

TRENDS OF INTEGRATION IN POST-SOVIET AREA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR

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1. Situation after the Collapse of the USSR

The collapse of the USSR went at such a speed that even the opponents of this country at the Cold War were not prepared to face all consequences of the process. Shortly after M. Gorbachev declared his *perestroyka* (reconstruction) policy, within a few years Eastern European satellite states overthrew their communist leaderships. Already by 1988 with the start of Mountainous Qarabagh conflict between Armenians and Azeris, the confrontation found its way inside the USSR. By 1989-1990 strong national movements in Baltic republics, Transcaucasia, Russia itself paralysed the local communist authorities. After the unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, when the Soviet leader was “saved” by the leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, it became obvious that the USSR no longer existed as a serious political factor.

On 8 December 1991 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed *Belovejsk treaty*, putting an end to the existence of the USSR. The treaty established the Commonwealth of Slavic States. Seeing objective prerequisites to include other former Soviet republics to the Commonwealth, the structure was renamed to Commonwealth of Independent States and eight more republics joined it by signing Alma-Ata declaration on 21 December 1991. The countries that joined the CIS besides Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baltic republics and Georgia did not join the treaty (Later, Georgia would pay dearly for its courageous step, when in 1993 the country would be on the verge of disintegration).

On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev officially resigned and denounced the USSR.

There were a few notable features about the dissolution of the USSR. First, there were no official territorial claims of any of the republics to each other, which made the processes develop relatively peacefully. Despite, there were ethnic conflicts going on in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, supported by other republics, those conflicts within the republics had not been developed to its peak point at that moment. Therefore, there were not enough excuses for republics to interfere with each other.

Secondly, there was a strong economic interdependence among the former Soviet republics. "Russia, for instance, supplied 80% of Ukrainian energy."¹ That problem was not easy to solve and "the energy related debt to Russia on part of the near abroad grew during 1995-1996 amounting to about \$3.9 billion,"² Ukraine being the biggest debtor. The situation was just a little better for the energy rich states. "For Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the current politics of resource exploitation were defined by physical location of Soviet constructed oil pipelines, all of which traversed the Russian Federation."³ "In post-Soviet Georgia, where Soviet power carved transportation routes through Abkhazia and across Mingrelia, the politics of development were similarly defined."⁴ So, despite all republics had natural anti-Russian inclinations and all of them wanted to build their economies independently from Russia, all roads lead to Moscow, or at least passed through Russia. That factor created a paradox of the time, when anti-Russian political positions of the newly independent republics were going in parallel with negotiations to get better economic deals from Russia.

Another difficulty was related to the "treatment of the Russian minority – 25 million in all – who live outside the Russian Federation."⁵ Kazakhstan, for example had Russian minority comprising "38 percent,"⁶ while the titular nation was only 41 percent. There was significant Russian minority in Moldova, which lead later on to the interference of the 14th Russian Army (stationed in Moldova) into the local ethnic conflict.⁷ The Russian minority was

also active in Baltic States and constantly caused frictions between Russia and the governments of those republics.

One more important factor was the presence of the former Soviet army basis all over the Soviet republics and even in Eastern European countries. The dissolution of the USSR developed at such a speed that the army got lost in the middle of the quarrel of sovereignties between the former Soviet republics. The army was still the Soviet army. However, Russians were dominating in the key structures. That factor alone forced the breakaway republics to be more careful towards Russia.

2. CIS – Tool for a Civilised Divorce or the Restoration of the USSR?

From the beginning of the dissolution process in the USSR, it became clear that the Baltic republics were under the special attention of the Western countries and the concerns expressed for the protection of rights of these republics were much louder than in any other case. That might be due to the fact that Baltic States were the closest among the Soviet republics to the North Atlantic Area and to the EU zone. Anyhow, directly after the dissolution of the USSR Baltic States lead their way through transition under the guidance of the EU countries and the place of this region in the international system was no more under question. It was predetermined and directed towards the EU. Therefore, this study does not deal with the Baltic case to the same extent as the other post-Soviet countries. The study is directed to explore the place of the other post-Soviet countries, which still lack a firm place in the international system.

Unlike The Baltic States, the rest of the former Soviet Union was an area of intense focus of Russia. Already in the beginning of 1992 Russia, after a short break, started a range of activities to get the former Soviet republics to the single economic, military and political sphere. Quite soon an unofficial term for the former Soviet republics – the term “Near Abroad” was coined in Russia. From the

point of view of the economic situation that term was a necessity. There was still the old Soviet currency acting all over the Soviet countries. All the industrial and agricultural enterprises across the USSR were bogged in internal debts to each other and the only price calculation was based on former Soviet criteria. For example, Ukraine, simply, did not have enough convertible money to buy oil and gas from Russia at the international market prices. The situation was the same with any other trade between the former Soviet countries. Carrying on according to the old prices lead to lots of corruption and eventually by 1992 the only effective way of doing trade became a barter exchange between the industrial enterprises. In one way it was a burden for Russia and quite a heavy one. All the export structures of the newly independent states were directed to Russia or through Russia. Pressed by the severe economic crisis, Russia refused to jointly regulate the rate of the rouble with the other republics, forcing them to introduce their own currencies. In these circumstances, Ukraine, for example, saw CIS as a tool for a civilised divorce between the former Soviet republics. In this vision, CIS was supposed to smooth down the process of economic and political transition of the post-Soviet republics, regulate the economic relations between the countries until they overcame the problem of too much dependence on the old Soviet economic ties. For Russia, CIS on the contrary was a new sphere of influence and basis for possible resurrection of the USSR in the form of confederation. "No one and nothing can relieve Russia of its political and moral responsibility for the fate of the countries and peoples which for centuries went with the Russian State. (Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia, 28 June 1994)"⁸ For Russia CIS was a kind of "Monroe sphere" to be protected militarily from dangerous Western influence.⁹ Being unable to protect that zone from external influence by economic means, Russia tried to substitute the economic integration with close military and political integration. The first serious document proposed by Russia in early 1992 and it was the Collective defence treaty, which was signed by six countries: Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan refused to join the treaty. Turkmenistan declared itself a neutral state, thus promising not to join any other coalition, while Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia were actively seeking for NATO membership. Unlike Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia did not recognise the CIS even as a tool for a divorce seeing in it an ultimate danger for their sovereignty. As soon as the national-democratic forces came to power in Azerbaijan in 1992, the country refused the CIS.

By the end of 1992 there were clearly two camps in the former Soviet area: Centrifugal tendency was observed in a milder form in the policies of Ukraine, Uzbekistan, inconsistently in the policy of Turkmenistan and radically in the policy of Azerbaijan and Georgia. On the other hand, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan were waging a pro-Russian policy saying “yes” to any action of Russia. The true and voluntary integration trend towards Russia was observed in Belarus only. “A public opinion poll conducted in Belarus in March 1994 discovered that more than 55 percent of Belarussians were in favour of the restoration of the USSR, and 63 percent favoured unification of the republic with Russia.”¹⁰

Aside from that country all the other republics were simply forced to be “pro-integration.” Armenia needed Russia’s support in its war with resourceful Azerbaijan; Moldova and Kazakhstan had a significant Russian minority capable of splitting the country any moment; Kyrgyzstan was a poorly developed country needing Russian help nearly at every sphere of the economy and also had “some 20 percent”¹¹ of Russian population.

In 1995 Russian newspapers published analysis about three possible scenarios for the development of the trends of integration within the CIS. There were three options. First option reflected the situation when CIS existed as an amorphous structure and the CIS countries each lead a separate foreign policy, without any serious coordination. The second option was the scenario when centripetal tendencies prevailed and the CIS countries deepened the integration in political, military and economic spheres. The third option was the

danger of creation of anti-Russian coalitions and groupings within the CIS.

The model was perfectly reflecting the logic of the political processes on the CIS integration. Russia was trying to use all leverages of pressure to force Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia to enter the CIS structures. Economic sanctions against Ukraine (which was unable to pay for the energy supply and thus ran itself into debt), the active support of militant ethnic separatists in Azerbaijan and Georgia (that lead to the total military defeat of these countries by the tiny “minority armies” in 1993) lead to the initial successes in achieving the Russian foreign policy objectives. By 1994 Russia forced all these countries to become full members of the CIS.¹² Azerbaijan and Georgia had also to sign the Collective Defence Treaty. However, that did not solve the problem. The same countries grouped against Russia within the CIS structures. They permanently resented to Russia chairing all the CIS structures, demanding rotation and went against creating a military block out of the CIS countries. “In the course of 1996-1997 a new alignment emerged involving initially Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and subsequently also Moldova: This resulted in GUAM, an informal grouping committed to deepening co-operation in the political and economic fields and to the formation of a joint peace keeping battalion.”¹³ The new alliance was clearly serving the purpose of joint defence against Russian pressures. GUAM, which was made out of the head letters of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, later changed into GUUAM, after Uzbekistan joined it. The alignment is mainly resting on co-ordinated bilateral treaties between the member countries. Despite the pressures from Russia to stop grouping within the CIS, GUUAM served as an effective tool of improving the economic, political and even military co-operation among the mentioned countries.

3. Other Regional Structures

Directly after getting independence, the post-Soviet countries started exploring the opportunities for developing of economic and political ties with other countries. The trends here were twofold: First, all the countries, except Belarus and Turkmenistan tried in one way or another to get under NATO umbrella. The main reason here was to secure the acquired independence from the political changes in Russia (the communist threat, first of all). The same reason forced all the European part of the former USSR to be serious about OSCE membership. Secondly, the economic crisis forced all the post-Soviet countries to develop bilateral or multilateral economic co-operation with their non-CIS neighbours. Thus the Baltic states developed relations with the Scandinavian countries; Ukraine started looking towards Eastern Europe; Moldova had a misfortune of relying on Romania, which was living through crisis itself at that time; Caucasus focused on Turkey and Iran, Central Asia, being locked had to rely on Iran and to much lesser extent on China.

This turn of events rapidly increased the role of Iran and Turkey in the region. That found its reflection in the establishment of multilateral organisations in the post-Soviet area. Since 1985 Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan had been active in the region, with its headquarters being located in Teheran. In 1992 “at Iran’s initiative, it was decided to expand ECO by including Azerbaijan and all Central Asian republics except Kazakhstan.”¹⁴ Later Kazakhstan joined the organisation as well and now together with Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Central Asian countries and the founders of ECO, there are 10 members.

The organisation was supposed to represent the balanced and co-ordinated enhancement of Iran and Turkey in the region. However, ECO soon became reflecting more the economic interests of Iran than of Turkey, which had to look for alternative structures. Iran appeared to be quite active in the region and already in 1992 it tried to isolate Turkey by playing with Russia alone. “To the further embarrassment of Turkey, Rafsanjani (the Iranian president – A.A.)

announced that a Caspian Sea Co-operation Council composed of the countries around the Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran – had been formed at the initiative of Teheran.”¹⁵ Turkey was left aside as a non-Caspian country.

Despite these successful moves of Iran, strategically Iran’s position was much weaker. It was the West enhancing against Russia and Turkey as a NATO member had much more advantage over the situation. Already after the Caucasian countries got the OSCE membership (Iran was not represented) and later with the participation of the post-Soviet countries in Partnership for Peace programs of NATO since 1994, the advantages of Turkey in Central Asia and Caucasus became clearer.

One more advantage of Turkey in the region is that Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics (except Tajikistan) are Turkic nations. So, ethnic solidarity is an important factor in favour of Turkey, whereas Iran has minority problems with Azeris and Turkmen within its own borders, which might severely affect the relations of Iran with the respective countries. Already in 1992 Turkey, Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics (except Tajikistan) founded the Organisation of Unity of Turkic Nations. Despite, things did not develop beyond a few summits and cultural activities, the idea may have a great future. Turkey – Azerbaijan – Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan- Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan might form a single zone of political and economic integration. The activities of Turkey in that direction lead Moscow to take a few active steps to balance the role of Turkey.

In 1992 Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSEC) was established by Istanbul Declaration as a balance between conflicting interests. Again, we have to mention that Iran got isolated. The organisation included Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. “Austria, Italy, Tunisia, Egypt, Slovakia, Israel and Poland joined it as observers.”¹⁶ Quite recently “applications to join came from Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Uzbekistan and Iran. Discussion however was referred to a future meeting, under presidency of Moldova, due to lack of preparation. Ministers said that the issue was yet right for a decision.”¹⁷

Despite the abundance of such regional co-operation structures, none of them can properly work because of the rivalry of the regional powers. Azerbaijan for example is member of ECO, BSEC and CIS at the same time. However, one can not say whether Azerbaijan really found its place in any of these structures of integration. The same is with all the other CIS countries. Baltic countries can be named as the only successful pattern, working their way out towards the EU.

4. Dynamics of Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Area

Russia had made its way to independence from the USSR by supporting the freedom movements all over the post-Soviet area. The phrase used by Yeltsin about giving to everybody as much freedom as possible was very famous. The policy of trying to keep the USSR republics under control was a policy of Gorbachev. Desperate leadership of the USSR used even military intervention in Tbilisi in April 1989, Baku in January 1990, Vilnius in January 1991. During all these actions democratic forces of Russia, lead by Yeltsin had been speaking against the Centre, defending the rights of the republics to independence. In the last three years of the USSR, between 1989 and 1991, the USSR had actively been playing the national minorities against the republics. The insurgent Mountainous Qarabagh was played against Azerbaijan, South Osetia and Abkhazia against Georgia, Trans-Dniestr against Moldova, Russian minority in Baltic against Baltic countries. And despite it did not influence the overall result and the USSR collapsed anyhow, the games brought certain successes. “In 1991 the Abkhazian authorities defied Tbilisi to hold a referendum on Gorbachev’s proposed new union treaty. The result was a large majority in favour

of joining the proposed reconstituted Soviet Union as an autonomous republic.”¹⁸

After the USSR collapsed Russia inherited the old leverages of pressure and started using it against the disloyal republics. However, between 1991 and 1992 because of temporary uncertainty of power in Russia, nationalist forces initially managed to strengthen themselves within the former Soviet Republics. This was the time when Baltic countries effectively neutralised the Russian minority, forcing them to accept the realities or leave. This was the time when the national-democratic forces came to power in Azerbaijan in 1992 and withdrew the country from the CIS and launched an effective military campaign against the Armenian separatist forces in the region of Mountainous Qarabagh. And this was the time when Georgia launched an offensive against the Abkhaz separatist forces in 1992. This was the time when ECO, BSEC, Organisation of Unity of Turkic States were established. At that stage the newly independent countries did not pay enough attention to co-operation with each other and institutionalisation of their positions through the establishment of multilateral political structures. Quite soon Russia managed to pressure each of these republics by singling them out.

In April 1993 Azerbaijan lost Kelbajar region bordering with Armenia and 60 thousand people fled. In June 1993 a coup lead by a pro-Russian colonel Suret Husseynov overthrew the nationalist government in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Armenian forces backed by Russia occupied 6 more regions of Azerbaijan taking advantage of the chaos and hundreds of thousand people lost their homes becoming refugees in their own lands, or simply Internally Displaced People (IDP). On 24 September 1993 Azerbaijan joined CIS and signed the Collective Defence Treaty. After the Abkhaz separatists, backed by Russia, had captured Sukhumi in September 1993, the president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze declared on state TV that Georgia was standing on its knees. The same month Georgia applied for CIS membership. “CIS membership, Shevardnadze concluded, was the ‘last chance’ to rescue the country from disintegration.”¹⁹ In 1994 Russia deployed its “peacekeeping

forces” in Abkhazia institutionalising its influence over the conflict management. The same model of using the CIS peacekeeping forces was proposed to Azerbaijan. Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan managed to prevent that option. In May 1994 Russia mediated the cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Bishkek, defying the role of OSCE in the region. During the Prague meeting of the OSCE in September 1994, the representatives of the organisation made serious complaints on the behaviour of Russia. “Complaints included Russia’s initiating a September 8, 1994 Azerbaijan-Armenia Moscow summit in Moscow without informing the OSCE; snubbing a OSCE Minsk Group meeting; demanding a CIS/Russian peacekeeping force in Qarabagh rather than a OSCE multinational force.”²⁰ The year 1994 was the height of the Russian domination in the post-Soviet area. It was that time when “Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov stressed after signing a military co-operation agreement with Russia in March 1994 ‘the Uzbek army has no development prospects if it does not maintain co-operation with the Russian army’.”²¹

However, already by the end of the same year the defeated group of countries started recovering and re-establishing their anti-Moscow policies this time in a new realm. In September 1994 Azerbaijan signed its first oil contracts with the Western companies. Kazakhstan adopted the same policy a year later. By the end of 1994 Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia developed contacts with NATO through PFP program. As mentioned earlier in 1996-1997 Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova established GUAM grouping, which was later joined by Uzbekistan. This time the main feature of the pro-independence policies of the republics was that a serious importance was given to the establishment of regional co-operation. The abstract alliances with the West, which was not backed with economic basis proved to be wrong tactics. The important positive factor about GUAM was that the economic co-operation between these countries would effectively substitute what those countries lacked because of loosened economic, political and military contacts with Russia. Ukraine needed energy resources, which Azerbaijan

could provide; Ukraine had a military industry inherited from the Soviet past and that could be useful to Azerbaijan and Georgia, if the military operations broke out again; Georgia with its ports could provide ideal transportation for the oil of landlocked Azerbaijan.

All of these factors played an important role in cementing GUUAM as a system of effective co-operation among the newly independent states. The U.S. and Turkey have been actively supporting GUUAM. To the deep frustration of Russia “on 18 November 1999 a framework agreement to build the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline was signed by the leaders of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the U.S.”²² during the Istanbul summit of the OSCE. The project will unite Central Asia with Turkey through Azerbaijan in a single energy project. During the same summit another agreement was signed, this time on transportation of oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Turkish port in Jayhan. Both projects serve the idea of bypassing Russia and creating direct access to the Central Asia for the West.

In order to counter the centrifugal tendencies in the CIS, Russia consolidated its efforts to enlarge the scope of integration with the rest of the member countries, which were still loyal to Moscow. Again this was done largely in the sphere of military co-operation. “On 9 December 1995 Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev and his Belarussian counterpart Leonid Maltsau signed eighteen documents on bilateral military co-operation.”²³ In 1996 about 10 military co-operation agreements were signed with Armenia. On 29 March 1996 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed a quadrilateral agreement on integration accords in Moscow. “On 2 April 1996 a broad treaty on union between Belarus and Russia was signed in Moscow by Presidents Lukashenka and Yeltsin to create a community of Sovereign States.”²⁴ Adding Armenia to that system (through the bilateral agreements with Russia) Moscow tried to make its own grouping within the CIS. The actions were sharply criticised by the leaders of the future GUAM countries at that time. “Aliyev (president of Azerbaijan – A.A.) criticised the quadrilateral grouping for elevating

certain members of the CIS to a special status and compared it to Gorbachev's failed experiments to reinvigorate the Soviet Union."²⁵

Some scholars have considered the years 1995-1996 as a period of successes for Russia's integration policy because of the agreements mentioned above. However, the agreements did not cover the whole of the CIS countries but only part of it and it did not promote the integration within the CIS, it rather sanctioned the division of camps within itself. Therefore, it is not surprising that the creation of GUUAM took place in that very period between 1996 and 1997. The following years also showed that Russia lacked the resources necessary to carry out its ambitious integration plans even within the area of the quadrilateral agreements. Despite the complete readiness of Belarus and the leadership of the Belarus to go to unification with Russia, little has been done in that direction and the reasons are purely economic. The present crisis of Russia related to its problems with Chechnya puts more dark colours into the perspectives of pro-Russian integration within the CIS.

5. Conclusions

1. The processes of local and regional co-operation as well as the institutionalisation of such relations are still being largely determined by confrontation between the newly independent states and Russia. In this set-up Russia tries to enforce close military and political co-operation close to protectorate, while the newly independent states try to defend their sovereignty;
2. Russia seems to have serious difficulties giving up its imperial policies. The reason for that might be in historical coincidence of two processes: The creation of the Russian nationhood coincided with the creation of Russian empire, "fusing the sense of Russian nationhood with the habit of imperial domination."²⁶ Despite the very authors which present this quotation do not agree with this assumption, the processes of recent years prove that statement true;

3. Russia lacks necessary resources to foster the economic integration in its “Monroe sphere.” The trends in nearly all integration accords proposed by Russia show that the high priority is given to military and political integration, whereas the economic prerogatives come as an addition to that;
4. Western countries show a great interest in the establishment of the regional structures of the post-Soviet countries. The agreement on Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, Silk Road Project, the TRACECA program on the development of communications and the infrastructure (funded by the EU) show that trend. At different times different models have been proposed to explain the motivation for creating such structures. In 1993-1994 the Western scholars had been talking about establishing a “Sanitary Cordon” consisting of the following chain: Baltic Countries – Belarus (if possible) – Ukraine – Moldova – Caucasus. The purpose of such “Cordon” was to protect the Eastern Europe from the negative changes in Russia. Later, when the changes in Russia became a remote danger, the same model was proposed as a kind of a buffer zone, but also allowing for contacts with Russia through it with possible Russian participation in the project. This was the time when the importance of Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation grew and a few Western European countries (Austria and Italy) joined the organisation with the observer status.
5. The idea of the regional co-operation mentioned above was implemented by the states of the region themselves with the establishment of GUUAM. This structure is successfully operating at the moment, uniting the efforts of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan. However, the Russian threat is the only uniting idea for this alliance so far. Such an idea can not become a founding idea for a long-term alliance. Ukraine, being a Slavic country and much closer to Russia culturally has very few in common with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Moldova looking towards Romania has the similar problems. More could be said about the idea of the “Common

Caucasian House.” However, Armenia is still allying with Russia rather than with Azerbaijan and Georgia

6. The alliance of Turkic nations spearheaded by Turkey has more potentials for a long-term integration. The oil pipeline agreements according to which the oil will be transported from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkish port of Jayhan, the agreement on Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline uniting the shores of Turkmenistan with Turkey through Azerbaijan are serious agreements that might give an impulse for further integration in the region. However, the economic potential of Turkey would play a key role in the development of this zone of integration.
7. The role of Iran is yet to be clarified in the post-Soviet zone. Iran perceives the integration of Turkic nations as a danger of isolation. At the moment, Iran sees a natural ally in Russia against the West, including Turkey. The expected transitions in the nature of the Iranian regime might help the process of the clarification of Iran’s role in the region;
8. Together with Belarus Ukraine’s natural sphere of integration rests with Russia and possibly a few more neighbouring Eastern European countries. However, no natural integration can take place unless Russia transformed its interests into economic rather than military or military-political terms and treated those countries as equals;
9. The present alliance around Russia, namely the quadrilateral arrangements covering Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the bilateral arrangements with Armenia and Tajikistan seem to be resting on fear (except maybe Belarus) and can not have a long term prospects, since the power of Russia is decreasing by time.

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3. *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), NY 1997, p.173.
4. Ibid.
5. *Russia 2010 and What it Means for the World*, Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, NY 1994, p.246.
6. Ibid., p.251.
7. The issue became a strong political trump in the hands of General Alexandr Lebed, who lead the army into a conflict with the government forces of Moldova. He later created an image of a strong man able to protect all Russians regardless to where they live and lead a strong presidential campaign in 1996.
8. *Between Marx and Muhammad. The Changing Face of Central Asia*, Dilip Hiro, London 1994, p. 326.
9. This "Monroe sphere" of Russia did not include Baltic States. Russia would remember them from time to time when Russian minority would raise its voice of dissatisfaction with the nationalistic policies of Baltic governments. Baltic States were even no more included to the term " the Near Abroad" and were not provided with any special advantages in Trans-boundary relations being very much treated as "the countries of far abroad."
10. *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds), NY 1997, p.170.
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Х ц л а с я

ССРИ-нин СЦГУТУНДАН СОНРА ПОСТ-СОВЕТ МЯКАНЫНДА ИНТЕГРАСИЙА МЕЙЛЛЯРИ

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(Вакы, Азэрбайжан)

Совет Иттифагынын дабылмасы еля сцрятля баш верди ки, щятта Сойуг Мцщарибя заманы бу юлкянин оппонентляри олмуш дювлятляр просесин бцтцнлцкдя йаратдыы чятинликлярля цзляшмяйя щазыр дейилдиляр. Совет Иттифагынын дабылмасындан аз сонра юзцнц сцгута уьрамыш империйанын вариси елан етмиш Русийа нйин бащасына олурса олсун итирилмиш сийаси вя щярби эцъцнцн бярпасына чалышмаьа башлады. Лакин щадисялярин еедишаты заман-заман Русийанын имканлары вя арзулары арасында чох буюцк зиддийятлярин олмасыны цзя чыхарды. Узун мцддят дцнйада баш верян сийаси просеслярин еедишатына куюлц тясир эюстярмиш вя щяр бир мясялядя юз хцсуси мювгейи иля щесаблашмаьа юйряшмиш Русийа чох гыса бир вахтда аьыр бир реаллыгла цзляшмяли олду. Аьыр реаллыы гябул етмякдя чятинлик чякян Русийа мцстягилликлярини йениъя газанмыш кечмиш совет республикаларынын дювлят гуруулуьунда гаршылашдыы проблемлярдян истифадя едяряк юз империалист мараьыны мцхтялиф сийаси, щярби бирликляр йаратмагла тямин етмяйя чалышды ки, буну да санки ССРи-нин башга бир мцстявидя бярпасы истигамятиндя атылмыш бир аддым кими гиймятляндирмяк оларды. 1991-ъи ил декабрын 21-дя Русийанын тяшыбцсц алтында 11 кечмиш совет республикасынын иштиракы иля Алма-Атада Мцстягил Дювлятляр Бирлийинин йарадылмасы елан олунду. Йалныз Балтик республикалары вя Эцръцстан бу бирлийин цзвлцйцндян имтина етдиляр. Аз сонра Эцръцстан бу тьасарятли аддымына эюря тьаваб вермяли олду вя 1993-ъц илдя демяк олар ки, там парчаланыб диз цстя чюкмяк тящлцкьаси гаршысында галды. Балтик юлкяляриня эялдикдя ися онларын бу аддымыны

онларын зеополитик мювгеляри шяртляндирмишди. Балтик юлкяляринин совет республикалары ичярисиндя Шимали Атлантика вя Европа Бирлийи зонасына ян йахын реэион олмаларыны вя бундан ялавя совет империйасынын сцгутундан дярщал сонра Европа Бирлийи иля эюзял ялагяляр гуруб бу Бирлийя доьру курс эютцрмялярини нязря алсаг онда бу реэионун бейнялхалг системдяки йеринин шяксиз бялли олдуьу айдын олар. Мящз бу сябябдян тядгигат ишиндя Балтик юлкяляри иля баьлы арашдырмалара даща аз йер айрылыб.

МДБ-нин йаранмасындан аз сонра Русийа бу реэионда юз щярби эщццнц бярпа етмяк мягсядиля орталыьа Коллектив Мцдафия Сазиши идеясыны атды. Кечмиш совет республикаларыны бу сазищя дахил етмякдя чятинликля цзлящян Русийа мцхтялиф тязйиг васитяляриня ял атмалы олур. Бу тязйиг васитяляри ичярисиндя сцни етник конфликтлярин йарадылмасы, игтисади-сийаси санксийаларын тятбиги чох гыса бир мцддятдя реэиону гайнар конфликтляр оьаьына чевирир. Русийа бир мцддят бу конфликтляри идаря етмякля МДБ юлкяляриндя юз уьурлу хариьи сийасятини щяйата кечирмяйя наил олур. Бу уьурлу сийасятин гурбанларына чеврилмиш юлкяляр ися юз нювбяляриндя Русийаьа гаршы айры-айрылыгда мцбаризянин еффектсиз олмасы нятиьясиндя эяляряк МДБ дахилиндя юз бирликляринин йарадылмасына наил олурлар. Бундан ялавя бу юлкяляр мцстягилликляринин тящлцкясизлийини тямин етмяк мягсядиля ири бейнялхалг гурумларын цвлцйцня дахил олмаг истигамятиндя мцяййян ишляр эюрцрляр...

Бцтцн бу мягамлара айдынлыг эятирмяк цццн йахын тарихи кечмишимизя гысаьа экскурсийа етмяк лазым эялир. Мящз бу бахымдан “ССРИ-нин сцгутундан сонра пост-совет мяканында интеграсийа мейлляри” адлы тядгигат ишинин эениш охуьу аудиторийасынын нязяриня чатдырылмасы йериня дцщцр.