, Armenia did not receive the support it received from the Russians in previous periods. In addition, the Western media covered the problem in depth and drew great attention to Turkey's position in the region: "During the war, in the British press, in the analysis and news about the agreement reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it was stated that the real winner of the war in Karabakh was Turkey and that Ankara was It has been evaluated that the decisive role has become fixed and the West has been pushed into the corner." (Gafarov, R. ve Sariyev, B. 2021)

The military equipment and experience that Turkey has transferred to Azerbaijan has a significant impact on the formation of this perception. In addition, the successful diplomacy carried out by Turkey and Azerbaijan was a separate determining factor in the emergence of this result. After the war was lost, Pashinyan publicly admitted that the Armenian Army was helpless against the military capabilities of the Azerbaijani Army and blamed the previous governments at this point. On this basis, it has once again been revealed how important Turkey's military capabilities and experiences are for both Turkey, the Middle East, and the Caucasus region. All humanity around the world has seen that Armenia's psychological warfare tactics against Azerbaijan have failed. Predictions and statements that Russia will provide unconditional and uninterrupted support to Armenia have become ineffective in every aspect. Armenia was left alone on the field due to its mistakes and miscalculation of the international balances of the day. Armenian policymakers have learned through bitter experience that every country will first think about its security and future and act within the framework of its interests. Violent clashes continued intensely in the Karabakh Conflict, which killed at least 1,000 people and possibly more throughout the conflict. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has progressed towards the destabilization of the South Caucasus region, one of the world's longest-running wars. Three ceasefires collapsed after the conflict flared up at the end of September. The conflicts, which attracted the attention of the world's public opinion in every aspect, received a lot of coverage in the world press. Going back to the early stages of the conflict, a border conflict in July 2020 triggered mass protests in Baku, with thousands of demonstrators calling for the

country to go to war with Armenia. The clashes, in which both sides blamed each other at the beginning, intensified in Karabakh on September 27. The border violations committed by the Armenian side in the initial phase of the conflict had a large share. The Pashinyan administration, thinking that the international balances were in its favor, predicted that it would benefit from the conflicts turning into war. However, in the following period, it was seen that the Pashinyan administration made a strategic mistake. The perception that has existed in the world public opinion from the very beginning about the latest Karabakh conflicts has been as follows: "Although Turkey has always supported Azerbaijan's claims regarding disputed lands in the region, it has not used any significant rhetoric or rhetoric to support Baku in its previous conflicts with Armenia.

However, contrary to popular belief, Turkey's military experience and knowledge in the Azeri and Armenian conflict that took place in 2020 completely changed the course of the "2020 Karabakh War" and reshaped the world public opinion's perspective on the Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship. Throughout the conflict process, the world press continued to cover the "2020 Karabakh War". Particularly the British press addressed the issue from quite different dimensions: "There are concerns that a long war may drag on in Russia, which sells weapons to both countries but has a military alliance with Armenia. Iran, which has a sometimes-tense relationship with Azerbaijan, may also step in." During the same period, the American press, just like the British press, looked at the "2020 Karabakh War from a very different perspective: "Armenian officials said that Stepanakert, the main city of Karabakh, was under intense bombardment by Azerbaijani forces. Journalists reported that many civilians were hiding in shelters as the city recovered from a sustained onslaught. Azerbaijan's ambassador to Washington, Elin Suleymanov, told Today's World View that his country's forces did not target civilians and accused the Armenian side of indiscriminately bombing parts of his country. The "2020 Karabakh War", which had a serious impact on the world press, was covered in very different dimensions, especially in the Western media. The Western media, which sees the Azerbaijanis as responsible for the emergence of the conflict, has, as always, taken a stand in favor of supporting the Armenians' theses. However, it was seen in the later stages of the conflict that policymakers thought or had to think differently from members of the media. If we go back to the root of the problem, as it is known, the independence process of the Caucasian Countries has been quite painful. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states in the post-Soviet space is a painful process. Although there were those in Russia's political and economic leadership who supported the establishment of normal, balanced relations with

these newly independent states (these were mostly young, Western-oriented, and technocratic politicians), they were clearly in the minority. Much of the political and military establishment suffered from the collapse of the powerful Soviet hegemony and the loss of pride in being a superpower. This majority has felt and continues to feel the necessity of maintaining sovereignty over the former Soviet Republics. The Russian political bureaucracy, which holds this idea, is one of the actors at the root of the problems experienced by the Caucasian Countries. This structure has a serious impact, especially on the Karabakh issue. At the beginning of the Karabakh Conflict, Russia actively provided weapons, military, and technical assistance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan to deepen each state's dependence on Russia. The aid provided was either free of charge or at cost. Military aid was provided at the state level and through corrupt local officers. Although Moscow is interested in weakening both states, its primary goal is to maintain its military presence in the region.

Russia, which tries to produce policies for the Caucasus region with this awareness, has conflicted with the policies produced by Western powers from time to time. The policies of both Russia and the Western powers on the region have deepened the Karabakh conflict considerably. It would be useful to go back to earlier periods to understand the development of the problem. It is known that Heydar Aliyev finalized the export route of Azeri oil during his trip to Moscow in July 1997. The reality is that Azerbaijan, a landlocked country and far from major oil consumers in Europe, has no alternative export routes other than the northern pipeline from Baku to Novorossiysk. Since the beginning of the century, Azerbaijan has used only this. The Chechen Conflict in the mid-1990s temporarily halted this use. However, oil exports resumed on October 25, 1997. This is the second time that Russia's energy policy coincides with Azerbaijan.

Russia communicates with Azerbaijanis within the framework of energy policies, which are of vital importance to Russia. Therefore, discussing Azerbaijan-Russia relations in a wide window will yield more productive results. Ultimately, the oil industry constitutes the backyard of the regional countries' commitment to Russia. The oil industry has historically been one of the most globalized industries in the world. Oil is a key fuel in industrial production as well as a vital component in the production of a wide range of products. It is the backbone of capital-intensive industrial production as it is the source of energy for transportation, industry, military, communications, mechanization, agriculture, and countless other services. Oil, an energy source needed by all countries in the world, constitutes the main topic of Russia's relations with Western countries. The connection of the Caucasus Countries with Russia in terms of oil supply is essential for Russian trade. For this reason, the commercial ties that exist between the countries

of the region and Russia have both economic and political aspects. Not far from Baku, not much investment activity takes place in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union's largest successor state. Attracting foreign investment proved very difficult for Russia in the 1990s, given the country's large natural resources and educated workforce, as well as its potentially large domestic market. The oil industry, which is the most important sector of the Russian economy, is also the main determinant of Russia's relationship with the Caucasus region.

CONCLUSION

The strategic importance of Azerbaijan's energy resources has indeed played a significant role in shaping the European Union's (EU) involvement in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. This involvement reflects a nuanced approach driven by the EU's energy diversification goals, which prioritize stable and cooperative relations with Azerbaijan, a key energy supplier.

Hypothesis 1 posits that the EU's energy needs have led to a more pronounced bias towards Azerbaijan. The evidence supports this hypothesis, as the EU's reliance on Azerbaijani energy, particularly through projects like the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), underscores the critical nature of Azerbaijan in EU energy strategy. The EU's engagement in the region, marked by substantial investments in energy infrastructure and diplomatic support, reveals a tendency to favor Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and stability to ensure uninterrupted energy flows. This bias is evident in the EU's relatively restrained response to Azerbaijan's actions during the Second Karabakh War, focusing more on maintaining regional stability than on addressing potential humanitarian concerns aggressively.

Hypothesis 2 highlights the complex interplay between EU-Azerbaijan energy relations and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, creating both opportunities and problems for energy policies and conflict resolution. The conflict has underscored the strategic vulnerability of energy infrastructure in the region, prompting Azerbaijan and its partners to prioritize security and stability. The war and subsequent ceasefire have opened avenues for regional cooperation, such as potential transit routes through Armenia, which could enhance economic integration and energy distribution efficiency. However, these opportunities are counterbalanced by significant challenges, including the need to secure energy corridors against potential threats and navigate the geopolitical tensions involving major powers like Russia and Turkey.

In conclusion, the EU's energy strategy has undeniably influenced its stance on the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, aligning its interests more closely with Azerbaijan due to the critical role of Azerbaijani energy supplies in the EU's diversification efforts. This alignment has created a landscape where energy policies and conflict dynamics are deeply intertwined, presenting both opportunities for enhanced regional cooperation and significant challenges in maintaining security and stability. The EU's involvement in the South Caucasus thus reflects a pragmatic approach aimed at balancing immediate energy needs with long-term regional stability.

REFERENCES

1. Abbaslı Gülnar. (2016), Azerbaycan AB ilişkileri, <http://www.azhumanrights.az/news/inthecountry/329350601rqt601r601fda3511305287305n305n.html> (03.01.2020).
2. Almammadov V. (2019). Azerbaycan'ın Enerji Stratejisi. Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi, 8(3), 40-5
3. Avrupa Birliği Dış Eylem Servisi (2023) “Avrupa, Birliği, Konseyi”, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/euarmenia_comprehensive_and_enhanced_partnership_agreement_cepa.%20Pdf (06.06.2020).
4. ABD, (2023), Asian Development Bank, Azerbaijan country profile, www.adb.org (Erişim tarihi 29.02.2024)
5. Hamzaoğlu Halit (2020), Komşuluk Politikası ve Doğu Ortaklığı Programı Çerçevesinde Azerbaycan - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri, 2. Baskı, Oskar Yayınları, Bakü
6. Hasanov Ali (2000), Azerbaycan'ın Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa ülkeleriyle ilişkileri. 3.Baskı, Elm Yayınları, Bakü
7. Hasanov Ali (2015), Modern uluslararası ilişkiler ve Azerbaycan'ın dış politikası. 2.Baskı, Azerbaycan Yayınları, Bakü
8. Hüseynova Hicran (1998), Azerbaycan Avrupa Bütünleşme Sürecinde Rolü. 1.Baskı, Azərneşr Yayın Evi , Bakü
9. Gafarov Ranetta ve Sariyev, Berdi (2021), Modern zamanlarda Azerbaycan ekonomisinin gelişmesinde petrol faktörünün rolü / ANAS'ın “Piyasa reformları ve ulusal ekonominin kalkınma sorunları” konulu konferansının materyalleri. Azərneşr Yayın Evi , Bakü 60
10. George Freedman (2017), Avrupa Krizi, 3. Baskı, Pegasus Yayınları, Ankara.
11. Mehdiyev Ramiz (2020), Milli İdeoloji Sayesinde, Devlet Olma, Bağımsızlık. 2.Baskı, XXI - Yeni Yayınevi Yayınları, Bakü.
12. Mehdiyev Ramiz (2021), Gelecek Stratejilerinin Belirlenmesi: Modernizasyon Hattı, DoğuBatı Yayınları, Bakü.
13. Mor Hasan (2020), Avrupa (Birliği) Bütünleşme Süreci ve Sorunları, Dergi Parkı Yayınları, Ankara.
14. Şahbazov R. (2015). Yeni Küresel Sistemde Avrupa Birliği ve Güney Kafkasya: Genişleme ve Komşuluk Politikası Ekseninde. EkoAvrasya Yayınları, Ankara,s134

15. Adomanis Mark (2021), Ukrainians must beware of what joining Europe could mean, <https://qz.com/204793/ukrainian-protesters-must-beware-of-what-joining-europe-could-actually-mean/>
16. Agayev Taleh (2020), "The Impact of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict on EU-Azerbaijan Relations", <https://eurasianstudiesjournal.com/impact-conflict> (20.06.2020).
17. Alieva Leila (2020), "EU-Azerbaijan Relations and the Role of Energy Policy", <https://caucasusanalyticaldigest.com/eu-azerbaijan-energy-policy> (16.02.2024).
18. Anieri Paul (2023), *International Politics (Uluslararası Politika)*, 3. Baskı, Wadsworth Publishing, California.
19. Aslanov Kamal (2020), "Azerbaijan's Geopolitical Significance and EU Relations", <https://journalofinternationalpolicystudies.com/azerbaijan-geopolitical-significance> (20.06.2023).
20. Baban I. (2010). *The Place and Role of Azerbaijan in Euro-Atlantic Energy Security. Is Azerbaijan a "Geopolitical Pivot" or "Geostrategic Actor"?* *Azerbaijan Focus*, 3(3), 34143-156.
21. Babayev Rovshan (2019), "Azerbaijan's Energy Diplomacy: The EU Dimension", <https://reviewofinternationalaffairs.com/azerbaijan-energy-diplomacy> (16.02.2020).
22. Balayev Rovshan (2019), "The EU and Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The Case of Karabakh", <https://cejiss.com/eu-conflict-resolution> (16.02.2024).
23. Bernd Weber. *The EU's External Energy Policy Towards Azerbaijan: Success Or Failure?* 2014. <https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03460551/document>
24. Bielecki J. (2022). Energy security: is the wolf at the door? *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 42(2), s 237-238.
25. Bohi D. R., & Toman, M. A. (2012). *The economics of energy security*. Springer Science & Business Media, s 1099-1100
26. Çelikpala Mitat (2019), "Azerbaijan's Role in European Energy Security", <https://perceptionsjournal.com/azerbaijan-energy-security> (16.02.2024).
27. Cornell Svante E. (2019), "Azerbaijan's Gas Projects: What Impact on the EU?", <https://centralasiacaucasus.org/impact-eu> (30.02.2021).
28. Cornell Svante E. (2020), "The European Union and Azerbaijan: End of the Honeymoon?", <https://centralasiainstitute.org/end-of-honeymoon> (20.06.2020).
29. Cornell, S. E. (2017). *Azerbaijan Since Independence*. Routledge.
30. De Waal, T. (2021). *The Caucasus: An Introduction*. Oxford University Press.

31. Dr. Laurence Broers, “ Analyzing the Second Karabakh War “ February 2021
<https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/analysing-second-karabakh-war>
32. Ehtisham Rizwan (2019), “The Southern Gas Corridor: Azerbaijan's Role and the EU's Energy Security”, <https://energypolicyreview.com/southern-gas-corridor> (20.06.2023).
33. El País. (2020). "Spain calls for ceasefire in Karabakh." Retrieved from <https://elpais.com/english/2020-10-05/spain-calls-for-ceasefire-in-Karabakh.html>
34. Ergun Ayça (2021), “European Union’s Role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict”, <https://turkishpolicyquarterly.com/eu-role-armenia-azerbaijan> (16.02.2020).
35. European External Action Service. (2020). "Karabakh: Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on the escalation of hostilities."
<https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/86692/Karabakh-statement-hi>
36. Federal Foreign Office. (2020). "Minister Maas on the conflict in Karabakh." Retrieved from <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-Karabakh/2404890>
37. Gurbanov Ilgar (2019), “EU-Azerbaijan Energy Relations: Strategic Partnership or Pragmatic Cooperation?”, <https://caucasusinternational.com/eu-azerbaijan-energy-relations> (30.02.2021).
38. Hajiyeva Vasila (2020) “EU'S POLICY FOR AZERBAIJAN: CHALLENGES, ERRORS AND OPPORTUNITIES”
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339602014_EU'S_POLICY_FOR_AZERBAIJAN_CHALLENGES_ERRORS_AND_OPPORTUNITIES
39. Huseynov Vasif (2021) “Geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the 44-Day War: A Failure or an Opportunity for the EU?”
[https://cspjournal.az/uploads/files/\(3\)%20Vasif%20Huseynov.pdf](https://cspjournal.az/uploads/files/(3)%20Vasif%20Huseynov.pdf)
40. Ibrahimov Rovshan (2020), “The Role of Azerbaijan in EU’s Energy Diversification Strategy”, <https://caucasusinternational.com/azerbaijan-eu-energy-diversification> (16.02.2020).
41. International Crisis Group. (2021). "Post-War Prospects in Karabakh." Crisis Group Europe Report N°264.
42. Ismayilov Murad (2021), “EU Energy Security and Azerbaijan: The Shifting Dynamics”, <https://energypolicyjournal.com/eu-energy-security> (20.06.2023).
43. Jonas (2021), EU realpolitik on Ukraine-too little, too late”, <https://euobserver.com/opinion/132899> (20.06.2020). Kornely, Kakachia (2020), Georgia needs new ideas and

- a strategic vision for the future, <https://neweasterneurope.eu/post-author/kornely-kakachia/> (30.02.2021).
44. Kakachia Kornely (2019), "The EU and the South Caucasus: Energy, Geopolitics and Security", <https://europeangeographyjournal.com/eu-south-caucasus> (16.02.2020).
 45. Kathimerini. (2020). "Greece condemns Azerbaijan's actions in Karabakh." Retrieved from <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/256845/greece-condemns-azerbajians-actions-in-Karabakh/>
 46. Kılıç Ali (2020), "EU's Energy Policy and Its Implications for Azerbaijan", <https://balkanandneareasternstudies.com/eu-energy-policy> (30.02.2021).
 47. Kseniia (2015), Industry Scenarios for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 2040, <https://uk.linkedin.com/in/kseniia-perevalova> (16.02.2020)
 48. Le Monde. (2020). "Karabakh: Macron accuses Turkey of sending Syrian mercenaries." https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2020/10/01/Karabakh-macron-accuses-turkey-of-sending-syrian-mercenaries_5994623_7.html
 49. Mamedov Sardar (2020), "Azerbaijan's Energy Security and EU Cooperation", <https://journalofenergysecuritystudies.com/azerbaijan-energy-security> (30.02.2024).
 50. Mammadov Mubariz (2021), "Azerbaijan-EU Relations: Current Status and Future Prospects", <https://caucasusjournal.com/azerbaijan-eu-relations> (20.06.2020).
 51. Meister Stefan, and Laure Delcour. "The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict ." October 2023. <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict>
 52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. (2020). "Statement by Minister Di Maio on the Karabakh conflict." Retrieved from https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2020/10/dichiarazione-del-ministro-di-maio-sul-confitto-del-Karabakh.html
 53. Museyibov M. A. (1998). Physical geography of Azerbaijan. Baku: Maarif, 400.
 54. OSCE Minsk Group. (2020). "Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
 55. Özerdem Füsün (2021), Avrupa Birliği Doğu Ortaklığı Programı ve Program Ülkelerinin Algıları, Electronic Journal of Political Science Studies, Muğla. Perevalova,
 56. Pashayeva Gulshan (2020), "The EU and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: A Policy of Engagement", <https://europeanneighbourhoodwatch.com/eu-armenia-azerbaijan> (30.02.2021).
 57. Piric Kenan (2021), "Azerbaijan and the EU: Energy Relations and Beyond", <https://energystudiesreview.com/azerbaijan-eu-energy-relations> (20.06.2023).

58. Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2020). "Poland calls for peaceful resolution to Karabakh conflict." Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/poland-calls-for-peaceful-resolution-to-Karabakh-conflict>
59. Rashid Ahmed (2020), "Azerbaijan's Strategic Energy Partnerships with the EU", <https://internationalaffairsjournal.com/azerbaijan-energy-partnerships> (30.02.2024).
60. Roberts John (2018), "Azerbaijan's Gas Strategy and Europe's Southern Gas Corridor", <https://atlanticcouncil.org/azerbaijan-gas-strategy> (20.06.2020).
61. Roberts, J. (2014). The Southern Gas Corridor: Europe's Lifeline? European Union Institute for Security Studies.
62. Rzayeva Gulmira (2018), Natural Gas in the Turkish Domestic Energy Market: Policies and Challenges, <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/natural-gas-in-the-turkish-domesticenergy-market-policies-and-challenges/>
63. Sandholtz Wayne ve Sweet, Stone (2018), Avrupa Entegrasyonu ve Uluslarüstü Yönetim, Oxford University Press, New York .
64. Stanislav Holubec (2021), The Year 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe, <https://www.routledge.com/From-Revolution-to-Uncertainty-The-Year-1990-in-Central-andEastern-Europe/Putkamer-Borodziej-Holubec/p/book/9780367786243>
65. Stefan Meister (2019), Doğu Ortaklığı 2.0-Arzuyu artırmak ve komşuluk üzerine etkisi, <https://tr.boell.org/tr/2019/09/26/dogu-ortakligi-20-arzuyu-artirmak-ve-komsuluk-uzerineetkisi>.
66. Stern D. I. (2021). The role of energy in economic growth. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1219(1), s
67. Süleymanov Emil (2019), "The Role of the EU in the Karabakh Conflict", <https://insightturkey.com/eu-Karabakh> (20.06.2023).
68. Taras Kuzio (2021), European Identity, Euromaidan, and Ukrainian Nationalism, Alberta Publishing, Edmonton. The Global Competitiveness Report (2013), "Dünya Ekonomik Formu", http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2013-14/GCR_Rankings_2013-14.pdf
69. Tsygankov Andrei (2021). Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: The Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy, Post-Soviet Affairs Yayınları, Kyiv.
70. Valiyev Anar (2021), "EU-Azerbaijan Relations: Beyond Energy and Trade", <https://caucasussurvey.com/eu-azerbaijan-relations> (30.02.2024).

71. Wessels Rutger (2019). The Development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, The New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union. Foreign Policy in Dialogue, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eastern-partnership-decade-looking-back-thinking-ahead>.
72. Yusifov Elchin (2021), “EU-Azerbaijan Energy Cooperation: Achievements and Challenges”, <https://energystudiesquarterly.com/eu-azerbaijan-energy-cooperation> (16.02.2024).