

NARRATING THE NATION: A STUDY ON RECASTING IDENTITY IN AZERBAIJAN*

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Twentieth century historiography on nation - state correlation and nationalism, to a large extent has been shaped by a eurocentric ethno-linguistic discourse, where "ethnicity and language become the central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criteria of potential nationhood."¹, or as Karl Renner asserts:

Once a certain degree of European development has been reached, the linguistic and cultural communities of people, having silently matured throughout the centuries, emerge from the world of passive existence as people (*Passiver Volkheit*). They become conscious of themselves as a force with historical destiny. They demand control over the state, as the highest available instrument of power, and strive for their political self-determination. The birthday of the political idea of the nation and the birth-year of this new consciousness, is 1789, the year of the French Revolution. However, here in this perception of nation-state, what has been largely neglected is that the construction of a bounded territorial entity, or what is generally refers to as nation-state building, has often entailed components other than ethnic or linguistic attachments. Collective imagination, political allegiances, reconstructing and reinterpreting history, the invention of necessary historical traditions to justify and give coherence to the emerging modern state, often became major factors in bringing groups of people together and strengthening or even forming their common sense of identity and political solidarity. In some cases the mere application of ancient, historically resonant names and traditions is enough to evoke a consensus of political legitimacy. Consequently, the social connotations of certain key socio-political phrases, as well as geographic terms, become an important element in reshaping the geographic boundaries of emerging sovereign states.

The intention of the present study is to contribute toward throwing further light on the complex origins of Azerbaijani nationalism. While examining the various loyalties of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia, I will sketch the various measures adopted by such groups when defending their real or imagined identities against the early-twentieth-century irredentist ideology of neighboring state.

Turks in Search of a New Identity

As early as 1904, Akçuroglu Yusuf (later known as Yusuf Akçura), a Tatar from the Russian Empire, published a pamphlet called *Üç Terz-i Siyaset* (Three kinds of Policies), which soon came to be known as the manifesto of the pan-Turkists. In this famous declaration, which was originally printed in Cairo by Turks in exile, Akçuroglu Yusuf discusses the inherent historical obstacles blocking the advance of pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism and advocates *Ittihad-i Etrak* (Unity of Turks), or as he was to call it later, *Türkçülük* (Turkism)³, as the sole concept capable of sustaining the *Türk milleti* (Turkish nation). He admits that he "does not know if the idea still has adherents outside the Ottoman Empire", especially in *Qafqaziya ve şumali İran* (the Caucasus and northern Iran), but he hopes that in the near future his views on Turkish identity will attract the support of many Turks wherever they live.⁴

Ittihad-i Etrak was soon adopted as a policy by political parties and "cultural organizations" in the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Society) was founded in Istanbul to study the "past and present activities and circumstances of all the people called *Türk*".⁵ In its declaration issued on the 25th of December 1908, the Society pledged to "encourage the use of Ottoman-Turkish among foreign peoples. At first, Turks in the Balkan states, Austria, Russia, Iran, Africa, Central Asia and China will be familiarized with Ottoman-Turkish". Furthermore, "languages in Azerbaijan, Kashgar, Bukhara, Khiva, etc., will be reformed to be like Ottoman-Turkish for the benefit of Ottoman trade".⁶ *Türk Derneği* was followed by another "society" called *Türk Ocagi* (Turkish Hearth). In its manifesto, written

in 1912, this society proclaimed as its chief aim "to advance the national education and raise the scientific, social and economic level of the Turks who are the foremost of the peoples of Islam, and to strive for the betterment of the Turkish race and language".⁷

The pan-Turkist uproar reached Baku as early as 1908, when the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) launched their coup, which brought an end to the despotic era of Abdulhamid. When Abdulhamid abdicated, pan-Islamism, which the Sultan had supported, was flavored throughout the heartland of the Empire by Turkic national sentiment. As in the case of the persons initiated pan-Turkism, those who were the pioneers in propagating pan-Turkism among the Turkic peoples came from the Russian Empire, having been influenced by the model of the nineteenth century pan-Slavism.

The pioneers of pan-Turkism in Caucasian Azerbaijan, however, were those Azerbaijani elite living in Istanbul who were disillusioned by the stagnation of the Iranian constitutional movement of 1905-1909, the failure of the Russian revolution of 1905, as well as the crisis in the European social democratic movement. Some of them, who were sympathetic to the Iranian reformist movement, turned their gaze from Tabriz and Tehran to Istanbul. The Istanbul of the Young Turks, with its call for unity among the Turkic peoples, was a new haven for such elite of Czarist Russia. With a growing sense of their isolation, they turned towards studying ethnic culture and history and its accompanying political importance. The outlook of Ali Husaynzade, Ahmad Aghayev, and later Muhammad Amin Rasulzade, was immediately welcomed by the CUP, and some of them were even given governmental positions in the new Ottoman regime. When *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), the main journal propagating pan-Turkism in the Ottoman Empire launched its publication in Istanbul, all of them became the most prominent contributors to it. In one of his editorials Ahmad Aghayev even reproaches the Ottomans for-calling the Iranian Azerbaijanis, Iranians, rather than Turks.⁸ Muhammad Amin Rasulzade in a series of articles entitled *Iran Türkleri* (the Iranian Turks), contributed a descriptive analysis of the Iranian Turkic

minorities and their distinctive national identities.

The Great World War

Soon after the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire, with the encouragement of Enver Paşa, sided with Germany. Enver Paşa, the Ottoman minister of war, judged that joining forces with Germany gives the Ottomans a good chance of surviving and perhaps even of making some gains from Russia. He also declared a jihad inciting Muslims to rise up against British and Russian rule in India, Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia. To Enver Paşa, the Russians were not only *kafir* (infidels), but also invaders who had occupied areas south of the Caucasus which were considered as part of the Islamic-Turkic homeland. Enver Paşa led in negotiating a secret German-Ottoman treaty, signed on the 2nd of August, 1914, and subsequently in October the Ottoman fleet entered the Black Sea, bombarded Odessa and the Crimean ports, and sank Russian ships. In addition, the Ottoman forces were deployed along the Caucasus frontier with Russia, where severe fighting began in the harsh mountain terrain.

The ultimate strategic objective for the Ottomans was to capture the Baku oil fields and the north of Iran in order to penetrate Central Asia and Afghanistan, not only as a threat to British India, but also to extend the Ottoman Empire to what was referred as its natural boundaries:

We should not forget that the reason for our entrance into the world war is not only to save our country from the danger threatening it. No, we pursue an even more immediate goal - the realization of our ideal, which demands that, having shattered our Muscovite enemy, we lead our Empire to its natural boundaries, which would encompass and unite all our related people.¹⁰ In

December 1914, a Russian advance toward Erzurum was countered by the Ottomans, but, in battles at Sarikamish in January 1915 the Ottomans, ill-clad and ill-supplied for the Caucasian winter, suffered their major defeat of World War I.

In the south, when the World War I erupted, political chaos and confusion swept across Iran. Successive governments proved to be incapable of solving the country's escalating problems and implementing fundamental reforms. Indeed, the outbreak of World War I not only did not stop the process of political disintegration in Iran, but also increased foreign pressure caused the long-standing rift in Iranian politics to widen. As early as October 1910, Britain delivered an ultimatum to Iran concerning the security of southern Iran. In so doing, Britain set an example for the Russians to follow. Russian troops had already occupied the northern provinces. In November 1911, the Czarist government presented its own ultimatum to Iran, which amounted to nothing less than an attempt to reduce the north of the country to the status of a semi-dependent colony." However, while the Iranian parliament, which enjoyed the support of the crowds in the street, resisted the Russian ultimatum, the fragile Iranian government decided to accept the ultimatum and dissolve the parliament. This seemed to be the only effective measure available to the deputies in face of the crisis, which had arisen.¹² Meanwhile, the occupation of the north and south of Iran by Russian and British troops was to provoke the Ottoman forces to invade western and northwestern Iran early on in the war. If we add to this list of disasters the activities of the German agents especially among the southern tribes, we begin to get an idea of how impotent the Iranian government was during this period.

The Iranian government's early reaction to the outbreak of the war was to declare Iran's strict neutrality in the *forman* of the 1st of November, 1914. On the other hand, what sense was there in the government's announcing its neutrality when a sizable part of Iran's territory was occupied by the Entente forces? When Mostowfi al-Mamalik, the prime minister, approached the

Russian authorities and asked them to withdraw their troops from Azerbaijan because their presence gave the Turks a pretext for invading Iran,- 'The Russian minister appreciated the Iranian viewpoint but inquired what guarantees could be given that after the withdrawal of Russian forces, the Turks would not bring in theirs.'¹³ Consequently, Azerbaijan became one of

the major battlefields of World War I. The Ottoman forces, which had meanwhile invaded the city of Maragheh in late November 1914, moved to Tabriz on the 14th of January. Since the Russian army was still stationed in Tabriz, the military confrontation between two armies seemed inevitable. Although the Russian troops avoided military confrontation with the Ottomans in Tabriz and evacuated the city, the Ottomans were, nevertheless, unable to maintain their hold on Tabriz and were expelled by a Russian counter-invasion in March 1915.¹⁴ The defeat at Sarikamish was indeed a turning point in the Ottomans' policy of expanding east. Throughout the remaining years of the war they adopted a low profile in the region. It was only at the end of the World War I, and following the Russian Revolution, that the Ottomans were able to return to Iran.

In the Caucasus, the attitude toward Turkism in the Caucasus was somewhat altered when in 1913 an amnesty was declared in Baku, which was still under Czarist political rule, on the occasion of three-hundredth anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. Political activists such as Muhammad Amin Rasulzade who some years earlier had launched the publication of the premium Social-Democrat newspaper *Iran-e Now* in Tehran, were then able to return home after a long time of exile first in Tehran and later in Istanbul. On their return, they took every possible measure not jeopardizing their relations with Russian. As a result their activities were mainly confined to the publication of certain periodicals. While maintaining their absolute loyalty to the Czarist alignment in the War, periodicals such as *Yeni Füyuzat* (New Abundance) and *şâlâle* (Cascade), adopted as their chief task the purification of the Azerbaijani language. Arabic and Persian vocabulary was to be purged, and words of pure Turkic origin were to be substituted, as was being done in nationalist circles in the Ottoman Empire. Whereas news about the activities of pan-Turkist organizations in the Ottoman Empire was often covered in editorials by Tsa Bey Aşurbeyli, the editor of *şâlâle*, the question of Iranian Azerbaijan still remained neglected by such periodicals, and it seemed that in their agenda the forging of firmer ties with the Ottomans had

priority over the question of unification with the Iranian Azerbaijanis.¹

The rather cautious stands adopted by the nationalist circles in Baku during the War more lucidly demonstrated itself in an editorial published by the *Kaspii*, a journal published by the Azerbaijani nationalist calling "upon Russian Moslems to join Russia in the fight against Germany and Turkey".¹⁶ On their part, the Russians too were extremely vigilant of the Mosavatists conducts. Their close ties with the Pan-Turkist circles in Istanbul during the years before the War, swayed the Russians while conceding the Azerbaijanis "cultural preferences" and their call for more cultural autonomy¹⁷, displaying their sincere commitment of severely crushing any move endangering their immunity in the region.

On his return to Baku, Rasulzade began to publish his own newspaper. The first issue of Açıq *Söz* (Candid Speech) appeared in October 1915 and publication continued until March 1918. Under the Czarist administration, the newspaper called itself "a Turkish political, social and literary paper" and adopted a standpoint close to that of the Czarist Empire, endorsing the latter's war policy. At the same time it also paid a certain amount of attention to Iran and Iranian Azerbaijan. When it had occasion to cover Iranian news, it voiced its sympathy for the Iranian Democrats.¹⁸ After the Russian revolution, however, it changed its attitude, and abruptly adopted an open pro-Ottoman policy, calling for *türklaşmā, islamlaşma va mu^asirlaşmā* (Turkicization, Islamicization and modernization).

On the 18th of October, 1917, the *Türk Ocagi* was founded in Baku. Among the aspirations of the new society, which claimed that its activities were confined exclusively to the cultural domain, was the desire to "acquaint the younger generation with their historical Turkic heritage and to consolidate their Turkic consciousness through setting up schools, organizing conferences and publishing books".¹⁹ Açıq *Söz* not only welcomed the new society but extensively reported on its activities. The frequent gatherings of *Türk Ocagi* in Baku were covered by Açıq *Söz*. Lectures delivered at the society's conferences

were published in *Açıq Söz*. Most of these lengthy articles were on different aspects of the history and culture of the Muslim peoples of the South Caucasus. *Türk milleti* or *Qafqaziya müsəlman Xalqi*, (the Muslim people of the Caucasus) were often employed to designate the inhabitants of the region. The first Constituent Assembly, which was established in Baku on the 29th of April, 1917, was even called the General Assembly of the Caucasian Muslims.

The consequence of the political upheavals in Moscow, which eventually ended with the Bolshevik take-over in October 1917, was the creation a power vacuum in the Caucasus. A month later, a Transcaucasian Commissariat was established in Tblisi, and proclaimed "the right of Caucasian nations to self-determination". By then it was obvious that the Armenian Dashnakists and Georgian Mensheviks were poised to establish their power over a large territory in the region. The Baku Musavatists who enjoyed an absolute majority in the Baku Constituent Assembly realized that the time had come for swift political action. With the old Czarist Empire gone, it seemed that the Musavatists were counting on the Ottomans who were now viewed as the uncontested dominant power in the region. The apparent goal of the Musavatists in their contest with the Armenians and the Georgians was to win control over as much territory as possible. They claimed "besides the Baku and Ganja province, the Muslim population of Daghestan, the northern Caucasus, the Georgian-speaking Muslim Inghilios of Zakataly, the Turkish inhabitants of the province of Erivan and Kars, and the Georgian-speaking Muslim Ajars of the southern shore of the Black Sea". Furthermore, since the majority of Azerbaijani-speaking people lived in a large region within northern Iran, their ultimate hope was to persuade the Azerbaijani leaders in Iran to support their proposed project for unity. Consequently, in October 1917, an emissary arrived in Tabriz, approached the local politicians and advocated that they separate from Iran and join with Baku in a great federation. However, their proposal was rejected by the Azerbaijani Democrats.¹

Following their failure to convince the Iranian Azerbaijanis to join

an independent federation, in an editorial published in *Açıq Söz*, on January 1918 the Musavatists for the first time tackled the question of Iranian Azerbaijan. In a rather haughty style, the author in *Açıq Söz*, defined the historical boundaries of Azerbaijan as stretching to the Caucasian mountains in the north and to Kirmanshah in the south, with Tbilisi forming the western frontier and the Caspian Sea the eastern frontier. The Russian expansionists and Iranian ruling class were blamed for having adopted policies that resulted in the dismemberment of the nation of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, according to the author it was the "natural right of the south Caucasian Muslims to call their territory Azerbaijan" and to hope that "one day their brothers in the south could join them".²²

Interestingly enough, the first reaction to this call, came from a group of Iranian Democrats residing in Baku. Since the beginning of the century, the flourishing economy of the Caucasus had been attracting many Iranians, most of whom were Azerbaijanis or Azerbaijan-speakers from the north of Iran. But although they spoke the same language, they did not readily assimilate. Throughout the Caucasus region they were known as *hamshahri* (fellow countryman) and they maintained a sense of separate identity which marked them as different from the local population to the north of the Iranian frontier.²³

Of the various organizations, which existed among the Iranian community living in Baku, the local branch of the Iranian Democrat Party was the most eminent and active club. The Baku Committee of the Democrat Party was founded in 1914 and its members were recruited from the Iranian community in Baku and the adjacent regions. In their perception the view expounded in the editorial of *Açıq Söz* was nothing less than an act, which menaced Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Disturbed by such attempts to undermine Iranian unity, they soon inaugurated their own political campaign in the region. On the 10th of February, 1918, the Democrats launched the publication of a bilingual newspaper *Azərbaycan, Joz'-e la-yanfakk-e Iran* (Azerbaijan, an Inseparable Part of Iran).²⁴ While the title Azerbaijan was printed in big letters on head of the paper, the

idiom *Joz'-e la-yanfakk-e Iran* was appeared with smaller letters in the final letter N of Azerbaijan. Later on Salamullah Javid, who was a political activist in Baku, acknowledged that "the decision to publish the newspaper was taken by the Democrats at the local level and was a direct response to irridentist propaganda initiated by *Açıq Söz*"

On understanding the Azerbaijanis' attitude, one should recall the part they played in re-establishing Iranian constitutionalism. For many Iranians the thirteen months of "lesser despotism" of June 1908-July 1909 which followed Muhammad "Ali Shah's coup was the most crucial period in their country's constitutional history. During this period the entire country, except for Azerbaijan, was subjugated to the new regime. By sending in the army and imposing economic restrictions the central government strove to bring the Azerbaijanis as well to their knees. However, while famine spread across the province, the Azerbaijani constitutionalists set up barricades in Tabriz and prepared to offer armed resistance to the central government. When the government in Tehran was eventually overthrown, the constitution restored and the Second Majles was opened, the Azerbaijani constitutionalists found themselves in a rather unique position with the attention of the entire nation fixed on them. Gradually the belief arose among Iranians that although the Constitutional Revolution was born in Tehran, it had later been baptized in Tabriz and the Constitution had no chance of surviving without Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijan was seen as the most important center from which any future progressive political changes would originate. This appraisal of the cardinal role played by the Azerbaijanis in restoring constitutionalism in Iran left Azerbaijani constitutionalists with a strong consciousness of being the protectors of the country's territorial integrity, a consciousness which has persisted down to the present time.

In addition to promoting political change and reform in Iran, the newspaper declared as its task "displaying the country's glorious past and its historical continuity"²⁶, as well as "hindering any attempt to

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diminish the national consciousness of Iranians". While glorifying the name of Azerbaijan and its "key position in Iranian history", the publication frequently referred to "the many centuries during which

Azerbaijan governed all of Iran". Similarly, it stressed that Azerbaijan has shared history with the rest of Iran, and strove to foster self-confidence and the feeling of belonging to territorial Iran. Pointing to the geographical front-line position of the province, the newspaper "declared it to be the duty of Azerbaijanis" to confront the hostile outsiders, and to safeguard the country's "national pride" and "territorial integrity". Though, the newspaper never openly named these outsiders or "intruders" as they were called, nevertheless, it considers that "their intention has always been to undermine Iran's territorial integrity and political sovereignty". Moreover, by representing Azerbaijanis as the main champions of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, it attempted to portray them as the sole guardians of Iran as a bounded territorial entity.

With a persuasive political agenda, the newspaper *Azarbayjan*, *Joz'-e la-yanfakk-e Iran* pursued what in its first issue it had proclaimed to be its duty, and continued to publish even after the takeover of Baku by the Bolsheviks known as the Baku Commune. However, it was forced to close down in May 1918 when the Musavatists regained power and formed their national government. In their turn the Musavatists, who had been obliged to stop publishing *Açıq Söz* during the previous five months, in September 1918 launched the publication of their new gazette called *Azerbayjan*. By adopting the same name for their publication that the Iranian Democrats in Baku had used four months earlier, the Musavatists demonstrated their firm attachment to the name, which they intended to apply to their future independent state.

The Return of the Ottomans

In the post-World War I period, the political arena in Anatolia as well as the Caucasus had been significantly altered. The Czarist Empire had been swept away by the winds of revolution and the Ottomans were striving to put together the jig saw pieces of their Empire. If during their first short-lived invasion the Ottomans had not had time to disseminate their pan-Turkist propaganda among the

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Iranian Azerbaijanis, as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the fall of their old foe, the CUP Ottomans were now able to initiate a new pan-Turkist campaign in northern Iran. As noted by a member of the British diplomatic service:

Turkey are hand in glove with the Tatars of Transcaucasia (Baku) and these have put in claiming to Azerbaijan on their own account....Northern Persia is essential to Turkey as a link with the

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Turanians of Central Asia.

By mid-April 1918, the Ottoman army returned to Tabriz. If in 1914 the Ottomans had been attached to their pan-Islamist propaganda principles, now, after three years of war and bitter anti-Ottoman rebellions by the Arabs, on the whole, *Ittihad ve Terakki* found pan-Turkic propaganda more favorable to its position. Moreover, the Russian Revolution of 1917 neutralized the threat from the old enemy and provided the Turks with the opportunity to emphasize their pan-Turkic rhetoric among Turkic peoples living between the vast region stretching from Mediterranean Sea to the Altai mountains.

Soon after the invasion of Tabriz, Yusuf Zia²⁹ and Fikri Efendi moved to the city and introduced a small pan-Turkic party³⁰, yet still under the old title of *Ittihad- i Islam*³¹. Moreover, Yusuf Zia launched an Azeri language newspaper, published under the title of *Azarabadegan*. This newspaper was to serve as the Ottomans' main instrument of propagating pan-Turkism throughout the province. The editorship of the newspaper was offered to Taqi Raf at, a local Azerbaijani who later became known for his innovations in Persian language and literature.

However, contrary to their expectations, the Ottomans once again did not achieve impressive results in the province. Although Azerbaijan remained under quasi-occupation by the Ottoman troops for months, attempts to win endorsement for pan-Turkism ended in utter failure. The Ottomans never enjoyed substantial support from local political parties, associations, or the general public. In a rather lengthy report sent to Ali ihsan Bey from Tabriz, Isma'l Haqi, now *Teşkilat's* charge d'affaire in northern Iran and the Caucasus, wrote:

In Tabriz, next to the Democrat Party which is run by Khiyabani, Nobari, and Hariri, who incidentally enjoy the support of the Police force, there exists a few trivial parties such as Ahfar, Taraqqiyun and Mujahidin. Amongst them it is only Mujahidin which is worth mentioning. The Party's leader is Haji Mirza Buluri, an old and eminent friend of ours. The party, with its distinct pro-Turkish stance, has been backed by the Crown Prince and local Cossacks, yet it lacks a clear and unequivocal program. It simply has failed to rally the people of the city. On the other hand, the Democrat Party, with its clear Iranian patriotic and xenophobic stance, is the most serious and popular party, which not only enjoys the good graces of the people, but has the support of the police, gendarmerie and regular soldiers. Furthermore, our explicit support of Mujahidin's pan-Turkist policy, has allowed the British to launch a counter-campaign in the city. They are accusing us of introducing an irridentist policy, aimed at the secession of Azerbaijan from Iran and its annexation to the Ottoman Empire. This campaign has bolstered the Democrats anti-Ottoman positions.³² In Tabriz, Ottoman relations with local Democrats deteriorated to the point where the Ottomans arrested the popular leader of the Democrats, Shaikh Mohammed Khiyabani, together with his two comrades, Nowbari and Badamchi. They all were sent into exile in Kars.³³ Although at a later date the Ottomans tried to justify their actions by accusing Khiyabani of being a "British agent,"³⁴ "collaborating with the Armenians against the forces of Islam",³⁵ however, the immediate result of their intervention was to whip up serious anti-Ottoman resentments among the Democrats, who were prepared to take control of the province.

The spring and summer of 1918 appeared to be a honeymoon period for the Ottomans. Occupying the area north of the Araxes was the next logical step on their

agenda. In mid-March a new party called *Büyük Türkiye ve İttihad-i İslam- Qafqas İttihad ve Terakki Fir kas i* (Greater Turkey and Islamic Unity - Caucasian Committee of Union and progress) was founded in Baku.³ In its declaration, the party announced its main objective: to unite the population of the Caucasus,

who according to the declaration "four-fifth of them are Muslim Turks".³⁷ The declaration also confined the party's domain of interest to the southern reaches of the Ottoman-Persian border; however, it did not forfeit its claim to the Caucasus, which it hoped would be joined with the Turkic motherland in the near future.³⁸

With the seizure of Baku in September 1918, it seemed that Enver Pasha's Turanian dream was about to be realized. Now the region both north and south of the Araxes was under their control. Yet, with the serious military set backs on the western fronts, the leadership of *İttihad ve Terakki* was obliged to give priority to the center of its envisaged empire. Escalating political problems at home, not to mention severe food shortages compelled them to rethink their overall strategy. A direct consequence of the large-scale export of cattle and grain from the newly occupied territories to the Ottoman interior caused mounting resentment among the local populations.

On the 23rd of September, 1918, an Ottoman-German protocol was signed which included the Central Power's commitment to the territorial integrity of Iran. On the western fronts, the Ottomans were forced to surrender to Bulgarian forces on 30th of September. Soon after, the *İttihad ve Terakki* government fell, and the new government of İzzet Pasha signed an armistice with the Allies on the 31st of October.

The fall of the Musavatists in 1920, which was a result of close collaboration between the Bolsheviks and the CUP leadership, caused a considerable disillusion among the Azerbaijani pro-Ottoman intelligentsia. However profitable this cooperation was for the Bolsheviks, the old guard of the Ottoman Unionists in the region, by adopting different measures, were still striving to realize their old dream. As an intelligence British office remarked:

It will be remembered that the unfortunate "Müsavat" government of Baku was successfully overturned by the Communists mainly as a result of the assistance given by the numerous Turkish Unionists. The infiltration of Unionists in the Turkish Communist Party in Baku still continues; they thus seek to establish complete

control in course of time, and to gain control of Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to connect them up with their schemes in Central Asia.... The Unionists' plan therefore is to continue the alliance with Russia so long as it enables them to advance their own plans, which are being energetically pursued.³⁹ The final consolidation of Soviet power in the Caucasus which was eventually realized by the subjugating of Georgia on March 1921, paved the way for a shift in diplomatic maneuvering by the newly born Soviet administration. In February the Soviet-Iranian Treaty was concluded which was then followed by the signing of a peace treaty with Turkey in March 1920. Having extended its southern border to the Araxes River, the Soviet regime adopted a restrained policy towards Iran, officially forbidding any nationalistic claims on Iranian territory.

In Iran the tragic outcome of Khiyabani's revolt, which was followed by the suppression of the uprisings in Khorasan and Gilan, left the Democrats in Iran in total disarray. While a group of them, mainly from non-Azerbaijani background, were enthralled by pan-Islamism, as propagated by the late Ottomans as a measure of wining over non-Turkic people in the region. Another tendency within the Democrats founded it difficult to subscribe to the regional movement launched by their party comrades. Subsequently, a

new group of reform-minded intellectuals gradually emerged on the Iranian political scene. Their mode of understanding society was based on socio-political ideas of west-European origin. Despite the diversity of their political views, what singled out them from the home-grown variety of educated or learned individual was the model of society, which they took for granted. The west-European model of society presupposed a coherent, class-layered society, which by definition was organised around the distinctive concepts of *nation* and *state*. They were convinced that only a strong centralized government based in the capital would be capable of implementing reform throughout the country, while preserving the nation's territorial integrity. Likewise they believed that modernization and modern state building in Iran would require low cultural diversity and a high degree of ethnic homogeneity. Only when Iran fulfilled the

pre-conditions for a nation-state as defined by them, when "empirically almost all the residents of a state identify with the one subjective idea of the nation, and that nation is virtually contiguous",⁴⁰ could they realistically cherish hopes of safeguarding the country's territorial integrity.

In the recently born state of Turkey, the *Türk Ocakı* activists strove to find a new home under the self-restrained Kemalist regime. For the new Republic of Turkey, any attempt to call the old trans-regional pan-Turkism was considered as a counter-revolutionary act, endangering her territorial integrity. The new Turkish nationalism, which was sponsored by the regime, was rather a localized version of Turkism being confined to the territory delineated with the defensible borders.

Some **Final** Remarks


The most important political development affecting the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century was the collapse of the Ottoman and the Czarist Russian Empires. The idea of a greater homeland for all Turks was propagated by pan-Turkism which was soon adopted as a main ideological pillar by the Committee of Union and Progress and somewhat later by other political caucuses in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of World War I, pan-Turkist propaganda chiefly focused on the Turkic-speaking people of the south Caucasus, Iranian Azerbaijan and Türkistan in Central Asia with the ultimate purpose of convincing them all to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and to join the new pan-Turkic homeland.

If in Europe "romantic nationalism responded to the damage likely to be caused by modernism by providing a new and larger sense of belonging, an all-encompassing totality, which brought about new social ties, identity and meaning, and a new sense of history from one's origin on to an illustrious future",⁴¹ in Iranian Azerbaijan, after the Constitutional movement romantic nationalism was adopted by the Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the irredentist policies threatening the country's territorial integrity. In their view, assuring

territorial integrity was a necessary first step on the road to establishing the rule of law in society and a competent modern state which would safeguard the collective as well as individual rights. It was within this context that their political loyalty overshadowed their other possible ethnic or regional affinities. In another word, their political loyalty and attachment to a constructed political reliability took precedence over their other forms of loyalty, in particular their ethnic loyalty. Likewise, they apparently believed on the nineteenth-century notion of a "historical nation" in which the *Staatsvolk* (state-people) was associated with the state. In their view, the Iranians just as the dispersed members of a Greater Russia or a Greater Germany, made up a community associated with a territorial state. Consequently they attempted to uphold their territorial identity by "shaping a significant and unbroken link with a seminal past that could fill the gap between the nation's origin and it's actuality"⁴². For them, as Nipperdey correctly points out, romantic nationalism provided the driving force for political action: "cultural identity with its claims for what ought to be, demanded political consequences: a common state, the only context in which they [the people] could develop, the only force that could protect them and the only real possibility for integrating individuals into a nation".⁴³

NOTES

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1. Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nation and Nationalism since 1780, Programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 102.
2. Renner, K., *Staat und Nation*, p. 89, quoted by Hobsbawm, E.J., *Ibid.*, p. 101.
3. Akçuroglu, Y., (ed.), *Türk Yılı, 1928*, Istanbul, Yeni Metba'a, 1928, p. 396.
4. Akçuroglu, Y., *Üç Terz-i Siyâset*, Cairo, Metba'a-i Qadr, 1909, pp. 11-12.
5. Lewis, B., *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 343.
6. Arai, M., *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, Leiden, Brill, 1992, p. 20.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
8. *Türk Yurdu*, Türk "Alemleri", *Türk Yurdu* Birinci Cilt 1327-1328, Istanbul, Tanin Metba'asi, 1328 (19 12), pp. 16.
9. *Türk Yurdu*, "Iran Türkleri", *Türk Yurdu* Birinci Cilt 1327-1328, Istanbul, Tanin Metba'asi, 1328 (19 12) pp. 106-11, 428-432, 551-556, 648-656, 670-672, 755-760.
10. Zenkovsky, S. A., *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge-Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960. P. 127-128.
11. For the details of the ultimatum see: Kasravi, A., *Tarikh-e Hijdah Saleh-e Azarbayjan*, vol.1, 9th edition, Tehran, Amir Kabir, 1978, pp. 235-240.
12. Ramazani, R., *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, University Press of Virginia, 1966, pp. 103-108.
13. Ramazani, R., *op.cit.*, p.1 15.
14. Orbay, R., "Hatıralar", *Yakin Tarihimiz*, cilt I, Istanbul, 1963, pp. 16-29.
15. See for example: *şâiâlâ*, 17 January 1914.
16. Zenkovsky, S. A., *op.cit.*, p. 125.
17. Of such a calls was the Muhammad Amin Rasulzdeh's article, *Mekab va Merasa*, published in consecutive issues of *Açiq Söz*, demanding reform in the educational system, See: *Açiq Söz*, nos.133, 134, 135, 138, 143, 147, March, 15th-31st, 1916.

18. See for example *Açıq Söz*, 20 August 1917.
19. *Açıq Söz*, 18, October 1917. Among the founder of *Türk Ocakı* was Abdullah Ââ"îq, the younger brother of Yusuf Zia. For Yusuf Zia, see footnote 29.
20. Zenkovsky, S. A., op.cit., p.262.
21. British Foreign Office, FO 371/ 4358, 1918.
22. *Açıq Söz*, 17, January 1918.
23. On process of self-identification see: Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, London: Pluto Press, 1993, 9-10.
24. Mohammad Khan Tarbiyat was the founder of the Democrat party, Baku committee. He was the director of Iranian Etehad school in Baku. Other members: Mirza Mahmud Khan Parvaresh, Mitza 'Abdollah 'Abdolahzade, Shaykh Baqir Shirazi, Azhdar 'Alizade, Hoayn Khayyat, Hosayn Mahmuzade, Mir Hosayn Motazavi, Mirza 'Aliqoli (from Ashqabad, who later became the editor of the newspaper *Azərbaycan, Joz'-e layanfak-e Iran*) Mir Jafar Javadzade Pishavari, Haji Mo'alem JaTarzade Kalkhali, Mirza Aqa Valizade, Sayfollah Ibrahimzade. 'Aali Akbar Osku'i, (Founder of Iranian guilds, labors executive committee). Parvarish was due to his political activities had to leave Baku in 1916. He left illegally to Iran. After the Russian revolution of February 1917, the Democrat party began to operate legally. See Javid, S., *Iran Sosial Demoktar (Adalat) Firqasi Haqinda Khatiralarim*, Tehran, Lithography, 1980. p.9-10. The other Iranian societies and organizations in Baku included: "Iran Independent party", pro-Iranian government, Javid, S., p.11. "Sanduq-e Ta'avon-e Madrisa-e Etehad-e Iraniyan-e Baku" Javid, S., p. 13. "Janfiyat-e Ma'arif-el Iran" (an Adalat party's front) Javid, S., p. 17. "İjtimaMyun-Inqilabiyun (Sosial-Revolutioner), 'Aali Bayramov, was killed by Musavatists during their reign, Javid, S., p. 19. Furthermore, the Iranians had two schools: Ettehad in the city center and Tamadon (in the Sabunçi district). In March 1918, following the conflict between Musavatists and the Baku

33. ATASE, K. 50, D. 714/239, F.21. See also: Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Hijda Salih-i Azarbayjan*, vol. 2, 9th edition, Tehran, Amir Kabir, 1978, p. 749.
34. ATASE, K. 50, D. 714/239, F.21.
35. Ahmad Kasravi, op.cit.
36. ATASE, K. 3818, D. 91/2.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. British Foreign Office, FO 371/6342, 1921.
40. Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, London, 1996, p.
41. Nipperdey, T., op.cit, p. 15.
42. Gershoni, I., "Imagining and Remimagining the Past: The Use of History by Egyptian Nationalist Writers, 1919-1952", *History & Memory*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall/Winter 1992, p. 7.
43. Nipperdey, T. "In Search of Identity: Romantic Nationalism, its Intellectual, Political and Social Background", in: Eade, J.C. (Ed.), *Romantic Nationalism in Europe*, Australian National University, 1983, p. 11.

X ü I a s ə

MİLLƏT HEKAYƏSİ: AZƏRBAYCANDA MİLLİ KİMLİYİN YENİDƏN FORMALAŞDIRILMASI

TuracATABƏYİ

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XX əsr tarixşünaslığında millət-dövlət qarşılıqlı əlaqələri və millətçilik araşdırlarkən, milli varlığın əsas meyan kimi dil birliyi və etnik birlik götürülür. Bunlar, 1789-cu il Fransa İnqilabından sonra, milli kimliyin təyin olunmasında apancı rol oynayan amillər hesab olunur. Ancaq bir çox hallarda bu amillərdən ziyadə digər faktorlar, məsələn, siyasi birlik, ortaqlar və tale birliyi, ümumi maraq və s. insanların böyük qrupları halında

birləşib, öz ümumi iradələrini ifadə etmək üçün vahid dövlət qurmalarına gətirib çıxarmışdır. Bu halda, artıq etnik və linqvistik bağlar deyil, eyni coğrafi arealı paylaşdırmaqdan irəli gələn içtimai şüur, bu ərazidə yaşayan xalqların tək dövlətdə birləşməsinə səbəb olmuşdur.

Çağdaş Yaxın və Orta Şərq siyasətində böyük dəyişikliklərə yol açan ən əhəmiyyətli hadisələrdən biri XX əsrin əvvəllərində Osmanlı və Rusiya imperiyalarının çöküşü olmuşdur. Çünki bu, bölgədəki bir çox etnik qrupların və millətlərin yeni milli kimlik arayışına çıxmalannın başlanğıcı olmuşdur. Bütün türklərin vahid və böyük bir vətəndə birləşməsinə təbliğ edən pantürkizm ideologiyası da məhz bu dövrdə təşəkkül etmiş və qısa bir müddətdən sonra, Osmanlı miUətçilərinin "İttihad və Tərəqqi" cəmiyyətinin ana ideologiyası vəziyyətinə gəlmişdi. Dil birliyini və etnik soy-kökü ön planda tutan pantürkizm I Dünya Müharibəsi dövründə böyük vüsətlə Anadoludan konardaki Türk toplumlarında (məsələn, Knm, Qafqaz və s.) ziyalılar arasında yayılır və rəğbət görürdü. "İttihad və Tərəqqi"nin liderləri tərəfindən idarə edilən Osmanlı dövləti də böyük müharibənin gedişatında öz ordulannı Qafqaz, İran və Orta Asiyaya daxil edərək, oralardakı türk əhali ilə six əlaqələr qurmaq və "Turan" idealini gerçəkləşdirmək istəyirdi. Ancaq Osmanlının bu müharibədəki ağır məğlubiyyəti, həmçinin, bəzi bölgələrdəki türk əhalinin Osmanlıya qarşı kəskin mövqedə durması buna imkan vermədi. Bu bölgələrdən biri də İran Azərbaycanı idi...

Şimali Azərbaycanda Türk millətçiliyinə bağlı olan Müsavatçıların qələbəsinə baxmayaraq, Cənubi Azərbaycanda Osmanlıların apardığı pantürkist təbliğat heç bir nəticə vermədi. İranda Məşrutə hərəkatının və milli haqların tanınması uğrunda mübarizənin lokomotivi olan Azərbaycan Demokratları, bir tərəfdən millətçi şüarlarla çıxış etmələrinə rəğmən, digər tərəfdən ölkənin ərazi bütönlüyünü təhdid edən hər cür ideologiya və siyasətə qarşı kəskin mövqedə dururdular. Bu monada, onların siyasi bağlılığı etnik bağlılıqdan daha üstün idi. Azərbaycan Demokratlarının nəzərində İran, Böyük Rusiya və Böyük Almaniya kimi, eyni coğrafi arealda yaşayan müxtəlif xalqların birləşdirən bir dövlət idi və burada, ortaqların və birlikdə yaşanan keçmişin verdiyi yaxınlıq duyğusu emik soy-kökə olan bağlılığı üstələyirdi. Beləliklə, onlar bu böyük və ortaqların dövləti özlərini qorumağın, inkişaf etdinnəyin və öz iradələrini ifadə etməyin yeganə təminatı olaraq görürdülər.