

**Russia's Impact On Osh Conflict
2010 Through Kyrgyz Nationalism**

by

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Abstract

In various mass media sources and international reports was mentioned influence of someone else in Osh conflict 2010. Actually, Kyrgyz nationalism has played a crucial role in June collisions in Osh between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. It's remarkable that suffered Uzbek side was also active in actions for obtaining autonomy in the same region after the coup. The problem also was aggravated with existence of just resource problem. Exactly 20 years ago, in 1990, first Osh conflict flashed because of lands lack. Now the problem was in water and disastrous economic situation in the south of Kyrgyzstan. On belief of many, kindle a fire of interethnic riots in Central Asia could benefit Russian authorities in order to win time after the overthrow of Bakiyev. In fact, there wasn't need any special help for increasing tensions in region in period of governmental vacuum. Russia's influence, cooperation and impact on Osh events by means of Kyrgyz nationalism will be considered through a prism of ethno – symbolism approach.

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Introduction

The Osh conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks repeated again exactly in 20 years in June 2010. The reasons of mass bloody collisions were not only interethnic, but coming out more from national, even nationalistic and socio-economic factors. They created great tension in relations of two ethnic groups, which was obviously convex in compare to other ethnic relationship of Central Asian states.¹ Analyzing and considering materials and sources on this subject it became impossible to exclude influence of foreign power from outside, which have impact on course of riots. Many events and their reasons are indicators in themselves of ambiguity and strange discrepancy that causes huge number of questions.

Historically main actor in Central Asia was Russia. Actually, roots of the Osh conflict go deeply in times of colonial policy of Tsar Russia. Then, formed USSR remade existing map and drew new borders. As a result of that some ethnic groups appeared in the territory of two states at once or just outside of their natural borders. This big problem of the region is well reflected through in a micro issue of one region of a certain state – in this case it's Osh of Kyrgyzstan. The main goal of this work is detection of Russia's foreign policy in this conflict and its impact on course of the events which have led to Osh conflict. There is a certain collection of reasons and factors which have been used as tools for influence or pressure from the former metropole.

First chapter is about a way, which has passed Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after collapse of USSR². The main emphasis is placed on their relationship and partnership with Russia. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan rushed between pro-Russian and pro-Western oriented organizations without fixed opportunity to choose one: it was entering and then leaving organizations. Owing to its relative wealth of resources, Uzbekistan could allow itself such policy, but Kyrgyzstan entirely depended on Russia in all spheres. Everything changed after 2000 when in Central Asia amplified influence of the USA, which began to restrict influence of Moscow in two Central Asian States. For counteraction to terrorism coming

¹Stuart J. Kaufman, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence", *International Security*, Vol. 30(4), (2001): 17

² Rajan Menon, "In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia", *International Security*, Vol. 20(1), (1995): 156

from Afghanistan the USA rents bases in Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad) and in Kyrgyzstan (Manas). In result a unique situation occurred in Kyrgyzstan, where situated at once two bases: American and Russian called Kant. Such difficult political situation promised to Kyrgyzstan future difficulties. The president of Uzbekistan under the pretext of being the guarantor of security in the region suppressed antigovernment protests meanwhile.³

Further there is analysis of resources and opportunities of two countries and their use in a game of politics. Kyrgyzstan has no natural resources, but there are great stocks of water. Water in Central Asia means a lot, as a acute shortage of water is felt and therefore its existence is put on one place with presence of natural gas or cotton. It's even called blue gold.⁴ Despite existence of one of the biggest water reservoirs of Central Asia, Toktogul, the Osh area suffered from lack of water. The closest river Ak-Bura constantly needed cleaning because of mud streams that made its water dull. Struggle for resources in Osh region already was a potential threat for peace and stability. The similar reason plus land division issue provoked the first Osh conflict in 1990.

In the subsequent two chapters attention is paid to rising nationalism, generally Kyrgyz, which was directed actually against all non-Kyrgyz in country. Growth of nationalist sentiments together with poverty and huge social and economic problems has already prepared soil for the future conflict. Kyrgyz tried to find their place in history; they addressed to their traditions and ancient cult.⁵ The Uzbek nationalism rose in counterbalance to an existing regime. Appeared personalities, trying to realize their national Uzbek projects out of Uzbekistan. However, intensity was only oral: in words and in mass media, but don't turn into

³Reuel R. Hanks, *Global Security Watch: Central Asia* (CA, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010): 142

⁴Ibid., 73

⁵ Matt Siegel, "In Kyrgyzstan Nationalism Rises from the Ashes", *Daily Times*, August 26, 2010 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C08%5C26%5Cstory_26-8-2010_pg20_9

physical opposition.⁶ At that time in Kyrgyzstan Tulip revolution took place and new president Kurmanbek Bakiyev promised changes to the best.

Soon Bakiyev became objectionable for Russia, as he didn't keep his promise to close for Americans base Manas. In Russian mass media rose anti-Bakiyev wave. Also internal discontent with him undermined Bakiyev's reputation. Split in Kyrgyzstan between South and North grew: there were his supporters in the South and opponents in the North. In fact, it was a good moment for management for the third side; at the same time in the South in Osh an Uzbek movement rose, which demanded for itself self-regulated autonomy.

Soon events stretched one after another in a chain: Bakiyev's overthrow and then anarchy, establishment of Interim Government and, finally, violence explosion: Osh riots. The Osh riots caused much doubt, suspicions and simply questions as occurred spontaneously and violently. They became continuation of April events. Division to North and South and also subsequent division of certain region residents into Kyrgyz and Uzbeks can be considered in a context of ethno-symbolism. This idea could be used for influence deduction in two states at once. An actor, which deepens distinctions between two warring sides, becomes the general denominator.

⁶ Daniil Kislov, "Kirgizy i Uzbeki nikogda ne Otkryli by Drug na Druga Ogon, Esli by ni Provokaciya" [The Kyrgyz and Uzbeks Would Never Have Opened Fire against Each Other, Unless a Provocation] *Radio France Internationale*, May 2, 2012

Chapter I. Policy of Russia and the USA in Central Asia during the post-Soviet period.

§ 1.1 Uzbekistan in international political arena.

Relationship between two countries - Russia and Uzbekistan gained very spasmodic character with beginning of post-Soviet period at once. Despite statements of full readiness to cooperate and be ally of Russia Uzbekistan sought to provide its own policy at which it could construct lines of cooperation with the West, the USA, Russia and other regional neighbors as well. But such multivector policy for the newly appeared state couldn't allow it to concentrate on specific objectives for maintaining a certain political course and stay part from conflict issues of Central Asia. Thus, maneuvering in a choice of close partners went by Uzbekistan in a zigzag way. It can be revealed more obviously from a membership history of Uzbekistan in the international governmental organizations, such as CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)^{7,8}

Both CSTO and GUAM are two absolutely different and opposite organizations in their foreign policy orientation. Actually, GUAM was created for a counterbalance to CSTO in 1997. Just the main divergence in their positions is attitude toward relations and close cooperation with Russia. In this case in pursued policy of the president of Uzbekistan since 1990 Islam Karimov are noticeable change of allies on a certain period of time and after return to previous one again.⁹ During the period from 1992 till 1999 Uzbekistan participated in CSTO and was ally of the Russian Federation at that time.

⁷Collective Security Treaty Organisation, o.w. <http://odkb-csto.org>

⁸GUAM, Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, o.w.
<http://guam-organization.org>

⁹Islam Karimov, *Uzbekskiy narod nikoqda i ni ot kogo ne budet zaviset [Uzbek nation will never depend from anyone]* Vol. XIII (Tashkent:Uzbekiston, 2005), 45

Two largest states of Central Asia - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were quite enough for being of CA in the field of Russia's influence. Uzbekistan was keen on bilateral defence cooperation with Russia; agreements in May 1992 and March 1994, when I. Karimov began to refer to Russian "imperialistic" ambitions, these treaties appear to have lapsed or remained merely blueprints.¹⁰ That's why Uzbekistan was treated very watchfully in CSTO.

Such conclusion can be drawn out on the basis of various Russian political experts opinions after Uzbekistan's escape from CSTO. The head of the Russian Institute of strategic estimates Alexander Konovalov: "Uzbekistan always was "a problem country" for CSTO. Uzbekistan disagreed with estimates from abroad which became concerning its domestic policy, sometimes happened that Uzbekistan don't want to incur the expenses related to membership in this organization, to carry out together some doctrines, to delegate its own divisions for joint forces of CSTO. Uzbekistan always was "a cat walking by its own way."¹¹ It was an appeal to Uzbekistan leaving CSTO already for the second time in 2012.

But there was one event, which changed prospects of development of relations of Uzbekistan and Russia before Uzbekistan's exit from CSTO and its immediate accession to GUAM. Appeared a political triangle where the third party was the USA.¹²

On February 16, 1999 occurred a bloody act of terrorism in Tashkent: six explosions happened in the central part of the city one by one. As a result 16 people were killed and more than 100 wounded. Islam Karimov right there condemned this act of terrorism having called it work of Islamists who want to destabilize situation in the country and to move him away personally. Right there began mass arrests over all country of those who was anyway suspected of connections with various pro-Islamic movements.¹³ Juma Namangani and Takhir Yuldashev were immediately accused. Uzbekistan closed its border with Tajikistan

¹⁰Rajan Menon, Yuri Fedorov and Ghia Nodia, *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the 21st century Security Environment* (New York, Armonk: EastWest Institute, 1999), 34

¹¹ Tatiyana Zamakhina, Uzbekistan uxodit iz "SNGshnogo" NATO [Uzbekistan leaves NATO of "CIS"], *Moskovskiy Komsomolets RU*, June 28, 2012

¹²Roman Muzalevskiy, "Russia's Strategy in Central Asia: An Analysis of Key Trends", *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, no. 1 (2009): 28

¹³Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia*, 1st ed (New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 54

alleging a Tajik connection to the bombings.¹⁴ These explosions in Tashkent responded as an echo not only in the Uzbekistan, but also beyond its borders.

According to opinion of the independent Uzbek experts living out of Uzbekistan these acts of terrorism were provoked specially by state's government for disposal of objectionable oppositionists, as there was a risk government change by revolution. However, the official version was that "Hizb Ut-Tahrir" group prepared these explosions. Further actions of Uzbek government showed what happened in Tashkent also helped for balancing of in a sheaf Uzbekistan - Russia. But the version of preparation terror act in Tashkent by Islamic radicals nevertheless was more confirmed, as members of the organization didn't hide the long-term plans and were open in fight for establishment of Shariah on all territory of Uzbekistan and after all in Central Asia. Therefore alternative versions about preparation of act of terrorism by other forces remained only unconfirmed guesses. Many citizens of Uzbekistan supported I. Karimov's preventive actions of the establishment of radical Islamic groups and identification of all participants of them.

With all that Uzbekistan had an obvious danger from Afghanistan - penetration and distribution of radical Islamic movements on its territory.¹⁵ It was necessary to get serious support for resisting them. Uzbekistan assumed long ago to stay apart from the Russian course of policy and now there was a convenient case to establish new coil of relations with the USA.¹⁶ So, in April 1999 Uzbekistan was included into GUAM and became its full member. Parallel to this were developing relations and joint cooperation in the safety sphere in the region with the USA.

Relations with Russia became cooled and two states participate in common economic projects. But very soon Uzbekistan became a member of SCO, as many experts think, owing to its geopolitical circumstances.¹⁷ Despite accession to SCO a military base located in Karshy-Khanabad, in the south of Uzbekistan, was given fro use to the USA troops.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 55

¹⁵Vitaly Naumkin, *Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle* (Lanham, MD: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 225

¹⁶Rajan Menon et al., *op.cit*, p. 68

¹⁷Eugene Rumer et al., *Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing* (New York, Armonk, M.E.Sharpe, 2007), 36

Certainly, such act puzzled politicians of the Kremlin. But for Uzbekistan itself the period from 2001 to 2005 passed under skillful maneuvering between different powers in the region. According to I. Karimov, Uzbekistan, finally, was forming its own independent and sovereign way of progress.¹⁸

But year of 2005 literally stirred up Central Asia. In the Uzbek Andijan escalated a huge unrest, which was suppressed so cruelly that those events entered into history under the name of the Andijan massacre.¹⁹ In neighbor Kyrgyzstan a revolution took place and president A. Akayev was governing the country for the last days of his presidency. Many articles of newspapers and journals dazzled with headings that Central Asia gets rid of freight of the communistic-Soviet remnants and begins a new era without the former Komsomols.

The Russian press showed the indignation concerning ease and simplicity of situation correction together by West and the USA in the region, trying to provoke escalations artificially. The head of state I. Karimov called again Hizb Ut-Tahrir organization guilty in preparing the Andijan unrest and promised to fight against any manifestation of religious extremism.²⁰ Everything was repeated exactly as it was once in Tashkent terroristic act. But many residents of Central Asia states considered that Andijan events were just a clan race for gaining governance and attempt to organize revolution in Uzbekistan like it happened in Kyrgyzstan.

I. Karimov covered Andijan massacre with a label of extremism in order to be able to eliminate from affairs of the opponents under the name of struggle against rebels. In many sources according to Andijan tragedy very often were mentioned bloody and mass massacres

¹⁸ Islam Karimov, *Nasha visshaya tsel – nezavisimost i protsvetanie Rodini, svoboda i blagopoluchie naroda* [Our prime aim is independence and prosperity of Homeland, freedom and well-being of the nation] Vol. VIII, (Ташкент: Узбекистон, 2005), 78

¹⁹ “How the Andijan killings unfolded”, *BBC News/Asia-Pacific*, May 17 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4550845.stm>

²⁰ Ekaterina Kubovskaya, “Posle Andijana budet tolko Andijan” [After Andijan it will be again Andijan], *Pervaya Krimskaya*, №74, May 26, 2005

over participants.²¹ Andijan, in fact, became one more starting point in development of the relations between Uzbekistan about Russia - interests of two heads of states concerning deduction of the political power and suppression of protests exactly met here. These actions of the president had quite weighty reasons for him. Akram Yuldash and his followers, which were called “akramists”, applied for change in Uzbek government.²²

Akram Yuldash was a new figure in political life of Uzbekistan, he openly declared the pro-Islamic ideology of his organization and tried to build a certain oppositional line with his supporters to the incumbent president. But, besides all this, it is impossible to speak about exact reliable information as the opinions received from various sources differ and provide absolutely opposite versions, which is out of wonder, considering bias or involvement of various information sources. In many aspects opinions of Central Asian residents were similar that presenting in region fundamental Islamic factor at Andijhan is true and also that mutiny were financed from the outside.²³

The USA and the European countries sharply scarified actions of the Uzbek authorities against protesters and even entered sanctions against Uzbekistan.²⁴ For president Karimov it was something like a signal for changes in state. In Uzbek political elite rose a question of how expedient was to continue close cooperation with the USA, which will promote changes in a country mode sooner or later. It is possible that harsh change of political guideline of Uzbekistan happened because of above-mentioned events.

Uzbekistan not only again entered CSTO, but also became a member of Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). Eurasian Economic Community or EurAsEs often is called

²¹“Bullets were falling like rain. The Andijan Massacre” May13, 2005, Vol. 17, No.5 (D), *Report of Human Rights Watch*, 2005 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/>

²²“Yuldashev otdaval prikazi o zakhvate vlastnix struktur v Andijane” [Yuldashev was giving orders to capture government organs in Andijan], *RIA “Novosti”*, Institute of Religion and Politics, October 19, 2005 <http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-1201.html>

²³Lena Jonson, *op.cit*, p. 56

²⁴“EU to discuss future of sanctions against Uzbekistan over Andijan massacre”, *Uznews*, October 13, 2007 http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=31&nid=1218

an organization of Moscow's attempt to revive the Soviet Union.²⁵ Many positions in it fix the uniform customs duties and export tax tariffs for participants: a peculiar policy of an economic binding. Also member states of this organization closely cooperate practically in all scopes. But membership of Uzbekistan in this organization also was short-lived; it left it in 2008.²⁶

The second stage of flexible policy between allies - Russia on the one hand and both the West and the USA on the other hand - began. The policy of the Kremlin in every possible way sought to promote rapprochement with president Karimov as Uzbekistan was some kind of buffer zone between Russia and Afghanistan. American troops were deployed in Afghanistan, so there was a possibility of recapture to Karshi-Khanabad.²⁷ According to local Uzbek and Central Asian sources, Uzbekistan decided to follow a way of golden mean, trying not to give any shift to one of the sides. Uzbekistan's maneuvers on the international arena should not all be reduced to a game of choice between the West and Russia.

China plays an equally important role in the foreign policy of Tashkent. For Beijing, the one-way intensification of U.S. policy in Central Asia is as disadvantageous as Russia's absolute domination over the region.²⁸ Thus, Uzbekistan is compelled to reckon with a triangle of foreign powers, which are present in the region.

§ 1.2 Russian – Kyrgyz - American interrelations.

Kyrgyzstan is a small poor country located at the intersection of geopolitical and geostrategic interests of three superpowers - China, Russia and the USA. As well as the neighboring Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the country which has no influence on global processes

²⁵Boris Rumer, Stanislav Zhukov, *Central Asia, The Challenges of Independence* (New York, Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1998), 21

²⁶Eurasian Economic Community o.w. <http://www.evrazes.com/>

²⁷Neil J. Melvin, Bhavna Dave, *Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008) 380

²⁸Sergey Markedonov, "Uzbekistan: The End of a Multi-vector Foreign Policy?" *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2012

and which throughout post-Soviet time solves problems of building of the statehood basically at the expense of external donors.²⁹ This short and capacious definition given to Kyrgyzstan by the Russian professor of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University directly indicates germs of future conflicts. Difficult economic situation within the country and absence or quite small quantity of resources, minerals and also goods for export does the country unattractive in comparison with its rich neighbors in this aspect.

But existence of the internal conflicts, both ethnic and regional and social class dismantling as well makes Kyrgyzstan even more vulnerable. All this forces to look for more favorable and useful ally not only in the region, but also beyond it.

It should be noted that after collapse of the Soviet Union Kyrgyzstan was one of the most loyal states among others towards foreign policy of Russia. First, mutual economic and trade cooperation between two countries played a favorable role.

Secondly, the huge percent of the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the large administrative and industrial cities also had a big influence as Russians occupied the most considerable part of state positions.^{30,31}

Thirdly, there are contracts on close military cooperation and presence of the Russian armies on territories of Kyrgyzstan and also placement of military facilities of one state on the territory of another, preservation of developed military communications and production, sharing of military ranges and training centers and supply of arms, military equipment and

²⁹ Alexander Knyazev, *Kyrgyzstan and Russia: Security, Cooperation and Development perspectives in the Central Asian region*, (Bishkek: Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, 2008), 3

³⁰ Elena Yarkova, "Russkie v Kirgizii: Sotsiokulturnaya dinamika mejetnicheskix otnosheniy" [Russians in Kyrgyzstan: Social and cultural dynamics of interethnic relationship], *Obshestvennye Nauki I Sovremennost*, No 5 (1999) : 107

³¹ Bulat Sarygulov, *Izmenenie etnicheskogo sostava naseleniya* [Change of ethnic component of population] In *Naselenie Kyrgyzstana v nachale XXI veka* [Population of Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of XXI century] ed. M. Denisenko (YUNFPA, Bishkek, 2011), 82

other appliances.³² Participating in CSTO, SCO and EurAsEs reflects priorities of state's political orientation. One of key factors in cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia was opening of an air base in Kant. Soon Russian troops were allocated there. On October 23, 2003 President Vladimir Putin participated personally at opening ceremony in Kant. In the same day some agreements concerning close military mutual cooperation were signed. Kyrgyzstan became tightly attached to Russia not only by obligations of participating in regional organizations but also directly as a state drawn by economic and military bonds.³³

Here was obviously visible that political relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan were constructing easier and smoother than in Russia-Uzbekistan sheaf. Such regional status of Kyrgyzstan gave another international actors more maneuvers for actions in Central Asia. The situation in Kyrgyzstan, unstable in whole because of many internal factors, could be used for political pressure upon neighboring countries. States like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with which Kyrgyzstan had unsolved boundary problems could be a target of regional and international influence of powers like Russia, the USA and China.

The USA also made an attempt to improve and develop closer American-Kyrgyz relations after opening "Kant" air base.³⁴ Even participation of Kyrgyzstan in NATO programs like "Partnership for Peace" played very insignificant role in the USA-Kyrgyzstan affairs; despite American and Kyrgyz military have conducted joint bilateral and multilateral military exercises. The National Guard of Kyrgyzstan has conducted joint military exercises in Montana with the National Guard of this state, during which they shared expertise in conducting military actions in mountainous areas.³⁵ Domination of the Kremlin policy in Kyrgyz international relations with other states was available. But it's impossible to say that

³² Rossiysko-kirguzskoe voennoe i voenno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo [*Russian-Kyrgyz military and military-technical cooperation*] Embassy of RF in Kyrgyz Republic, o.w. <http://www.kyrgyz.mid.ru/vivtc.html>

³³ Alexander Knyazev, op.cit, 5

³⁴ "U.S. Relations with Kyrgyzstan", Fact Sheet, *Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs*, November 16, 2012

³⁵ Baktybek Abdrysaev, US-Kyrgyz Strategic Cooperation, Lecture №760, *The Heritage Foundation*, June 18, 2002

Kyrgyzstan accepted this way of partnership without doubts.³⁶ It had no other choice except agreement with regional requirements that have been put by Russia. But Kyrgyzstan managed to make attempts for improving relations with the USA. These discussions were far going, even dispute about military cooperation was held. It specifies Kyrgyzstan as a state trying to keep in touch with other actors as well as Uzbekistan, and despite its complicated situation to expose the multi-vector line of foreign policy.

The offer of the USA to use “Manas” air base put a new turn Kyrgyz-American interrelations. The USA needed to get support from states of the region during operations in Afghanistan after events of September 11, 2001. Representatives of Kyrgyzstan coordinated the decision on granting “Manas” air base to American troops at SCO and SCTO meetings.³⁷ Thus, “Manas” air base became a dislocation of the American military forces in Kyrgyzstan. Quite interesting case turned out in global politics: military bases of the USA and Russia were settled down on the territory of one country in close proximity from each other.

On one hand, it proved flexibility of the policy pursued by the Kyrgyz government. But on another hand, many experts were afraid that sooner or later any conflict could develop from this non-understandable situation. Certainly, times of cold war passed for a long time and now there was no opinion concerning conflict escalation because of influence zones between Russia and the USA.³⁸ Considering a number of problems in Kyrgyzstan’s social, economic and political life it was possible to tell that standing of different political orientated states’ troops only aggravated the provision of the latent conflicts and warmed up future uncertainty in questions of regional development.

After revolution of 2005 when Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to the power relations and cooperation between the USA and Kyrgyzstan sharply grew cold. First of all, it was expressed in a question of stay term extension of American troops at “Manas”. So, from July

³⁶ Aleksandr Kim, “Kto zashitit bezopasnost' Kyrgyzstana: SSHA ili Rossiya” [Who will defend Kyrgyzstan's security: the USA or Russia], *Moya stolitsa*, April 18, 2003 <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1050700020>

³⁷Roman Muzalevskiy, op.cit, 37

³⁸Edward Allworth, *Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance*, 3rd ed (North Carolina, Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 86

2005 to July 2006 the status of the Manas, U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan, became a central issue in U.S.-Kyrgyz relations and within Kyrgyz domestic politics.³⁹

Bakiyev as pro-Russian focused politician tried to resolve this issue with the help of price increase that has to be bring leave air base by Americans. But the USA policymakers were interested in preservation troops at this air base more than ever. Donald Ramsfeld, Minister of Defence of the USA, personally visited Bishkek for this purpose. Soon with similar visit to Bishkek arrived the US Secretary of State- Condoleezza Rice.⁴⁰ All this weakened efforts of Russia on complete control and allied cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that here Russia wasn't more the only player in the region. There was a considerable setof projects modeling of regional or ideological integration in which Kyrgyzstan was involved.

³⁹Alexander Cooley, *Manas Matters: The Changing Politics of The U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan*, Barnard College, *Columbia University*, December 2006

⁴⁰Alexander Knyazev, *op.cit*, 6

Chapter II. The reasons, which preceded to the Osh conflict.

§ 2.1 First Osh conflict as fight for social inequality between Uzbek and Kyrgyz people.

It's worth to pay close attention to the Osh conflict of 1990, which preceded to the Osh conflict of 2010. The second conflict went back to the first escalation in Osh region, where unrest began. The Osh conflict in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1990 was one of the largest and most violent riot-type conflicts on the territory of the former USSR.⁴¹ If to consider conflict directly between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan then to the forefront came out actions of certain groups or organizations of these states. There was an association "Osh Ajmagy" (means "Osh Region") in Kyrgyzstan, which provided interests of Kyrgyz residents of Osh. From the Uzbek side the public organization "Adolat" was protecting interest of Uzbek population living in Osh.⁴² In this case apple of discord between two nations was sharing of land sectors for infrastructure. This question couldn't be solved peacefully and very soon expanded to scale of slaughter.

The end of '89 and beginning of the '90 was marked by splash of Kyrgyz nationalist movements not only in Osh but also over all country. Collisions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and Russians as well happened in Jalal-Abad and Uzgen cities. But worst of all protests were in Osh. There was a sharp problem of lands shortage. This task, which had to be solved by officials and representatives of government, remained a big problem throughout

⁴¹ Peter Roudik, *The History of the Central Asian Republics* (Connecticut, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007), 143

⁴² Nurbek Omuraliyev, "Oshskaya reznia 1990-ogo goda, Khronologiya tragedii" [Osh massacre of 1990, Chronology of a tragedy] June 8, 2010, *Fergana News* <http://www.kp.kg/daily/24501.4/653645/>

long time. Kyrgyz were very dissatisfied with that their requirements remained without any answer.⁴³

They tried to allocate for themselves some parts of Osh land for buildings. The association “Osh Ajmagy” was the main initiator of it. About 5 thousand Kyrgyz gather for meeting on the territory of high school №38 in collective farm named after Lenin on May 27.⁴⁴ Head chiefs of the Osh area also arrived there. Chairman of regional executive committee declares that 32 hectares of cotton fields would be allocated for buildings to Kyrgyz residents. However, according to Uzbek residents and eyewitnesses everything didn't occur so peacefully. Gathered for meeting Kyrgyz protesters behaved extremely aggressively and tried to attack Uzbeks.

There were numerous skirmishes between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek population of Osh on the same day. Uzbeks were very dissatisfied with such progressing situation in Osh. "Kyrgyz came here from mountains: today they seized our earth and tomorrow will expel us from our own houses" – such opinions spread quickly among Uzbeks.⁴⁵ According to Shavkat Rahmon, Uzbek writer and public figure of Uzbekistan, who researched first Osh conflict in details, representatives of Kyrgyz government behaved extremely careless in this situation. Many people of the Uzbek community of Osh waited for resolute actions from Kyrgyz officials, which would condemn impudent behavior of “Osh Ajmagy” union. At the same time among the Kyrgyz population began to spread rumors about Uzbeks considering them alien robbers of lands. This entire startled situation even more.

The secretary of regional party committee Usen Saddykov more than the others kindled international discord, trying to show, in fact, domestic conflict as an interethnic collision. Many considered that he was providing policy of Zhumagulov right there in

⁴³ Kathleen Collins, *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*, 2nd ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 118

⁴⁴ Shavkat Rakhmon, *Pochemu uzbeki doljni jit v gorode, a kyrgyzy v derevne*, K istorii 1-oy Oshskoy rezni [Why Uzbeks should live in a city but Kyrgyz in a village, To the history of the 1st Osh massacre], In *Iskusstvo Zagovora*, 1st ed, (Tashkent: Fan, 1993), 48

⁴⁵ Nurbek Omuraliyev, op.cit

Osh.⁴⁶ Zhumagulov was a chairman of Board of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and had power to ask chairman of collective farming of Osh to sign the decree about allocation of land grounds for Kyrgyz.

But this assignment had to pass a row of various bureaucratic procedures and only to be approved. But officials weren't in a hurry with answer; meanwhile conflict of Osh population already started becoming ripe.

But Kyrgyz had their own version of these events. According to major of Osh of that time, Melis Myrzakmatov, a conflictness was proceeded from the Uzbek side and, if to be more exact, from Uzbek separatists, living in Osh.⁴⁷

The Uzbek population of Osh was involved in all spheres of activity in the region: Uzbeks held state positions, had cultural centers, own living massives, were engaged in business and economy. Various sport and cultural events were arranged together by Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. No discrimination could be seen in Osh toward Uzbek minority. But created in Uzbekistan "Adolat" association, that means justice, gathered under its idea many extremely radical Uzbek nationalists.⁴⁸ Certainly, right there appeared leaders and spiritual ideologists of this organization - Kadyrzhan Batyrov and Inomzhan Abdurasulov. Subsequently their names will incline in mass media even much after Osh events.

Batyrov, which was a businessman at that time then would lead "Vatan" party.⁴⁹ Members of "Adolat" were among the first reacted to the statement of the Kyrgyz society "Osh Ajmagy" about granting lands of collective farming community to them for building houses. To support Osh Uzbeks "Adolat" also organized meeting on certain date in order to meet with Kyrgyz demanders.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Shavkat Rakhmon op.cit, 100

⁴⁷ Melis Myrzakmatov, *Впоисках истины [Searching the Truth]* (Bishkek: Turar, 2011), 27

⁴⁸ O'zbekiston Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi, o.w.<http://www.adolat.uz>

⁴⁹ Sergei Burlachenko: "Kyrgyzstan: slezi kyrgyzov, gore uzbekov" [Kyrgyzstan: tears of Kyrgyz and tragedy of Uzbeks] Interview with Kadyrdzan Batyrov, *Ejenedel'nik 2000*, September 18, 2010 <http://2000.net.ua/2000/forum/puls/68993>

⁵⁰ Nurbek Omuraliyev, op.cit

It should be noted that officials from both sides didn't try to affect seriously on current situation somehow. It was obvious that the situation was heating and becoming critical and after its peak it would be hardly possible to avoid collisions between two sides. This opinion is shared both by Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides. Both sides are sure now that if there was a timely intervention in affairs of communities and a quick solution then could be avoided growth of problem to huge scales.⁵¹ The atmosphere in the cities of Osh was noticeably heated. Uzbeks started refusing housing hiring to Kyrgyz, therefore more than 1500 Kyrgyz lodgers that were living on private apartments at Uzbeks were on the street. These houseless lodgers filled up rows of those who demand allocation of the land ground.

Kyrgyz in a categorical form demanded from the authorities to give them the final answer about granting lands.⁵² Uzbeks also waited for the final answer concerning lands. There was put a concrete date: 4th of June. Much before 4th of June many people already assumed that this day wouldn't pass just like others. Tensions were too high.

Rumors and unchecked information also added oil in fire and promoted growth of hostility. Some claim that Kyrgyz and Uzbeks prepared for a showdown on a protest place before that date. Kyrgyz protesters who considered themselves offended on their own land in Osh region of Kyrgyzstan were showing special activity for forthcoming meeting. Also many Kyrgyz considered that their requirement is obliged to be satisfied; after all they are title nation in their country.⁵³

On 4th of June from two arguing sides on a field of collective farming community gathered crowds of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Between them settled down with a thin chain armed police with machine guns. According to one data, Uzbeks began first: the Uzbek youth, being drunk tried to break through a cordon of police and to attack Kyrgyz. Stones and bottles

⁵¹ Marco Buttino, *In a Collapsing Empire, Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union* (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1993), 302-303

⁵² Melis Myrzakmatov, op.cit, 126

⁵³ Azamat Tynayev, "Oshsjie sobitiya 90-go – i tragicheskaya stranitsa, i tyajeliy urok" [Osh riots of '90 is both tragic page and hard lesson], Interview with Shamshibek Medetbekov, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 3, 2010

departed to policemen. Uzbeks even took two fighters of special mission unit. In an hour the crowd became uncontrollable and policemen started shooting. But there is absolutely opposite opinion in compare to given above description of collision beginning.

The Kyrgyz enraged by hearings that Uzbeks look down to Kyrgyz decided to attack them. Uzbeks were trying to reject pressure. Trigger was a fact that somebody from Uzbek crowd began to cry out words “Autonomy! Autonomy!” For Kyrgyz it was as a signal for reaction.⁵⁴ Crowd of Kyrgyz having heard shots and having felt aggression of the opposite side began to arm with sticks, stones, metal rods and other things. People began to break up trees growing on the edge of a field. Though there were radical - minded persons in crowd, nevertheless people kept silent.

Among Kyrgyz people sounded appeals not to give in to provocation, not to move towards the Uzbek crowd. Some activists of “Osh-Ajmagy” called everyone for tranquility and noted that their purpose is to achieve allocation of the land grounds but not fighting with Uzbek population of the city.⁵⁵ At the same time activists declared that if Uzbeks will approach to them and will start attacking them, then they will receive worthy repulse. From the Uzbek crowd members “Adolat” union they were the most active as they cried out various slogans existing on Kyrgyz protesters as a red rag on a bull.

From all this it is possible to draw out an opinion that members of two associations were the main instigators of disorders during meeting on the field. But it was only the beginning. Further actions were acts of violence and murder. The situation got out of control and open fight between two warring sides began. Meeting planned for 3 o'clock dispersed in only 35 minutes. Many analysts noticed later that such carrying out of meeting reflect planning of such actions before.

It confirms fact of long lasting events that didn't end on a day, which succeeded to manage with small losses, but proceeded further. Actually, there was a war of quarters over all Osh cities next days. Riots against Uzbeks occurred in Uzgen city, in villages Gulcha, Zhurkun, Mirza-Aki and others. In Fergana, Andijan and Namangan administrative areas

⁵⁴ Shavkat Rakhmon op.cit, 103

⁵⁵ Nurbek Omuraliyev, op.cit

were noted facts of beating persons of Kyrgyz nationality by Uzbeks. There were arsons of houses where lived Kyrgyz and that caused a flow of Kyrgyz refugees from the territory of Uzbekistan. The conflict between two communities being domestic began to accept interethnic coloring. Residents of Osh, both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz had one strong feeling - feeling of revenge. The Soviet army also was settled down on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. It didn't allow passing conflict to a war phase, but disorders proceeded with the same force.

In time of distemper intellectuals and public figures of two countries could undertake something useful to stop a real bloodshed. And such person appeared – this was famous Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov who urged Kyrgyz first to stop clashes. He personally went to Osh to talk with Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and communicated a lot with youth of the region and elders.⁵⁶ Many people considered that exactly Aitmatov's trying at last managed to make so-called reconciliation of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz more, than trying of all other officials together taken.

There was no wonder in this as chairmen and heads of states of that time entirely depended on recommendations from Moscow, namely from the Kremlin, and couldn't act free. The chairman of the Central Committee of CPSU of Kyrgyzstan Absamat Masaliyev practically stayed idle and was exposed with rigid criticism both by Kyrgyz population and regional chairmen. It is possible to say that Masaliyev was literally broken off between the difficult situation in state and coupling of his actions of regulation of Osh conflict with the Center of USSR.⁵⁷ The violence was finally halted by the deployment of over 2,000 members of the Soviet airborne.

It was six months before Moscow felt the situation had normalized to the point that the troops could be withdrawn.⁵⁸ Already in the middle of political crisis when the Soviet

⁵⁶ Raul Mallermann, *U podnojiya gori Suleyman-too ili padayushie Gori* [At the mountain bottom of Souleymane-too or Falling Mountains], doc.f., (Bishkek: Khizr A.S., 2010) FLV

⁵⁷ Shavkat Rakhmon, op.cit

⁵⁸ Andrey Yashlavskiy, "Kyrgyziya: nasilie v vozvrashennoy forme" [Kyrgyzstan: violence in the returned form], *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, June 17, 2010

www.mk.ru/politics/interview/2010/06/17/510606-kirgiziya-nasilie-v-vozvrashennoy-forme.html.

Union collapsed and republics were left to their own devices, Masaliyev organized president elections where Askar Akayev won.

§ 2.2 Estimating first Osh riots.

Right there after the Osh events were written reports of KGB, where reasons, which have led to emergence of the conflict, were specified.⁵⁹ There is a remarkable fact of absence of special commission investigating Osh events at that time. Only after a while each side - Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – would study this conflict for itself. In a case of Kyrgyzstan investigations were interrupted and sometimes even stopped by unclear reasons. In KGB report were a great variety of reasons but the main and the most influencing was the land inequality between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks residents of Osh.

There was noted that Osh slaughter was result of ignoring by the authorities social problems of the region, increasing discontent because of uneven distribution of municipal posts between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, splash of the Kyrgyz nationalism in all areas of Kyrgyzstan and also features of clan and breed psychology of both nations. Also negative perception of poorer ethnic Kyrgyz that Uzbeks were becoming more prosperous and controlling the markets.⁶⁰

The officials of Osh region and its cities didn't estimate this situation properly and, thereby, gave the chance for it to pour out into an open collision. Also was a chance of violence and murders prevention if in due time regional structures could interfere and localize it with strict measures without having allowed it to spread over neighbour regions. Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides have agreed with some resolutions of this report but both declared that such mass riots lasting for a certain period of time couldn't have just spontaneous character without approval of certain forces.

⁵⁹“The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan”, Asia Report, N°193, *International Crisis Group*, NGO, under Louise Arbour presidency, August 23, 2010, 3

⁶⁰Ibid.

This information is confirmed only by Kyrgyz and Uzbek persons, which were considering Osh riots. In this question meet opinions of eyewitnesses and politicians standing on the different parties of barricades during the conflict. For example, Zhypar Zheksheev who has become in May 1990 one of cochairmen of "Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan" and after was a secretary general of the national commission of Kyrgyzstan for UNESCO is convinced that the fault for the Osh events lies on KGB of the USSR. It places the main emphasis on the fact that such conflicts swept across all Soviet Union in the nineties. "We reconsidered a set of video and other materials considering Vilnius, Kishinev, Tbilisi and Baku events. And I came to a conclusion that scenario was the same and so are the authors. It's possible to guess who was interested in these events without any effort" told in the interview to Fergana news portal Zheksheev.⁶¹

Shavkat Rahmon shares the same opinion, however, he connects Osh events with the conflicts of last five years of the Soviet domination: "Since the Soviet's policy of "Perestroika" began all big nations, except Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians have managed to fight with each other".⁶² According to Rahmon, events in Zheltoksan and Fergana were characterized absolutely from another foreshortening and Kremlin didn't give them an objective assessment for that simple reason that indirectly influenced itself on a way of actions developing in above-mentioned events.

Certainly, in the Osh conflict role of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek provokers who were initiators of the plan of collisions is emphasized, as their influence was obvious and very notable. Here again it's useful to remember associations "Osh Ajmagy" and "Adolat" and their militant participants. "And technically it wasn't so difficult to enter one or two provokers into a meeting who will start pushing the conflict. At that time situation was very hard and only one lit match was enough."⁶³

However, despite such statements, other officials consider that situation got out even from Moscow's control and the conflicts carried over all former Soviet Union territories are

⁶¹ Zhypar Zhekshyev, "Esli bi ne dalnovidnost Karimova, vznikla bi bolshaya voyna" [Big war could arise if Karimov wasn't foresighted, *Uchur*, January 1 (2011) №2

⁶² Shavkat Rakhmon, op.cit, 109

⁶³ Nurbek Omuraliyev, op.cit

just natural combination of circumstances in period of collapsing empire because of a number of economic and intraregional problems. Rahmon repeatedly told about open questions that still demand an answer. For example, why commission on emergency situations wasn't created at the Supreme Council of the USSR in the very first days of the tragedy and why Council of the Nations at the Supreme Council of the USSR didn't cause extraordinary meeting? All these questions bring only to even bigger deadlock and don't shed light on a real picture of those events. On the other hand, the embodiment of the plan of collision between two nations on the basis of social, namely land grounds question can't seem really real. Set of the factors, which have defined explosion of the Osh conflict, coincided in this period of history break (1989-1990).

§ 2.3 Kyrgyzstan's water resources: consumption, shortage and cooperation with regional states.

One of the poorest countries of Central Asia in the sphere of natural resources is Kyrgyzstan. This factor left a serious mark not only on its economic development. While Kyrgyzstan's neighbors used their natural resources as a bargaining chip in international political arena Kyrgyzstan was suffering quite sharply of problems connected with energy, fuel, fresh water resources and the land grounds.

Unlike its Central Asian neighbours, Kyrgyzstan has very insignificant reserves of petroleum and natural gas. Kyrgyzstan's principal energy resources are its deposits of coal; sub-bituminous coal deposits are found on the southern fringe of the Fergana Valley (at Suluktu and Kyzyl-Kyya), while hard coal comes from the west and northwest fringes of the valley (at Tash-Komur, Jalal-Abad, and Osh) and in the Tien Shan foothills east of Issyk-Kul Lake.⁶⁴

The population of Kyrgyzstan despite quite impressive outflow of many Kyrgyz abroad steadily grows up. So necessary quantity of resources continues not to suffice

⁶⁴ "Kyrgyzstan – Energy and Power, Encyclopedia of the Nations", <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Kyrgyzstan-ENERGY-AND-POWER.html>

population catastrophically. But much more complex problem is uneven distribution of available resources on territory of the country. For example, the considered Osh region more than the others suffers from a problem of water and irrigational systems, because there is a hydro-thermo electric plant, which consumes a lot of water.⁶⁵As it was already noted earlier, there was an obvious imbalance of lands distribution between Kyrgyz and Uzbek population in Osh. On new land grounds that were given to Kyrgyz good and developed infrastructure was necessary. But there was a heathland, which needed to be equipped. Because of the inflamed conflict Uzbeks refused to provide help with anything to new Kyrgyz residents. This process of infrastructure development went quite slowly and many times was broken for a number of reasons. On the first place was not a land question anymore, but a water issue.⁶⁶

Although the fresh water resources of Kyrgyzstan have enormous potential to contribute to the economy of the country, the efficient use of this resource has become a matter of big research.⁶⁷Kyrgyzstan is the second largest source of water resources in Central Asia after Tajikistan. The average annual surface run-off from the rivers and other water sources in Kyrgyzstan accounts for about 45-50 km³ per year. This includes about 75% of the water of the Syrdarya (27-28 km³) River and 2% of the Amudarya (1.9 km³) – the two major water arteries of the region.⁶⁸

Also a big role in providing population with water plays the longest Naryn River. It should be noted a large number of lakes on the territory of the country; the biggest one is Issyk-Kyl with the 6236 km² area of water surface.⁶⁹From artificial water reservoirs the first

⁶⁵Shairbek Jurayev, “Energy Emergency in Kyrgyzstan: Causes and Consequences”, *Europe-Central Asian Monitoring*, №5, February, 2009, 2

⁶⁶Matteo Fumagalli, “The Food-Energy-Water Nexus in Central Asia: Regional Implications of and the International Response to the Crises in Tajikistan” (*Europe-Central Asian Monitoring*, Policy Brief №2, October 2008)

⁶⁷Nurlan Mamatov and others, “Water Resources Problem in Kyrgyzstan”, *International Congress on River Basin Management*, 171

⁶⁸ Diagnosticheskiy doklad po vodnym resursam Tsentralnoi Azii [Diagnostic Report on Water resources of Central Asia,] *United Nations Economic Commission for Europe & Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific* (2002), 18

⁶⁹Nurlan Mamatov, op.cit., 172

place is held by Toktogul reservoir, which is located in Jalal-Abad region. To all other, Toktogul reservoir is one of the biggest in all Central Asia.

The primary storage reservoir is located in, and owned by, the upstream country of Kyrgyz Republic, and the bulk of the agricultural production is located in the downstream countries of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.⁷⁰ These resources, which are being utilized by the neighboring countries in increasing their agricultural output, the contribution of the same resource to the agricultural activities and overall economy of Kyrgyzstan raises serious questions. Kyrgyzstan also has huge resources of other ground and surface waters, the significant stocks of which are in the rivers, eternal icehouses and snow massifs.

It is paradoxical that despite such impressive stocks the problem of water use remains pretty big issue. Water affairs in Kyrgyzstan are badly managed because of the wrong distribution of water systems and lack of infrastructure. Here the vicious circle turns out – water is needed for developing infrastructure in the certain region of the country, and on the contrary it is necessary to have logistics for checking and correct use of water reservoirs.

Considering water issues in Kyrgyzstan it becomes evident that problem of water using in term of infrastructure depends on too unequal consumption between various sectors: industrial, agriculture, household, electricity and others. The consumption of water for agricultural irrigation is 88% of total use (about 12% of water is for household and industrial consumption).⁷¹ Apparently, the most water-consumed sector is agriculture: almost most part of water from different resources (reservoirs, rivers, lakes) goes to irrigation. The problem here is that quite often there are water losses because of an inadequate condition of irrigational systems. Irrigational systems sometimes have failures in functioning also.

Generally it happens because of features of land relief: the most part of Kyrgyzstan is covered with mountains and plateaus. Due to mountainous terrain, the major portion of water flows into the territory of neighbouring downstream countries, mainly Uzbekistan and

⁷⁰ John Keith, Daene C. McKinley, Options Analysis of the Operation of the Toktogul Reservoir, Issue paper №7, U.S. Agency for International Development, (Central Asia Regional EPT (Environmental Policy and Technology Project): Almaty, August 26, 1997)

⁷¹ Nurlan Mamatov, op.cit., 175

Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent – China and Tajikistan. According to “Water Resources Problem in Kyrgyzstan” even about 75% of the river runoff goes out from Kyrgyzstan to neighbour countries. The irrigation systems of both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend on the hydro system and water reservoirs located in Kyrgyz territory. More than ten large reservoirs for irrigation were built to regulate runoff of transnational rivers: Chui, Naryn, Talas, Ak-Bura, Kara-Darya.⁷²

The second big problem by importance considering water issues of Kyrgyzstan is water quality. The outbreaks of water-borne diseases in rural areas are observed not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in Uzbekistan. There are risks of the spread of water-borne infections such as typhoid fever, bacterial dysentery and other types of diarrheal diseases in rural areas. These risks exist because access to the piped centralized drinking water sources in rural areas is approximately 50 to 60 percent on average for the whole region.⁷³

Number of coli-form bacteria and streptococci in different water sources used by the population create high risks of water-borne diseases in the local communities. Such pollution of water happens for two reasons: mudflows from mountains mix up with fresh water in periods of floods and not well-working system of water purification for repeated and reverse osmosis water use couldn't help. During very high waters even dams don't rescue many water receptacles from dirty mudflows, which mixes with fresh water. For elimination of consequences of these disasters the system of water purification and consumption of returnable waters is necessary.⁷⁴

With growth of water consumption the quantity of drainage and superficial waters formed from use in various branches of economy and household needs increases. This causes pollution both natural water reservoirs and underground waters. The system of repeated and reverse waters that was used widely in the Soviet Union now became old and useless and

⁷²Ibid., 174

⁷³ Eryn-Aslei Bailey, “Water Issues in Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan”, *WaterWideWeb*, March 1, 2011 <http://www.waterwideweb.org/water-issues-in-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan.html>

⁷⁴Irina Bayramukova, “Kyrgyzstan – strana chistoy vodi” [Kyrgyzstan is a country with clean water], *Vremya Kyrgyzstan*, December 12, 2012

demands urgent updating and change of technical equipment considering this method.⁷⁵ Besides the environmental pollution prevention repeated water supply also allows to save clear water many times over. As quality of the water dumped from one technological process makes its possible to use in other technological process. So, it's impossible to prevent any outbreaks of the water-borne diseases without creation of the relevant system of monitoring, including check of water structure and water supply system.

But there is one huge advantage of water resources of Kyrgyzstan: these are hydro-electricpower generator plants and stations. They serve not only for needs of Kyrgyzstan, but also for necessities of neighboring countries. Kyrgyzstan spends scanty amount of coal, gas and fuel oil for electricity production. Over 80% of electricity is produced by hydro-power plants. The hydro-electric potential of Kyrgyzstan is estimated to be over 160 billion kWh per year, 10% of which is currently utilized.⁷⁶

The five major hydro-electric power generator plants are located on the Naryn River below Toktogul reservoir and two thermo-electric plants located in Bishkek and Osh generate electricity and heating for these towns and the surrounding areas. All this organizes huge enterprise, so-called "cascade of Toktogul hydro power plants".⁷⁷ Thus, Kyrgyzstan has what to offer Central Asia republics that really need water very much, except Tajikistan.

Water turned out for region countries to the blue gold, because its shortage is constantly felt over all Central Asia. The significant problems confronting the entire region of Central Asia—lack of water, lack of cultivated soil, boundary issues—are by their very nature prone to dispute. But among all these problems the problem of water ranks first in the region. However, cooperation in sphere of energy and resources isn't at the proper level. Water, used for power generation by Kyrgyzstan, is also vital for Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan for irrigation purposes. Uzbekistan needs water especially sharply, especially for industrial needs, for example, such as irrigation of cotton fields.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Shairbek Jurayev, op.cit.

⁷⁷Ibid.

In the early 1990s, the Central Asian states tried to reach multi-party agreements on water-sharing in the region.⁷⁸ However, most of the agreements proved ineffective, and instead the countries have opted for annual bilateral agreements. In Central Asia different contradictions between neighboring countries stir cooperation between them. In the political arena, all the leaders of the newly created states of Central Asia prize their countries' sovereignty, while some of them compete with each other for control of resources, especially water and energy like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; for supremacy in regional leadership - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - or just prefer to operate in strict neutrality to the point of isolation like Turkmenistan.

The tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over Tajikistan's intentions to build the hydro-dam at Rogun that has led to actions by Uzbekistan that have severely affected Tajikistan, including selective border closures, interference with rail transit and blockage of Tajikistan's access to electricity and gas imports.⁷⁹ Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan abandoned the existing regional electric power dispatch mechanism that had existed in Central Asia since Soviet days, directly undermining the development of a regional energy market.⁸⁰

Between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there are also economic barriers because of the Customs Union, in which Kazakhstan is a member. But there are positive moments of interregional cooperation as well. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have concluded their first agreement on the joint distribution of water resources and energy power. The countries concluded various agreements on coordinated water use—in particular, the Agreement of February 1992 and the Nukus Declaration.⁸¹

§ 2.4 Uzbekistan's Energy Resources in Compare to Misbalance in Osh region.

⁷⁸Nurlan Mamatov, op.cit., 177

⁷⁹Johannes Linn, *Central Asian Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?*, (Eurasian Development Bank: Eurasian Intergration Yearbook, 2012), 113

⁸⁰Lyudmila Baum, "Regional Aspects of Kyrgyzstan Energy Security", *The Quarterly Journal*, March (2003), №1, 38

⁸¹Johannes Linn, op.cit.

In comparison with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, which is rich with resources, constantly develops its energy industry and carries out numerous projects. Uzbekistan provides itself with gas, oil and coal almost completely. Agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, through which the Syrdarya also flows, ensure a continued water flow for Uzbek power plants.⁸² Country is trying to become a certain leader in region with the help of natural resources and using them a pressure lever for political ambitions.

By the mid-1990s, as a result of Government measures, energy policy adopted by the Government during the early years of independence had been achieved: energy independence and self-sufficiency by resources.⁸³ The measures Uzbekistan took during its first years of political independence to ensure its fuel independence made it possible to significantly increase the country's output of natural gas, oil and natural gas condensate. A number of national and sector projects had been devised and were being implemented to develop the power, petroleum, natural gas and coal industries; for example, Kokdumalak petroleum condensate field and Bukhara Oil Refinery. Sulphur scrubbers had been installed at the Mubarek Natural Gas Refinery and power-generating unit had been completed at the Novoangren Thermal Power Plant.⁸⁴

Even for accommodation seasonal variations in natural gas use, there is a network of underground natural gas storage facilities. Uzbekistan had a well developed and sizeable system of long-distance natural gas pipelines and pipeline bleeders as well as a distribution network for transporting natural gas from gas fields and refineries to consumers in Uzbekistan and abroad. Oil and gas industry and infrastructure is still developing in Uzbekistan with big rates. Special attention to this sector is paid by state as this industrial area is completely nationalized.

⁸² Glenn Curtis, "Uzbekistan: A Country Study", (Washington: *GPO for the Library of Congress*, 1996), <http://countrystudies.us/uzbekistan/37.htm>

⁸³ Temurjan Nasirov et al., *Uzbekistan's Energy Policy, In The Outlook for development of Renewable Energy in Uzbekistan, Publication in support of the Millennium Development Goals* (Tashkent: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 14

⁸⁴ Ibid.

The resource base allows Uzbekistan to be ill with the “Dutch illness” and to continue investin sector of raw materials and fuel production again and again. The Uzbek population is also interested in development of oil business as it creates the greatest number of workplaces in country, even a bit more that cotton industry. A lot of prosperous Uzbeks moved and lived in the neighbouring republics; part of them lived there historically, other part moved recently to new territories.⁸⁵

In Osh region and its cities urban population mostly consisted of Uzbeks and mountaineer rural population generally were Kyrgyz people. Soon the social inequality between two ethnic groups began to accrue. A huge role in an imbalance played both social and resources inequality, because using of water as an energy resource on an equal basis with oil and fuel demand big expenses and infrastructure and that was impossible project for Kyrgyz Republic.

As Kyrgyz population of Osh region appeared in more difficult situation, then right there accelerated growth of nationalistic moods as almost always-low standards of living are characterized by splashes of nationalism and radical tendencies in communities or societies.

§ 2.5 Ethno-symbolist approach to Kyrgyzstan.

The history of relationship between Central Asian ethnics and Russia has passed quite a long way. The Russian diplomacy had great opportunities during this time to study and learn other ethnics thoroughly and to regulate their situation in the Tsar Russia.⁸⁶ Regulations were carried out by special developed methods. Already in the USSR the main method of deduction and pressure was the principle of "divide and rule".⁸⁷ This principle revealed itself quite obviously and convex throughout the time of Union's existing.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 15

⁸⁶ Daniel R. Brower, Edward J. Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples; 1700-1917* (IN, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997): 115

⁸⁷ Richard Rousseau, “The International Factor in the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan, European Dialogue”, September 3, 2010 <http://eurodialogue.org/The-International-Factor-in-the-Events-in-Southern-Kyrgyzstan>

After USSR's collapse, Russia, being not able to develop at once new methods for deduction of old zones of influence was still using mentioned above method. But time of brutal power for a binding of certain regions has already passed. This was not a necessary political tool any more. Here it's useful to remember events of the 2008 occurred in Georgia, when Russia entered its troops to that country. Kremlin behaved suddenly very clumsy in this situation.⁸⁸ Hard power was obvious: not only because of intervention, but diligence to replace borders on map as well. This operation affected negatively on Russia's reputation. Even so negatively, that many people inclined to thought that namely Russia's policy was a trigger in Georgian situation. Therefore, after those died-down events, the course of the Russian policy changed considerably.

A new principle came to arena – it was ethno-symbolist approach toward zones of influence. Roughly speaking, it's about having influence in the region or the state, when you proceed only from internal contradictions of state or contradictions with its neighbors, but trying not to designate in any way itself as the enemy. On the contrary, actor using this method comes in an image of savior when bloody actions reached the peak already. This method was probably borrowed from global political practice, but Russia began to apply it quite recently. Such approach was more sophisticated, and therefore it was imperceptible. Actually, it was very difficult to catch a side between influence of the actor and his inaction (as all could be seem like natural combination of misunderstandings inside one ethnos or between two ethnics).⁸⁹ Riots that took place in Osh could indicate such approach.

According to father of ethno-symbolism – Anthony Smith, economic self-interest is not usually the stuff of stable collective identities, while cultural collectivities are more stable because the basic cultural elements – memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions – tend

⁸⁸Elise Labott, "U.S. official: Russia's Attack on Georgia is 'disproportionate'", *CNN News*, August 9, 2008 <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/09/georgia.reax/>

⁸⁹Athena Leoussi, Steven Grosby, *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007): 15-16

to be more persistent and binding.⁹⁰ Thus, it is clear that only economic influence and social structure are not enough for establishing firm influence.

It is necessary to take into account ethnical values and its symbols and to play political game considering these tendencies. For example, the nationalism and symbolism in Kyrgyzstan was widely adopted; almost the same was in Uzbekistan in 2000s. Using this approach it was possible to achieve much more, than simply to divide zones by principle of geographical borders.

Ethno-symbolists consider the cultural elements of symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition to be crucial to an analysis of ethnicity, nations and nationalisms. Various combinations of these elements continue to play a vital role within the communities.⁹¹ Thus, it was easily possible to divide and mark out main differences between the South and the North of Kyrgyzstan. Also it was possible to designate distinctions between sedentarism of Uzbeks and nomadism of Kyrgyz.

⁹⁰Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001): 19

⁹¹Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, 1st ed. (NY, New York: Routledge, 2009): 25

Chapter III. The Rise of Nationalism in Kyrgyzstan.

§ 3.1 Nationalism in Kyrgyz Society.

To consider external influence on repeated escalation of Osh conflict domestic situation in Kyrgyzstan should be taken into account very carefully. Certain internal conditions and political tendencies in a conflict zone are necessary for conflict to be ripened and then to be passed to the following stage. The so-called zone of risk is usually an unstable territory filled with various radical or far-right ideologies.⁹² The last is very important in a context of the reasons for emergence of the second Osh riots in 2010. The reason of increasing tension in Kyrgyz-Uzbek population were nationalist sentiments of Kyrgyz people. At the beginning this nationalistic wave wasn't destructive, on the contrary, it was uniting people and arose interest to history and culture. But after being speculated by various politicians it went by another way.

The nationalism in Kyrgyzstan takes its roots from the very beginning of 90s, when new republics undertook construction and an upclassing of national states. Nation should have its own territory, and that this territorial nation-state should in some way reflect the character of the nation - it is the ideology of the world divided into nation-states into which independent Kyrgyzstan was "born" in 1991.⁹³ This ideology informs the state-led nation-building projects that all Central Asian governments embarked on in 1991. Kyrgyzstan here have too much similarities with other republics, gained independence: same course, same

⁹²William Zartmann, *Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, 2008), 176

⁹³Nick Megoran, "Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism", Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper, *Chatham House*, (December 2012): 3

priorities and tasks. Many commentators predicted that after the 1990 violence the region in general and Kyrgyzstan in particular was likely to be marked by widespread ethno-nationalist violence. These predictions were based not on empirical research but rather on uncritical invocation of 'ethnicity' as an independent and supremely powerful social force.⁹⁴ It didn't influence negatively on relationship with other ethnic groups.

There was a strong nationalist movement among the young students in the late 80s. The movement also formed a number of student organizations with clear nationalist and anti-Communist orientations. This movement very soon reestablished into Ashar community, which has different branches all over Kyrgyzstan: it was something like first manifestation of multiparty system. But Ashar don't stay as it was reestablished for a long time: after some years all branches consolidated into one and a new union called Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan was created on 26 May, 1990.⁹⁵ This small stroke allows learning about moods of Kyrgyz society when there were no preconditions to the Osh conflict yet.

The Kyrgyz Union Republic was a multiethnic formation and still has a substantial presence of minorities despite emigration. The largest minority is Uzbeks, then come Russians; others are small: Dungans, Uyghurs, etc.⁹⁶ Thus, already in 90s there were certain difficulties with a self-definition of many representatives of ethnic minorities living in Kyrgyzstan, as to the forefront was put factor of titular nation. When the "nation" was created, works were commissioned to demonstrate its historical roots. Stable community was ensured by allocation of republican status. Territorial borders of the new republic were defined, and industrial facilities were established to provide economic foundations for it.

Kyrgyz was vulnerable. The Kyrgyz were a small group squeezed in-between the larger neighbours of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China, with relations with each of these becoming problematic following independence. In the argument as to 'who-has-been- on-

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia* (NY: New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995.):108-9

⁹⁶ Anna Matveeva, "Kyrgyzstan in Crisis: Permanent Revolution and the Curse of Nationalism", Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no.79, UKAID (September 2010): 11 <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/CrisisStates/WP79.2.pdf>

this-land-first', the Kyrgyz were on weak ground.⁹⁷ Being historical nomads with no urban centers, it was more difficult for them to claim the territory as theirs. Therefore Kyrgyz had counter reactions: as a result strengthening of national consciousness as a counterbalance to those circumstances began to rise rapidly. But at the same time it's impossible to say that Kyrgyz felt themselves restrained, they just tried to seem especially among other Central Asian nations. It was a fight period of states for popularity and welfare not only in the region, but, whenever possible, in the world. That's why Kyrgyz people didn't want to stand aside: even centrist movements were observed among population in order to keep strong their national identity.⁹⁸

Many considered that the extreme nationalism became the main reason of second Osh riots. In fact, Kyrgyz nationalism went in a wrong way. According to Nick Megoran, foreign analysts have misunderstood nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Most Western studies have critically engaged with the nation-building projects of the governments of the newly independent republics, faulting them for the inauthenticity of their use of history and their ethnic exclusivity in post-Soviet contexts where many ethnic minorities live.⁹⁹ But historical trajectory of Kyrgyz nationalism is marked by a profound insecurity about the very survival of the country, and the fear that Kyrgyzstan is primarily endangered by the weak state of the Kyrgyz language, internal disunity, and geopolitical threats.¹⁰⁰

The first thing that is obviously evident in studying Kyrgyz nationalism is a situation with the Kyrgyz language in the country. Language is often a pivotal factor in nation-building, and this is particularly the case in Kyrgyzstan. From the historical situation it turned out that Russian and the Uzbek languages were in Kyrgyzstan at much more highest qualitative level, than Kyrgyz language.

⁹⁷Ibid.,4

⁹⁸Erica Marat, "National Ideology and State-Building in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan", *Central Asia – Caucasus Institute*, Silk Road Studies Programme (January 2008): 21-27

⁹⁹Nick Megoran, op.cit., 2

¹⁰⁰Abilabek Asankanov, Ethnic Conflict in the Osh Region in Summer 1990: Reasons and Lessons In *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery Tishkov (Paris: United Nations University, 1996), 117

After the Soviet power was established in the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, the forerunner of present day Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz found themselves among numerous ethnic groups, which were arranged unevenly on the territory of a state. Many Uzbek communities compactly lived in the south and in north there were Kazakhs. The South is perceived as more traditional and more religious, while the northern side is closer to the neighbouring Kazakhs.¹⁰¹

The Russians living mostly near Ferghana valley along south borders occupied the considerable part of the country. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed extensive Russian farming settlement in the fertile lowlands of Osh and Jalalabad provinces. In 1909, the Ferghana statistics committee registered 29,433 Russians. By the turn of the twenty-first century no trace was left of that, and few mostly older generation Russians remain in urban areas. Nevertheless, in modern Kyrgyzstan Russian has a status of official language in Kyrgyzstan, while Kyrgyz is the state language.¹⁰² Official documents and forms are available in both, as well as access to educational opportunities, mass media, street signs and posters.

Development of the Kyrgyz language is slowed down very much by this factor. The base for competent studying and development of the Kyrgyz language is still in progress, despite the fact that Soviet rule resulted in the first systematic written codification, development and promotion of the Kyrgyz language, establishing universal literacy and the emergence of a nationwide stream of Kyrgyz schooling.¹⁰³

But becoming more nationalized groups of Kyrgyz within the country ask for literate and fluent language. It turns out that there is a request from population, but no goods to be present. Even Kyrgyz nationalists sardonically draw a distinction between people who are Kyrgyz (pronounced with a Kyrgyz hard 'y') of and Kirgiz (pronounced with a Russian soft

¹⁰¹Oskon Osmonov and Abylabek Asankanov, *Kyrgyzstan Tarykhy: Eng Bayyrky Doordon Azyrky Mezgilge Cheyin* [History of Kyrgyzstan: From Early Times to the Present] (Bishkek: Erkin-Too, 2011): 60-64

¹⁰²Pavel Alekseenkov, *Krestyanskoe Vosstanie v Ferghane*, Department of Central Asian Bureau of BKP(b) Central Committee for study of history of Party and October Revolution in Central Asia (Tashkent: IstPart, 1927): 14

¹⁰³Nick Megoran, op.cit., 15

‘i’) – the latter being elites who spoke better Russian than Kyrgyz and are thus linguistically and culturally alienated from authentic ‘Kyrgyzness’.¹⁰⁴ In their opinion, the respect for Kyrgyzstan has to begin if not with knowledge of language, then at least with an attempt to study the native language. The language problem caused a lot of debates in the Kyrgyz society. Kyrgyz language played second-fiddle to Russian in education, politics and the professions.¹⁰⁵ Kyrgyz cultural forms of music and oral poetry were denigrated.

But more difficult situation with a Kyrgyz language problem in Osh - here besides Russian language presents a factor of well-adjusted Uzbek language. Uzbeks had schools, newspapers and magazines; also it was possible to meet many bookstores with Uzbek language books everywhere in Osh. The mass of literature in Uzbek language wasn't printed in Kyrgyzstan, but was brought from Uzbekistan.¹⁰⁶ It is remarkable that these Uzbeks know Kyrgyz really badly, and what about second language - this for them was Russian. All this caused an indignation storm among Kyrgyz people, who considered that Uzbeks behave quite impudently in this way. However, according to Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan, they had great difficulties with learning and reading in Uzbek language, as Uzbekistan switched to the Latin alphabet, while Uzbeks of Osh and Jalal-Abad continued to use Cyrillic script.¹⁰⁷ Language became one of the key moments in tension accruing between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and Russians and Kyrgyz in state as well. According to an article in Kyrgyz newspaper “Ferghana” Kyrgyz people were poorly motivated for learning their language. There were marked various reasons as including the poor teaching of Kyrgyz in Russian and Uzbek schools, the influence of Russian and Uzbek television and absence of laws obliging people to know Kyrgyz to take citizenship or enter state employment.¹⁰⁸ Kyrgyz had a strong feeling that Uzbeks feeling quite freely in their territory will start actions about receiving autonomy

¹⁰⁴“Kyrgyz Tili Emne Uchun Memleketlik Til Bol Albay Jatat?” [Why is Kyrgyz Language Failing to Become the State Language?] *Ferghana*, October 11-17 (2004)

¹⁰⁵ “Osh Governor Issues Language Resolution”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Newline, Vol.8, Part I, № 88, May 11 (2004)

¹⁰⁶“Ona Darsliklar Xususida” [Regarding Textbooks in the Mother Tongue], *O'sh Sadosi*, September 25 (2000)

¹⁰⁷Anna Matveeva, op.cit., 14

¹⁰⁸*Ferghana*, 11-17 October, op.cit.

again. As it was already noted in previous chapters a big social abyss between two nations promoted such hostility.

Some analysts explaining such turn in Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations referred to an ethno-psychological factor and, as a result of it, further appropriate behavior of each ethnos. Results of numerous conversations have been carried out. Focus groups were observed in Osh and Jalal-Abad. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks perceived each other really differently, but at the same time they noted their common cultural values, that both nations share. But in negative adjectives they were open and talkative. So, Uzbeks by Kyrgyz residents' opinions "are richer and in unjust way took the best lands from them". There were other opinions like "life of Uzbeks is always hidden from foreign eyes" and "Uzbeks are cunning and liars". According to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz people are "wild" and "mountaineers".¹⁰⁹ Mountaineer in this definition has negative coloring meaning backward and incapable to create people. Also there were adjectives like "aggressive" and "lazy". Uzbeks have accused Kyrgyz of too exaggerate hearings about their welfare, when in real Uzbeks are discriminated and clamped in their right.¹¹⁰

Kyrgyz accuse Uzbeks of receiving profit and income from business by unfair means with the help of trustful Kyrgyz. Moving from the Soviet to post-Soviet times, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz became social alien, as common civic affiliation could not overcome differences in political status and in social resources.¹¹¹ Large numbers of Kyrgyz abandoned their traditional way of life at years of Russian dominance in the region.¹¹² Kyrgyz from the south of Kyrgyzstan considered that they start from scratch, as it is still very difficult for them to be well skilled and urbanized in city life. And Uzbeks instead of helping and understanding them

¹⁰⁹Elena Molchanova, "South-Kyrgyz Crisis: Narcissism of Small Differences and Defence Mechanisms of Social Syste" In *Psychology Laboratory Review 2008-2011* ed. Aron Brudny and Elena Kosterina, American University of Central Asia (2011)

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Kalen Subanov, Tushtuk Kyrgyzstan: "Khalifatpy je Ozbek Mamleketibi?" [Southern Kyrgyzstan: Caliphate or Uzbek State?], *Alibi*, Part I, June 11 (2010)

¹¹²Brian Palmer, "Why Cant' Kyrgyz and Uzbeks Get Along?", *Slate Magazine*, June 14 (2010)

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2010/06/why_cant_kyrgyz_and_uzbeks_get_along.html

were getting rich by unfair ways on their land. The Kyrgyz could not see why Uzbeks were unhappy with personnel appointments, as no formal barriers prevented them from joining the civil service. In such situation the Kyrgyz nationalism grew more and more as to be reconciled with such relation of Uzbeks toward them was shameful for Kyrgyz.

Kyrgyz believed that Uzbeks behave too frivolously in the south of the country, while Kyrgyz living in Uzbekistan don't afford any excess actions. On television and in mass media appeared appeals of the Kyrgyz intellectuals to representatives of ethnic minorities directed on studying Kyrgyz language. But Uzbek narratives relate a story of how Uzbeks traditionally lived in the city and worked as artisans, cooks, traders and technicians, but the Kyrgyz gradually displaced them, taking land, jobs and wealth. Kyrgyz narratives invert these accounts and have Osh's land traditionally controlled by Kyrgyz tribes.¹¹³ In Kyrgyz talks of Osh as a contested space, Uzbeks played a role of separators and those who threaten Kyrgyz statehood.¹¹⁴ Also Kyrgyz ethnic group excludes Uzbeks from state politics because of fears about them being some kind of "Fifth Column" and aiming for unification with Uzbekistan.¹¹⁵ Thus, it's visible that situation in itself was very ambiguous between two ethnicities as everyone considered himself right and accused opposite side in its troubles.

A considerable influence also rendered a role of the Kyrgyz politicians who pursued interior policy under the name of revival of the Kyrgyz statehood and nationality. This ideology promoted kindling of nationalistic and non-tolerant moods among Kyrgyz, despite that in 90s this ideology in government had quite peace character.

3.2 Nationalism among Kyrgyz Politicians.

¹¹³"Kyrgyz Tiline Kyr Korsotkon Torolor" [The bigwigs who threaten the Kyrgyz language], *Osh Shamy*, Vol. 30, No. 946, (September 2009): 2

¹¹⁴Pulat Shozimov et al., *The Ferghana Valley during Perestroika: 1985-1991* In *Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia* ed. Starr Frederick and others (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2011): 197

¹¹⁵Reto Weyermann, *A Silk Road to Democracy? FAST Country Risk Profile Kyrgyzstan* (Bern: Swiss Peace, 2005): 28

“Everyone in Central Asia wants to create something great, no one wants anything simple”.¹¹⁶ This phrase can be fairly related to all five republics of Central Asia. In this case, considering Kyrgyzstan, it’s possible to tell that the state itself chose a certain national strategy for the very beginning. At the time of Askar Akayev such plans worked quite good, as, for example, turning Kyrgyzstan into Switzerland of region and the ideology with a motto "Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home" also was declared.¹¹⁷ In Akayev’s books central theme was a cultural and historical sophistication of the Kyrgyz as an ethnic group. And what is the most interesting thing is that Akayev also promulgated Kyrgyzstan as an “Island of Democracy” in the region.

"Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home" was a vital plan for Kyrgyzstan as it was way to keep balance between numerous ethnic groups within the country, which was a difficult issue after collapsed empire. Akayev promoted integration of local Russians, Ukrainians and Germans and stimulated them not to leave country, but remain and work in Kyrgyzstan.¹¹⁸ Kyrgyz-Slavic University was renamed after the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Russian language was established as a second national language in Kyrgyzstan.¹¹⁹

According to many analysts, concerning Uzbeks a correct strategy was chosen.¹²⁰ In Akayev’ period numerous cultural joint events of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were held and the Uzbek -Kyrgyz schools were created. Even Uzbeks that left Osh after conflict events remembered that at Akayev’s time of governing there was no oppression or a latching of Uzbeks from the authorities, but there was household nationalism that took place several times. The chosen strategy about a common home gave fruits that did Kyrgyzstan during this period a stable country for investments and future projects.

¹¹⁶A quote by an Uzbek high official, Washington, D.C., April 2007

¹¹⁷Erica Marat, op.cit., 34

¹¹⁸Askar Akayev’s speech at Kyrgyzstan’s People’s Assembly, Bishkek, 7 July, 1992

¹¹⁹Askar Akayev’s selected speeches, Kyrgyzstan: *Na Puti Stanovleniya Nezavisimosti* [Kyrgyzstan: In the Process of Formation of Independence] (Bishkek: Uchkun, 1995): 6

¹²⁰Anna Matveeva, op.cit., 16

In practice, however, Akayev's civic-based ideas were not as successful and persuasive as they appeared. Although Akayev pioneered the modern definition of citizenship in Kyrgyzstan and the Central Asian region, both Kyrgyz political elites and the republic had difficulties in separating the ideas of citizenship, nationality, nation and ethnicity.¹²¹

The young republic only began the way of its national revival and therefore to orient and separate necessary and useful from harmful and radical for Kyrgyz officials was still quite difficult. Tens years of the Soviet rule introduced its own concepts about above-mentioned terms; in fact, they weren't wrong or bad, but they just were carried other meanings. Therefore newly appeared politicians of Kyrgyzstan tried to make up for lost time and sharply follow a revival way of Kyrgyz statehood, as they called it. National ideas among politicians differed by degree of nationalism. At that time from all politicians of Kyrgyzstan the most liberal was just president Akayev.

Other authorities participating in politics didn't share its views and considered him too soft in relations with regional neighbors, especially Russia and also too slow in promotion pure Kyrgyz culture. According to many authors, during this period Kyrgyz far rights appeared.¹²² They subjected Akayev's actions on preservation of ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan. While almost in all republics of the former USSR was watched mass outflow of Russians, Akayev was trying to keep them and create available conditions for them, so they wouldn't like to leave Kyrgyzstan. It incited many politicians against him and forced Akayev to nationalize interior policy. He, actually, made a deal with Kyrgyz conservatives and far-rights and began to extend and propagandize the Kyrgyz culture very actively in all spheres of society. Scope of such acts was extensive.

In the summer of 1995, Akayev organized celebrations for Manas's symbolic 1,000th anniversary. "Manas" – one of the world's longest oral epic narrations is an epos of Kyrgyz folklore. At the same time it's a name of the main character. For Kyrgyz themselves "Manas" always had a huge value and played a big role in keeping their national consciousness as Manas managed to unite separate Kyrgyz and to reflect attacks of the neighbor tribes, despite

¹²¹Erica Marat, op.cit., 36

¹²²Askat Dukenbaev, William W. Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan* (Aarhus, University of Aarhus: Department of Political Sciences, 2003): 21

that Manas is a collective image.¹²³ In Soviet period wasn't pay due attention to this epos, as the main hero fought against Chinese and this could affect to the Sino-Soviet relations a bit negatively.

For the Kyrgyz government, the “Manas” represented a comfortable option for a national ideological framework. Akayev emphasized the importance of Manas in his public openings and speeches, and even authored a book dedicated to the epic.¹²⁴ All this added to Akayev greater popularity among the people and also didn't give more chance to the Kyrgyz nationalists to accuse him of inaction and ignoring of Kyrgyz culture. Almost a religious cult of Manas testifies fact of Akayev's comparing this epos and its value for Kyrgyz to the New Testament for Christians.¹²⁵ Also Akayev used Manas's celebration during elections, as just in 1995 there were first presidential elections in independent Kyrgyzstan. Popularity of a cult of Manas increased so greatly that his 7 precepts soon were hung at each school and were discussed and propagandized in mass media. Probably, already then it was a certain sign for the subsequent bloody conflicts in Kyrgyzstan.

Many people after Osh will tell that Manas's precepts were apprehended too literally and that Kyrgyz were trying to realize all his precepts among which were militant calls. Today, in XXI century no one should understand literally legend words of those days and try to imitate behaviour of epos characters. However, Kyrgyz who have yearned on spirit of a national ideology absorbed in themselves any fragment of their historical property in order to feel more patriotic. Despite the difficulties encountered with popularizing Manas, the epic provided a prolific groundwork for transforming the national ideology into a more generalized and less ethno-centric project in the early 2000s.¹²⁶

¹²³Imel Moldobayev, “Epos Manas kak Istochnik Izucheniya Duxovnoy Kulturi Kirgizskogo Naroda” [Manas epos as a sources of studying Kyrgyz Spiritual Culture] (Frunze: Ilim, 1989): 73

¹²⁴ Askar Akayev, *Kyrgyzskaya Gosudarstvennost' i Narodniy Epos Manas* [Kyrgyz Statehood and National Epic Manas], (Bishkek: Uchkun, 2002)

¹²⁵ Askar Akayev, *Trudnaya Doroga k Demokratii* [A Difficult Road to Democracy] (Moscow: Mejdunarodnie Otnosheniya, 2002):177

¹²⁶Erica Marat, op.cit., 39

But Manas was not the only one. Very soon other historical characters, dates and events came after that celebration. A new era of “Kyrgyzzness” was beginning. Politicians in every way tried to use national moods of populations and play this card in political games as good as the only can. However, one moment wasn't considered: low welfare of the society, especially in rural areas and poor social protection with accruing nationalism could play an evil joke. But it was still far before explosion of such time bomb.¹²⁷

A new project, which was called “2,200 years of Kyrgyz civilization”, was developed.¹²⁸ Such loud name caused among many Kyrgyz laughter and some indignation. Akayev seemed to overload his task over national revival. But this project was established during controversial third term of Akayev’s presidency, when there was widespread public acknowledgement of the pervasive involvement of his family members in the country’s economy. To keep his name of promoter of national heritage of Kyrgyzstan Akayev took this step, which was unsuccessful not only from political, but also from the economic point of view as money for implementation of many grandiose projects simply didn't suffice.

Besides such projects and ideas, which among people were called “akayevskie”, there were also other views of Kyrgyz spirit revival. The idea of a Tengrism, ancient Turkic-Mongolian nomadic religious beliefs that had to be transformed now to national ideology, began to gather considerable number of supporters among Kyrgyz politicians. The most active was Dastan Sarygulov with his proclamations about Tengrism view and culture.¹²⁹ Adakhan Madumarov supported him, in spite of the fact that Madumarov was a strong supporter of westernization of the Kyrgyzstan and introduction of the western values.

Tengrism as an ideology promptly grew and caused interest in the most different segments of the Kyrgyz population. Some public figures opposed Islam and a Tengrism and insisted that it’s necessary immediately to return to the native religion, which corresponds to

¹²⁷Jane Falkingham, Income, Poverty and Well-being in Central Asia In *Poverty in Transition Economies*, ed., Sandra Hutton, Gerry Redmond (London: Routledge, 2000): 72

¹²⁸Erica Marat, op.cit., 40

¹²⁵Nathan Hamm, “Tengrism on Trial”, *Registan*, 2 January, 2012

<http://registan.net/2012/02/01/tengrism-on-trial/>

way and outlook of true Kyrgyz people.¹³⁰ According to Sarygulov, Islam was imposed to Kyrgyz and therefore it shouldn't cause due servility, only respect and that's it. In the public companies and in mass media there appeared a lot of information considering Tengristic mythology, its gods and goddesses and ceremonies.¹³¹

While in neighbor Uzbekistan was watched a rising of Islam in society and many young unemployed men were recruited in ranks of IMU, in Kyrgyzstan there were hot discussions about native beliefs and ways of returning to them. This was also a sign of extreme nationalization of population as practically always return and interest to the roots in all spheres, even in such, that seems to be unshakable as religion bears a call to people around.^{132, 133}

In gender issues were venerated various Kyrgyz women heroines, both mythic and real as, for example, Kurmanzhan Datka and Manas's wife Kanykey. Among them was also Umai Ene goddess, which collected in itself almost all best and noble qualities of nomadic women, Kyrgyz women in this context.¹³⁴ All this created almost a new cultural and political layer in the states, in which earlier there were no ideologies like these at all. Some note, that Kyrgyzstan promoting gender equality and cultural heritage of a Tengrism tried to build a special new image among Central Asian countries and to be allocated against them.

¹³⁰Marlene Laruelle, "Religious Revival, nationalism and the 'Invention of tradition': political Tengrism in Central Asia and Tatarstan", Vol. 26, no. 2, *Central Asian Survey*, (2007): 211-212

¹³¹Zamir Osorov, "Vozvrashenie k Tengiru" [Return to Tengri], Various Interviews, *Kyrgyz El*, 27 February, 2006 <http://www.kyrgyzel.kg/vozvrashenie-k-tengiru-anarbek-usupbaev.html>

¹³²Rashid Ahmed, *The resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994): 148

¹³³Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tukles and Conversions to Islam in Historical and Epic Transition*, 1st ed., (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994): 170

¹³⁴Erica Marat, op.cit., 42

However, despite projects concerning revival of national consciousness there were huge problems with poverty in country's regions. It wasn't regarded as of paramount importance and solvation of poverty problem went too slowly. Just three southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan had the higher levels of poverty and extreme poverty. Also in the early 2000s, the level of inequality increased dramatically, while the level of poverty was decreasing very slowly.¹³⁵ Unemployment is another major social issue, which accelerates the deeping of poverty in Kyrgyzstan.

According to Falkingham, the payments for unemployment are insignificantly little and it suffices only on food purchase, on all the rest it is necessary to save money.¹³⁶ The difficult situation of the southern areas also caused by influence of criminal groups and various smuggler mafias here. In situation nationalism, which has lifted its head, could be very dangerous not only for the population, but also for president of the country.

¹³⁵Jane Falkingham, *op.cit.*, 78

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, 79

Chapter IV. Different Aspects of Kyrgyz Policy: from A. Akayev to K. Bakiyev.

§ 4.1 Factor of North and South in Kyrgyz Policy.

One very important factor, by which the policy of Kyrgyzstan is provided, both at the time of the USSR and at the time of independence of the country, should be noted directly. This is a non-literal division of the country for the North and the South; sources of this division, however, are not industrial and infrastructural, but rather tribalistic and mental. Such division of the country allowed to pursue here a certain policy of other regional actors as for Kyrgyz people the clannishness and tribal division always played huge role in life.¹³⁷ It was possible with using this factor to incite just theoretically southerners against northerners or on the contrary, as the differences between the South and the North were visible with the naked eye as this issue brings split in Kyrgyz society.¹³⁸

Unlike division into three zhuz (tribal communities) in Kazakhstan and clan separation depending on territories in Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz society has its peculiarities. Apart from position in a tribe, it is also important to know which-northern or southern- part of the republic a person belongs to.¹³⁹

The South of Kyrgyzstan, where also located Osh administrative region, was mainly agricultural rural zone. Communication between north and south is also tenuous. While regular flights link Bishkek to Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken, there are only two usable roads

¹³⁷ Abduvahab Moniev, "About South-North Problem, Kyrgyzstan Review: 10 years ago", *Agym*, May 7, 2002

¹³⁸ Anna Matveeva, op.cit., 2

¹³⁹ Atai Moldobayev, "Origin of Kyrgyz Divide Between North and South", *International Affairs In RiaNovosti*, June 28, 2010

http://en.rian.ru/international_affairs/20100628/159604529.html

through the mountains to connect north to south. It is a full day's drive to travel the 650 kilometers between Bishkek and Osh.¹⁴⁰ There was the biggest Uzbek community and Osh was known very well as a place of compact accommodation of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. According to Mikheev, the south of Kyrgyzstan is not monolithic, because in the Jalal-Abad region and in Osh a substantial portion of the population is Uzbek.¹⁴¹ In Osh, more than a half of the population is not Kyrgyz but Uzbek. Southerners of Kyrgyzstan differed with bigger religiousness and conservatism in compare to those who lived in northern part.

The North gravitated to Kazakhstan and here sometimes could be found quite freethinking innovations and liberalism with tolerance manifestations concerning ethnic minority, in spite of the fact that North was more likely to seem mosaic because of the various ethnic groups living here, as it was noted before, for example, Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Uyghurs, Dughans and others. Economically, without a doubt, the north is more developed. Bishkek is in this part of the country. It has all economic centers built during the Soviet years.¹⁴² The northern tribes came into contact with the Russians much earlier than the southern tribes, who were part of the Uzbek Empire of Khokant.¹⁴³

Also the factor of such separation within the country was explained by different Kyrgyz generas: there was certain division between generas living in the North and in the South. In the pre-Russian times the Kyrgyz society was made up by some forty tribal units (uruk), each of which consisted of different sub-levels units (top) that were united by (imagined) kinship links. The uruks were united into three big confederations, the so-called

¹⁴⁰Bruce Pannier, "Future Kyrgyz Government Faces Traditional North-South Divide", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, April 26, 2010

http://www.rferl.org/content/Future_Kyrgyz_Government_Faces_Traditional_NorthSouth_Divide/2025131.html

¹⁴¹Valentinas Mite, "Kyrgyzstan: North-South Divide is a factor in Politics", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, March 24, 2005

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³ Azamat Temirkoulov, "Tribalism, Social Conflict and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic", *Berliner Osteuropa Info*, (2004): 90-94

Right Wing (On khanat), the Left Wing (Sol khanat) and Neither (Ichkilik).¹⁴⁴ But with growth of economic instability and unemployment huge outflow of southerners run from native places to the North for seeking a better life.

Before the 2005 coup tribal ties were strong in rural communities, today it is getting stronger in urban areas as well amid the growing migration from the south to the north in 2005-2010.¹⁴⁵ This factor of the North and the South was most brightly expressed in politics and even could shake whole layers of public moods in Kyrgyzstan.

Politicians in Kyrgyzstan were alternated by the principle: one from the North, next from the South. In Soviet era Kremlin was careful about dividing the power, it was balancing representatives from both parts. For example, being the last governor official of Kyrgyzstan, Masaliyev, was a southerner, but his follower, Askar Akayev, was from the North.¹⁴⁶ When Bakiyev came to power no one was surprised that he is from the South. There was a special privileging for clans and generations of an area, where the president is from. This unspoken rule was kept in power pretty good. But many personalities from Kyrgyz intellectuals try to erase such here division in society after Kyrgyzstan's finding independence.¹⁴⁷

Jolboldu Alybaev exactly described such situation of not unity of Kyrgyz nation: "We don't have a good identity, we are not developing, we need one. We have enough of the resources that we need – land, people, etc.; but we have poor leaders, no ideology, and we need it, to unite the people. The challenges of disunity are many: North and South, (tribalism), other ethnic groups. Our leaders are only pursuing their own interests, making us capitalist; they are not thinking about the people, so it is vital that we unite."¹⁴⁸ However, the greatest split in such mental and tribal division brings absolutely other factor, which does the Kyrgyz society very vulnerable for military collisions and the other armed conflicts.

¹⁴⁴ Cornelius Graubner, "Kyrgyzstan: Mapping the Shadow State, The informal Political Economy of Kyrgyzstan Before the Tulip Revolution", *Field Research Report*, (2005): 6

¹⁴⁵ Atai Moldobayev, op.cit.

¹⁴⁶ Edward Schatz, "The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda-Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan", *Comparative Politics*, Vol.41, no.2, January (2009): 207-211

¹⁴⁷ Nick Megoran, op.cit., 13

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

§ 4.2 Influence of Clan Policy and Mafias.

One of the main factors deepening the divide of Kyrgyz on northern and southern was clan policy. The clan factor is characteristic for many countries of the former Soviet Union, and often it's the tool in state policy of the country. In this plan Kyrgyzstan became a bright example. Representatives of North and South battled not only for the power in the government and the privilege for people from their clan, but also they tried to allocate for themselves the income from various sectors of national economy.¹⁴⁹ Besides representatives of political clan elite there were monopolists in the sphere of illicit trade and drugs trafficking as well.

There are several areas in which money can be made in Kyrgyzstan on a large scale and several individual (who are, supposedly, the patrons of larger criminal gangs) involved. The number one area of criminal activity in Kyrgyzstan is without a doubt drug trafficking. The major producer of opium poppy based drugs in the world throughout the 1990's until today is Afghanistan.¹⁵⁰ During the first years of existence of independent states the regime of border control on the Afghani border was broken because of the civil war in Tajikistan, and later - by the unilateral activity of Turkmenistan on the establishment of relations with Talibs.¹⁵¹ At the same time the process of direct involvement of representatives of the state and political structures of the Central Asian countries in illegal drug trafficking has started.

All this makes unsafe especially South part of the country where plantations on cultivation of drugs are mainly concentrated. But as for the southern areas this business is the fastest in aspect of fast money profit, it involves a very big number of young Kyrgyz and creates between clans the rigid competition for the right of drugs transit and deliveries.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Maral Madi, "Drug trade in Kyrgyzstan: Structure, Implications and Countermeasures, Carfax Publishing", *Central Asian Survey*, December (2004): 251-252

¹⁵⁰ Alexander Knyazev, op.cit., 35

¹⁵¹ Maral Madi, op.cit., 254

¹⁵² "Kyrgyzstan: Economic Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction", 1 ed., Report of International Labour Organisation, Geneva, *International Labour Office* (2008): 55

Drugs business was especially prospering in regions of Osh and Jalal Abad; actually these places began to be named as drug centers of Kyrgyzstan. In fact, in Kyrgyzstan, there are three main areas where drugs are circulating and sold. These are Bishkek city, and the Chui and Osh regions. So far, there are no indications that drug trafficking will decrease.¹⁵³ For many Kyrgyz, engaged in drug trafficking, it was the only way to go abroad in order to earn much more money than in Kyrgyzstan. Besides Kyrgyzstan passed the main drugs traffic way, it also for was a supplier of drugs for other Central Asian states. Chui valley became well-known thanks to this business. Groups of the Tajik drug dealers and their mafias were also among main suppliers and distributor of drugs.¹⁵⁴ From western Tajikistan directly into Kyrgyzstan or via Uzbekistan, opiate trafficking groups are able to take advantage of Kyrgyzstan's Osh regions' weak border controls.¹⁵⁵ Such situation developed from the beginning of the 90s when plants and factories were closed, the old system of economy planning and social sphere were thrown out, but a new one wasn't created.

In fact, by the second half of the ninetieth, the structure of drug trafficking through the Central Asian countries takes shape on the whole. With reference to East routes of the Central Asian direction (Tajikistan and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan) it appears as follows. The organization of transit is carried out by general coordination, the issues of transit to the neighbouring territory transfer of the cargo from the Tajik suppliers to the Kyrgyz groups, and from Kyrgyz - to Kazakh groups.^{156,157} Such close mutual drug cooperation in Central

¹⁵³ Maral Madi, op.cit, 257

¹⁵⁴ Alisher Latypov, Drug Dealers, Drug Lords and Drug Warriors-cum-Traffickers: Drug Crime and the Narcotics Market in Tajikistan, In *Central Asian Drug Policy Center, Kyrgyzstan Through the Prism of Drug Economy* (Bishkek: Public Foundation Central Asian Drug Policy Center, 2011): 260-262

¹⁵⁵ Jacob Townsend, "The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol.4, no. 1 (2006): 73-76

¹⁵⁶ Alexander Knyazev, op.cit., 37

¹⁵⁷ Letizia Paoli and others, "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State", *Journal of Drug Issues* (2007):957

Asia reflected benefits of such transactions for clans and also lack of criminal prosecution of drug dealers.

Studies of the structure of the drug traffic in the country have led analysts to believe that several high-level officials have divided the drug trafficking market of Kyrgyzstan between themselves, but so far they have not been identified. It only could help to understand why drug business could reach such scale in the country and also in the whole region.¹⁵⁸ According to this, such situation in the country was favorable to officials and authorities that didn't try to change or stop drugs' routes deliveries. Here it was possible to speak about a peculiar pyramid where on a top were clan leaders or other officials, on the second stage there were clans which collected money, and the last layer consisted of clan people which were engaged in drugs trafficking. This doesn't mean at all that all officials or representatives of a government were anyway involved in drug traffic or they had communications with the drug dealer's clans.¹⁵⁹ Many clans were busy in smuggling of products or materials, than in drugs sales. To determine even concrete cases is quite difficult, but that regions of Kyrgyzstan's South had a great concentration of criminal issues is obvious.

Besides drug business, also one of the most important problems is smuggling, particular cotton smuggling, considered as white gold of all Central Asian region. Capacity of smuggler trade go almost in the same level as drug trafficking in Central Asia. All this creates danger for stability in the region. Such vulnerable region was very dangerous especially for south part of Kyrgyzstan, particularly Osh. By means of various mafia clans or business monopolistic structures it was possible to influence situation in the region in a quite hard-powered form.

§ 4.3 Kurmanbek Bakiyev Takes Cabinet in Kyrgyzstan.

In 2005 a Tulip Revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan and as a result was overthrew of Askar Akayev accused of the permanent governing Kyrgyzstan and assignment of money from the state budget. Parliamentary elections, which have passed on February 27 and on

¹⁵⁸Kathleen Collins, op.cit., 114

¹⁵⁹Maral Madi, op.cit., 260-263

March 13, 2005, were a reason and trigger of that revolution.¹⁶⁰ As a result of these elections representatives of pro-governmental and neutral forces including children of president Askar Akayev occupied the majority of places in Parliament.¹⁶¹

A new president - Kurmanbek Bakiyev - had to become a person of full contrast in compare to Akayev and to put Kyrgyzstan on a way of true democracy. With Bakiyev's coming to the power many Kyrgyz expected high economic growth and increasing of salaries and living standards; also many Kyrgyz enterprises had to be denationalized and transferred to private businessmen. In term of Kyrgyzstan's divide on North and South, this time victory was on the side of southerners.¹⁶² K. Bakiyev originally was from South that was again mentioned as alternating of the southerners and northerners in power. However, to soften skeptical moods of North concerning his presidency, Bakiyev appointed the prime minister a person from North of Kyrgyzstan - Felix Kulov, which was well known for his pro-Russian orientation.¹⁶³ Bakiyev also very soon began to be called as pro-Russian politician, because one fact drew public attention very much.

While Askar Akayev tried to keep some balance in the territory of Kyrgyzstan in aspect of a hosting two bases - American and Russian, Bakiyev himself inclined a bowl of scales towards Russia. Akayev tried carrying out a policy of balance of power, while Bakiyev considered such situation very unacceptable for Kyrgyzstan and uncertain in term of priorities arrangement.

Bakiyev's essential difference from Akayev was in opposite thoughts about Kyrgyzstan's multiethnicity: new president didn't pay due attention to this factor and didn't try to promote policy of national spirit rising among Kyrgyz population that was very diligent and carefully provided by Akayev.¹⁶⁴ There were no posters- reminders that Kyrgyzstan was

¹⁶⁰ Martin Henningsson, "The Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan - Revolution or Coup d'état?", Individual Research Work, *Stockholm University*, 2006, 16

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Erica Marat, "The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After", *The Jamestown Foundation*, Washington DC., (2006): 8

¹⁶³ Ivan Bychkov, "Nejelezniy Feliks" [Non-Iron Feliks], *Kompromat.Ru*, March 6, 2006

¹⁶⁴ Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979): 36-37

a common home for all ethnicities living in it, no propaganda posters promoting cultural and spiritual heritage of Kyrgyz and campaigns inviting people for an occasion of national symbols or heroes anymore. Because all this was considered as a reminder of the previous president and therefore was cleaned out from the streets. Already exactly in a year after Tulip Revolution many Kyrgyz people were disappointed with its fruits as their hopes weren't justified and the same social problems remained almost unsolved.¹⁶⁵ Refusal of interior national policy by Bakiyev becomes a reason for discontent among nationalist politicians in Kyrgyz government. There was literally a split between it and other politicians in parliament. Also oil to fire added Bakiyev's protege and right hand - Felix Kulov, whom many Kyrgyz considered not corresponding person for a position of the prime minister. Once he made a statement that Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation could create something like confederation in order to strengthen the bilateral communications.¹⁶⁶ In the Russian Federation Kulov's statement was apprehended very skeptical, at the same time in Kyrgyzstan it caused an indignation squall among a huge number of population. Such attitude toward Kyrgyz and Kyrgyzstan's problems discredited reputation of both Bakiyev and Kulov in country.

Became clear that Bakiyev wouldn't have second term if he doesn't try to make something, as what was going on really didn't benefit Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev explained this tendency only as political tricks of the West and different forces in Kyrgyzstan, indulging West and the USA.¹⁶⁷ While Akayev seemed concerned about creating national or multicultural unity; Bakiyev focuses on strengthening his political power. The International Crisis Group contends "parliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan has been hobbled" because "the president's team was motivated purely by the desire to concentrate power in its

¹⁶⁵ Sultan Akimbekov, "Kyrgyzskiy Bunt: Bessmislenniy i Besposhadniy?" [Kyrgyz Riot: Senseless and Merciless?] *Tsentrazii*, №7, (January 2010) <http://magazine.asiakz.com/rus/article/483>

¹⁶⁶ Taalibek Amanov, "Kyrgyzstan: Kulov Confederation Plan Slated: Idea of Union with Russia Attacked by Establishment and Opposition Alike", *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, June 18, 2007

¹⁶⁷ Graeme Herd, "Colorful Revolutions and the CIS – "Manufactured" Versus "Managed" Democracy?" *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 52, no.2, March/April (2005): 10-14

hands.”¹⁶⁸ Such ardent aspiration to keep in power was characteristic for both presidents, and if to analyze within the CIS, it was issue not only of Kyrgyzstan, but also of many other states too.

Chapter V. Russia's Impact on Kyrgyzstan in 2010

§ 5.1 Bakiyev's overthrow.

“The authorities stepped up pressures on the opposition and independent media. Several independent editorial offices were closed in March and early April 2009, under the pretexts of slurring the presidency or using pirated software. Steps were taken to block online news services, instances of harassment and persecution of NGO and opposition activists were reported, and on 25 March the Parliament voted new laws making citizens’ surveillance easier.”¹⁶⁹ It’s a fragment about situation during the Bakiyev period in Kyrgyzstan and reasons of accruing discontent with him among the population. The more long the country was ruled by Bakiyev, the more Kyrgyzstan rolled down in totalitarianism and had decline of democratic values in the country.

Ethnic fermentation had also began in country: Kyrgyz and Uzbeks began to separate from each other in all spheres of daily life and other ethnics also began to mark demonstratively their ethnic originality. Akayev’s times of "Common Home" for all people living in Kyrgyzstan has passed long ago.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ “Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm”, Update Briefing, *International Crisis Group*, Bishkek/Brussels: Asia Briefing no. 79, 14 August, 2008, 1

¹⁶⁹ Jacek Foks et al., “Overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Bakiyev: Causes and Implications”, Bulletin no. 59, *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, PISM, April 20, (2010): 25

¹⁷⁰ Erica Marat, op.cit., 42-45

Many experts claim that not rendering due consideration to a problem of ethnic minorities and their coexistence with Kyrgyz was one of Bakiyev's main internal mistakes.¹⁷¹ However, the president very soon began to lose in the political sphere to the main global actors. Also rigid discontent among Kyrgyz people was caused by Bakiyev's tribalistic approach in domestic policy. Bakiyev appointed many of his family members to key positions within his Government. 32-year-old Maxim, his younger son and head of Kyrgyzstan's Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation since October 2009, was widely detested.¹⁷² Bakiyev has exactly repeated a way of his overthrown predecessor, though at the beginning of his presidency he promised to eradicate all shortcomings of Akayev's governmental system. It should be noted that as at the time of Akayev, so at the time of Bakiyev activity and work of mass media was rigidly regulated in the country as well. However, by estimates of many, during the period of presidency of the second one it became even more rigid.

Actually, those freedoms, which the new president promised everyone in Kyrgyzstan weren't carried out. Any criticism was ripped in the bud, and journalists were accused of assistance to western political agencies. The Kyrgyz government had been blocking transmission of Radio Free Europe (Azattyk) and BBC radio, both of which had a broadcast range covering the entire country. The ban came at a time of a worsening energy crisis, rampant inflation, and mobilization by opposition movements, and general public disaffection with President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's government.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Sean R. Roberts, "Déjà vu in Kyrgyzstan 5 Years Later?", The Roberts Report on Central Asia and Kazakhstan, *Analysis on the Political Economy of Greater Central Asia*, April 8, 2010 <http://roberts-report.blogspot.com/2010/04/deja-vu-in-kyrgyzstan-5-years-later.html>

¹⁷² Richard Rousseau, "Kyrgyzstan Events: Central Asia Entering a Period of Serious Destabilization", *Europe's World*, April 12, 2010 http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/1310/language/en-US/Default.aspx

¹⁷³ Erica Marat, "Bakiyev Anticipates a Harsh Winter and an Energy Crisis, Further Restricts Free Speech", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 5, Issue no. 237, The Jamestown Foundation, December 12, 2008 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34267

Kyrgyz government censorship has been criticized by the Bishkek office of the OSCE, which has called on Bakiyev to veto the recent restrictive law on the mass media. In its 2009 report, Freedom House described Kyrgyzstan as a country with shrinking independence in the mass media and noted its absence of freedom of speech.¹⁷⁴ It's possible to tell that all achievements in term of a democracy and freedom of speech, which at the beginning of independence broadly used by citizens of Kyrgyzstan, were almost nullified. Kyrgyzstan came back again to a form of an authoritative mode, though there were all rudiments for normal functioning of the purely parliamentary republic.

The relations with the Kremlin began to worsen because of disagreements with Kyrgyz government about Manas air base. Bakiyev kept the promise and signed an agreement, which transformed base in the logistic Kyrgyz - American Center.¹⁷⁵ Upon replacing Akayev, Bakiyev quickly took over the complex network of base-related fuel and service contracts, but he also sought to increase the official \$ 2 million rental payment for the base, given the base's obvious value to U.S. defense planners.^{176, 177}

However, this act it didn't satisfy the Russian government; moreover, it expressed concern about such situation. In the Kyrgyzstan the political situation became at that time extremely unstable: opinions of people concerning air base rented by the USA shared. But these actions of Bakiyev's didn't mean that he was going on rapprochement with the USA. He rather tried to continue policy of balance and deduction on the territory of Kyrgyzstan two bases: Kant and and Manas. At the beginning of April, 2010 people began to gather in crowds to hold meetings concerning discontent with Bakiyev's presidency.¹⁷⁸ Generally, they were angry at social problems and clan policy provided by Bakiyev and his family. In Talas and Bishkek passed mass excitements, which thrown after on other cities and have shaken all

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵Jacek Foks et al., op.cit

¹⁷⁶Alexander Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia* (NY, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2010): 121

¹⁷⁷Erica Marat, "Bakiyev Wins New Geopolitical Game Over Manas Base", *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute*, January 1, 2009 <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5137>

¹⁷⁸Natasha Yefimov and David Trilling, "Kyrgyzstan's April Uprising: Path to Change or Death in Vain", *Eurasianet*, April 7, 2011 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63242>

country. However, the rapid downfall of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev came as a surprise for political analysts. Only four days previously he met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in Bishkek. Not a single analytical center in Russia or the West predicted such a rapid turn of events.¹⁷⁹

People told the different reasons, which have pushed people to revolt, but the main was poverty and absence of any work for young people. Increase of tariffs for electricity became a last straw. Last year the electricity costed 75 kopeks, since New Year tariffs rose twice. Nurse from protesting crowds said: "I have a salary of 2000 rubles, for electricity I have to pay 80 rubles now, but it was 40 earlier!"¹⁸⁰ There were masses of such people on streets: each of them had its own story about dissatisfaction with the government, and especially, with the President. It seems Bakiev did not learn from his predecessor, AskarAkaev, who was also toppled in March 2005 in what became known as the Tulip Revolution.¹⁸¹

The fact of the begun disorders already demonstrated that events repeat again according to the same scenario of 2005. Collisions of oppositionists with police took place on April 7, 2010. Then protests turned into armed revolution during which supporters of opposition seized the capital of Bishkek and the main office buildings.¹⁸²

But the last straw was Bakiyev's statement about his desire to transfer the capital of Kyrgyzstan from Bishkek to the south of country: two cities were chosen for bidding - Osh and Jalal-Abad. Certainly, residents of Bishkek didn't want to give their city's status of capital to another city so simply. As the politician was from the South, he assumed that having

¹⁷⁹ Andrei Stenin, "Bakiyev: Falling Into The Same Trap: Kyrgyzstan After Ousting President Kurmanbek Bakiyev", *Features&Opinion*, In *RIA Novosti*, April 8, 2010 <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100408/158488480.html>

¹⁸⁰ Ilya Varlamov, "Perviy Den' Posle Revolutsii: Bishkek 2010" [The First day After Revolution: Bishkek 2010], *Livejournal*, April, 11, 2010 <http://zyalt.livejournal.com/236341.html?nojs=1>

¹⁸¹ Richard Rousseau, op.cit.

¹⁸² Nika Bavik, "V Kirgizii Nachalas Revolutsiya?" [Has Revolution Begin in Kyrgyzstan?], *Trud*, April 7, 2010 http://www.trud.ru/article/07-04-2010/239661_v_kirgizii_nachalas_revoljutsija.html

secured with support of his regional countrymen, he'd be able to hold the power.¹⁸³ But the non-return point for Bakiyev had already passed: the opposition gained strength, having secured with people's support. As Bakiyev actually didn't supervise situation in the country any more, opposition officials created by provisional government led by Rosa Otunbayeva.¹⁸⁴ Several times the provisional government addressed to Bakiyev with an appeal to sign the statement for addition. At last, seeing accruing chaos and being afraid for the safety of himself and his family members, Bakiyev held negotiations with opposition and on April 13 and 15 and then resigned.^{185, 186}

§ 5.2 Destabilization of situation in Osh and riots.

Kyrgyzstan endured the second revolution exactly in 5 years. For such short period political stresses were extremely undesirable for the country in which there were enough internal problems that were aggravated each time government changes. The provisional government realized that despite Bakiyev's departure to Kazakhstan and then to Belarus, passions within the country won't settle for a long time, because of citizens' anger for

¹⁸³“Bakiyev Zayavlaet o namerenii Perenesti Stolitsu v Osh i Torguetsa za Slojenie Polnomochiy” [Bakiyev declares intention to transfer capital to Osh and bargains for abdication], *Ferghana News*, April 12, 2010

<http://www.ferghananews.com/news.php?id=14459&mode=snews>

¹⁸⁴“Kyrgyzstan Opposition Declares New Government: An Interim Government Has Been Set Up By Opposition Leaders in Kyrgyzstan”, April 8, 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8608708.stm>

¹⁷ “Ousted Kyrgyz Leader Agrees to Resign in Exchange for Protection”, *Asia-Pacific, FoxNews*, April 13, 2010 <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/13/ousted-kyrgyz-leader-told-return-face-arrest/?test=latestnews>

¹⁸ Alexander Tokmakov, “Kurmanbek Bakiyev Gotov Vesti Peregovori na Yuge Strani” [Kurmanbek Bakiyev is Ready to Negotiate in the South of State], *DeutscheWelle*, April 13, 2010

Bakiyev's reforms.¹⁸⁷ Preparation for new presidential elections and establishment of the functioning government for a while was the main objective of Rosa Otunbayeva's government. But the situation was very hard and shaky; tensions were increasing, as people were afraid that now someone worse than Bakiyev would come to power.

In problem regions of the country disorder and arbitrariness began despite existence of provisional government. Especially in poor southern regions of the country activation of monopoly and clan policy in social life of the population was clearly observed. The most unstable and restless areas of Kyrgyzstan in a difficult transition period became even worse. All underground enterprises became more active and even skirmishes between supporters and opponents of Bakiyev in the south continued to happen as well. In news chronicles of those days two cities, Osh and Jalal-Abad, flashed most of all. The situation in Osh became much complicated because of big population of Uzbek ethnic minority.¹⁸⁸ After Bakiyev's overthrow Kadyrzhan Batyrov has arrived again for supporting Uzbeks of Osh as considered them the most vulnerable in this situation.

Many believe that just his arrival provoked new collisions of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, as Kyrgyz knew him as an armed separator.¹⁸⁹ Daniel Greenfield wrote in Eurasia Review that «leveraging Uzbek separatists like Kadyrjan Batyrov, Putin had managed to light the fuel dump of ethnic tensions that had already been simmering in Osh constantly».¹⁹⁰ Certainly, his arrival wasn't the only reason of newly escalated Osh protests, but its stay in Osh added oil in fire of the chaos, which has captured Kyrgyzstan in those months. The provisional government worked too slowly and didn't cope with the accruing tension in Osh.

¹⁸⁷ Philip P. Pan, "Deposed Kyrgyz President Leaves, Allowing U.S. Outreach to New Leaders", *The Washington Post*, April 16, 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041505067.html>

¹⁸⁸ Sanobar Shermatova, "Kirgizskiy Yug i Uzbekskiy Vopros" [Kyrgyzstan's South and Uzbek Issue], *Ferghana News*, June 8, 2010 <http://www.ferghananews.com/article.php?id=6602>

¹⁸⁹ Andrei Areshev, "Osh Massacre and International Politics", *Open Dialogue Research Journal*, Oriental Review, June 17, 2010 <http://orientalreview.org/2010/06/17/osh-massacre-and-international-politics/>

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

Such scope of violence in Osh took the provisional government unawares, though some Uzbeks claimed that these riots occurred with the connivance of Kyrgyz authorities.¹⁹¹ And fact of asking Russia's military help with approval from Collective Security Treaty Organization for regulation of situation by Rosa Otunbayeva caused suspicions not only among Uzbeks, but Kyrgyz as well. Only when obvious armed conflicts between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz began the provisional government sounded an alarm and entered a curfew.¹⁹² But it was late as in Osh has already bossed gangs attacking people and killing them.

According to eyewitnesses, collisions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks started by a casino, located near the Alay Hotel, in the center of Osh in the evening on June 10.¹⁹³ Many people, having caught sight of huge crowd, just came out of their houses in order to learn what was happening. Various rumors and guesses began to spread all over Osh city. Non-confirmed rumors and gossips played a huge role in situation forcing - in the next days mass violence, tortures, murders and rapes captured almost all Osh city.

Rumors from both parties contradicted each other: Kyrgyz said that Uzbeks attacked them in order to force Kyrgyz not to enter Osh: they burn their houses, raped women, shot everyone in streets, blocked roads.¹⁹⁴ The same unreasonable rumors were spread among Uzbeks; they considered that Kyrgyz want to squeeze out all Uzbeks from Osh and resort to

¹⁹¹Rochelle Jones, "The Conflict in Kyrgyzstan – Complex and Gendered", July 1, 2010
http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AWID_ConflictKyrgyzstan_ComplexGendered.pdf

¹⁹² Ron Synovitz, "Kyrgyz Troops Dismantle Osh Barricades; State of Emergency Raises Referendum Doubts", *Radio Free Europe, Free Liberty*, June 20, 2010
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyz_Troops_Prepare_For_Osh_Ultimatum_State_of_Emergency_Raises_Referendum_Doubts/2077040.html

¹⁹³"Where is the Justice?, Interethnic Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath", *Human Rights Watch*, August, (2010): 24
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kyrgyzstan0810webwcover_1.pdf

¹⁹⁴Human Rights Watch, *Interview with "Kanat K."* (not his real name), village of Mady, July 15, (2010)

various above-mentioned methods. According to many eyewitnesses and researchers, it's still unclear how rumors could spread just for one night all over region and who were distributors of them.¹⁹⁵

Outraged by the violence, and concerned about relatives in the city, crowds of ethnic Kyrgyz from neighboring villages descended on Osh city. From early in the morning on June 11, crowds of ethnic Kyrgyz from surrounding villages joined locals in Osh in looting and torching Uzbek shops and neighborhoods, and sometimes killing Uzbeks they encountered.¹⁹⁶

Uzbeks began to barricade in their houses, quarters and to expose the patrol gathered from volunteers. All this revolted Kyrgyz even more as Kyrgyz have considered that Uzbeks have no right to do such things living in Kyrgyz land. Disorders accepted mass and bloody character and cruelty was especially evident.^{197,198}

Barricaded Uzbeks were attacked not by simple Kyrgyz people with stones and sticks, but by men on tanks in camouflage. They had enough weapons and ammunition and, according to many eyewitnesses, they were mercenaries. Among them were snipers who accurately shot on the purposes.¹⁹⁹ People in camouflage passed from one quarter to another and fired on defeat. Soon disorders were thrown on Jalal-Abad and happened there with the same intensity and by the same scenario as in Osh.

The situation became critical when crowds of refugees from Osh leaving their homes in a hurry reached mountain Souleymane at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. A great crush began and many had fainted just there. Shots of those events even without any comments give a clearly picture of chaos and hopelessness of those days for residents of Osh.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵Where is the Justice? op.cit., 24-27

¹⁹⁶Ibid.

¹⁹⁷Abdulkarim Mirzayev, *Iztirob* [Suffering] doc.f., (Brussels: A. Navoi Institute, 2011) FLV

¹⁹⁸Human Rights Watch, *Interview with "Ulan U."* (not his real name), Gulcha, July 14, 2010.

¹⁹⁹Raul Mallermann, op.cit.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

However, it's remarkable that many Kyrgyz of Osh despite flashed violence and the anti-Uzbek moods continued to help Uzbeks. Kyrgyz let them live in their houses, defended from gunmen, and gave money, food and medicaments. Many Uzbeks said that these riots were work of certain forces, including Kyrgyz, which just used Kyrgyz nationalism in this way. But these killings and persecutions of Uzbeks had nothing common with other Kyrgyz.²⁰¹ Thus, despite Osh tension in 2010, which came like a ghost from the past 1990, there wasn't attitude towards Kyrgyz like a real enemy.

But one thing has consolidated both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks: this conflict and destabilization of situation within several days was very well conducted by someone, and maybe, even planned.²⁰² Such thoughts of simple citizens found quite reasonable confirmation by some analysts.

§ 5.3 “130 years of Russian Dominance”²⁰³

The countries of Central Asia after the USSR's collapse continued to be more connected with Russia than with someone else. Even mutual cooperation between Central Asian states them hadn't level of the same cooperation and relationships as it was with Russia. All this made Russia main actor in this region and held it leadership for a long time. It should be noted that boundless influence of Russia was spread over all countries, except Uzbekistan, that have borders with Afghanistan.²⁰⁴

As a result, the American presence in the region and its influence rose from the South. But after well-known agreements considering air-base Manas influence of Russia even in

²⁰¹ Abdukarim Mirzayev, op.cit. *Interview with Tursunbay Adamboyev* (Uzbek poet and interpreter) and *Abdusalam Jonibekov* (Kyrgyz professor)

²⁰² Raul Mallermann, op.cit.

²⁰³ Title is taken from Edward Allworth's of the same name book *Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance*.

²⁰⁴ Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy”, *Congressional Research Service*, (Report for Members and Committees of Congress, June 18 2009): 51

Kyrgyzstan became shaky. According to some analysts, states of region were almost "floating away" from under Russia's wing.²⁰⁵ It was necessary to try returning them. Therefore any occurred event in the region was immediately explained from Kremlin prism or just was connected with Russia's foreign policy. According to the listed above reasons it wasn't surprising, but even natural approach. So was with happened second Osh riots. Many experts right there noted that Russia could not stand apart from this mess. The only thing to do was to find out degree of Russia's involvement into a course of Osh conflict.²⁰⁶ Some western journalists and analysts believed that the ethnic conflict, which took place in Osh, was interior structure. Nationalism used in a context of ethno-symbolism for the solution of some tasks of certain powers was a superstructure. There is a certain political picture appears if to combine all factors, which at least brought to Osh conflict.

First, artificial borders of the modern five states of Central Asia, which were traced after collapse of Tsarist Russia without taking into account settlements of nations and ethnics in khanates, has already created a base for the further conflicts. It turned out that some people remained out of their natural borders of accommodation.²⁰⁷ Also, in 1991 a new Central Asian state inherited the same state borders that were devised in the 1930s on the Stalinist principle of "divide and rule."²⁰⁸ Thus occurred very big Uzbek settlements in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz settlements in Kazakhstan, Uzbek settlements in Tajikistan and on the contrary and so on.

During the Soviet Union it was restrained by one general communistic-totalitarian system and intrusion of idea of internationalism for the sake of bright future of all Soviet proletarians. Hard power as executions and references and some other methods of a

³⁶ Richard Galpin, "Struggle for Central Asian energy riches: Russia losing ground", *BBC News*, June 2, 2010 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10131641>

²⁰⁶ Daniel Greenfield, "A Russian Made Disaster in Kyrgyzstan", *Canada Free Press*, June 14, 2010 <http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/24231>

²⁰⁷ Michael Mandelbaum, *op.cit.*, 24

²⁰⁸ Richard Rousseau, "The International Factor in the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan", *European Dialogue*, *op.cit.*

totalitarian mode were applied as well.²⁰⁹ But already in the last years of Soviet empire's existing this factor detonated and ethnic riots began.

The Osh conflict, which has flashed in 1990, has already indicated the intensity center. However, for young independent and getting nationalized states it was normal. Nationalism in many former Soviet republics has demonstrated the essential uniformity with nationalism in some developing countries.²¹⁰ The transition period could not be passable painless.

Secondly, nationalism and its all manifestations played a big role in region. The risen wave of nationalism swept away literally everything on its way: glorification of one nation and belittling of the neighbour's nation.²¹¹ But by the end the 90^s situation more or less calmed down and became stable. But the abyss between some ethnics became not bigger, but just deeper. In a context of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan the risen nationalism literally faced foreheads in 20 years. Many political factors have showed why these riots occurred namely in 20 years. The available latent nationalism and border disputes were like a trump in hands of those who could influence a situation.

Thirdly, there were also personalities, which interests quite coincided with interests of the main actor. For example, Uzbek political figure Kadyrjan Batyrov. This made many analysts to accuse Kremlin policy of kindling the interethnic conflict.²¹² But everything was more difficult than seemed. Fourthly, the accruing nationalism in Kyrgyzstan could reach sooner or later the critical weight and stream on any other ethnos within the country. But because of internal political dismantling and revolutions it turned into a peculiar weapon against neighbors. At the same time politically inconvenient Bakiyev was not faithful to his pro-Russian position any more. But at the same time his overthrow was hardly planned by

²⁰⁹Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union: 1923-1939* (NY, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001): 212-220

²¹⁰Anatoly Khazanov, *After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States* (WI, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995): 27

²¹¹Terry Martin, op.cit., 274-275

²¹²Daniel Greenfield, op.cit

other powers, though there are also opinions about it.²¹³To win time and to affect elections of new government it was necessary to create turmoil in the territory of country. People like Uzbek nationalist leader Kadyrjan Batyrov were used to stage riots, and suppress counter-riots, in order to remove Bakiyev from power, and replace him with Roza Otunbayeva.²¹⁴

“The U.N. has found evidence of bloody intent behind the chaos in Kyrgyzstan that killed hundreds. The declaration by the U.N. that the fighting was "orchestrated, targeted and well-planned" - set off by organized groups of gunmen in ski masks - bolsters government claims that hired attackers marauded through Osh, shooting at both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks to inflame old tensions.”²¹⁵

One very remarkable fact is that Russia didn't seek moment to manage military intervention in Kyrgyzstan. It only has sent some troops for protection of the base Kant and Russian families living around it. For Russia's policy it could be an unpopular measure after war with Georgia in 2008.²¹⁶ Also such intervention could obviously indicate its assistance both in coup and in the subsequent Osh conflict.

§ 5.4 Connections between coup and Osh riots.

Events in Osh showed that coincidence of several significant factors at once could play a role of trigger in starting bloody protests. The Osh conflict became continuation of the April disorders caused by removal of the president of Kurmanbek Bakiyev for many people in Kyrgyzstan. According to Anna Matveeva, June riots could be quite provoked by Kurmanbek Bakiyev's supporters which tried to return him toin this way.²¹⁷ But how these

²¹³Simon Tisdall, “Russia May Regret Kyrgyzstan Coup”, *The Guardian*, April 21, 2010
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/21/russia-kyrgyzstan-coup-regret>

²¹⁴Daniel Greenfield, op.cit

²¹⁵“Kyrgyzstan Deadly Rioting “Planned”, says U.N., *CBS News*, June 16, 2010
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-503543_162-6586854.html

²¹⁶Simon Shuster, “Why Isn't Russia Intervening in Kyrgyzstan?”, *Time Magazine*, June 16, 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1997055,00.html>

²¹⁷Anna Matveeva, op.cit., 23

protests began in Osh, where mainly Uzbeks live, two months later. Tension in the relations between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz was increasing during the period from April to March because of disagreements concerning the president of state. Uzbeks weren't satisfied with Bakiyev's presidency and were glad to see him overthrown, while Kyrgyz of the South were not happy with happened coup. Influence of April revolution on Osh riots could be observed through a prism of Kremlin policy. Russia played no direct role in Kyrgyzstan's violence in April and June of that year, the Kremlin was disenchanted enough with President Kurmanbek Bakiev and his government's policies to do something about it – particularly given the perceived duplicity over the American Manas 'Transit Center', and the fact that Bakiev's son had control over the economy, giving him the ability to block Russian projects.^{218, 219}

Wide well-organized campaign in the Russian mass media against Bakiyev could only confirm readiness of Russia to overthrow an objectionable politician by means of soft power. "In early 2010, Russian TV broadcasts in Kyrgyzstan and online news sites produced hard-hitting pieces about top-level corruption. These often truthful (if selective) exposés helped prepare the ground for Bakiev's end. Even before April, Russia had already raised the fuel duty on petrol it exported to Kyrgyzstan (in preparation for the latter's entry into the Customs Union, it claimed) and shut down some bilateral banking transactions, triggering social unrest."²²⁰

The sudden increase in criticism also demonstrates how the Kremlin uses the national mass media to express its frustration with Bakiyev. Previously, Russian media outlets were galvanized to provide filtered reporting of issues relating to developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and other countries deemed as important to Russian foreign policy.²²¹The situation

²¹⁸James Nixey, *The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, The Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad Series* (London: Chatham House, 2012): 9

²¹⁹ David Trilling, "Kyrgyzstan: Russian Press Bashing Bakiyev", *Eurasia Net*, March 29, 2010 <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav033010.shtml>

²²⁰James Nixey, op.cit.

²²¹ Erica Marat, "Russian Mass Media Attack Bakiyev", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VII, The Jamestown Foundation, April 1, 2010 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36226

in Kyrgyzstan at that time was quite difficult not only in the political plan, but also in economic. It was not obligatory to an actor to use special force in order to change something in Kyrgyzstan. The situation could be compared with whiff towards a card-castle, which easily breaks up because of the slightest fluctuations of air.

But what happened after April was not included into plans of Russia concerning deduction of Kyrgyzstan in loyal to Moscow situation. It seems like that if to consider geopolitical situation only in a sheaf Russia-Kyrgyzstan. But Osh riots were a collision of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz territory. Uzbekistan also appeared in dependent on the main actor of Central Asia situation, as the card of protection of ethnic minority was played. K. Batyrov literally was given card blanche in his hands during the riots.²²² According to materials, Uzbek separatists had enough weapons and were well armed to manage to bring turmoil in Osh in June 2010.²²³ Even Uzbeks consider that he could not act so independently by himself.²²⁴

§ 5.5 Ethno-symbolist approach in providing policy in Central Asia.

Despite many factors, the source of second Osh conflict is democratic and economic condition, but not ethnic identity. While the ethnic approach is successful in the international level, the ethnic conflict will continue to happen.²²⁵ These words reflect that each conflict which has occurred between two nations cannot be equated right there as an interethnic conflict. Other reasons of conflict origin come to surface while trying to understand the reasons and to study them deeper. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks despite the available differences, in general, are representatives of one part of ethnic symbolism as share common ethnic elements. Several reports stressed the essential similarity—ethnic, linguistic, cultural—

²²²Daniel Greenfield, op.cit

²²³Bektursun Stamkulov, Tolkun Ermekbayev, *K Besporyadkam Tshatelno Gotovilis* [Riots were Carefully Prepared] StanTv, Kyrgyzstan, June 24, 2010, FLV http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wLO19BHP2E&feature=player_embedded

²²⁴Abdukarim Mirzayev, op.cit.

²²⁵ Aksana Ismailbekova, Sophie Roche, “The glimmer of hope in bloody Kyrgyzstan”, *Ferghana News*, August 8, 2010 <http://enews.ferghananews.com/article.php?id=2654>

between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations.²²⁶ Even considering hostility of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz against each other in Osh region throughout long, disorders did not come out from interethnic roots. Two communities were not divided by irreconcilable hatred; barriers between them were caused by realities of a social categorization. Being tired out in their certain niches, they didn't see sense in building one common future. Cooperative communications were too fragile to resist to political crisis and to external powers.²²⁷

Actually, the beginning of the Osh events was marked by terror of Bakiyev supporters, which tried to show discontent with his overthrow. But this statement still is causing mass of doubts. Giving to riots color of the interethnic conflict turned out quite easy and simply, as there was an Uzbek component.

²²⁶ Christopher Hitchens, "The Narcissism of the Small Difference", *Slate*, June 28, 2010

²²⁷"Oshskie Sobitiya-2010: Eshe Odin Vzgljad Na Tragediyu na Yuge Kyrgyzstana" [Osh Events-2010: One more View on Kyrgyzstan's South Tragedy], translated Report of Osh riots, June 28, 2012 <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1340829120>

Chapter VI. Presence of the USA, China and other regional states in Kyrgyzstan.

§ 6.1 The USA's reaction to events of 2010.

“The United States has shown during the last two so-called revolutions in Kyrgyzstan – the one in 2005 and the one that just happened in April – that they would rather take a wait-and-see approach. They have not come out strongly on the side of this provisional government; they did not come out so strongly on the side of Bakiev when he became president in 2005. Their interest is primarily in Manas for transporting goods to Afghanistan, and by taking one side or the other they risk the side they're on will lose, and if that happens, then they might lose the base.”²²⁸

These words truly characterized interests of the USA in Kyrgyzstan and gave an assessment of its inaction concerning Osh conflict. The main issue for America was to keep the presence in region by means of base Manas. Therefore, the USA has chosen such approach to that riots: just to wait for some time and look what will be farther.

The USA didn't declare any special statements concerning Osh conflict. But there was a statement of the State Department release about providing humanitarian aid to a problem zone. “The United States is deeply concerned and is closely monitoring developments in the Kyrgyz Republic and the affected border regions of Uzbekistan and supports international efforts to facilitate peace and order and the provision of humanitarian assistance coordinated

²²⁸ Bruce Pannier, “10 Things You Need To Know About The Ethnic Unrest In Kyrgyzstan”, *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*, April 28, 2013
http://www.rferl.org/content/10_Things_You_Need_To_Know_About_The_Ethnic_Unrest_In_Kyrgyzstan/2071323.html

by the UN and other international organizations.”²²⁹ The goal was to keep base Manas and with it to keep American presence in the region. For starting negotiations it was necessary to be sure about political and ethnical stability in state.

U.S Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake met with Roza Otunbayeva in Bishkek, the capital, on Saturday after touring several packed refugee camps in neighbouring Uzbekistan.²³⁰ In his speech he said, that the USA would support relief actions for people, which suffered from happened riots. Also Blake declared that “interim government should probe the violence and such an investigation should be complemented by an international investigation by a credible international body.”²³¹

As Manas air base was close in 2009 it could be understandable that the USA don’t want to have risks again in losing presence on Kyrgyzstan’s territory. But this reason was not the only one why the USA was watching carefully situation in the region without actions.

The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US. Kyrgyzstan then offered to host US forces at an airbase. The US military repaired and later upgraded the airfield for aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, medical evacuation, and support for U.S. and coalition personnel.²³² Kyrgyzstan borders with Uzbekistan, which in its turn borders with Afghanistan. This issue is not about political influence and presence, but regional and international security. Even sometimes Uzbekistan is called “key to Afghan war drawdown” as it plays huge role in methods of solution of terror and drug trafficking problem in Afghanistan.²³³

²²⁹ Gabriella Krohmal, “U.S. Providing \$32 Million in Humanitarian Aid to Kyrgyzstan”, *IIP Digital*, June 18, 2010
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2010/06/20100617165258kjleinad7.954043e-02.html#axzz2RYdDbol0>

²³⁰ Alexander Zemlianichenko, “U.S. envoy urges independent probe into Kyrgyz riots”, *Associated Press*, In USA Today, June 19, 2010
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-06-18-kyrgyzstan_N.htm

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Jim Nichol, op.cit., Summary

²³³ Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Uzbekistan, key to Afghan war drawdown, to ban foreign military bases”, *Contributor*, In *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 30, 2012

But Central Asian region still have weak security system and preventing attacks of regional terrorist groups in states. At the heart of Central Asia's security crisis is the Fergana Valley. Since the late 1990s this region has been fervently contested by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and has endured continuous armed clashes, led by the IMU through raids and terrorist attacks, including car bombings, full-scale village assaults and the kidnapping of foreigners.²³⁴ But in 2010 instability and violence reached Osh city and spontaneously extended on other cities. So, even interim government wasn't able to regulate situation in the country as the wished it to be controlled.

It's quite possible, that the USA was waiting for Russia's actions during this period in order to choose its policy toward Kyrgyz authorities after according to generated situation. And again it was quite possible to draw some analogies of this situation with Georgian-Russian war 2008, when the USA also refrained from any actions and just watched Russian' military reaction. Such approach was very favorable to the USA and helped it to avoid the direct pressure upon the state of conflict that is Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the USA just specified on humanitarian aid and financial support for Kyrgyzstan, as it was mentioned in its statement.

These campaigns provided assistance to displaced and returning families and address the roots of the conflict through community development and conflict mitigation programs.²³⁵ Thus, it's visible that America just stood a bit apart from other political issues in acting and providing policy of recognition of guilty and innocent in that conflict. Some experts consider that wait-and-see approach was chosen because of the US sure, that situation in region was well controlled by Russia authorities by the help of pro-Russian oriented officials of both countries: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0830/Uzbekistan-key-to-Afghan-war-drawdown-to-ban-foreign-military-bases>

²³⁴Richard Rousseau, "The International Factor in the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan", *European Dialogue*, op.cit.

²³⁵Gabriella Krohmal, op.cit.

Only when everything calmed down in Osh and came to a normal state, US officials renewed again the relations with Kyrgyzstan at former level. President Obama offered congratulations to the people and government of Kyrgyzstan for holding a “democratic and peaceful” election and for taking “an important and courageous step on the path of democracy”.²³⁶ After 2011 the USA tried to establish more close economic relations with Kyrgyzstan, to help with development of infrastructure in problem regions, mostly in the South and to improve strong diplomatic relations with newly elected president Almazbek Atambayev. The future of base Manas will be reconsidered again in 2014. An old agreement signed by ex-president Bakiyev in 2009 just renamed air base in “Manas Transit Center” for period of five years.²³⁷

§ 6.2. Interrelations with China

Speaking about role of Russia and the USA in Central Asia it’s impossible to ignore such actor of the region as China. China, which has no big political influence and pressure, just perfectly uses its economic superiority and plays this card in relationship with Central Asian states. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had quite close economic relations with China.

China is Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest trade partner (behind Russia; many of the Chinese exports are re-exported by Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries) and is an investor in some Kyrgyz industry and transport projects.²³⁸ There is cheap labor of workers from China: construction of roads, bridges, repair works on hydroelectric stations, small business and trade. At higher level could be named owning of some Kyrgyz companies,

²³⁶Roger McDermott, “Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Concept Legally Enshrines Strategic Balance,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, August 6, 2012, CEDR, June 14, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950091

²³⁷“Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense’s Fuel Contracts in Kyrgyzstan”, US House of Representatives, *Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs*, Report of the Majority Staff, December 2010

²³⁸ Jim Nichol, “Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests”, *Congressional Research Service*, 7-5700/97-690, October 26 (2012): 10

industries by Chinese businessman. China is recently working on a road from its Xinjiang Province to Osh.²³⁹ As in political sphere there are a lot of common points between Russia and China, therefore Russia does not oppose to economic expansion of China in Central Asia. It should be noted that China is better presented in Kyrgyzstan.

In political issues China always tried to adhere good neighborliness as it has potential disagreements with Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan is a key component of Beijing's "go out" strategy towards Central Asia - and Eurasia in general.²⁴⁰ Two border crossings at the Irkestan and Torugart passes connect the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Kyrgyzstan.²⁴¹ The biggest problem is still Uyghur issue; there are about 50 Uyghur living in Kyrgyzstan thousand. On the one hand, China and Kyrgyzstan recognizes integrity of each other territories and in every possible way sweep aside any separatist moods. On the other hand, growth of anti-Chinese moods in Kyrgyzstan pulls together some Kyrgyz with Uyghur. At times, Kyrgyz ultranationalists have attacked ethnic Chinese traders and others in Kyrgyzstan.²⁴² China's economic "expansion" in Kyrgyzstan has been overwhelming. Almost all consumer goods sold in Kyrgyzstan are imported from China.²⁴³ Such skirmishes have household character, as waves of migration of Chinese to Kyrgyzstan are very huge.

Potential threats to the Chinese-Kyrgyz relations remain only in the theory as neither China, nor Kyrgyzstan could be pleased with any deterioration of their partnership. China "feeds" with its investments Kyrgyzstan, which after revolution and the conflict in Osh appeared between two fires, that is Russia and the USA. China as well as other countries, directed the humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyz and Uzbeks after the Osh events.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ M. K. Bhadrakumar, "China plays it cool on Kyrgyzstan", *Asia Times Online*, April 20, 2010 http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LD20Ag01.html

²⁴² Jim Nichol, op.cit.

²⁴³ Igor Rotar, "Chinese 'Expansion' in Kyrgyzstan: Myth or Reality?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Vol. 9, Issue: 204, In *The Jamestown Foundation*, November 7, 2012

The same policy is pursued in relation to Uzbekistan for which China is also the second biggest partner in terms of trade and economics.²⁴⁴ In the political plan Chinese authorities support very much Islam Karimov and his measures of revolts suppression. For example, in due time China not only didn't condemn bloody suppression of the Andijan riots, but also expressed the satisfaction with such governmental actions.²⁴⁵ China managed to improve its relations with a regime that had previously shown reluctance towards developing deeper Chinese-Uzbek relations.²⁴⁶ Therefore, there were no special statements on the Osh conflict; China preferred to stand aside in order not to break its economic relations with close partners. The Chinese exercise of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic tools in response to political developments in Central Asia indicates the importance it places on its western front.²⁴⁷

§ 6.3 Other integration projects of the region.

The regional leader and so-called chief in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. It also possesses championship in creation of various regional integration projects according to which all countries of Central Asia has to interact more closely practically in all regional issues. This initiative of Kazakhstan is an aspiration to play a role of unifier in the region in a counterbalance to other powers. It can be clearly tracked by reaction of Russian press to Kazakhstan's attempts of consolidation into one union all countries of the region.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴Interview with Kamoliddin Rabbimov, "China, Uzbekistan Ties Shaped by Shared World View", *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, June 18, 2012 <http://iwpr.net/report-news/china-uzbekistan-ties-shaped-shared-world-view>

²⁴⁵Zamir Chargynov, "Revolution, Repression and Re-election in 2005: China's Response to Political Developments in Central Asia", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, no. 1, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program ISSN: 1653-4212 (2006): 33

²⁴⁶Stephen Blank, "Islam Karimov and the Heirs of Tiananmen", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, June 14, 2005

²⁴⁷Zamir Chargynov, *op.cit.*, 36

²⁴⁸Daniil Kislov, "Bolshaya Tsentralnaya Aziya – eto vpolne ochevidniy geopoliticheskiy marazm" [United Central Asia is obviously marazmatic geopolitical project], *Arba*, July 5, 2007 <http://www.arba.ru/news/2400>

However, despite all attempts of Kazakhstan, centrifugal forces in the region are much stronger, than integration process as mostly all unions and organizations in Central Asia are under construction and influence of Moscow policy line.

Turkey also has its own projects considering the Central Asian region. Turkey's policy is directed on integration of Turkic-speaking states for creation something like Turkic League or Union in future. The Turkish challenge is viewed as particularly serious because of the support to lie behind Ankara. Russian commentary frequently portrays Turkey as a “spearhead” of Western and NATO strategic influence.²⁴⁹ Such facts testifies by creation of Agency of Turkic cooperation and development (TIKA) for the purpose of coordination at the state level of all kinds of activity directed on a unification of Turkic people. The activity in the Central Asian region was stirred up by such Turkish organistaions as “The Turkish international research center” of Turan Yazgan, “Avrasiya Bir” fund and “Turksoy”.²⁵⁰ In an asset of these organizations lies promotion of special Turkic model of development which is based on the values inherent to Turkic culture. In Kyrgyzstan this purpose is provided by the net of Turkish-Kyrgyz lyceums "Manas".²⁵¹

One of the the major directions of Turkish activity is training various profile professionals for working and living in Central Asian republics. It's possible to notice big aspiration of Turkey to influence on situation in the region and provide its interests by means of soft power. Ankara annually allocates some thousand grants for training students and teachers from the Turkic-speaking republics in higher educational institutions and the research centers of Turkey. A Memorandum of Understanding in the fields of education and science between the Ministry of National Education of Turkey and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic” was signed on May 6, 2008 in Kyrgyzstan in order to improve the relations of friendship and education. The education in Turkey of military personnel for the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and rendering of the humanitarian and military and

²⁴⁹Rajan Menon and others, op.cit, 35

²⁵⁰Alexander Knyazev, op.cit, 11

²⁵¹Elira Turdubaeva, *Kyrgyz-Turkish Cooperation in the Sphere of Education, The Role and Perception of Turkey in Kyrgyzstan* (Bishkek: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), 112

technical aid are traditional.²⁵²

It should be noted about influence of an Islamic factor in the region. The Islamic organizations in every possible way try to extend their influence on the region and, thereby, to connect all Muslim states to one uniform Caliphate.²⁵³ Become well known in the region “Hizb Ut-Tahrir” fundamental organization which generally bosses in the territory of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, but has strong supporters in Kyrgyzstan and other states of Central Asia adheres such provisions.

However, despite all attempts of region states integration on the basis of a religious idea this ideology doesn't find due number of the supporters.²⁵⁴ There was Islam with ethnic coloring and factor of regionalism throughout centuries on the territory of Central Asia.

Thus, it's visible that Russia being not the only actor in the region tries to work more actively in order not to lose former influence in each of the certain states of Central Asia. In this plan Russia has one big advantage in compare with others: historically these territories were developing together with Russia and living under ideology that was provided by Russia.²⁵⁵ Therefore for Russian experts it is much easier and more convenient to calculate behavioral models of these or those politicians of Kyrgyzstan and to reveal levers of pressure upon their policy for achievement of needed purposes.

²⁵²Alexander Knyazev, op.cit, 12

²⁵³Mariya Omelicheva, *Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia* (NY: New York, Routledge, 2011), 126

²⁵⁴Vitaly Naumkin, op.cit, 237

²⁵⁵Pauline Jones Luong, *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence* (NY: Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004), 6-14

Conclusion

It should be noted from the very beginning that Osh conflict of 2010 was very ambiguous phenomena as a lot of information from various sources was extremely inconsistent and opposite. It's possible to allocate three versions considering Osh events: Russian or pro-Russian from regional Central Asian agencies, Western and local Kyrgyz or Uzbek, more often addressed for raising popularity of presidents. But separating wheat from chaff it become possible to come to a certain conclusion. Deep analyses of many facts help to draw in detail a whole picture of reasons, which brought to Russia's impact on Osh conflict. Division to South and North played a big role for Kyrgyzstan, therefore in Soviet period heads of governments were appointed serially from Moscow. Deduction of such secret section helped to agree easier with discordant of one of the sides: northern or southern.²⁵⁶ On the other hand, in South there was quite big settlement of Uzbeks, but it didn't play any special role at that time. With growth of nationalist sentiments both in Kyrgyzstan and in Uzbekistan tension between residents-representatives of the basic ethnic group and ethnic minorities increased promptly. It's especially necessary to emphasize that most of all nationalism wave was directed against Russians, especially in Kyrgyzstan in the 90s.²⁵⁷ Even the first Osh conflict by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz opinion was not interethnic, but social where apple of discord was land issues. The same was observed in other areas of Kyrgyzstan, mainly occupied by Kyrgyz, plus there was a problem with water resources. Even defilement of monuments to communists took place in some regions of the country. All this put Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on one side of barricades at that time.

²⁵⁶Edward Allworth, op.cit., 54

²⁵⁷Shavkat Rahmon, op.cit.

But Kyrgyz nationalism appeared more strongly and more radical. Russia, which was carefully watching Kyrgyzstan after 2001 when the USA has already fixed positions in Uzbekistan, tried to achieve from Kyrgyzstan as much loyalty as it was possible. But nationalism grew not only among the population, but also among politicians who got to parliament and tried to create opposition in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, nationalist sentiments exuded in Kyrgyzstan from everywhere: from mass media, from Parliament and southern regions, which has hard economic situation. There wasn't obvious problem namely of Uzbek residents in Osh even despite these facts. Nothing reminded first Osh riots.

After 2009 relationship between Kremlin and Kyrgyz authorities considerably worsened. The reason for that was that base Manas was still open for Americans. First of all, Russia saw in that threat for its base Kant and didn't want to reconcile with such situation in Kyrgyzstan. Also Russia began to doubt Bakiyev's devotion. Within the country people also were dissatisfied with Bakiyev. They were angry about behavior of members of his family and increased corruption in the country. In Russian mass media massive anti-Bakiyev attack gave chance for many people to believe that Kremlin prepared his overthrow in advance. There are no obvious proofs of it, but there are indirect evidences. Such step had to be justified by Russian foreign policy and useful for it. But if to consider that here one stone killed two birds, then it's clear why this step was chosen.

Accruing Kyrgyz nationalism was easy to use not only for Bakiyev's overthrow, but also in aspect of relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan began to move away too, as felt domination in the region in fight against terrorism with the help of US.²⁵⁸ Many Uzbek politicians were connected with Osh, therefore overthrow of Bakiyev, which was very painful for southerners of Kyrgyzstan would inevitably affect Uzbeks as well. Nobody else could know and count such changes in situation as well as it could do main actor in Central Asia for centuries. It is undoubted that in such situation a new approach come to a political arena and began to be used. Ethno-symbolism in such circumstances should play a role of sophisticated divider. After revolution of 2010 division to North and South went much deeper than it was ever; at the same time in South residents of Osh were divided into Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in very brutal way. The old classical Stalinistic scheme just got a new refined look.

²⁵⁸Joshua Kucera, "In US-Uzbekistan Military Relations, How Big a Factor is Money?" *Eurasia Net*, September 17, 2012 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65923>

It's impossible to say that third side provoked all things. In such a case an actor would act directly, especially, Russia that used to enter troops almost immediately. Here conditions developed in such way that to bring an escalation to situation was not about big efforts. After April riots Osh Uzbeks became more active in political plan and started demanding autonomy. They had also leader, who earlier led "Vatan" party in Uzbekistan. This party considered being oppositional. So, with the help of Kadyrjan Batyrov and Inomjan Abdurasulov it becomes possible to play card of nationalistic feelings in a problem southern region. Many experts are sure that mentioned above people had a certain financial feed from Moscow for implementation of such plans. Russian foreign policy found at once a number of benefits. 1) Bakiyev's elimination from power and by that elimination liquidation Bakiyev-USA authorities relations 2) help to Uzbek separatists as a signal for the authorities of Uzbekistan 3) control in a conflict zone, that is Osh, by means of the entered military troops for protection of Russian military families living in Kyrgyzstan.²⁵⁹ Osh, despite its location in Kyrgyzstan, directly affected Uzbekistan. There were rumors that Uzbekistan is even going to enter troops in Osh and Jalal-Abad in order to protect Uzbek minority from violence and punishment. Uzbekistan considered that Interim Government didn't hurry to interfere to a critical situation in South. Also many Uzbeks were against Russian troops entering Osh as considered these riots to be only interior issue of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.

The fact that also played a big role in violence was that Osh being quite poor region had well-controlled transit drug trafficking paths. Mercenaries for provocations and violence were easy to be found from the criminal mafias and smugglers. Locals said that faces of many gunmen during Osh massacre were completely closed by masks. Many locals claim that those people were Bakiyev's supporters and they come back to have revenge for coup. Uzbeks were dissatisfied with Bakiyev's presidency and therefore immediately started organizing movement for autonomy in the period of governmental vacuum. Too fast for a short period to organize such movement and put demands in front of Kyrgyz. Uzbeks speak about that moment a lot. Many openly declare that they have no such thoughts about

²⁵⁹Paul Goble, "Bishkek Fears Russia Wants a Protectorate over Kyrgyzstan, but Moscow is Reluctant Because of the Costs", *Window On Eurasia*, May 20, 2010

demanding from Kyrgyz independence or more rights.²⁶⁰ They said that for long time of living side-by-side many Kyrgyz and Uzbeks managed become related.

Thus, impact on Osh conflict 2010 from outside was not obvious and direct, but indirect according to many factors. First, there were certain problems of residents with employment and water resources. Secondly, nationalism reached its peak. Thirdly, it was already second coup in 5 years that created instability in such region and generated governmental vacuum. A mass of discontent and anger reached its critical point in Kyrgyzstan. Only some slightest movements were enough to trigger conflict.

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²⁶⁰Raul Mallermann, op.cit.

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