

THE GEORGIAN ROSE REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES AND SUPPORTS FOR ENSURING THE NON-VIOLENT OUTCOME IN A POST-SOVIET SOCIETY

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Chapter One

Introduction

This thesis is about the Georgian revolution that took place on 23 November 2003, popularly named the 'Rose Revolution.' It began in the form of street protests in the capital of the country against the falsification of the November 2003 parliamentary election, and culminated in the storming of the Georgian Parliament and the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. Massive demonstrations were held in Tbilisi 20-23 November 2003 and tens of thousands of people participated. Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze and others led the demonstrations that ended with the collapse of the government. After an increasingly tense two weeks of protests, Shevardnadze bowed to the inevitable and resigned as president on 23 November 2003. The parliamentary speaker, Nino Burjanadze, replaced him on an interim basis.

The exceptional feature of this revolution is that Georgia managed to overcome the gravest crisis of its latest history without shedding a single drop of blood. Considering Georgia's turbulent history and lack of strong democratic traditions, the non-violent character of the revolution was by no means self-evident. The question is whether the non-violent nature of the event was the result of a deliberate and well-planned strategy, or whether it was mere coincidence. In any case, the Georgian revolution attracted a lot of attention from the regional and Western media. The important feature of this revolution is that it happened non-violently in a former Soviet country. The concept itself is astonishing, because a non-violent revolution, or the peaceful changing of a corrupt government whose leader has always wandered

between dictatorship and democracy, is the starting point for a new generation of nonviolent revolutions in the countries who shared the same political culture in the past. This idea is supported by the recent events in Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, clearly inspired by the Georgian success. Bearing all this in mind, the Georgian case provides an excellent opportunity to get insight into and to further develop the theories of non-violent behaviour.

The aim of this research paper is to find out and discuss how the Georgian revolution could happen non-violently. This will include a theoretical explanation of the strategies and tactics of the protests, as well as other factors that in the end made the president resign from his post peacefully. The empirical approach of my research is based on finding political-legal and economic factors of influence, seeing the revolution as a historical event.

The empirical data collection is based on the Georgian revolution. However, this research paper will also refer to the nature of the new generation of revolutions with their minimal requirements and their demands, support and regulations by international law and community and major institutions. At the same time, a theoretical discussion will take place about the causes, reasons and legitimizations of the Georgian revolution within the broader context of history and the economic, political and social situation of the country before and during the revolution period.

Research Questions

The research questions have been formulated in order to serve the aims and objectives of the Master's Thesis. Since the aim of the thesis is to find out why the Georgian revolution was non-violent, it is important to research the specific strategy and methods of the revolutionary movement. In addition, it is essential to understand which internal and external challenges and supports influenced the nature of the November 2003 events. Based on this I formulated the following main research questions: "what made the Georgian revolution non-violent? What specific strategy and methods did the

revolution movement use? What challenges and supports were there for the non-violent revolution?"

Hypotheses

My overall hypothesis is that the non-violent strategy and tactics of the opposition contributed to making the revolution non-violent. However, these organizational and planning elements were not in themselves a guarantee for the non-violent outcome; other factors also had to be present such as the tolerant behaviour of the government, the lessons learnt from recent history and external factors such as foreign pressure and support. I believe that during the events, there was a great risk that the Georgian revolution might turn violent, but the above-mentioned factors greatly increased the probability of a non-violent outcome.ⁱ

Sources of Information

This thesis is based on several sources of information. In the period between the outbreak of the revolution in November 2003 and until June 2004, I collected and read as much as possible of the available written material about the Georgian Revolution. This material consisted mostly of informative and analytical articles about the revolution, found in official Georgian sources (statements, decrees etc. publicized in newspapers, TV and web pages controlled and operated by the Government), Georgian and international newspapers and books and journals.

In the summer of 2004, I made a six-week research trip to Georgia to meet real informers, i.e. people who had actually taken part in the revolution and who had made decisions. The information has mainly been gathered from interviews with high-ranking former and current government elites who were 'for' or 'against' the revolution, the neutral elite, mass media representatives, academic workers, different party activists, NGOs activists, foreigners living in Georgia, ordinary people and active students etc. However, the main verification still relied on

interviews with those people who concretely took decisive roles during the whole processes on the eve of the Georgian revolution.

Target groups

Generally speaking, the target group of my interviews can be divided into three categories: pro, anti and neutral to the revolution. The target group consisted of people who physically took part in or made decisions during the revolution, as well as people who did not physically take part, but who share common knowledge about the events. The age of the interviewees ranged from approximately 22-60 years. The gender balance, the number of representatives from the pro, anti and neutral camps as well as their knowledge about and involvement in the event have been taken into consideration in order to keep a fair balance.

Problems

Since the research has mainly been based on interviews it is necessary to point out the positive and negative sides of interviews as a methodology. The advantages of the interview, for instance, compared with self-administrated questionnaires are: a) the verbal interaction with the interviewee allows for greater depth than is the case with other methods of data collection b) the interviewer can ensure that the interviewee sticks to the question, c) the interviewer is able to clarify the question in order to avoid misunderstandings. During my data collection, it sometimes occurred that the same questions had different meanings to different people. It helped to explain questions and to 'push' the interviewee to stick to the question.

Meanwhile, the problematic side of interviewing was that some people did not feel comfortable sitting in front of a stranger and talking about politics. In addition, an obvious disadvantage of interviews as a research method is that this method is prone to subjectivity and bias on the part of the interviewerⁱⁱ. There were some problems with the chosen methodology, timing and understanding of Georgians'

psychology. All these were potential dangers to any academic research.

Another important problem during the fieldwork was that interviewees sometimes categorized their answers into "I think" and "Our party, organization, institute etc thinks". These answers and views were sometimes totally opposite to each other. It made it difficult and confusing to understand whose "thinking" they were referring to. From this experience it is clear that one needs to view an individual and the organization the individual represents as two different entities or 'subjects'. In general, available information about something can be either subjective or objective because it results from the interaction of the subject (perception and cognition of knowledge) and the object (its environment). Therefore, the main problem when using interviewing as a methodology is that the informant's information about the event will always be relatively true; it exists only as a part of a certain subject. It is truth from a certain perspective, thus partial and never complete. This is, however, different from the problem of authenticityⁱⁱⁱ.

The technical side of the conducted interviews during the fieldwork can be divided into two: voice recorded and note-taken interviews. Some people did not mind having their voice recorded during the interviews. A recorded interview gives the opportunity to listen to the same conversation in its entirety over and over again and save it accurately. It reduces the chance of forgetting and adding self-interpretation compared with note-taken interviews. However, there is always a risk that the recorder may affect the conscious or unconscious self-censoring of the interview so that items are omitted, suppressed or twisted.

Clarification of Two Main Concepts

There are two crucial concepts that need to be clarified. They are whether the Georgian Rose Revolution was a 'revolution' or a 'coup', and whether it was 'violent' or 'non-violent.'

"This was not a people's revolution. It was a coup, masked by the biggest street party that Tbilisi has ever seen", Charlotte Keatley writes in a comment in *the Guardian* on 6 December^{iv}. During the fieldwork, almost all interviewees who were against an unconstitutional change of government regarded the November events as a coup d'etat. Their main argument was that several higher officials from Shevardnadze's government had cooperated with the opposition forces. For the sake of clarification, let me start with some general definitions: a) a revolution is a fundamental change in a country's power relations, order (government/people) and institutions, e.g. from authoritarian to democratic. Whether a revolution occurred can only be decided in the aftermath; only then we can see whether institutions, power relations and order have changed substantially and permanently, b) a coup d'etat is a sudden displacement of an existing government.

Based on these definitions, one can argue legally that, a coup d'etat is always a revolution.^v However, according to the general understanding, the difference between a revolution and a coup d'etat is determined by the level of mass support behind those who take power. A revolution is the result of popular uprisings on a mass scale, while a coup d'etat is carried out by a small group of people, usually in or previously in positions of power. Relying on this definition, it becomes clear why the Georgian case is disputable.

By emphasizing the fact that the main organizers of the events in Georgia, Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, had been high-rank officials in the Shevardnadze government, and by assuming that it was mainly them who initiated the overthrow of the government, it can be argued that the Georgian revolution was a coup d'etat. However, I want to make the argument that even if it was a 'coup', it enjoyed the active and passive support of the majority of the people in Georgia. The active participation of ten thousands of people during the demonstrations played a vital role in pushing the Shevardnadze government to resign, as well as giving legitimacy to the whole event. In the democratic presidential elections in 2004,^{vi} Saakashvili received 96.3% of the votes with an 88% turnout,^{vii} which weakens the argument that the November event was a coup carried out by a few

elites without mass popular support. This is why I choose to term the event a 'revolution', and not a 'coup' throughout this thesis.

There are also some controversial ideas about the Georgian revolution, stressing that it was actually a violent revolution; "the revolution of guns but not roses"^{viii} Since all revolutions generally can be characterized as violent acts because pressure, force and severe influence are part of their nature, there is a need to clarify how the terms 'violent' and 'non-violent' are used in the following chapters. From a Western perspective, some analysts argue that storming into the parliament, breaking the window, beating some of the parliament's members and tearing the chair of the president were violent acts. However, the Georgian context and especially the gravity of the crisis and the potential violence which could have been released - or even expected - have to be taken into consideration.^{ix} In this thesis, the term 'non-violent' refers to the process or act where bloodshed, human causality and murdering are absent. Therefore, the Georgian revolution can be called a non-violent historical event because - as was documented by media and other independent sources - these above-mentioned factors were absent from the arena.

Methods and Methodology

The purpose of choosing this specific case of the Georgian non-violent revolution, is in the wider context to find out whether it is possible to organize successfully a non-violent, large-scale political event causing fundamental political changes in similar societies. This will enable us to adjust existing non-violent resistance (combat) theories to the local psychology and structures of government in a specific country in order to ensure a non-violent outcome (changes). Therefore, the aim of this research paper is to find out what made the Georgian revolution non-violent.

The methodology of this research is based on the theoretical and epistemological context for the investigation and gathering of knowledge. As a method, the *empirical* way, which sees knowledge as the product of sensory perception, has been leading. The empirical

approach has both deductive and inductive formations. Careful data collection, processing and analysis, and inductive theory formation comprise the inductive approach, whilst the other way around, i.e. comparing data and theories and adjusting the latter to the former, comprise the deductive approach^x. This research is a mixture of both, but the deductive approach leads mostly, which means that data collected from interviews, publications and analytic presumptions will be systematically compared with existing theories, revising the theories if they do not agree with the data - data being stronger than theory.^{xi} Scientifically speaking, therefore, the tenability of a theory or hypothesis depends on the nature of the empiric evidence for its support.

The method of data collection refers to the techniques associated with the interpretive model, such as collecting answers to predetermined questions, describing phenomena and performing experiments. Although collecting data from publications has been an important method in this research, the main method of research has still been *interviews*. Generally, the purpose of interviews in this research is varied: testing, developing hypotheses, gathering data, sampling respondents' opinions and surveying experimental situations etc. Other methods can be used to include the more specific features of the scientific enterprise, such as forming concepts and hypotheses and building models and theories.

In the academic sphere, the interview as a research technique is normally considered as one out of a range of survey methods in social research. The interviews in this thesis have a specific purpose, i.e. to obtain information relevant to the research, and their content is focused on specified research objectives.^{xii} The theoretical and academic justification for choosing the interview as a research technique in this thesis is that the interview may serve as a) the principal means of gathering information having a direct bearing on the research objectives. It provides the possibility to find out what a person knows (knowledge or information), likes or dislikes (values and preferences) and thinks (attitudes and beliefs), b) the principal means of testing hypotheses or suggesting new ones, or be an explanatory device to help identify variables and relationships^{xiii}.

At the same time, the question format and modes of response associated with interviewing were taken into consideration. At the beginning, the main challenge was to find out how a question should to be phrased or organized in order to fit into the Georgian psychology. Although the research questions, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, were set and well formalized, there was still a need for extra support questions and quotes serving the aim of the thesis in order to let conversation flow smoothly during the interviews. Accordingly, the interview questions were put into Tuckman's suggested four famous formats: direct and indirect form, and general and specific.^{xiv} The sequence of the designed questions was from the general and non-specific to the more specific. I agree with Tuckman, who thinks that specific questions, like direct ones, may cause a respondent to become cautious or guarded and give less-than-honest answers. Non-specific questions may lead circuitously to the desired information but with less alarm by the respondents.^{xv} By making the purpose of questions less obvious, the indirect approach was broadly used in order to produce frank and open responses.

Theoretical Context

This section discusses the theoretical basis in terms of assumptions and connections to the revolution theories; theories about political jiu-jitsu, disobedience, mass protest, power and crowd psychology. The theories of Gene Sharp, "the methods of nonviolent action, protest and persuasion for power and struggle", Johan Galtung, "triangle conflict theory" and Gandhi, "non-violent action by marching forces" are going to be the main sources for the theoretical input. The purpose of theoretical input is to explain the most in the simplest way by gathering together all the isolated bits of empirical data into a coherent conception framework of wider applicability. The theoretical basis of the study builds on three key assumptions:

1. nonviolent education, training and good management can lead to nonviolent behaviour
2. attitude and behaviour can change or tolerate the situation.
3. all people have the capacity for inner peaceful decision.

The first assumption refers to the nonviolent disobedience concepts as defined by Sharp.^{xvi} He thinks that the government is a vital organism where the harmony and interdependence make this organism able to function and to resist problems. Therefore, Sharp suggests in his book "The Politics of Nonviolent Actions: Power and Structure" that if the people and organizations ("organs") could rise to show massive disobedience, then they would be awakened and overthrow the unfair authority. To reach this level, people need to implement nonviolent tactics, strategies and methods in order to achieve a fair outcome. The underlying idea is that regardless of the obstacles to dissemination of nonviolent resistance, nonviolent education, training and tools can lead to nonviolent behaviour.

The second assumption is developed from the conflict triangle theory defined by Gaining where a certain attitude (a), behaviour (b) and situation^{xvii} (c) are conspicuously present.^{xviii} In this assumption, the conflict is a dynamic process where attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other. Here, attitude includes emotive (feeling) and cognitive (belief) elements. It is an expressive view of the source of conflict. Behaviour is the second component. It can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. It is an instrumental view of the source of conflict. The third component is a situation, which means a contradiction. Here, a contradiction can be experienced as a frustration, where a goal is being blocked by something (refusing to confess real election results by the government, or disturbing the legalizing of an "elected" parliament by the opposition), leading to oppression as an attitude and to oppression as behaviour according to the hypothesis (recognizing that the events in Georgia had a great potential to turn violent).

Gaining argues that three components have to be present together in a full conflict.^{xix} As a conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation as parties' interests come into conflict or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. The situation is changeable. It depends on, in our case, the Georgian government and opposition attitude and behaviour as well as to individual people's behaviour (people may behave in the way they tend to behave - like devils or angels, both or neither -

depending on personalities, which certainly may be shaped by conflicts in the past.^{xx}).

Gaining defines conflicts of interest as either symmetric or asymmetric. Conflicts of interest between relatively similar parties are symmetric conflicts. In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interest and the clash of interests between them. Conflict may also arise between dissimilar parties such as a majority and minority or vice versa. In our case, it is the Georgian government against the Georgian nation or vice versa. This is an asymmetric conflict. Here, the root of the conflict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relations between them. It may be that this structure of roles and relationship (such as the opposition demanding the real results of the parliament elections be implemented, insisting that they had won a lot of seats in the parliament, though the government said no because they did not want to let the opposition MPs control the parliament in the future) cannot be changed without conflict.

This thesis is about a nonviolent power takeover where the outcome was defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. The conflict (and the triangle as an abstraction) can occur if there are at least two parties. Thus, the very existence of a triangle (and the conflict itself) shows the existence of two or more parties. By analyzing the Georgian case, I divided the main actors into two: 1) the opposition movement (opposition parties, NGOs, media, external powers, etc.) 2) the government (police, military, government officials, armed people from Adjara and groups with economic interests, etc). In Figure 1 I have illustrated the theoretical model which is developed from Gaining's conflict triangle theory, where attitude, behaviour and situation have a continuous influence on one another. In addition to the triangle theory, I added the internal and external factors (challenging and supporting the nonviolent outcome) to the attitude and behaviour of the government and opposition. However, I think that the external factors had less direct influence on the situation (on the people protesting at the rallies and protests) than the internal ones

(history, culture and values). Therefore, I do not connect external influence to the situation in the model.

The behaviour of the government and the opposition have similar challenges (restrictions): a) the use of any kind of violence will cause strong dissatisfaction, both inside and outside the country, b) the danger of civil war, c) loss of support from the population, d) damage to the prestige of the political leaders and the country. Meanwhile, there were some differences in the attitude of the sides, such as refusing to hear international and local criticism of falsified elections and the government trying to calm the uprising or ignoring the protests to some extent. Their attitude was based on the belief that these rallies and protests would be the same as many other rallies and protests which the opposition had organized in the past. On the contrary, the opposition was becoming famous in the country, and they started to call for changes to the results until the number of their people and real power in the streets turned to their favour. After that, they demanded the resignation of the president. Accordingly, to avoid direct violence the violent behaviour should be changed, to avoid structural violence structural contradictions should be removed, and to avoid injustices, attitudes should be changed. Thus, Galtung's conflict triangle was chosen in order to focus on the process and actions and help find out which factors had the most influential and decisive role in avoiding a violent 'Attitude' and 'Behaviour' in a certain 'Situation'.

The third assumption refers to the Gandhian tactic of 'speaking the truth to power', influencing and persuading the power holders. The underlying idea here is to raise awareness about the conflict among those who are external and internal supporters of the opponents (the government and the opposition movement)^{xxi}. The Gandhian perspective claims that "if your opponent has not totally limited your options, then you can fight in the most direct way. You can simply start carrying out your alternative to the conflict as if you had already won the right to do so."^{xxii} But if you use violence as a strategy for political change, you end up with a political order based on violence.^{xxiii} All people have the capacity for inner peaceful decisionmaking in order to solve their conflict by changing the structure.

Chapter Two

Historical Background

Georgia is situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, in the western part of Transcaucasia on the southern slopes of the Caucasian mountains, covering an area of 69,700 sq. km. It shares borders with the Russian Federation in the north, Azerbaijan in the southeast, Armenia in the south and Turkey in the southwest. Georgia is bounded to the west by the Black Sea. The population of Georgia has diminished significantly during the last years due to emigration, amounting today to about 4,7 million.^{xxiv}

Georgia's recent history is as complicated and sad as the history of the other Caucasian countries. There are many reasons for this recent turbulent past and the roots of the problems go far beyond recent events such as the independence of Georgia from Soviet Russia, civil war and ethnic conflicts. As a result of these turbulent years, Georgian society has been deeply traumatized. The factors of traumatization, fragmentation, polarization, internal hostility, changing disposition into aggression, victimization as an excuse, IDPs, the individual's losing dignity and status, etc. are all visible factors in Georgian society.^{xxv}

Independence from Soviet Russia

By the end of the 1980's, when the Soviet regime was weakening day by day, Georgians started to think about their independence from the communist hegemony. On 9 April 1989 the Soviet Army broke up a peaceful pro-independence rally, killing 20 innocent civilians.^{xxvi} Because of the massacre, the Soviet leader, Mr Patiashvili, who was the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, lost his legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and was thus replaced by Mr Gumbaridze. This shocking event fundamentally changed the political environment in Georgia and accelerated the policy of complete independence and separation from the Soviet Union. Later on, the multiparty elections of October 1990 ended Communist rule and gave

power to the "Round Table - Georgia" block, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia. On the 9th of April 1991, the parliament declared the independence of Georgia. However, the international community did not recognize Georgia's independence until the end of the breakup of the Soviet Union.^{xxvii}

Zviad Gamsakhurdia

In nationwide elections on 26 May 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia received 87% of the votes cast and became Georgia's first democratically elected president. During the first half of the 1990s, the Soviet Union was a sinking ship, but at the same time it was sucking all the economical, social and political cooperation and ties down with it into the darkness of history. Therefore, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was unable to rule the country at that crucial juncture. He did not have a clear vision of where to lead the Georgian political system. Gamsakhurdia's mode of government caused dissatisfaction among the opposition, among Western governments and even in his immediate circle, who all regarded him as a 'flaky' nationalist with no experience of government.^{xxviii} Gamsakhurdia's regime faced a coup. The coup grew into armed conflict between the supporters of the authorities and the opposition, which led the country to civil war. The battles lasted two weeks and left over 100 fatalities, and, as a result, Zviad Gamsakhurdia left the country on 6 January 1992. Gamsakhurdia and his supporters escaped from the governmental palace and sought asylum abroad.^{xxix} Later, back in Georgia, he committed suicide in 1993. His supporters are known as Zviadists, who were imprisoned and prosecuted by the Shevardnadze government until very recently. Unable to cope with the many international, economic and other domestic problems, the rebel Military Council, who had formed the State Council, invited Eduard Shevardnadze to return to politics in Georgia.

The Return of Eduard Shevardnadze

Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and former Soviet Foreign Minister, returned to

Georgia in 1992. He became Chairman of the parliament after obtaining an overwhelming majority of the votes in the elections that followed in October 1992. A new constitution was adopted on 24 August 1995. On 5 November 1995, presidential elections were held and as a result Shevardnadze became the President of Georgia.

Shevardnadze's political skills and prestige both internationally and locally gave him the opportunity to be involved in the political life of a new, independent Georgia. Shevardnadze's political skills earned him the nickname "Tetri Melia" ("White Fox"), while his former American negotiating partners, President George W. Bush, Sr. and Secretary of State James Baker, reportedly preferred to call him "Shevvy".^{xxx} When Shevardnadze joined the Georgian State Council in 1992 in the chaotic aftermath of the coup against Zviad Gamsakhurdia. He presented himself as being the best candidate to guide Georgia through its difficult rebirth as an independent nation. Over time, he seemed to have become convinced that his interests and Georgia's were essentially the same. Under his rule, a civil society in Georgia became well established, and would possibly be better able to meet the challenges of the time than had been the case in the early 1990s. It seems likely, though, that Shevardnadze will be better remembered for his contribution to the deconstruction of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union than his undistinguished decade as the President of Georgia.

Ethnic conflicts: Abkhazia and South Ossetia

During the Soviet Union, the Soviet Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were part of the Soviet republic of Georgia, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union they became part of an independent Georgia. These autonomous republics are inside the internationally recognized territories of Georgia. However, during the different times under the former Soviet Union there were some legal confrontations between the central authorities of Tbilisi and autonomous levels, and gradually these confrontations became openly hostile. Starting from the second half of the 1980s, Georgian nationalism attempted to separate Georgia from the Soviet Union, but

at the same time, Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalism aimed at separating from Georgia. In Georgia, armed confrontations had begun by the end of 1988. Georgia was defeated in the wars of 1991-1993 and lost Abkhazia as well as a greater part of the South Ossetian territories, which made up almost 15 per cent of the country's territory. As a result of these conflicts, 300,000 fled and became Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and the two territories became centres of criminal business and smuggling.^{xxx1}

Through the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian ethnic conflicts Russia gained influence over Georgia and the Southern Caucasus as a whole. These wars left thousands of human casualties, a destroyed economy, hostilities and traumatized societies behind. In the years following 1993, the Georgian authority tried to keep a balanced policy keeping both Russian influence and Western money as part of their agenda.

Political Parties

In 1993, Shevardnadze strengthened his rule by establishing a political party, the Citizen Union. The Citizen Union party became the ruling party in the country for a long period. It won the country's elections in 1995 and 1999, but as the Shevardnadze government started to lose its legitimacy among the citizens, his party also became weaker day by day. The most visible opposition politicians in Georgia that overthrew Shevardnadze in November 2003 had been leading members of Citizen Union (CU) and personally close to Shevardnadze, holding posts as Citizen Union Members of Parliament (MPs) and ministers in successive Georgian governments. For example, Zurab Zhvania was chairman of the Georgian parliament until he resigned in 2002. He topped the Citizen Union party list for the 1999 parliamentary election. Mikheil Saakashvili was second on that list and, at the same time, chairman of the parliamentary committee charged with creating a new electoral system, an independent judiciary and a non-political police force. He later became Minister of Justice resigning from his post in 2001. Nino Burjanadze was No. 6. She had previously been

Chairman of the Parliament Legal Affairs Committee and became Speaker of the Parliament after Zhvania resigned.

Saakashvili was the first high ranking official from Shevardnadze's government who resigned, and he went over to the opposition after stating that he believed it was immoral to remain part of a corrupt government. Saakashvili was loved for being active and having a clear past^{xxxii}. In the year following his resignation, he founded his own political coalition, the National Movement, to contest the 2002 local elections. "Saakashvili had very organized party. Maybe it is only political party organized [that] existed in Georgia" Muskhelishvili said.^{xxxiii} Meanwhile, Burjanadze and Zhvania joined forces to form the bloc 'the United Democratic Party', known as the 'Burjanadze-Democrats' for the 2003 election. Zhvania was unpopular because he was believed to have been a corrupt official in Shevardnadze's government. It was, therefore, openly accepted that Burjanadze should front the party.

The Revival Union party was created by Alsan Abashidze, the governor of the regional province of Adjara. The Zviadists eventually formed a coalition with the Revival Union. Revival Union was the most serious challenger to Shevardnadze's regime in 1999, and became the second largest party in the Georgian parliament after the 1999 election; however, some sources insist that numerous acts of violence and intimidation had been directed against Revival Union supporters both before and during the poll.

In 2001, several leading figures in the Citizen Union broke away from the party, and by the time of the election, only 47 members of the parliament remained in its parliamentary caucus. President Shevardnadze's supporters formed a new bloc, For a New Georgia (FANG), to contest the 2003 election. Probably reflecting the absence of sufficient funding, FANG's campaign in 2003 was a pale shadow of those conducted in the past by the Citizen Union.

Parliament Elections 2003

On 2 November 2003, Georgia held its fifth parliamentary elections (previously held in 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999) since its independence. This election was of great political importance for the political situation in Georgia. In the four previous parliamentary elections, the voter turnout had been fairly steady at 69.9% in 1990, 74.8% in 1992, 68.2 % in 1995 and 67.9% 1999. However, all these numbers were doubtful in their reliability because all the elections had serious irregularities.^{xxxiv} Although the quality and fairness of those elections varied according to the interviewees, the common belief among ordinary Georgians is that there had never been any Western-style democratic and free parliamentary elections in Georgia.

The Georgian parliament consists of 235 seats. 150 are filled by the party list while 85 MPs are elected from mandate constituencies. In the 1999 elections, 22 blocks and parties as well as another 3000 individual candidates took part in the poll. The large number of political organizations registered in Georgia creates a misleading impression. Many of them were little more than names, and there was next-to-no grass root political life in the country.^{xxxv} In 1999, the election law was amended to introduce a threshold of 7% for a party's eligibility to enter parliament. Only 3 parties/blocks managed to pass the 7% barrier in 1999 - the Citizen Union (41.75%), Revival Union (25.18%) and Industry Will Save Georgia, which scraped through with 7.08%. The Unified Elections Code was further amended in 2003 to allow for a new Central Election Committee and use of an additional voters' list.^{xxxvi}

Generally speaking, as time passed by and the quality of life failed to improve, fewer people went out to vote.^{xxxvii} Due to the profusion of parties, their mixed messages and strange alliance - blocs often contained groupings of both right and left - people tended to cast their vote for the personalities.^{xxxviii} Illegal methods were employed in the parties' political confrontation with the regions to suppress their political opponents. The government resorted to a method known as the 'carousel method', where the same group of voters cast votes several times. For example, society was well aware that a group of

120 persons used different identity papers and cast votes in several districts during the 1999 parliament elections.

Although this was a clear case of violation of the electoral laws, no one, even political opponents, endeavoured to reveal it openly.^{xxxix}

On the other hand, leaders of the civil society in Georgia began to understand that with the Shevardnadze-led government and the roles of the political game, it would be difficult for anyone to achieve success through elections. Therefore, there was a need for greater dialogue between civic actors and the government in order to identify the threats in the electoral process and find ways to overcome them. To this end, a strong election-monitoring group, the so-called Fair Elections, had been established in the early 1990's. This group became active and critical in assessing and monitoring elections. The group was funded by a coalition of donors (Open Society-Georgia Foundation, Eurasia Foundation, USA International Development Agency, British Council). In the 2003 elections, the group aimed at counting cast votes parallel to the election commission. It was the first time in the history of Georgia that this was done.^{xl}

The findings of the polling agencies funded by the coalition of donors were broadcasted by the Georgian TV stations, including the state TV. In particular, Rustavi 2 TV as well as the Western media used the findings extensively. The primary goal of the poll was the parallel counting of votes cast and motivating citizens' activity in elections. In the end, the results of the exit polls differed considerably from the official election results published by the Central Election Commission (CEC), which was controlled by Shevardnadze.

Central Election Commission^{xli}

1. For a New Georgia -21.32%
2. Revival Union - 18.84%
3. National Movement - 18.8%
4. Labour Party - 12,4%
5. Burjanadze Democrats - 15%
6. New Rightists - 12%

Exit polls^{xlii}

1. National Movement - 20,7%
2. For a New Georgia - 14,2%
3. Labour Party - 14,2%
4. Burj anadze Democrats -8,1%
5. Revival Union - 7,3%

Opposition parties held a number of demonstrations as a warning to Shevardnadze, denouncing the results of the CEC. The demonstrations were increased on 20, 21 and 22 November when tens of thousands of people demanded the resignation of Shevardnadze. Mikhail Saakashvili declared that all negotiations with the president had been stopped and that they now had only one demand: Tens of thousands of people cried "Resign; Go home!".^{xliii}

Chapter Three

Factors that contributed to the revolution

Was the Revolution Necessary?

The general answer to this question is directly connected to the economical, political and social situation both before and after the 2 November parliamentary elections in Georgia. In my interviews, I received several arguments 'for' and 'against' the necessity of the revolution. Generally, almost nobody in Georgia appreciates revolution as a means of changing the government. According to Emil Adelhkanov, Programme Director, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, "I could perfectly survive without the revolution. I did not like the idea of revolution because a) I did not like the opposition leaders. I knew very well Saakashvili, and b) I have seen how enthusiastically Kmara [the student movement] had started to the preparation for the revolution. I thought what they were going to do might lead the country into bloodshed or civil war". Meanwhile, after the revolution, people felt it difficult to oppose the concept of revolution completely as well, because the revolution solved the gravest crisis in Georgia's recent history without bloodshed. In short, the means had justified the outcome. Michael Saakashvili, the President of Georgia, said, "I hope we will not need anymore to change government by revolutions in Georgia. We will build a democratic country where the need for changing government will go through elections".

Some interviewees argued that the revolution was necessary, because it was impossible to achieve political changes in the country through democratic means, namely elections. It was widely believed that elections had always been falsified by the Shevardnadze regime, and therefore, a nation-wide uprising and mobilization was necessary in order to make the Shevardnadze leadership illegitimate, and force him to step down.

Whether the revolution was necessary or not, there were a set of factors that made the ground proper for a national uprising to happen. The leading argument for many of the interviewees was that in order for a revolution to take place, the conditions have to be right. Therefore, understanding the political, economic and social situation in Georgia before the November events is crucial for judging people's motivation for taking part in the demonstrations and the power officials' excuse for showing disobedience.

Georgia's Economic Development under Shevardnadze

It is absolutely appropriate to draw parallels between Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia when analysing the Georgian revolution from an economic perspective. Both Milosevic, Kuchma and Shevardnadze were undermined not by an economic crisis (which forces society to fight for survival, and that, as a rule, distracts society from politics) but by an economic catastrophe (where the fight for survival has been lost completely). In such circumstances, mobilizing the protesting masses was not hard.

Almost all interviewees, regardless of their political view about the revolution, confirmed that if there were two reasons for the revolution, one of them would surely be the economic situation in the country. The Chairman of the executive board of the Open Society-Georgia Foundation (known as the Soros foundation in Georgia), Micheal Chachkhunashvili, thinks, as many others in Georgia, that "... to live in Georgia under the Shevardnadze government was simply impossible." This point was supported by the secretary of the New Right Party (a right-wing opposition party), Shavla Lavudze, and Natela

Sakhokia, Director of the Strategic Research Institute, saying that the economy did not go anywhere during the Shevardnadze government. Starting from 1998, Georgia experienced a severe fiscal crisis. The budget was never in balance, and it was unable to meet the targets for tax revenue collection. The government did not have exact plans for what to do in order to improve the economic situation. The country collapsed from an economic perspective.^{xliv}

The majority of the people were unemployed, poor and desperate, though there was also a small group of very rich people with fancy lifestyles, cars and houses that had a quite nice life in the poor country. They were mostly people close to the clan, rich businessmen, government officials and mafia members. They were all corrupt people who had contributed to destroying the country's economy and stealing the grants and loans given by international funds to the country. According to Natalia Antelava, these grants and loans have never helped ordinary Georgian citizens, but they were the engine of much of the corruption there. The grants and loans were also important because they enabled the government to pay off its apparatus and bureaucratic system.^{xlv} In this situation, the West could influence the situation in Georgia. On 23 September 2003 the United States announced that it was cutting USAID funding to Georgia. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also pulled the plug, stopping loans until the corruption in Georgia was cleared up.^{xlvi} The withdrawal of such funds meant that Shevardnadze's power base was stripped for cash in the run-up to the election in November 2003. The lack of funding also contributed to the fact that by 23 November, Shevardnadze had been deserted by his security organs as well as the army and police. Shevardnadze started to fall from the moment when all his channels of financial aid were reduced. By the time of the election, the Shevardnadze government was like a rotting door, ready to collapse when kicked. This situation made the quasi-democratic regime change inevitably. From an economic perspective, it can be argued that the Georgian revolution was mostly made possible by a collapsed economy where corruption and unemployment were steering factors.

Corruption in Georgia under the leadership of Shevardnadze was so widespread that it affected life on nearly every level. The degree of corruption had crippled economic development and attempts at reforms. Shevardnadze was unsuccessful in curbing the rapid growth of corruption through Georgian society and political processes. However, the system of corruption in Georgia was different from, for example, the corruption in Azerbaijan and Armenia in many respects. Dr Marina Muskhelishvili thinks "...all the leaders of these countries are on the top of the corruption pyramid". These countries have created a unilateral system of corruption which is controlled by the top management, the president. This makes the money flow in one direction; towards the current president. Shevardnadze was different in this respect. Shevardnadze did not create a pyramid system. "It was a chaotic corruption in Georgia during the Shevardnadze leadership". Despite very strong laws against corruption, little was done to enforce them. The government was corrupted and "...Shevardnadze did not do anything to stop the corruption. He himself was not directing this system and did not get any of this money", although he was allowing his family and people around him to have their businesses (interest in oil, in telecommunication, etc). This did not make a unilateral, but a multi-central system of corruption in Georgia.^{xlvii}

Social Development under Shevardnadze

In May 2003, the Executive Director of the IMF declared that despite small growth over the past two years, Georgia was on the verge of bankruptcy. Its foreign debt was more than \$2 billion. In the year 2003 alone, Georgia had to pay \$160 million alone in interest - a quarter of the country's budget. Next year (2004) it would have to pay close to \$170 million. To boost the budget income, Shevardnadze was forced by the IMF to try to increase the prices of goods and services, such as electricity and bread. These increased prices struck the poorest part of the population the hardest.

The minimum wage - on which pensions and benefits are based - was \$10 a month before the revolution. It is reported that 2.1% of the country's 4.4 million population lived in extreme poverty - with less than \$12 a month to survive on. 10% lived a bit "better" with \$20.

Over 50% of the population got by on around \$50. Over a million Georgians, a third of the working population, emigrated in search of work, many going to Russia.^{xlvi}

The conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not solved, and remained in a state of neither war nor peace; a cease-fire situation. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) -ethnic Georgians from these two regions, especially Georgians from Abkhaziya - did not have any chance to return to their homes. Shevardnadze was not regarded as being strong enough to carry out social reform or fulfil people's expectations.

The level of mistrust in official bodies was rather high in the regions. Cooperation with official bodies within the scope of law was not considered honourable. The ordinary citizen preferred to solve his or her problem using unofficial methods. There was a lack of awareness among a large section of the population about their rights. Demonstrations and other protest actions voicing social demands were rare. Public protest was expressed openly only in connection with political issues. These attitudes were reinforced by the chaos and corruption in the official bodies. A typical example of violations of the law by the state was the violation of human rights.^{xlix}

The Human Rights Situation: The most effective steps towards human rights protection a government can take comprise the elimination of discrimination and enforcement of the equality of citizens. In this respect, Georgia under Shevardnadze's leadership failed to fulfil some basic human rights for the citizens. In the mid-1990s, the Shevardnadze government raided political demonstrations rather aggressively, where the organizers of such demonstrations were the hard-line supporters of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The government justified these raids by claiming that such demonstrations posed a threat to the political stability in the country. Surprisingly, during the recent years of the Shevardnadze government, cases of assemblies being raided by police had become less frequent. However, a new tendency emerged: Non-state groups, who for political and religious reasons did not share the goal of such meetings, often raided peaceful assemblies.¹

According to Nino Makhashvili, Director of Georgian Centre of Psychosocial and Torture Victims, a lot of human rights violations were conducted and complaints received during the Shevardnadze period. There were serious violations, such as violations against the dignity and integrity of a person. Although there were many complaints, pressure and systematic work in order to prevent similar cases, the Centre of Psychosocial and Torture Victims and many other human rights protection NGOs failed to do anything because the system was built for violating human rights and for oppressing the people. The system was dependent on these methods in order to exist. No one was protected from torture, although the constitution, international conventions signed by the Georgian government and other laws prohibited torture.ⁱⁱ

During the last two years before the revolution (2002-2003), NGOs played a very serious role in the democracy building processes of Georgia. There were few leading NGOs, but those who functioned could strongly influence the decision-making processes of the government. Nevertheless, "there were many cases of human rights violations during this time too" -assures Nana Kakabadze, Director of Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights. According to her point of view, human rights violations happened just because Georgia is a former Soviet country, which still possesses features from the past and cannot become a democratic society right away.

In 1992-1994, paramilitary formations were not subjected to any control. The extent of their connections with representatives of the authorities was alarming. This appeared to be a big criminal problem for Georgia. In 2000-2001, Pankisi Gorge became a centre of kidnapping and drugs and arms traffic.ⁱⁱⁱ The life harmony of ordinary Georgians was disturbed in Pankisi Gorge while the government did not take any measures to stop it. In 2001, Russia bombed suspected Chechen guerrilla positions in Kodori and Pankisi, regions within Georgia.ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Shevardnadze did not manage to satisfy the basic needs of the Georgian citizens on whom the country's defence forces depended. As a result, when the people rose against him in 2003, the military and police establishments that he had nurtured refused to protect him.

Georgian-Russian relations: As a result of the catastrophic economic situation in the country during the 1990s, around 300,000 Georgians fled to Russia in order to earn money or living.^{liv} During recent years, these people have become a political instrument for Russia to pressure Georgia. Indeed, the critical Georgian-Russian relations at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000 reached its peak by Russia's introduction of an unfair visa regime to Georgia.^{lv} This had a negative impact on the economic situation in the country. It slowed down the flow of Georgians seeking jobs and living in Russia, who usually sent money back to Georgia. All this served the creation of a fundament for economic, social and political dissatisfaction and a spark for uprising in Georgia.

Civil Society and Freedom: Under President Shevardnadze, Georgia earned an unfair reputation as a success story of post-Soviet democratization among many Western observers. The existence of a relatively lively civil society had been regarded for a long time as evidence of Georgia's democratic qualifications. Although the development of independent media,^{lvi} freedom of speech, assembly and manifestation was allowed during the Shevardnadze period, the political system itself was not democratic, but a corrupted clan-system. Furthermore, the impact of civil society was much less apparent outside of Tbilisi.

If the development of media and NGOs has been regarded as a strong contributor to Georgia's transition, the situation with regard to party development has been less satisfactory. While civic groups may express group demands, they are not structured in such a way as to aggregate group interests meaningfully. This is the proper function of political parties, which ideally provide an interface between society and the political order by shifting and reconciling group interest into coherent programs for the government. As already mentioned in chapter 2, when parties are many in number (22 parties and blocks contested the November 2003 election), they tend to be ineffective and highly short-lived, due to differences in their capacity to mobilize resources. In addition, Georgian political parties demonstrated very little ideological differentiation. This situation lasted until the grooming of the Georgian political system during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The period following the 1999 elections and the

resignation of high-ranking officials from the Shevardnadze government is the most significant example.

The development of civil society found its practical expression in the close alliance between certain civil society organizations, above all those funded by George Soros' Open Society-Georgia Foundation and the National Democratic Institute, with the political opposition. Later, this civil society would become the major player in the Rose Revolution at three key levels: enhancing the transparency of the November elections, organizing protests in its aftermath, and third, showing protest through the media.

Dr David Darchialshvili thinks that Shevardnadze was not hard-handed. Therefore, the media could say what they wanted. The media could have asked hard questions, logically suggesting that Shevardnadze or any high-ranking official is corrupt. But the media were much less able to publish hard core evidence, showing high-ranking officials taking bribes, extorting money from businesses, being friends of criminals, imprisoning people illegally or ordering people tortured. From time to time, the media openly accused chiefs of power agencies of corruption and cultivating human rights violations, but mostly with little real evidence. Generally, investigative journalism remained on a low scale, though it was not totally absent.^{lvii} This situation made Georgia a politically active and dynamic country where both freedom and threats were present.

External factors

A very important factor both as strategy/tactic and challenge/support to government and opposition was the increasing role of outside influence. There were several reminders from the West to the Shevardnadze administration, e.g. elections should be democratic, there was a wish for stronger leadership, high-level meetings with opposition leaders, visits by big names etc. Interestingly, at the beginning this kind of diplomatic messages and pressures was relatively natural in character, but later it shifted in favour of the opposition. The West continuously wished for stronger leadership during the high-level meetings with opposition leaders, while

Shevardnadze, at the same time, "admit[ed] that Georgia failed to meet some of its commitments.^{lviii} It was obvious that the West was interested in having a new leader in Georgia. Evidence of this was that the West supported the opposition parties economically in their election campaigns.

Another interesting fact was that the Georgian revolution came at time when the Moldovan government looked ready to accept a Moscow-drafted plan that would re-unite Moldova and Transdniestria, but as part of a very loose federation. The United States deemed it necessary to activate its role and perform some political engineering in the post-Communist world. Georgia was another poor, failed state, which also had a "frozen conflict", Russian "peacekeepers", and ongoing energy deals with Russia. In this situation, the United States and other Western governments started to use heavy diplomatic pressure to encourage greater democracy in Georgia.^{lix} It seemed Washington believed that Shevardnadze, in spite of all his years of pro-Western policies, was less able to secure its energy interests in the Caspian Sea^{lx}.

Georgy Khelashvili thinks that as an outsider factor "...the only power that played a significant role was the USA". Indeed, the interference of the USA played a great role. It started with public statements saying that the USA was interested in democratic parliamentary elections in Georgia. A visit of the former U.S Secretary of State James Baker to Georgia on 5-6 July 2003 aimed at sending a message to Shevardnadze saying that the election must be conducted democratically. Understanding the importance and seriousness of this visit, Shevardnadze admitted "...President Bush assigns to James Baker only entirely special missions, the missions which are of great importance for the United States of America itself."^{lxi} These kinds of messages were sent by US President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Georgian government. It seems Shevardnadze also understood that the West's wishes for stronger leadership in the country. In the speech of President Shevardnadze's weekly radio interview on 7 July 2003, he admitted that during James Baker's visit to Tbilisi, Baker had a meeting not only with the president of Georgia but also with the opposition! He also noted that "...[he] sincerely

welcomed this fact. As he [James Baker] himself said, it was a very useful and essential meeting on the whole".

The civil society groups and the political opposition used this opportunity to unify their resources against the Shevardnadze government. The civil society groups were backed by significant Western funding, reflecting the USA's strong interests in the region. Almost all the interviewees agreed that the political opposition could not have achieved the revolution on its own, had there not been external funding available. Supported by external funding, key elements of civil society and the media especially provided vital coordinating functions beyond the capacity of the political parties organizing the protest movement.^{lxii}

External factors also contributed to limiting Shevardnadze's choices of action, namely, using ruthless methods against the population. In neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia the governments knew that "if they beat somebody, namely demonstrators, as a 'dog'^{lxiii} nobody would blame them". Therefore, the presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which both took place in 2003 before the Georgian revolution, were accompanied by violence, organized and committed by the authorities. In Georgia, however, the situation was different. "Even beating demonstrators with rubber sticks would sound like violence against democracy", Adelkhanov said.^{lxiv} It looked like somebody either from the USA or Europe told Shevardnadze during the November events that "my friend, if you beat demonstrators now, then say bye to our friendship. If you use violence, then we will leave you alone with your opposition and you should make your own destiny. Some message of this kind was surely sent to Shevardnadze."^{lxv} Therefore, external pressure was an important factor in making the November events non-violent.

The Factor of Personality

It has also been argued that the factor of personality played an important role in mobilizing and uniting people against the government. Vitali Silitski thinks that the job is easier when charismatic leaders

emerge from the opposition's ranks. That is what happened in Georgia, with Saakashvili, and in the Ukraine, with Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. In these two countries, it was the leaders who unified the opposition. Both Saakashvili and Yushchenko emerged on the political scene and attracted public attention as former top-level officials of the regimes they subsequently overturned. However, things worked the other way around in Serbia, where the opposition first unified and then committed itself to working together with a candidate who could beat Milosevic. Though hardly a charismatic man, Vojislav Kostunica was, for many reasons, still a highly effective figure.^{lxvi}

Almost every interviewee recognized that Saakashvili had provided very good management during the revolution. "He has very much impressed with his skills", Dr Marina Muskhelishvili said.^{lxvii} For example, referring to Saakashvili's tactics, she describes how people were standing in front of governmental buildings but Shevardnadze was not responding at all to the demands of the demonstrators. Nothing was happening. Indeed, Saakashvili wanted people to stand there peacefully, but not to go home. Therefore, he invented something, like "...now we should go to ... shouting Shevardnadze qadadeki-qadadeki"^{lxviii} ... [and after standing there for a while] "...now we should go to the electoral committee building and shout there". In terms of achieving a result it was an absolutely pointless move, but in terms of making people involved, mobilize them etc. it was very powerful.^{lxix}

Besides this, Nino Makhashvili says that Saakashvili, compared to Zhvania and Burjanadze, was like a teenager who forced his way through the corruption. People did not have much trust in Zhvania and Burjanadze, but they followed Saakashvili. The Georgian people and the West believed in his 'war against corruption'. He is a populist and spontaneous guy. "...We could not run after him because he was very fast and with changing decisions". He has no control and he has a talented, psycho-type personality but Georgians like this kind of person.^{lxx} The argument is that besides Saakashvili, there was nobody else who could 'fight' against the old-structured system. People believed that he might be able to destroy the Shevardnadze regime.

Shevardnadze also contributed to the realization of the revolution, partly by his mistakes, and partly by not being ruthless enough. One of his greatest mistakes was that he did not name anyone as his successor. Dr Muskhelishvili thinks that this mistake was his personal contribution to his own fall. "Everybody knew that it was his [Shevardnadze's] last term of power. Everybody knew somebody would come after Shevardnadze". This made Shevardnadze's officials very uncertain about their future, and who would be the next president. Therefore, they started to find alternatives and 'shields' against future pressures. They started to play the game of balance of power. "Some of them were bribed or offered a post after the Shevardnadze period by the opposition..." on the condition that they cooperate with the opposition. Another big weakness of Shevardnadze was that his own government, although it was corrupted, was not under his control.^{1xxi}

One additional factor is that Shevardnadze failed to use his legal rights to stop the demonstrations. Although Article 25 of the Constitution of Georgia states that: 'Every individual ...has the right to hold a public assembly without arms either inside or in the open air without prior permission', the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations adopted in 1997 requires people to submit a notification before conducting an assembly. The application, which organizers of such events must submit to local government bodies, must indicate the purpose of the assembly, in addition to other information. Assemblies or manifestations without permission from the government are considered illegal. According to the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations "...the authorities shall have the right to break up a public assembly or manifestation in case it is considered illegal."^{1xxii} Local governments have an authorized right by law to turn down applications if the purpose of the assembly is considered to be inconsistent with the law (the law does not specify what is consistent with the law and what is not^{1xxiii}). These contradicting laws gave a legal base to Shevardnadze to show ruthlessness in breaking up demonstrations from a very early stage as well as later, but he failed to use this opportunity. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this can partly be explained by external pressures, but his personality also needs to be taken into consideration. In May 2004, as Saakashvili was struggling to bring

Adjara under Tbilisi control, Shevardnadze urged Abashidze to step down peacefully: "Resign as I did, don't shed people's blood." This indicates that Shevardnadze's personality was not ruthless.

Alexander Lomaia, executive director of the Open Society - Georgia Foundation during the revolution, notes that: "We deseeded society and had mobilized polar power resources to send a very clear message to the government [stating] that we are not going to tolerate any interdment of the electoral poll, like, any factor of hijacking the elections...we were really trying to get a message out [stating] that fundamental democratic changes are needed." The most important stimulator of the suggested democratic changes was the above-mentioned factors, which also determined the nature, time, duration, place, strategy and tactics for the Georgian non-violent revolution.

Chapter Four

What strategy and tactics did the opposition movement and government use?

"If Shevardnadze refuses to acknowledge the true election results he will meet the same fate as ... Slobodan Milosevic"- Mikheil Saakashvili

There are many different opinions and arguments about the strategy and tactics of the Georgian revolution. The main divergence is whether the Georgian revolution was planned, or whether it came as a surprise to the opposition and the authorities. If the revolution was planned, the strategy and tactics were logically set and prepared beforehand. In this case, the question "which specific strategy and methods did the revolutionary movement use" will seek its answer in the sequence of organized events that took place in Georgia before the revolution. Or if the Georgian revolution was not planned, the strategy and tactics appeared according to the demand on the field. Then the same question will seek its answer in all the spontaneous decisions and acts which served the unexpectedly successful non-violent outcome.

Starting from just after the elections, the aim of the protests at the beginning was to demand the real results of the parliamentary election from the election committee. For example, Georgy Khelashvili, consultant to the Georgian Parliament, argues that Saakashvili did not intend to protest at the beginning because "...he was quite happy with even the falsified results of the November 2 elections". He was winning. His party could get seats in the parliament, but other democratic parties who were left behind the 7% barrier went out to the streets to demonstrate. "Only after that, Mr. Saakashvili joined the forces..." Khelashvili said. Natela Sakhokia, the Director of the Strategic Research Institute, assumes that the "...tactics of the Georgian revolution appeared according to the demand on the field". Since the united opposition had declared the elections defaulted, they were not sure whether the elected opposition party members should go to the parliament or not. Shevardnadze was going to legitimize the new "elected" parliament in very few hours. "I can remember desperate and uncertain faces. I can remember some divisions between compatibilities, passions and criticism among the opposition" said Georgy Khelashvili. A Kmara activist said that he knew that "...according to information from inside [the opposition camp], Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze were pretty moderate. They were saying we should stop everything"^{1xxiv} and they were more negotiation oriented. The huge number of people participating in the demonstrations made the opposition camp and the demonstration organizers confused and stressed. The large crowds were a clear message to the government as well as to the opposition that they have demands from them. They demanded the government resign, and at the same time they demanded the opposition make their wish come true. Masses of people were standing in front of the parliament and some other governmental buildings starting almost immediately after the elections till 23 November, without anything happening. I would say that this was more stressful to the opposition than to the authorities. The demonstration had declared its peaceful nature and was not going to give a free hand to bloodthirsty people among demonstrators or to the peaceful mass to find alternative methods in order to shake the ignorant authorities. There was an urgent need to do

something important. Therefore, the idea to storm the parliament was spontaneous and the only way out from the dead end.

On the other hand, almost all interviewees who were against the revolution and some who were for the revolution argued that the revolution was planned. Shevardnadze did not have a clear idea of who would be his successor, someone whom he could push forward to win the presidential election in 2005 (As opposed to his colleague Boris Yeltsin, who in 1999 ensured Putin's rise to power in Russia, known as the heritage plan). He failed to unify Georgia under central authority; instead he was waiting for the result of the inner 'fighting' within his own power pyramid. Whoever was at the top would become president.^{lxxv} The opposition did not want to miss this chance to use the authorities' uncertainty. Opposition members knew that the competition with rich and corrupted government officials for the president seat in 2005 would be very challenging. In countries like Georgia, it is a common tactic that Majoritarian MP candidates pay, distribute food, oil etc. or threaten people on the eve of elections in their electoral districts (especially in the countryside) in order to make people come to the election stations to bring about artificial success in the "elections".^{lxxvi} If Georgian politicians could easily attract people with money, goods or threats, then this tactic could be used to buy votes in the presidential election as well. Even during his weekly radio interview, on 7 July 2003, Shevardnadze admitted this fact by saying "...if we do not rule out the shameful practice of bribing voters, we will not be able even to think about the fairness of the elections". In this case, the rich government-nominated candidate would logically win against his or her opposition colleague with the help of the financial and other resources he or she possesses. Thus, the opposition planned to make political changes before the 2005 presidential election.

Ramashvili also argues that there were plans to make political changes in the country. He claimed that the Liberty Institute had started to build the fundament for the changes in Georgia one or two years earlier. Kmara activists and some other opposition leaders participated in training abroad on how to conduct non-violent demonstrations and how to control them.^{lxxvii}

The research has shown that the revolution had planning and organizational elements, but it also seems that strategies and tactics emerged according to the demands on the field. The following paragraphs will give an overview of the most visible strategies and tactics that led to the Rose Revolution.

Opposition Movement Strategy

Since strategy as a phenomena can be defined as a set of plans for achieving a definite goal, then obviously the strategy of the opposition was different from the strategy of the authorities. From the opposition perspective, there could have been three strategies during the events taking place between 2-22 November in Tbilisi:

1) Bring Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania one step closer to the power and promote their position within the political opposition and in society.^{lxxviii} The opposition planned to reveal the real results of the parliamentary elections, and thereby create promising ground for winning the 2005 presidential election, bearing in mind that few people generally expected Shevardnadze to stay in power till the coming presidential elections in 2005.^{lxxix}

2) Declare the parliamentary election falsified to make the Shevardnadze government a less legitimized authority in the eyes of the international community and the Georgian people. The primary hypothesis for this strategy was that the international community would start to put pressure on the Shevardnadze government to reform and open a competitive environment for the 2005 election

3) Make revolution and change the government using the falsified elections as a legitimization. The opposition parties knew that changing the government legally through elections was impossible. The government had falsified every election result since they came to power, and people's participation and expectations in every election was declining. The parliamentary election was a good opportunity to legitimize their plan and get international support. There was a need to save Georgia from a crisis.^{lxxx}

However, one of the key players of the Georgian revolution, Alexander Lomaia, thinks that the opposition had no set strategy for the November 2003 elections, and that no one had planned this revolution. According to Lomaia, the opposition had some plans for March and April 2005, connected with the upcoming presidential elections, but their strategy was in fact an 18-month strategy. In general, people were fed up with poverty and the lies and corruption of the Shevardnadze government. The situation on the ground was getting ready for a revolution, but no one could have expected that the government would go as far as hijacking the elections. Lomaia argues, "If the results of these elections were a little bit closer to the reality, then there would not be expected big chaos or ... mass protest".^{lxxxix} From this perspective, it can be argued that the strategy of the opposition in this case emerged from the demand on the field rather than from long-term plans.

Government strategy

From the authority's perspective, the strategy can be divided into two. 1) Strengthen the legislative organ with MPs from the authority. By doing this, Shevardnadze was aiming to secure his own remaining presidency period till 2005. 2) Secure the majority in parliament. This would produce the possibility to legalize any law or act that met the government's interest. This would again create a friendly environment for government interests in the 2005 elections.

Actually, it is obvious that these two government strategies failed. First, Shevardnadze ruled the Citizen Union party, which took control of the parliament during the 1999 parliamentary election. His party was incomparably weak during the November 2003 elections. As I have mentioned in chapter two, starting from 2001 a group of high-ranking members of the Citizen Union party left Shevardnadze in order to create new, alternative parties. Second, Saakashvili led the National Movement (the largest opposition party) and Zhvania/Burjanadze led the Burjanadze-Democrats block (the second largest opposition party). They criticized Shevardnadze in every possible situation, describing him as a symbol of evil, and saying that

he had helped some people to become wealthy, while the levels of poverty were rising greatly in Georgia. Their popularity among the people was increasing rapidly, while Shevardnadze's party was losing its support. Third, The National Movement and the Burjanadze-Democrats block had a pro-American orientation and were strongly supported by the US. The West was interested in democratic elections, therefore there were strong diplomatic pressures on the Shevardnadze government. The West was limiting government resources to avoid Shevardnadze hijacking the elections. Fourth, there were many NGOs that struggled against Shevardnadze, and most of their projects were sponsored by the Soros Foundation, UNDP, USAID and other Western foundations and organizations. NGOs also played a significant role in stopping or disturbing the realization of the government's strategies.

As mentioned, the Shevardnadze government was not able to falsify the elections and achieve the strategic goals mentioned above. Following simple logic, one can say that since Shevardnadze's party had used falsification, and there had never been fair elections in the country, it was not essential for the government representatives to be popular either. This might explain why they put less effort into making election campaigns for themselves compared to the opposition. The government representatives had less popular support in society. However, although there was tremendous outside and local pressure on the Shevardnadze government, this pressure was in fact limited in a way because the country's power and resources were still gathered in one hand, which in a way supported Shevardnadze's strategy

Opposition movement tactics

The theory of political engineering describes tactic as a political movement or steps forward to the realization of the goals and objectives of a given strategy. In other words, political tactics are tools for the strategy. Since there are arguments that the tactics of the Georgian revolution appeared according to the demand on the field and that there were a lot of spontaneous decisions and situations, I would say the tactics of the Georgian Revolution are numberless.

However, there was a set of tactics which was more obvious and decisive to the outcome. These are the 13 most important tactics used by the united opposition movement. 1) Declare all their actions non-violent. 2) Use civil participation, disobedience and demonstrations as the main methods of protest. 3) Pull out huge crowds to the demonstrations and meetings. 4) Organize places to stay and sleep for demonstrators who came from the countryside. 5) Promise economical, social and political security in the future to the people if people come out to defeat the corrupted government. 6) Discredit and dissolve the prestige of Shevardnadze among people. 7) Use the media as a tool against the government. 8) Achieve a common idea and unity in the country among different groups which oppose the government. 9) Attract the civil society and use their resources. 10) Campaign saying that the western-educated, new generation of politicians is aiming at fighting the corrupt government. 11) Have both secret and open talks with powerful officers in order to make them show disobedience to Shevardnadze. 12) Attract the attention of the international community and get heavy diplomatic pressure placed on the Shevardnadze government from abroad.

Most of the interviewees confirmed that the key point of the Georgian revolution is that defending democracy is ultimately in the hands of the people. The primary goal of these protests and demonstrations was to pressure the government and attract the international community's attention to the hijacked election results. Therefore, the opposition had a set of tactics concerning the people and how to motivate them for the demonstrations. From this perspective, the most tactical political gesture by the opposition was to declare their intentions and attempts entirely non-violent. However, there were still problems getting the protest going despite the fact that it would be a 'public good', i.e., even if the protest succeeded in securing justice, everyone would benefit whether or not they bothered to take part in the protest.^{lxxxii} At the beginning, Georgian society faced collective action problems: for the individuals, it made more sense to free-ride on the efforts of others. The economic theory of conflict argues that the collective action problem for a justice-seeking opposition is usually challenging because organizing the collective actions is closely interconnected and interrelated to the recent history, tradition, the economic, social and

political situation in the country as well as to the global political situation.^{lxxiii}

This was a problem during the protests and demonstrations because there was a fear that the government might punish people who took part, unless there were so many people that the number ensured safety. People characterized the demonstrations and meetings as insecure and a source of potential violence. (Although some say it was never dangerous to take part in demonstrations in Tbilisi during the Shevardnadze period.^{lxxxiv}) Further, in order to protest, most people will lose a day of income (although there were many jobless in Georgia as well). This is one reason why a high proportion of protesters is usually students. Although students were not the biggest part of protesters in Georgia, in a broader context, the Kmara student movement was a vital source of free and flexible people for demonstrations.

Generally, the tactic that mostly ensured the success of the revolution was organizing mass demonstrations. The number of demonstrators was vital for ensuring the non-violent behaviour of the authorities. There was a great risk that the Georgian events would become violent, since there were confrontations between people and the police (and some Special Forces soldiers and officers). The police and the Special Forces were ready to implement orders to use violence at the beginning of the rallies, but as the number of protesters increased, they started to take the people's side. The number of demonstrators also affected the Government's decision to step down peacefully.

Specifically, the tactic of the united opposition was to bring people actively from the districts to the capital, organizing transportation as well as places to stay. This tactic was the starting point for the psychological "war" between them and the government. The opposition knew that a huge number of human resources would win the first stage of the psychological war. Second, the opposition worked hard to convince people that demonstrations are safe. The appearance of the opposition leaders every day in front of the mass destroyed the myths saying that political parties are not reliable and that they pose dangers for the stability. Third, the united opposition managed to reduce the stress and tensions during the demonstrations. The most

common tactic, in this respect, was to invite famous actors, musicians and dancers to the demonstrations. It helped to create a party mood in Tbilisi and a lot of people went out so as not to miss this fun. Charlotte Keatley in *The Guardian* has also written that it was "...the biggest street party that Tbilisi has ever seen".^{lxxxv}

Nino Makhashvili thinks, "...[The Georgians'] biggest trouble is that we are not competition-oriented people". Georgians did not believe in communism but they just pretended to. This double game left a scratch in the Georgians' mentality. During the period of Shevardnadze, Georgians lost their feeling of involvement in the decision-making. "We became passive receivers. We could not understand that we should not wait. We should work and request harder".^{lxxxvi} In this respect, involving people in politics and explaining to them why they are important in bringing about changes to Georgia was an important political tactic played by civil society and the opposition.

Analyzing the dynamics of protest shows that a successful protest is the one that escalates, and that this depends on a flow of participants. However, if one aggressive act happens, it could cause the collapse of the whole event. Therefore, the whole power of the Georgian Rose revolution is that it was peaceful. Suppose the potential supporters of a protest were ranked in order of their willingness to take personal risk. The most eager supporters joined the protest first, at the stage when it was small and it would be easy for the government to victimize the participants. Each time an additional supporter joined the protest, the risks of punishment for participation went down. The flow depended upon the reduction in this risk inducing enough people to change their minds and join the protest, making the risk of falling even further, inducing another group of people to change their minds. Therefore, in the end there were around 100,000 people outside during the demonstrations on 22-23 November.

Kuran suggests that the tactic of crowd gathering is more likely to work in fairly homogenous societies. In such societies, there will be a dense continuum of opinion. Many people will be on the margin of changing their minds and thus will be swung into action as the risk of government punishment starts to fall. By contrast, if the society is split into many different groups who see the concerns of other groups as

irrelevant to their own, instead of a continuum of opinion there is crowding together broken by gaps. As soon as the flow reaches the first gap it stops. One implication of this insight is that the societies in which protests often fail to gather momentum are those which are diverse.^{lxxxvii} The Georgian case seems to contradict this theory, because it is a heterogeneous society, consisting of several ethnic groups. However, there was no such extreme division between them, such as in the Ukraine, where the theory is more applicable. During the presidential elections and the following protests in November-December 2004, the whole of Ukraine was divided into eastern and western camps (eastern camps consisting of more Russian-speakers) as well as into the supporters and opposers of the opposition and government candidates. Nevertheless, the massive crowds gathering were large enough to bring on a change of government, and in this respect Koran's theory did not come true. In addition, right after the Georgian Revolution, some experts said that if Ukrainians wanted to follow Georgia's example, they would need ideas, unity, strategy and tactics and - as Georgians and Serbs demonstrated - a mastery of the techniques of protest.^{lxxxviii} These experts were in the end contradicted by the Ukrainian events, because it seemed that nationwide unity was not as important as other factors, such as external support and masses of people. All this shows that an ethnically homogenous society is not needed in order to gather masses of people in demonstrations. The Georgian and Ukrainian cases show, however, that a heterogeneous society can become homogenous on particular issues.

The economic situation also influenced the tactics used by the opposition: The opposition leaders were promising new work places, a promising future to the people and an uncompromising stand against corruption. Saakashvili made his position clear by saying that "We must root out corruption. As far as I am concerned, every corrupted official is a traitor.. ." ^{lxxxix} Unemployed people with no economic hope in the future found it motivating to join the opposition activists selflessly. It is quite reasonable to think that the reason for their motivation was that they were hoping to be rewarded with work if the opposition succeeded.

Emil Adulkhanov makes this point well by telling "...there were three strong arguments and topics where two of them probably attracted people's attention" from an economical perspective. They are: 1) messages to the low-income population, e.g. the Shevardnadze government does not develop the economy, that is why there is a large number of unemployed people in the country. If we [the opposition] come to power we will supply you with new working places, high salary and increased pensions. 2) messages stressing the need for urgent action, e.g. Shevardnadze is selling the Georgian economy to Russia. The reason for this position was that the Russian monopolist electricity company, RAO Unified Energy Systems, bought 75% of the shares in Georgia's AES Telasi, a subsidiary of the US-based AES Cooperation. And also, in May 2003, Georgia and the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom conducted negotiations about future cooperation. If they reached an agreement, it would mean Gazprom developing the Georgian gas pipeline system, and would gain control of gas distribution in Georgia.^{xc} Following these events, George W. Bush sent his special envoy for Caspian energy issues to Georgia. The purpose of this trip was to warn official Tbilisi "that the proposed gas-sector cooperation between Georgia and Gazprom could undermine prospects for the exploitation of Azerbaijan's Shah Daniz Caspian gas deposit and the export of gas through a pipeline from Baku via Tbilisi to Erzerum".^{xcii} Simultaneously, the opposition rallied against these energy contracts. The underlying message was that "if we come to power we will stop it".^{xcii} It was a correct economic tactic used by the opposition to attract outside support for their political ambitions.

The success of the street protests in Georgia was the product of 12 years of poverty, a vibrant if overreached political culture, a loud media and well-organized demonstrations. In all cases, the Georgian opposition stressed the important role of the ordinary citizen, saying that they could only become organized, stop the corruption and bring changes to the country by relying on and following the opposition movement. The most effective way of taking these messages out to the people was through the use of the media. The usage of the media by the opposition played a serious role in the realization of their political ambition. I think the use of the media was the most effective tactic to

coordinate, organize and motivate the people as well as to put pressure on and control the Shevardnadze government.

Government Tactics

As the population of Georgia was aware, all the well-known opposition leaders had held high-ranking posts during the previous regime, and therefore their claims to represent democratic values were taken with considerably greater uncertainty domestically. The government used this fact as a tactic to diminish the prestige of the opposition leaders, by saying that these officials could not handle the situation and overcome the challenges of a transition period.^{xciii} Adelkhanov thinks that these people could not lead the country anywhere because "... [Shevardnadze] gave them the chance to prove themselves, but they failed...". Meanwhile, it was only Saakashvili who did not have any spots on his political career caused by corruption. He was also respected by the Zviadists because he was not related to the 1992 coup against Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

The government also had a very effective tactic to challenge the citizens' participation in opposition-organized demonstrations. According to Alexander Lomia, the Georgian "...people have seen a lot of blood during the years that followed the independence. There was a very strong form of negative conciliation because, obviously, we had a civil war including the wars..." in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia lost thousands of people during these conflicts, which made people cautious about violence. This fact was used in government propaganda which included statements saying that demonstrations were a source of violence and if something happened during them, nobody would know who did it. Therefore, it took the opposition a while to deliver the message to the public saying that mass protest could be peaceful. This tactic let the Shevardnadze government win time and stay in power during the political "fight" with the opposition.

Another obvious tactic by the government during the very last days of the Shevardnadze government was bringing armed people from Ajaria

to Tbilisi, who were known as Aslan Abashidze's supporters. Their presence in front of the parliament and other governmental buildings with their guns and black leather jackets was mostly a psychological tactic by the government in order to threaten, challenge and press people and the opposition camp, discouraging them from confronting the government bureaucracy.

The Domino Effect

According to the official reports, on 23 November 2003 the President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze, who had ruled Georgia for 11 years, in accordance with his own statement, resigned from his position and his term of office ended before the appointed time. The Georgian government collapsed simultaneously, and a new presidential election was announced for 4 January 2004.^{xciv} It is relevant to know why the Shevardnadze government collapsed on Shevardnadze's resignation. This domino effect saved the country from civil war or bloodshed. What brought the domino effect into action, and which strategies and tactics accelerated this process?

Shevardnadze was left alone, to some extent, during the revolution. However, he was not totally abandoned. Small groups of people, such as clan members, rich businessmen and high rank officials were with him. Ministers and their deputies were very corrupt. High-ranking officials were against the revolution but commanders and small unit leaders supported the opposition movement. The opposition was afraid that corrupted, high-ranking officials might use force against them by using criminals and some of their own gangster-groups. Therefore, the opposition movement had contacted the power ministers on beforehand.^{xcv} The main topic of the negotiations with government officials was avoiding violence. "It was impossible to buy Shevardnadze's near circle, but we were able to convince some key military and police officers to show disobedience and not execute the orders of the Shevardnadze government" says a co-founder of the Kmara movement.^{xcvi} There were a lot of activities aimed at the soldiers and police officers to persuade them that this revolution was not against them. Perhaps the revolutionaries did not like their

ministers and bosses who were corrupt, but they did not have anything personally against them. The main intention was to destroy the Shevardnadze government's chain of command, so that: "If they give an order, those who have to execute would have a hesitation to do it."^{xcvii} By doing this, soldiers and police officers started to consider whether they should maintain the regime or not. "Our favourite common question at this stage was, 'what is your salary?'" It was too small to maintain their family. Police and security forces were thinking about their future, i.e. what will happen to me if I use force.^{xcviii} On the other hand, Gia Bliadze, a member of the military, thinks that there was not any hidden contact with the opposition movement. "Maybe during the opposition's meetings with TV and press representatives they sent messages to government officials, but their messages were open."^{xcix}

In a broad context, since the whole nation had been united during the November events the army and all other power structures refused to use any violence against the people. It was clear to everyone from the beginning that the opposition parties had declared their protests and demonstrations as being peaceful. They explained that if something violent happened from the opposition's side towards the police, security forces etc., it would only serve as a provocation.

The government "fought" till the end but they could not take serious measures, e.g. using violence. Bliadze confirms that the army did not have any orders to use force against demonstrators. However, he confirms that "... when officers got the order to have emergency preparation they declared openly that they will not act against people." Military officers sent messages to the police, who stood in front of the demonstrators, telling them not to use violence against the nation. Messages then came back from the police, noting that they would not use violence against the people but they would need moral support from the Army. As a consequence of these messages, the Ministry of State Security and some other Special Forces soldiers and officers finally declared they would behave in the same way.^c

The government collapsed because they were psychologically defeated: all government members had lost their credibility in the eyes of the people because the opposition leaders were already regarded as

the moral 'winners'. The psychological defeat syndrome started just after Saakashvili had led the opposition members in storming the parliament. Shevardnadze was physically bundled away by his bodyguards, soon to be followed by his supporters, leaving the parliament building - and soon the whole centre of Tbilisi - in the hands of the opposition. It seems this tactic worked perfectly. Simultaneously, people started to celebrate the victory over the Shevardnadze government. In reality, however, Shevardnadze declared his resignation long after the storming of the parliament. The tactics of starting to celebrate victory without any legal reason destroyed the rest of the chain of command and the legitimacy of the Shevardnadze government. The number of people in front of the Georgian Parliament suddenly symbolized the will of the Georgian nation, and the number of people in the streets ensured that the Georgian opposition could realize its long wanted plan without being smashed by the government machine.

Actually, all the above-mentioned strategies and tactics made the chain of command fall down like dominoes, not from top to bottom, as it was described in the official report (Eduard Shevardnadze resigned and his government collapsed simultaneously), but from bottom to top.

These strategies and tactics again confirm that the situation was controlled during the November events. I think there is no need to argue about which side of the conflict had the most effective strategy and tactics. The opposition was the winner and most efficient side with their precise strategies and tactics. However, it might be wrong to say that Shevardnadze lost completely. As I mentioned above, Shevardnadze's strategies and tactics failed from a government perspective, but from a personal perspective Shevardnadze did not lose much, because according to the last minute negotiations, he obtained a security guarantee for himself and his family. From the personal perspective, therefore, his strategy and tactics can be viewed as successful, at the same time as they can be viewed as a supportive feature to the non-violent revolution.

To summarize, factors that increase a government's ability to remain in power (e.g. falsified elections and corruption) may simultaneously

reduce the regime's capacity for violence, its electoral strength, or simply the unthinking support of the majority. Non-violent action appears to be the action people take when they judge that they have a particular objective in a "fight", and consider non-violent action to be the most effective approach to reach this objective. Some tactics of non-violent action were found in cultural traditions, history and the economic and social situation rather than just being freely adopted with a goal in mind. This shows that there are different reasons for non-violent action, one of them being the dimension of choice. However, there was a set of challenges and supports for the non-violent outcome besides the factors mentioned and the chosen strategy and tactics.

Chapter Five

What challenges and supports were there for the nonviolent revolution?

As I have mentioned in Chapter Three and Four, the Georgian non-violent revolution was the outcome of many factors, strategy and tactics. This chapter will mostly talk about administrative, organizational, educative and political direct and indirect challenges and supports for the non-violent nature of the revolution.

It is no accident that the Georgian opposition leaders, most of them are lawyers by training, understood the importance of lending legitimacy to their actions by working within the guidelines of the law. The use of the law by the Georgian opposition forces in challenging the November election resulted in an insistence on political change, which served as a powerful model both within and outside Georgia. Internally, the use of legal means to effect change gave the Rose Revolution a mandate of legitimacy at home and abroad.

When the government attempted to assemble the new parliamentary session, members of the opposition again cited the law to justify entering the chamber - an entry that otherwise might have been considered illegal - by accompanying the 65 opposition parliamentarians who had just been elected and thus had a legal right to be in the legislative chamber. The opposition's efforts to block the assembling

of the new parliament was in fact a legal countermove to block any attempt by President Shevardnadze to cover fraudulent elections results under a veil of legitimacy.⁰ⁱ The legitimacy of the opposition's actions within the guidelines of the law was the most obvious support for the development of events.

There were also other challenges and supports that played an important role in the outcome and character of the revolution. These challenges and supports come from different countries, organizations, people and from the history in general. One of the biggest challenges for Shevardnadze was the imported ideology and model of the 'non-violent revolution', known as the Serbian Model, which generated a lot of support for the opposition.

The Serbian Model

There were a lot of developments revealing parallels between the events that took place in Tbilisi in November 2003 and the coup d'etat or revolution that followed the presidential election in Serbia in 2000. The Serbian Model is a collection of the ideas where operating organizations build a network with the media and are backed by the power of people. In Serbia, the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) and the Otpor (translated as 'Resistance') movement in particular were the operating organizations.^{cii} The ideas of these organizations attracted the Georgian opposition and civil society in Georgia with their nonviolent strategy and promising outcome. The outcome of this mirror effect also brought Georgia the exact same model, the National Movement as a CeSID and the Kmara movement as an Otpor.^{ciii}

The chairman of the Liberty Institute, Levan Ramashvili thinks that not only theoretical aspects of the Serbian Model were imported, but also many practical techniques, such as how to behave when you are arrested and how to organize demonstrations as well as how to organize a network and to coordinate different episodes. Since this model was approved¹ through the Serbian experience, it made people in Georgia confident and played a psychological role for both civil society and for

opposition parties. According to Courier International (Number 682, 27 November 2003), a member of Otpor said to the Serbian radio channel B92 that "...the Georgian students have been trained by Otpor".^{civ} The chairman of the Executive Board of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation, Micheal Chachkhunashvili approves the fact that "... the young people [of the Kmara movement] had been trained how to organize [meetings], and leaders of the opposition movement went to Serbia for the trainings".^{cv} The supporting characteristics of the Serbian Model for the Georgian non-violent revolution occurred mostly as psychologically and educationally oriented. This model helped the opposition camp as well as civil society comprehend what kind of resistance and support non-violent revolution could get in the modern world. And, the Serbian Model made it clear that international support, in terms of money, plays an important role during organizational process and educational projects.

The Open Society - Georgia Foundation (known as the Soros Foundation)

In the Georgian revolution the civil society's role and importance was exceptional. Micheal Chachkhunashvili said that the aim of the foundation during the last 10 years had been to build a civil and open society in Georgia. The Open Society - Georgian Foundation especially interested in helping organize "...transparent elections which has never happened before" in Georgia. Therefore, the foundation funded projects whose aim was encourage people to participate in the elections, and they sponsored projects such as debates on TV (but not favoring any political party).^{cvi}

The executive director of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation during the revolution, Alexander Lomaia, said "...obviously, the revolution was sort of the result of 10 years of Soros work here [in Georgia]". He thinks that the Open Society - Georgian Foundation and other foundations together managed to create a core of reform-minded people in the country. By doing this, they contributed to creating a strong, containable source for changes in the country.^{0"1} However, Lomaia also thinks that the foundation created a ground not in terms

of revolution, but for maturing the people, making them more responsible for their future. This made people "...feel that it depends on them to decide their future and the future of the country. In this respect, the Soros foundation had some role building up these feelings, the self-confidence of the society", Lomaia said. In both cases, following these arguments both directly and indirectly, the role of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation during the revolution can be estimated as supportive to the opposition camp since they also aimed at bringing democratic changes to the country.

During an interview with Thomas de Waal and Margarita Akhvlediani, Shevardnadze said that the non-governmental organizations that monitored the elections had not been fair. He strongly blamed Western governments for giving them financial support. "Maybe it was not the intelligence agencies, but some agents [representing different countries]" Shevardnadze said. He also said that "...one ambassador told me that it [the revolution] had cost him up to \$4 million." On the other hand, Michael Chachkhunashvili claims that the entire budget of the 'monitoring of the elections', 'exit polls' and 'parallel counting of votes' did not exceed half a million US dollars.

According to Michael Chachkhunashvili, the Open Society-Georgia Foundation has never funded anything directly for Kmara. "Kmara as an organization does not exist - it has not been registered." Chachkhunashvili said.^{cvi} Meanwhile Levan Ramashvili, the chairman of the Liberty Institute, said "the Soros Foundation assisted us in bringing people from the Serbian movement [Otpor] here [to Georgia] for one week, two or three times. Once. Soros funded our people [5-7 persons] to go to Serbia for one week studying". Ramashvili thinks that the Kmara members' trip to Serbia was aimed at exchanging experiences and getting inspiration from the Otpor movement, who played an important role during the toppling of Slobodan Milosevic. These above-mentioned details show that the role of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation in Georgia was supportive for peaceful protest. David Darchashvili thinks that the revolution could not have been planned by visiting Serbia. "Revolution happens if the government is totally deaf of peaceful protests, but nobody at the time of visiting Serbia could have predicted how Shevardnadze would behave." The

only plan was to learn how to conduct mass rallies, which can lead to revolution or cannot - totally depending on the government response.^{cix}

Richard Miles

Richard Miles was appointed as US ambassador to Georgia in 2002. He was an ambassador in Baku, Azerbaijan in 1992-3 during Abulfaz Elchibay's short-lived presidency that ended in a coup d'etat in June 1993. He then moved to the Balkans. From 1996-9 he remained the United States' charge d'affaires in Belgrade after the official diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia had been severed. In 1998 he took part in negotiations during the Kosovo crisis.^{cx}

Some sources say that since his appointment as US ambassador to Georgia in January 2002, Miles has made no secret of his support for the opposition in Georgia. Shevardnadze thinks that there were different forces for revolution in Georgia; "...some took part, some helped, some made things possible". Concerning the role of the USA he said, "I can't speak about the whole country, the whole of America playing a role. But I don't think that the administration itself was involved in what happened. I don't believe that."^{cxii} Generally, after the end of the Cold War, the USA turned to Georgia quite early. Georgia was the second largest recipient of US aid per capita (after Israel) between 1992 and 2000. Georgia received US\$ 778 million of aid, roughly five times the amount of neighboring Azerbaijan during this years.^{cxii}

The role of the USA and its ambassador during the revolution is very debatable. As I have mentioned in Chapter four, the USA was interested in having democratic elections in Georgia, as well as securing the transportation of the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea via Georgia. Therefore, there were strong diplomatic pressures on the Shevardnadze government regarding these issues. Ingrid Degraeve argues that the US ambassador was very active, and he was always at places where decisions were taken. His presence and advice during the negotiations between Shevardnadze and Zhvania, Burjanadze and

Saakashvili put heavy diplomatic pressures on them. In this respect, the role of the USA during the eve of the revolution was quite supportive to the revolution. "You know, in the West they support realistic forces," Shevardnadze said. "They were convinced that those people were coming to power. Yes, there was Shevardnadze, he was a good man, they could work with him. But he only had a year or two left and he had to go. And then, whom could they deal with? So they started looking. And they found these three people and maybe some others too. As to whether they made the right choice-let's see", Shevardnadze argued.^{cxiii}

Kmara (Enough)

The Kmara movement emerged on 14 April 2003, when about 200 students marched from Tbilisi State University to the State Chancellery,^{cxiv} chanting their slogan "Kmara" and waiving the flags of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic with the faces of the current government leaders on them. Before this event, the Kmara group was known under different names^{cxv} Kmara followed the model developed by the Otpor student movement in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was later reprised by the Pora Movement in Ukraine. This involved active exchange of expertise in methods of non-violent protest, e.g. some Kmara activists had been taken to Serbia to meet Otpor members or the trip of Otpor activists to Tbilisi in 2003. The Otpor activists ran three-day classes teaching more than 1,000 Georgian students about mobilization and how to stage a nonviolent protest.^{cxvi}

Ramishvili said that Kmara emerged from the student protest groups who were initially against corruption in the universities. Later on, when it became clear that it was impossible to change anything within the universities unless you changed the whole political system, Kmara started to mobilize the citizens to participate actively in public life. Kmara gradually became an organizing movement taking part in different demonstrations primarily with young people as their target groups.

Talking about the origins of the revolution, Ramashvili thinks everything started much earlier. "We were preparing the ground for a long period of time". When the Shevardnadze government lost its legitimacy among a majority of the citizens, the emergence of a civil society in Georgia was made possible. When the leader is famous among a majority of the citizens, the civil society's call for democratization and development sounds less convincing. Therefore, there was not much room for the civil society to emerge during the Gamsakhurdia period. He was very popular among citizens, although the political system was weak and the citizens were not engaged in public life. Neither was there was not any donor organizations at that time for the civil society. Later, the military defeat in Abkhazia during the Shevardnadze period caused the idea of a united Georgia to collapse. "When you are defeated you became more critical, therefore, these critical minds opened [up for] sort of democratic reforms in Georgia" said Ramashvili. Shevardnadze was forced to take into more serious consideration issues like the role of law, democracy building etc. because it was time to get foreign aid too for Georgia.^{cxvii}

Kmara activists went to the districts and had a lot of talks with people. Kmara tried to explain to the people that if you want to get rid of this government, solve all these problems and live better then you should come to the election stations to vote. "We organized humour shows in order to get popularity... we wanted [to present] something visually and organizationally nice to people by showing that we want truth, nothing but truth". During these shows Shevardnadze used to be a small toy personage or character, discrediting and dissolving his prestige. There was a real need to bring creative approaches and style to the political life of Georgia. Another such creative action was to make all cars honk their horn while Shevardnadze was sitting in a radio interview, making the whole city shake. Ingrid Degraeve approves of the fact that "people like actions which gives power and suits perfectly to the character of Georgians".^{cxviii}

During the November 2003 events, Kmara was one of the two organizers of the demonstrations. The other, and strongest one, was the National Movement. Kmara's role was mostly organizational.^{cxix} For example, there were some buildings surrounded by buses (used as

barriers) and government forces. Kmara put some people there in order to not let people go in the direction of these buildings in order to avoid any provocation. Akaki Minashvili says: "We were like militants [with our] about 5000 Kmara people with whom we had contact" among the around 100.000 demonstrators. There were a lot of people wearing Kmara t-shirts and imitating them. They could not know all of them. Therefore, "we tried to have a decentralized system", e.g. there were 2-3 known Kmara activist supervising subgroups and these subgroups were also divided into subgroups. However, all these levels were responsible to the same objective.

Levan Ramishvili thinks that the success of the Georgian revolution comes from self-confidence and good organization of the citizens. Five years ago there had also been corruption, poverty and all other kinds of problems in Georgia, but that time they had failed to organize themselves. When there was an attempt by the government to shut down the independent Rustavi-2 TV-channel, people went out to the streets to protest against the government's behaviour. The protests, in which youth took an active part, culminated in the resignation of the government and the chairman of the parliament. "Because the Kmara group was not organized, and there was not a nation-wide network, we could not finish the revolution" said Ramashvili. He thinks that if somebody wants revolution, this person needs, as Lenin said, organization, organization and organization".^{cxxvii}

The role of the Kmara student movement during the Georgian revolution supported the nonviolent outcome. As I have discussed during this subchapter, Kmara mostly filled the role as organizers of the protests, and, using their own words, they were "the militants of the demonstrations". Their role was very challenging to the government, and thus Kmara was one of the most important players during the Georgian non-violent revolution.

Most of the people of Georgia felt excluded from the democratic processes, because they believed that political parties are located exclusively in the centre of the country, and the regions are only remembered shortly before elections when their votes are needed. People did not like the government. Although they were critical of the situation, most of them were cynical about public life and politics.

Nobody was trying to change the country, or to come out and tell them to go away.^{cxix} It was because people were afraid of bloodshed. In this situation, Kmara offered people the chance to follow them. "We also wanted to make people believe that all these changes will occur non-violently" said Kmara movement activists.^{cxx}

Kmara had applied the philosophy of non-violence to the Georgian revolution. "We worked very hard in order to make it non-violent", says a Kmara activist. "Georgians turned out to be good students [of non-violent methods], however, we must make sure that demonstrators would not throw stones at the police". A part of the Kmara activists' training was that they had to count on the police. Even if the police was violent and aggressive, they had to hide their discontent. "We should always appeal to the police and show cooperation". It was strictly prohibited for Kmara activists to respond to the police even if they were beaten.^{cxxi} "To be very non-violent and very peaceful was one of our main concerns in order to encourage citizens to take part to the demonstrations" Ramashvili said. He also thinks that before Kmara's engagement, people had a perception that demonstrations mean instability. Therefore, "with small demonstrations, underlining the non-violence, we tried to convince citizens that it would not be war. If people are active, this means we will achieve what we are trying to get. There will be no destabilization or violence".^{cxxii}

The most visible tactics of the Kmara movement before and after the 2 November elections were bringing people outside and motivating them to participate in political life. It was a set of tactics that promised people non-violent changes, discipline and commitment. According to Levan Ramishvili, Kmara's biggest challenge to the government was the tactic of engaging the rural population in politics. "In the city we were in a dead-end. People were on our side, but the power structures were [strong] enough to counterbalance", said Ramashvili. The way out of this dead-end was to bring new players onto the political stage, and that was the people who had not played a previous role in politics; the citizens of the countryside. Kmara had a bigger network and more activists in the countryside than in the capital. "When we came out with several thousand people, we transported many groups of people from the districts and organized everything for them", a Kmara

activist says. A primary goal was to not let the police and militants occupy the demonstration field.^{cxxiii} Therefore, there were Kmara activists staying at the demonstration field day and night. Besides these young people, not a lot of people wanted to stay outside. However, when people saw Kmara activists staying day and night in the demonstration field in order to express their dissatisfaction regarding the work of the government; it motivated a lot of other citizens.

People did not like the political parties in Georgia, and some did not trust their members. However, Kmara always distanced themselves from the opposition parties. They stated clearly that "we are not a [political] party, and our goal is not to participate in the government".^{cxxiv} This was a completely new message for Georgian ears. "We are fighting and struggling for certain ideas", said Georgi Kandelaki. "We invited people to the elections, but whom they would vote for depended on them". Kmara always tried to differentiate itself from the rest of the political opposition. "We organized joint demonstrations but we still had different objectives" Kandelaki argued. To change the Shevardnadze government and to come to power was the dream of almost every political party, at least for those who had joined the demonstrations; meanwhile, Kmara's objective was to reform the government and monitor it in the future".^{cxxv}

Adjara

The Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, on the southern Black Sea coast, was almost out of Tbilisi's administrative control during the last years of Shevardnadze's leadership. Shevardnadze's efforts to bring the Ajarian regime led by Asian Abashidze under control failed. Abashidze had routinely obtained more than 90 percent of the votes in every election he had faced since coming to power in 1991. In 2002, his 24-year-old son, George, became mayor of Batumi, the regional capital, receiving 94 percent of the votes. Some analysts have also suggested that **MOSCOW** entertained the hope of having Abashidze succeed Shevardnadze, either mid-term or after the end of Shevardnadze's term in 2005. Some even talked about engineering such a succession as a condition for Moscow's support for Shevard-

nadze. Interestingly, Shevardnadze's old foe Asian Abashidze became his last ally during the failed 2003 election. Shevardnadze found support in Abashidze's Union of Democratic Revival party, which was a formal opposition party, but which became Shevardnadze's supporter during the revolutionary days (the regime was also supported by Industry Will Save Georgia).^{cxxviii}

Interestingly, Asian Abashidze became the most challenging figure for the opposition and for the Georgian revolution during the November events. Abashidze sent a group of armed people from Ajaria to Tbilisi to protect the Shevardnadze government. He knew that the fall of Shevardnadze would lead to his own fall in the long run. Nino Makhashvili thinks that "the gunmen from Adjara were not competitive, because they knew that although they are here [in Tbilisi] for supporting Shevardnadze, in reality Abashidze does not like him [Shevardnadze]" Therefore, they were less motivated to use weapons to support Shevardnadze. Gia Bliadze thinks that 70-80% of the Abashidze people standing in front of the demonstrators were Adjarian police and Special Forces wearing civilian clothes. "They were ready to use weapons, but when they saw the big mass they knew that they cannot leave without casualty if they use weapons" thinks Bliadze. According to Tea Tukharidze, the number of people coming to protect Shevardnadze was around 6-8000. After the opposition stormed the parliament, some of these armed people ran away while others simply stayed there, but this time as demonstrators, and not as defenders of Abashidze's interests. The unexpected support of Abashidze and gunmen from Ajaria represented a psychological as well as a tactical challenge for the non-violent revolution. During the interviews, people expressed their concern that people from Ajaria easily might have used weapons against demonstrators during the November elections.

Trust and Credibility

It is hardly surprising that the conventional association of revolutions with violence was also considered in pre-revolutionary Georgia. Since the civil war and the later prosecution of Zivadists had political

reasons (i.e. obtaining power), it made ordinary people afraid of engaging themselves in anything believed to be against the will of the government. Another argument for the mistrust was that the opposition in the country was spread and divided. Even two months before the November parliamentary election, the leader of the opposition National Movement party, Mikheil Saakashvili, cast doubt over the opposition stance of the leader of the United Democrats, Zurab Zhvania, considering him to be in alliance with President Shevardnadze. "If the President calls Zhvania tomorrow, he will run without hesitation and stand with him. This is the conclusion I have made as a result of [my] relations with him," Saakashvili said on 8 September 2003.^{cxxxix} But two months after this accusation these two parties organized their demonstrations and rallies together and united. This kind of uncertainty and this kind of political parties made it difficult for ordinary people to build their confidence. Therefore, it was very challenging to convince people that there was not going to be violence if they also took part in the opposition-organized demonstrations.

It is appropriate to mention that there were several violent conflicts between the supporters of the pro-government alliance and the members of the National Movement before the parliamentary election. This also created a psychological barrier for the people to take further part in political activities. The leader of the National Movement party Mikheil Saakashvili accused the supporters of the pro-governmental parties of organizing a provocation against their rally. Saakashvili said that his party had planned to hold a peaceful rally only.^{cxxx} Thus, history proves that peacefully planned rallies have had violent ends in Georgia before. Therefore, in the beginning people were cautious about taking part in the rallies to demand the real results of the election after 2 November 2003.

Eduard Shevardnadze's Fall from Grace

The general opinion about Shevardnadze's fall from grace is debatable and sometimes contradicting. The main reason why people became very radically involved against Shevardnadze is that the Shevardnadze

government was too far from reality. The last years of Shevardnadze's presidency had nothing to do with real life^{cxxxii} and had nothing to do with the needs of the population.^{cxxxii} The revolution was a logical continuation of the degradation of society. However, Shevardnadze was trying to give the impression that Georgia had some democratic institutions, e.g. a parliament with some young reformers, adapted reformist laws and even a campaign against corruption. Basically, Shevardnadze thought that he controlled everything with his power, but the reality was different. Without his will, he let "the genie out of the bottle, and it was impossible to get it back".^{cxxxiii}

Meanwhile, pro-democracy groups within the government were looking for allies in order to consolidate their power in the future. Their natural allies became the free media and the NGOs.^{cxxxiv} Therefore, these pro-democratic groups made the parliament very transparent and open, as they were inviting NGOs to attend committee hearings, to make their testimony, and to argue for adoption of some laws. For example, the Liberty Institute carried out investigative journalism. As a result of these investigations, several ministers of the Shevardnadze government were forced to resign, e.g. the ministers of communication, finance and agriculture, and two ministers of energy. This successful experience started to be replicated by other people and NGOs against different governmental institutions and bureaucracy. The step-by-step development of civil society simultaneously weakened Shevardnadze's government.

The later years of Shevardnadze's presidency increasingly demonstrated signs of democratic erosion. This led to rising tensions, expressed in the form of an increasing polarization in Georgian politics between the broad coalition of Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, and those who were challenged them.^{cxxxv} For example, Saakashvili resigned from the post of Minister of Justice in 2001 after claiming that the government would not support him in the fight against corruption. Meanwhile, the international community began to distance itself from Shevardnadze and his regime, starting from 2000. All government projects were failing, and the world started to call Georgia a failed state.^{cxxxvi} When the OSCE harshly criticized the conduct of the presidential elections in 2000, it was the first time that this organi-

zation had denounced a Georgian poll. Later, in 2003, James Baker sent a clear message to Shevardnadze by stressing that the elections should be fair, in order to allow young people, who had distanced themselves from the government, to enter government posts.

The Shevardnadze government had always been based on a balance of power between different groups. Shevardnadze tried to keep the balance between different people inside the country.^{cxxxvii} He did not have a coherent political view. Therefore, the struggle between groups started to become intense during 1992-97. Shevardnadze behaved like a father and had influence on the competing groups. These groups were mainly representatives of the corrupt, and of the young generation of people who wanted to get into the government through parliament. These competing groups used the strategy of blaming each other of disturbing Shevardnadze's work. However, Shevardnadze chose to work with the corrupted group.^{cxxxviii} Therefore, Saakashvili later resigned from his post of Minister of Justice, citing that he believed it was immoral to remain part of the corrupt government. After Saakashvili's resignation, several high-ranking officials from the Shevardnadze government followed his example. So in that way, Shevardnadze stayed alone among these corrupt officials and he lost his own prestige and charisma.

In the beginning, the figure of Shevardnadze was very strong. He had ruled Georgia for 30 years, first as a leader of the Georgian Communist Party during the Soviet era, and then as head of state in the independent Georgia. He was an unreachable and remote person for Georgians, because he had held high posts in Moscow during the Soviet time, and had always been far from people. That is why people respected him. Shevardnadze had a kind of myth around himself and he was the dominant figure in Georgia. Meanwhile, civil society was thinking about how to destroy this myth around Shevardnadze. The Liberty Institute came up with the idea of political cartoons. Shevardnadze was a little cartoon character in these cartoon shows. When they showed this cartoon on Rustavi 2 it sent shock waves through society.^{cxxxix} It can be argued that as a result of these cartoons, people started to devalue the prestige of Shevardnadze. In fact, the chairman of the Liberty Institute, Levan Ramashvili (the owner of the cartoon

idea) thinks that there was a bit of creativity in the cartoon idea, but it was eventually Shevardnadze himself who discredited and dissolved his prestige. "He was promising the citizens to bring law and order, end corruption, to crack down organized crime and trafficking. He promised everything", said Ramashvili. Meanwhile, in the opposition camp, another figure was growing - Mikheil Saakashvili, who had won the "man of the year" reward introduced by the civil society in 1996.^{cxl} Shevardnadze's fall from grace was already underway.

Based on the above-mentioned facts, it can be argued that Shevardnadze's fall from grace was not completely unexpected, and his weakening position was of major support to the Georgian revolution.

The Danger of Civil War

The greatest challenge to the concept of revolution in Georgia was the threat of civil war. According to Anke Hoeffler and Paul Collier, if a country has recently had a civil war,^{cxli} its risk of further war is much higher. Immediately after the end of hostility, there is a 40% chance of further conflict, but this risk falls with around one percent for each year of peace.^{cxlii} If we follow this logic, a simple calculation will show (2003-1992=11; 40-11=29) that there was a 29% chance of having a civil war in Georgia in 2003. However, there was a major difference between the period of Zviad Gamsakhurdia at the beginning of the 1990's, and the end of Shevardnadze's period about ten years later. If we look at one example from Georgia's *recent past we see that during the period of Gamsakhurdia the people of Georgia were divided* into two parts: people supporting Gamsakhurdia and people opposing him. But during the 2003 revolution, people were divided between Shevardnadze and his corrupt team and their families on one side, and the whole nation on the other. Therefore, Shevardnadze and his team did not dare to shed blood because almost nobody supported them and were with them. However, there was a danger that some people from the police and army or from those sent to Tbilisi by Abashidze, would blindly follow a hypothetical order to shoot at the demonstrators.

Generally, people possess a lot of weapons in Georgia. Arms are spread all over the country. According to the information from the Minister of Defence, around 15,000 light weapons were lost by the army units during the turbulent period in Georgia.^{cxliii} The Director of the Strategic Research Institute, Natela Sakhokia, argues that people may have had weapons with them at the demonstrations, though they did not openly show them. Meanwhile, Michael Chachkhunashvili assumes that there were no weapons in the hands of the people during the revolution day. Otherwise, we would have seen or heard them.^{cxliv} In all the mentioned cases, there was a danger of civil war, which directly and indirectly challenged the revolution. Actually, the possible danger of civil war in a way also supported the non-violent revolution, namely because this increased the opposition's efforts in choosing a strict, non-violent character.

Symbols and Superstitions

The rose appeared. Throughout the revolution, the rose was the symbol of protest. On 22 November in particular there were a lot of roses in the hands of protesters. The rose became a symbol of peace and friendship. At one point, people even started to give roses to the soldiers in order to show their peaceful intention to those who were standing face-to-face with them.

The rose was also present when Saakashvili and his fellows stormed into the Parliament's plenary room while Shevardnadze was giving his blessing speech to the new "elected" Parliament Members. Shevardnadze's people met a bunch of opposition members at the doorstep. First of all, they were all men. They were enemies (or at least their ideologies were enemy). Ingrid Degraeve describes the tense situation: "They were so close to each other. Their bodies were touching each other, but they were not fighting or beating. It was like touching, but only by using the power of the bodies pressing against each other. It was a very strange situation."^{cxlv}

During this confrontation, Shevardnadze's bodyguards took him away. Shevardnadze was pale and looking sick. He was yelling on his way

out of the parliament that he would not resign, that he would be in power until his presidency period expired. Meanwhile, Saakashvili stepped ahead and mounted the rostrum. He took Shevardnadze's unfinished tea, drank it completely and put the glass back in its place with power. He actually touches the glass that Shevardnadze drunk from. This action becomes a symbol of the opposition's victory, because in Georgian culture, drinking something bottoms up signifies power and braveness. To draw another analogy, it is like knocking over your opponent's king during a game of chess, when he himself does not want to admit that he lost the game. All of a sudden, a Georgian national folk song started to play outside the parliament. This song, in its figurative meaning, acted as a sign of victory for the opposition.^{cxlvi}

"Georgians are superstitious", said Nino Makhashvili. The revolution occurred on the day of Saint George. Georgians respect this saint more than other saints, and this is why Georgia is also named after this saint. Saint George's Day is a very big holiday in Georgia.^{cxlvii} A local revolution^{cxlviii} to remove Asian Abshidze in Ajaria on 6 April 2004 also occurred on Saint George's Day five months after the Rose Revolution.^{cxlix} Was it a coincidence? According to the beliefs of some Georgians, it was certainly not a coincidence. Georgians say that "the sky and the sun are talking with us during the day of George. So if they talk to you then you can ask help from them." This is exactly what, according to Nino Makhashvili, the Georgian opposition said to the people during the eve of the Rose Revolution.^{cl}

When Saint George's Day arrived, the opposition camp started to campaign that they would win today because truth is on their side. This served as a mythical and religious support for the opposition. The religious factor probably also played a big role in the decision of the government to get the new "elected" parliament approved on 23 November.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the church became more and more important in Georgia. However, the role of the church during the revolution did not appear to be very significant. On the day of the storming, at the very beginning people went out, carrying crosses to the soldiers meaning that we are praying, please do not shoot. This

was the only really strong religious act during that time. However, the Georgian religious leader did not come to bless the new, "elected" parliament on 23 November, and this was of great moral support to the people.

According to Ingrid Degraeve, the eve of the revolution was a really magical time. People were walking around the parliament building to create good energy. "It is a dervish", she said. She seemed to be of the opinion that there was a lot of influence from the West, but that the revolution also contained very eastern-oriented elements. Power, touching, poetry and peoples' singing and dancing were the romantic part of the revolution. All these symbols and superstitions played a supportive role to the organizers of the non-violent revolution, and they played a role in defining its character and time.

The Media

The Media is considered one of the other main factors that played a role in the realisation of the revolution and the formulation of its character. In a broad context, some creative interviewees described the Georgian Rose Revolution as an outcome of digital supports and challenges in the modern world. In an international context, the revolution received tremendous support from the world's leading broadcasting companies, above all CNN. The events in Georgia during 22-23 November were broadcast almost 24 hours on CNN. The government could not afford to be violent, because the whole world was looking at Georgia. The fact that the revolution was on CNN all the time, represented in itself a tremendous pressure and support to both the government and the opposition.^{cli}

In a local context, there was high competition between the local TV channels to cover the events from the streets. The TV channels needed to criticize the government in order to become a famous channel.^{clii} That is why some of the TV channels that were not pro-opposition at the beginning, in the end had shifted their support in order to meet the demand of the audience. As I have already mentioned, the Open Society - Georgia Foundation funded some projects on TV, such as

political TV debates. The TV debates became especially popular among the citizens. The Shevardnadze government gave relative freedom to the mass media and press in the country. Natela Sakhokia thinks that Shevardnadze did not take the mass media seriously. They gave the mass media the chance to say what they wanted to say because "they thought that at the end they would control the government as they want". But this did not happen. In fact, only TV controlled the whole mass of people outside. The media, namely TV, told people to go here or there. "Even those people who were standing in the square or streets did not know where to go. We followed the TV channels," said Natela Sakhokia. The Rustavili 2 TV-channel with its broad audience was working for the opposition. Nana Kakabadze said "...the opposition had paid a big amount of money to the mass media. Newspapers and journals were bought by them as well".^{cliii}

Rustavi 2 TV has been broadcasting in Georgia since 1996. It is an efficient, professional company compared to the old-fashioned, boring Georgian state TV. Rustavi 2 had been the major mouthpiece for the Saakashvili opposition for the past 3 years. Rustavi 2 TV was a key ingredient in the campaign - as Radio B92 had been in Serbia. Just as B92 did, Rustavi 2 gave airtime to the Kmara youth group, who urged people to go out to vote.

After the 2 November parliamentary elections, the opposition parties only organized demonstrations on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. At the beginning, these demonstrations aimed at sending a message to the government saying that the people of Georgia are not going to tolerate any intention that might violate the real election results. People were called to these meetings by Rustavi 2 TV and the 'Mcvane Talga' ('Green Wave') Radio channel. During this stage of the events, the media was the only power pressuring the government. Ingrid Degraeve thinks that many people had learnt a lot about how to adjust themselves to a new position and strategy of non-violent protest during the last 20 days before the revolution. "Everything was constructive and peaceful", thinks Ingrid Degraeve. A documentary on the mass protests that brought Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic from power in September 2000 and movies devoted to Mahatma Ghandi's tactics of non-violent protests was aired several times before

22 November by Rustavi-2. The aim of these movies was to teach people about the possibility of conducting revolution without violence. They were motivating films in order to get people outside^{cliv}. "Most important was the film," the General Secretary of the National Movement, Ivane Merabishvili, told reporters on 25 November. He added that "all the demonstrators knew the tactics of the revolution in Belgrade by heart because [Rustavi-2] showed...the film on their revolution. Everyone knew what to do. This was a copy of that revolution."^{clv}

At the beginning, TV channels were in the middle by maintaining the balance. They always commented on both sides, but by the end everything was clear. "You simply needed to take position, either here or there", Minashvili thinks. "Around ten days ago [approximately starting from 8 November], Rustavi 2 took the opposition side".^{clvi} Nino Makhashvili confirms that Saakashvili perhaps every day had a direct speech on TV to the people of Georgia. "He had been saying very shocking and clear things against the government.

Everybody understood his language. When Sheveranadze was talking, you really needed to interpret several things, because you could not understand, but with Saakashvili, he presented clear and understandable ideas. People were discussing all his ideas at home and with colleagues. He always told police and soldiers "we are your brothers, sisters and your blood. You cannot kill us. It is true that soldiers are hungry and have a lot of problems. They also do not want this government anymore". All this shows that the media were supportive to the Georgian revolution in formulating its nature, and they challenged the government by making any provocations or use of violence difficult.

Conclusion

What made the Georgian Revolution non-violent?

"...I do not believe that any man can dress in civilian clothes who wants to be quick and ready for any violence..." Niccolo Machiavelli^{clvii}

All the discussions in the previous chapters show that there were many factors, strategies, challenges and supports contributing to the nonviolent outcome during the November events. As we have seen, the answer to the question 'what made the Georgian revolution nonviolent?', does not lie in one unique fact or reason. However, the general answer to this question might be that the Georgian Rose Revolution was nonviolent because it was a coup from inside as well as a revolution from outside.

In reality, the need to bring changes to the country did not necessarily define the character of the events. Thus, there were several reasons why the Georgian revolution could have been violent as opposed to non-violent. These reasons could not guarantee absolutely whether a non-violent or violent revolution would break out, because one group's nonviolent action does not cancel out the other's violence or vice versa. Nonviolent action is likely to be chosen by only one party in a conflict. Empirical data show that both the government and the opposition were expecting violence. According to Dr Marina Muskhelishvili "...when Saakashvili seized the parliamentary building, he and his surrenders all had bullet proof jackets." Interestingly, the co-founder of Kmara movement, Akaki Minashvili, also argued that "they [the bodyguards] had their guns ready..." when the opposition activists stormed the parliament. These arguments support the idea that violence was expected.

1) Theoretical explanations for the non-violent outcome

According to Thomas Weber, nonviolent action is often deliberately met with violence (or by legal or political suppression).^{clviii} In spite of all the mentioned factors, strategies and tactics, there was a great risk

that there would be violence in Georgia. Even though most attention in this thesis has been given to the organizational, educational and management work of the opposition movement, in reality it is a fact that no organizer can control every individual inside a mass of people unless every individual understands that he or she plays a creative role and a symbolic part for the outcome during the public actions.^{clix}

A working democratic constitution is not only a legal textbook, but also a legal 'norm of action' - not just a 'law in the book' but rather a 'law in practice'. Therefore, a strong public relies on a public sphere framed by the norms of a constitution. Meanwhile, a weak public is characterized by 'communicative power', but lacks 'administrative power'. Or, a weak public has more influence, but no legally regulated access to practical or administrative power. However, the communicative power of a weak public can have a profound political impact and can lead to political reforms (for example in the Moldovan case) and even to revolutions like in the post-Soviet countries, Georgia and Ukraine. Pre-revolutionary Georgia also had a weak public. It was a public sphere where the existence of basic rights was established by soft or hard laws. In reality such rights were necessary, but not sufficient for the emergence of such a public. Therefore, in the case of a weak public, relations between different public spheres and political legislation, administrative implementation, juridical application and law enforcement are neither ruled by norms of (sufficient and effective) democratic self-organization, nor granted (sufficient and effective) democratic access to the legal system.^{clx}

As far as Gatung's conflict triangle theory is concerned, we can see that here again the attitude, behaviour and situation were determinedly non-violent by the people. Their attitude was to bring democratic changes to the country, while their behaviour was to show civic cautiousness against any attempt of violence; to be non-violent. Therefore, they had the most direct influence on the situation in the field than any other external factors. Gandhi argues that in order for civil disobedience to be effective "the issue must be defined and capable of being clearly understood within the power of the opponent's effort". In this respect, the people's demands were

understood correctly by some Shevardnadze officials who took their side at the end.

The uniqueness of the Georgian Rose revolution is that it started as a protest against a falsification of the parliamentary election, but ended with revolution, making it an electoral revolution. The use of the law by the Georgian opposition forced November election results to be challenged and resulted in an insistence on political change, which served as a powerful model both within and outside of Georgia. The use of legal means to effect change gave the Rose Revolution a mandate of legitimacy at home and abroad. Having the legal basis as well as the eagerness of people to protect their votes made this protest different from many other protests and demonstrations held by the opposition in the past against the Shevardnadze leadership. It is also worth stressing that the opposition's non-violent declared protests turned out to be non-violent in reality as well. This fact itself made the police friendly and socially interactive towards people during these protests. Starting from 2 November, the police and other power structures were present in the field in order to supply public security for the protestors. Small scale rallies and protests at the beginning did not give the impression that their political activity would lead to the resignation of the president, the Rose Revolution. At this level, rallies and protests were very small and easy to break up; at the same time, the police and officials from other power structures were also much more loyal at the beginning and would hypothetically have implemented any kind of order from the government, though this was not the case by the end.

According to David Darchashvili, one of the potential dangers was that there were "...many bloodthirsty people on the streets during the revolution."^{clxi} Gandhi admits that the need to remain non-violent and truthful becomes more difficult "because the emphasis in group action tends to shift from inner purity to external conformity, and this tells on the potency of soul-force."^{clxii} But an ordinary participant in the demonstrations, Georgi Shubutidze, said: "I was standing at the demonstration with a bunch of my friends, but I did not have anything in my mind like to burn automobiles or fight. We were very happy because we were doing something good that day". Accordingly, this

relaxing atmosphere did not allow the hooligans and bloodthirsty people to use the opportunity to mess around. In other words, according to Gandhi's theory, civil disobedience was not a state of lawlessness, but presupposes a law-abiding spirit, combined with self-restrain.^{clxiii}

To summarize, the situation encouraged people to follow the organizers and opposition leaders during the demonstrations, rather than make their own decisions and initiatives according to the changeable environment. In other words, theoretically, the situation did not change people's attitude and behaviour. Therefore, the situation did not have a strong impact on changing the declared non-violent nature of the events. Nino Makhashvili thinks that the Georgian nation showed that they had more resources than one can imagine during the November events. "For many people in Georgia, the revolution was a survival from the crisis, stopping awful processes in the society" Makhashvili said. Therefore, people looked at these protests as a starting point for integrity and unity in the society or country. It was in peoples' interest to keep things under control.

Gene Sharp in his book, the Dynamics of Non-violent Action, argues that the course of a struggle may take any of a wide variety of forms depending on the strategies and tactics and methods chosen to meet the particular needs of the situation. In contrast, the situation concept of Galtung's Conflict Triangle theory proves here that peoples' 'attitude' and 'behaviour' was less dependent on the real situation in the field. People were supporting non-violent and civic forms of changes and therefore they had a stable attitude and behaviour regardless of any new situation appearing.

Another important theoretical answer to the question why the Georgian revolution was nonviolent is that, as Gandhi argues, no matter what legislation is passed over peoples' head, if that legislation is in conflict with people' ideas of right and wrong then people say that they shall not submit to the legislation. Thomas Weber thinks "where the state is corrupted, repressive or dominated by an imperialist power the "citizen" may "revolt", that is, break laws even for symbolic purposes in order to bring down the system."^{clxiv} In the Georgian case, the opposition movement referred to the civil

disobedience strategy. It aimed to force the government and public into making a choice.

2) The use of violence would lead to loss of economic and political support and therefor make it impossible to 'win' the conflict.

It is believed that both the government and opposition in Georgia were very much afraid of bloodshed. The opposition camp and the government knew that whichever side started to use violence first, would lose its support. According to the exchange theory of power, a political actor has power because it has resources.^{clxv} In general, power can be divided into two: 1) the power to command, order, enforce - coercive or 'hard' power. This kind of power has always been important in violent conflict. 2) The power to induce cooperation, to legitimize, to inspire - persuasive or 'soft' power. And, this kind of power may be important in conflicts but must be managed peacefully.^{clxvi} Therefore, using violence during the November events would mean that political actor (either from the government or from the opposition) has chosen hard power. In the Georgian case, choosing hard power would raise awareness of the conflict (e.g. how undemocratic it is and how it violates Human Rights) among those who are external or internal supporters of the top dog. The resources available for the political actors from the external and internal supporters were mostly economical and political. These supporters would refuse to support the top dog (the violent one) anymore because using hard power cannot easily be justified, and without economic and political support the top dog would start to weaken gradually and collapse.

In addition to the strong international observation and commitment, the live broadcasting of the events on the streets by the leading world mass media put pressure and responsibility on the sides not to use violence. Due to the high press coverage of the events, the use of violence would definitely have been a victory for the other side.

According to the news release issued by the United States Embassy to Georgia on September 29, parties across the political spectrum agreed to support a Scorecard for Georgian Elections advanced by former Secretary of State James Baker during his July 5-6 visit to Tbilisi,

which says "all political actors will refrain from violence, or incitement to violence, threats and intimidation during the election campaign, the election itself, and the election's aftermath."^{clxvii} Therefore, there is no reason to doubt that Saakashvili was very aware of the importance of keeping the events non-violent; if a revolution declared as non-violent anyway causes bloodshed on the part of the opposition movement, he would lose the real and expected support of both the people of Georgia *and* the West. Leaders may much of the time come to believe their own propaganda, but if their own words are opposed by their own behaviour, then their words would have little explanatory power. At the same time, Shevardnadze knew that if a single shot was be fired from the government's side, it would be described as an act of terror against his own people and democracy. Shevardnadze himself confirmed this point by saying "the coup was prepared over several months, everything was thought through in advance and everything was built on one idea—Shevardnadze won't spill blood."^{clxviii} If he had spilled the blood of people, Shevardnadze's government would have collapsed in any case; "it would collapse in an unpopular way; with bloodshed."^{clxix} This is why the government was unable to defend itself, even though it had brought the armed people from Adjara there, to stand in front of demonstrators and protect their interests. Emil Adelkhanov argues that their presence there had only one aim: "...to show demonstrators that we are armed."^{clxx} Adelkhanov thinks that this was a fake strategy by the government because the opposition knew that as soon as these arms were fire, the government would lose the game. In that case, it would be a moral defeat for the government.

One answer to the question why the revolution was non-violent is therefore that in Georgia, the use of violence would lead to loss of economical, political and moral support and therefore make it impossible to 'win' the conflict.

3) The lessons learned from recent history

To summarize, my analytical arguments have explained that the government and the opposition camps were discouraged from using violence because using violence by any side would bring victory to the other. In addition to this point I must say, there was an important

influence and lesson from recent history to the event as well. Because of Georgia's turbulent post-independence period, the consequences of violence were still fresh in people's memories, and this contributed to making people cautious and less violence-oriented by the time of the revolution. People were scared, as well as fed up of violence. Therefore, this lesson from the turbulent history limited the use of violence extremely during the massive disobedience on an individual level, e.g. in terms of revenge, pressure or tactics. This fact itself decreased the danger of civil war or radical division of the society (although as I mentioned in Chapter Five, according to Anke Hoeffler and Paul Collier's theory, there was a 29% chance of having civil war in Georgia). I can confidently say that it was actually the people's decision not to use violence. This fact itself played an important role, giving determination and reason to have non-violent events during November.

According to Thomas Weber, "cleaving to non-violence in group social conflict situations may undercut the ability of the opponent to employ overly harsh measures of suppression or retaliation. If they make use of measures that appear to be disproportionately harsh, they run the risk of alienating not only neutrals but also, eventually, supporters and allies."^{clxxi} One of the main reasons for the non-violent revolution was that people knew the consequences of violence, or in Gandhi's words "people had the capacity for inner peaceful decision". People who decided to go out to the streets were not just a crowd. It was a citizen's decision to go out to protest against the regime without committing any violence. There were tens of thousands of people outside with very high civic caution. That was a fact that played an important part in the non-violent outcome.^{clxxii} Nino Makhashvili thinks that during the reconciliation projects, it is usually Georgian mothers who lost their sons for political, economical and social reasons are the most tolerant people. "These mothers knew how and what it means to experience sorrow. It was a character that we all had inside. Georgians had passed through hell, like a civil war and the ethnic wars" Makhashvili said. It was the nation's trauma, but meanwhile it had enriched them without knowing. It had made the people non-violent, and made the revolution possible. Nino Makhashvili also said "...we knew what violence might bring to

us.^{clxxiii} Indeed, there were many potential dangers for having a violent revolution, but according to many people, society itself avoided violent confrontation. The Georgian people showed at the end of the day their desires, activities and decisiveness as a mass to decide what happens. The masses saw their own strength. They cannot be accused that once again they had been used.^{clxxiv} Thus, another reason why the revolution was non-violent was the lessons learnt from history, which had made people anti-violent, aware and cautious. This factor may have been more important than any other factor mentioned in this thesis.

4) The opposition's strategy and tactics

The opposition movement, the media and civil society played an important role in cultivating civil participation and engagement in the political issues among ordinary Georgians starting from the beginning of 2003. However, according to the political culture of the Georgian people it took a while to convince them that it would not result in war or violence if they come out to protest. One of the successful tactics of the opposition movement was to make the protests a people's protest, mobilizing and bringing people from all over the country to Tbilisi. The size of the mass attracted even more international support, because listening to groups with a broad social base is one of the core ideas of democracy. Second, the size of the masses also encouraged government officials (police and bureaucrats) to show disobedience to the authorities. Third, the number of people showed that the government did not have a social base, which pushed them to step down peacefully. All these were important factors in making the revolution non-violent. More generally, my arguments in previous chapters have shown that the opposition's management skills, organization and education were essential contributions to the non-violent character of the revolution, enabling them not only to gather the masses, but also to control and lead them in such a way that things did not get out of hand.

Another successful tactic of the opposition was that they acted within the frame of law, following the constitutional order and requirements so that they prevented chaos after the storming into the parliament. In compliance with Article 76 of the Constitution of Georgia the Chair of

the Parliament of Georgia, Nino Burjanadze, implemented the duties of the president of Georgia.^{clxxv} Her immediate legal power takeover and prioritizing to maintain stability and to prepare new elections prevented the country from confrontations and chaos.^{clxxvi} A new president (04 January) and parliamentary elections (28 March) were planned for 2004. Since Nino Burjanadze was a co-leader of Burjanadze-Democrats Party taking an active part in the opposition movement against the Shevardnadze leadership, she was a representative of the winning side, the opposition, as well as the government as a Speaker. Besides this, the opposition movement's strategy was built on Gene Sharp's theory saying that the effective power of a ruler (Shevardnadze) may be limited by his subordinates (his corrupted circle) if they quietly block the relay downwards or execution of orders, or the passage of information from lower echelons upwards. Therefore, the opposition had intensified their direct and indirect communication (for security guaranty) with the government officials, namely with the police and military, after the 2 November falsified elections. This tactic guaranteed the normal functioning of the police and some other law-and-order maintaining institutions after the revolution as well as a non-violent attitude by the power structures. Except for a few high-ranking officials who disappeared, the infrastructure of police and other forces did not completely collapse on Shevardnadze's resignation; they were functioning, meeting people's and the opposition movement's interests.

Another important opposition strategy was using the coordination theory of power; this theory argues that a political actor has power because it can coordinate social behaviour. Successful social coordination can create extraordinary power even in a weak public.^{clxxvii} Therefore, the social capital, or the feature of relations between persons that facilitate coordinated action among these persons, is needed. This kind of coordination was most appropriate to the political agenda of opposition leaders in Georgia. Using violence would cause chaos and disbelief, which would make it impossible to coordinate social behaviour. Therefore, all the tactics and strategies of the opposition were made socially friendly, where the role of people and their behaviour during the protests was always taken into consideration.

5) The psychological victory

When Saakashvili led the group of opposition activists who stormed into the parliament, Shevardnadze was giving his opening speech, blessing the new "elected" parliamentary members. Eyewitnesses and participants say that, initially, the guard would not open the gate of the parliament for opposition supporters to enter the building. "They asked for some kind of legitimate ground for that, but then opposition MPs came and told them to open and they did it because "...opposition MPs had supporters among the guards from the inside."^{clxxviii} The fact that guards opened the doors by themselves to the opposition activists contributed and led to a non-violent revolution. Until the moment of the parliament storming, the revolution had not yet started: it was simply a demonstration that the united opposition movement was organizing. Until that moment, people had assembled in front of the parliament and sent messages and slogans out to the government. It was a passive action, but when people witnessed an action on the field and a symbol of overcoming the psychological barrier, such as taking the parliament under control and driving away Shevardnadze, people started to celebrate the victory. Although Shevardnadze did not officially resign from his post until many hours after the storming of the parliament, the psychological victory and celebration mood in the nation discouraged any attempt to take control again by Shevardnadze's loyal officials.

6) International factors

The international causes of revolution lie much more in the economic, social and ideological fields than in the narrowly political; when states directly cause revolution. In Georgia, international factors played an important role in formulating the non-violent attitude and behaviour of the government and the opposition. Both the opposition and the government were dependent on international financial aid. Losing this source would anyway lead to losing the political competition in the end. The Georgian economy was on the verge of complete bankruptcy by November 2003, so the government could not afford to lose international financial aid and credits. At the same time, the opposition movement was also dependent on foreign financial aid in order to survive. To organize the demonstrations and retain the party structure

and branches active in the districts, they needed funding. Besides this, international political pressures also limited the government and the opposition's ability to resort to violent means. Having democratic elections and maintaining security and order in the country was a common demand made of the government and the opposition by almost every foreign diplomatic institution.

7) Civil society

During Georgia's electoral revolution, the success of the democratic opposition depended upon the help of civil society. The role of Kmara within organizational support and the role of the media from a mobilisation perspective in particular were exceptional. Civil society and the media played a very educative role by emphasizing non-violent methods to solve political problems in the pre-revolutionary Georgian society. As I mentioned in Chapter Five, the Kmara movement did tremendous work in cultivating the civil participation of people (especially the rural population) in politics. The Liberty Institute in particular played an important role in discrediting and dissolving the prestige myth of Shevardnadze in the eyes of people. The media, particularly the Rustavi 2 channel, played an important role in coordinating the masses and being the mouthpiece of the opposition. Through these channels, the opposition leaders had access to large parts of society, campaigning on their platform and pursuing their propaganda.

8) The opposition leaders' personal contacts and relationship with the government officials

The role of disobedient officials was as important for the character of the outcome as all other available supports the opposition camp had from the outside. Saakashvili, Zhvania and

Burjanadze had been high-ranking officials of the Shevardnadze government until very recent years. This fact also played a big role in the successful/non-violent nature since even officials loyal to Shevardnadze knew and worked with them. Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze were not random opposition leaders but former colleagues

of government officials, and this probably made it easier to convince the officials (their "old friends") to support the revolution.

9) Shevardnadze's personal contribution

By looking at this electoral revolution it becomes clear that Shevardnadze was his own gravedigger. Georgians were fed up with the wars, misery and corruption that had rained their lives and damaged their societies. Its recent history had at least, witnessed the catastrophic experience of war and social dislocation. Even though Shevardnadze to some extent was a democratic leader, allowing the development of the civil society and media the poverty, social injustice, corruption and the cynicism of power were too much for people to forget. While the "Revolution of Roses" was generally unexpected, it had become clear much earlier that the November 2003 elections would be a critical juncture for Georgia and could lead to deep political crisis unless conditions for free and fair elections were created.

Georgian society had become very deeply traumatized during the recent turbulent years. Shevardnadze's team showed less and less eagerness and impulse regarding starting to change the economic, social and political conditions in the country. Some people think that Shevardnadze thought about how to achieve an integrated and unified Georgia in the future. Therefore, he collected all these horribly corrupt politicians who did not like Georgia and always put their own interest above the interest of the Georgian nation, in order to sink their political careers as one ship, and, as captain, sink with them. The purpose was to let a new generation of politicians come to power without the old guard standing in their way.

In addition, official Tbilisi had practically lost control over three regions (the Abkhazia and South Ossetia breakaway areas, and Abashidze controlled Ajaria) of the country. Shevardnadze seems to have realized that he was not able to unify Georgia because Russia was involved in and supported all these three regions. This was a very challenging situation, where the only apparent way out was to obtain support from the West. However, this was difficult because of Georgia's reputation as a failed state, and Shevardnadze's wandering

between dictatorship and democracy. Therefore, the non-violent revolution was needed to make Georgia popular in the West; as the first, successful example of non-violent revolution in a post-Soviet society. With Western support, Georgia could unify the country and neutralize Russia's negative influence.

This thesis has argued through the most important factors, as well as strategies and tactics that had planning and organizational elements. But for the Tetri Melia (White Fox), a revolution was the only way to get rid of all these corrupt, rich and dangerous people. It seems he suddenly understood the consequences of his not being hard-handed and letting these officials do all these horrible things. Although he always wandered between democracy and an authoritarian style of ruling the government, he did not trust the parliamentary system. Shevardnadze believed that a centralized political system with one strong leader was better for Georgia. Therefore, "Shewy" decided to resign in order to let Saakashvili get the leadership. At the age of 75, the White Fox did not have much to lose, and accordingly he could contribute to making a coup from the inside and a revolution from the outside to make Georgia the first motherland for nonviolent revolution in a post Soviet society.

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ⁱⁱ Louis Cahen and Lawrence Manion: *"Research Methods in Education"*, Biddies Ltd, Guildford and Kings's Lynn, Great Britain, 1994

ⁱⁱⁱ This is an argument for interviewing people in top positions and/or use documents produced in "high places"

^{iv} Charlotte Keatley: *"A very Georgian coup: The people are the biggest losers in the 'democratic revolution'"*, The Guardian, 6 December 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/georgia/story/Q.14065.1101299.00.html> accessed on 28 January 2004

^v Vidar Vambheim, supervisor, comment during the supervisor meeting

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- ^{ix} The term 'violence' or 'violent' always has to be qualified with reference to the context and scale/size of the situation, and the intention of the actors. Clearly, domestic violence in a family is violence under otherwise peaceful circumstances, while one person killed in a revolution would not qualify that revolution as 'violent', unless it was a symbolic act designed to communicate the power and willingness to commit violence by the actors, e.g. by the new government. Further, the political culture of the country also has to be taken into consideration.
- ^x Louis Cahen and Lawrence Manion: "Research Methods in Education", Biddies Ltd, Guildford and Kings's Lynn, Great Britain, 1994
- ^{xi} Johan Galtung, "*Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*", International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1996 p. 10-11
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- ^{xvi} Gene Sharp: "*The Politics of Non-violent Action, Part Two: The Methods of Non-violent Action*", Porter Sargent Publishers, Eighth Printing, Seventh Printing, 1998, p. 193-199
- ^{xvii} In the original theory of conflict triangle Johan Galtung calls this corner of triangle as a 'Contradiction' (in the meaning: incompatible goal-state in a goal-seeking system). Since, as I mentioned, I have drawn the idea from J. Galtung theory I called it as a "Situation".
- ^{xviii} Johan Galtung, "*Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*", International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1996 p. 70-73
- ^{xix} Ibid., p. 72-73
- ^{xx} Ibid., p.73
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- ^{xxii} Ibid., p. 38
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- ^{xxv} Author's interview with Nino Makhashvili, Medical Director, Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation Torture Victims

^{xxvi} Building Democracy in Georgia, *"Attempts to Establish Democracy in Georgia"*, Discussion Paper 1, Printinfo, Armenia, May 2003, p 8-11

^{xxvii} Building Democracy in Georgia, *"The Constitutional System in Georgia"*, Discussion Paper 2, Printinfo, Armenia, May 2003, p.8

^{xxviii} British Helsinki Human Rights Group, *"Georgia 2003. The revolution of guns not roses, The story of a coup d'etat"*, <http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?ReportID=207&CountryID=10>, accessed 24 May 2004

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^{xxx} Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia, Eduard Shevardnadze, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shevardnadze#Georgian_president

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^{xxxii} Saakashvili'e resignation was the beginning of his fight against Shevardnadze, his former colleague and friend. Saakashvili was known as a non-corrupted official under the Shevardnadze government. He maintained the support of the former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia's supporters, because he didn't have any role in or contributed to the coup against Gamsakhurdia in 1992.

^{xxxiii} Author's interview with Dr. Marina Muskhelishvili, Political Science Division, Democracy and Democratisation, Centre for Social Studies, University of Georgia.

^{xxxiv} Building Democracy in Georgia, Electoral Processes in Georgia, Discussion Paper 4, Printinfo, Armenia, May 2003, p.9

^{xxxv} Like most post-Soviet societies, politics was a luxury for the few, and inaccessible to the many due to the daily grind. Stated in: British Helsinki Human Rights Group, *"Georgia 2003: The revolution of guns not roses, The story of a coup d'etat"*, <http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?ReportID=207&CountryID=10>, accessed 24 May 2004

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^{li} Author's interview with Nino Makhashvili, Medical Director, Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation Torture Victims

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^{liii} Leonid Serebrakov, "*Mass movement overthrows Shevardnadze regime*", 1 December 2003, <http://www.socialistworld.net/index2.html?eng/2003/12/07georgia.html>

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^c Ibid.,

^{ci} Claude Zullo, "Georgia's Rose Revolution Rotted in Law ", Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, December 03, 2003

http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1946 assessed on 25 march

^{cii} British Helsinki Human Rights Group: *Georgia 2003. The revolution of guns not roses, The story of a coup d'eta*,

<http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?ReportID=207&CountryID=10> accessed on 15 January 2004

^{ciii} Ibid.,

^{civ} The Hungarian daily newspaper Nepszabadsag stated that the students of Otpor had themselves been trained by American experts in Hungary.

^{cv} Author's interview with Michael Chachkhunashvili, The Chairman of Executive Board, Open Society -Georgian Foundation

^{cvi} Author's interview with Michael Chachkhunashvili, The Chairman of Executive Board, Open Society -Georgian Foundation

^{cvii} Author's interview with Alexander Lomaia, Executive Director of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation during the revolution

^{cviii} Author's interview with Michael Chachkhunashvili, Chairman of the Executive Board, Open Society -Georgian Foundation

^{cix} Darchiashvili commented during counselling

^{cx} British Helsinki Human Rights Group: *Georgia 2003: The revolution of guns not roses, The story of a coup d'eta*,

<http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?ReportID=207&CountryID=10> accessed on 15 January 2004

^{cxii} Thomas de Waal and margarita Akhvlediani, "A Bitter Resignation", Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/1689.cfm>

^{cxiii} Natalia Antelava: "United States cuts development aid to Georgia",

www.EurasiaNet.org, 29 September 2003;
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092903.shtml>

- ^{cxiii} Thomas de Waal and margarita Akhvlediani, *"A Bitter Resignation"*, Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/1689.cfm>
- ^{cxlv} The Government House is called the State Chancellery in Georgia.
- ^{cxv} Author's interview with Levan Ramashvili, Chairman of Liberty Institute
- ^{cxvi} Daan van der Schriek, *"Few Tears for Shevardnadze Georgia: 'How Good the Revolution Has Been!'"* World Press Review, Tbilisi, Georgia Dec. 7, 2003, http://worldpress.org/article_model.cfm?article_id=1805&dont=ves
- ^{cxvii} Georgia became the second biggest recipient (after Israel) of US foreign aid.
- ^{cxviii} Author's interview with Ingrid Degraeve, contemporary artist. She is a Dutch woman married to a Georgian, and has been living in Georgia for 5 years at the time of the interview.
- ^{cxix} Author's interview with Levan Ramashvili, Chairman of the Liberty Institute
- ^{cxx} Author's joint interview with Kmara activists: Tea Tutkharidze, Keto Kabiashvili, Giorgi Kondelaki and Ksenia Kaqsisashvili, Kmara, Liberty Institute
- ^{cxxi} Ibid.,
- ^{cxixii} Author's interview with Levan Ramashvili, Chairman of the Liberty Institute
- ^{cxixiii} As it was a goal in Ukraine, too, to not let the police occupy the 'Freedom Square' during the demonstrations in 2004.
- ^{cxixlv} Author's joint interview with Kmara activists: Tea Tutkharidze, Keto Kabiashvili, Giorgi Kondelaki and Ksenia Kaqsisashvili, Kmara, Liberty Institute
- ^{cxixv} Ibid.,
- ^{cxixvi} Author's interview with Akaki Minashvili, Co-founder of the Kmara movement
- ^{cxixvii} Author's interview with Levan Ramashvili, Chairman of Liberty Institute
- ^{cxixviii} British Helsinki Human Rights Group: *Georgia 2003: The revolution of guns not roses, The story of a coup a'eta*, <http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?ReportID=207&CountryID=10>, accessed on 15 January 2004
- ^{cxixix} Qonline Magazine, Civil Georgia: *"Saakashvili Casts Doubt over Zhvania's opposition Stance"*, Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, September 8, 2003, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=4901> accessed on 5 May 2005
- ^{cxixxx} Online Magazine, Civil Georgia: *"National Movement, Government Supporters Clash in Gori"*, Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, May 27 2003, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=4280> accessed on 5 April 2005
- ^{cxixxi} Some people say that Shevardnadze just became very old and very ill. He was different from what he was several years ago. He did not understand the situation.
- ^{cxixxii} Author's interview with Alexander Lomaia, Executive Director of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation during the revolution
- ^{cxixxiii} Author's interview with Levan Ramashvili, Chairman of the Liberty Institute
- ^{cxixxiv} Author's interview with Levan Ramashvili, Chairman of the Liberty Institute
- ^{cxixxv} Dr. Laurence Broers, Department of Political Studies, University of London, December 2004, London, http://www.ec.ut.ee/transition/k4_4.html

^{cxxxvi} Author's interview with Dr. David Darchashvili, Supervisor, Executive director of the Open Society -Georgia Foundation

^{cxxxvii} Author's interview with Natela Sakhokia, Director, The Strategic Research Institute

^{cxxxviii} Author's interview with Ia Antatze, Journalist, Radio Freedom

^{cxxxix} Author's interview with Nana Kakabadze, Director of Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights

^{cxl} Levan Ramishvili was clarifying that: "In 1996, Mr. Saakashvili was a chairman of the committee on leader affairs and he initiated judicial reforms. Basically, his reforms was aimed to remove all the soviet judges and to introduce exams to test qualifications, then to appoint new people as judges on a merit basis. That made Saakashvili very popular. We together with some other organizations gave him the reward "man of year" in order to somehow support these reforms."

^{cxli} Although a civil war is classified as an internal conflict with at least one thousand battle-related deaths, and Georgia only had a little over hundred casualties, I still chose to call it a civil war, because it was commonly referred to as a civii war among Georgians

^{cxlii} Paul Collier, Director, Development Research Group Wrold Bank, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy", June 15, 2000,

<http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.pdf> accessed on 28 September 2004

^{cxliii} Author's interview with Dr. David Darchashvili, Supervisor, Executive director of the Open Society - Georgia Foundation

^{cxliv} Author's interview with Michael Chachkhunashvili, Chairman of the Executive Board, Open Society - Georgia Foundation

^{cxlv} Author's interview with Ingrid Degraeve, contemporary artist. She is a Dutch woman married to a Georgian, and has been living in Georgia for 5 years at the time of the interview.

^{cxlvi} Some people say that during this song, many armed people from Adjara started to run away from their positions.

^{cxlvii} Author's interview with Nino Makhashvili, Medical Director, Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation Torture Victims

^{cxlviii} Some Georgians describe it as a revolution, but meanwhile others, as disarming local mafia.

^{cxlix} Georgia celebrates two Saint George's Days every year, on 6 April and 23 November.

^{cl} Author's interview with Nino Makhashvili, Medical Director, Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation Torture Victims

^{cli} Author's interview with Ingrid Degraeve, contemporary artist. She is a Dutch woman married to a Georgian, and has been living in Georgia for 5 years at the time of the interview.

^{clii} It is the same in many former soviet countries; namely in the neighbouring countries. People know that state channels cover reality from one angle and they do not criticise the government.

^{cliii} Author's interview with Nana Kakabadze, Director of Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights

- ^{cliv} Author's interview with Georgy Shubutidze, Sociologist, Caucasian Institute for Peace and Democracy and Development
- ^{clv} Daan van der Schriek, "*Few Tears for Shevardnadze Georgia: 'How Good the Revolution Has Been!'*" World Press Review, Tbilisi, Georgia Dec. 7, 2003, http://worldpress.org/article_model.cfm?article_id=1805&dont=yes
- ^{clvi} Author's interview with Dr. Marina Muskhelishvili, Political Science Division, Democracy and Democratisation, Centre for Social Studies, University of Georgia.
- ^{clvii} Niccolo Machiavelli: "*Citizen and Secretary of Florence on the Books on the Art of War*". <http://www.constitution.org/mac/artofwar0.txt>
- ^{clviii} Thomas Weber: "*Conflict Resolution and Gandhian Ethics, the Gandhi Peace Foundation*", New Deli, 1991. P. xx-xxi
- ^{clix} Author's interview with Ingrid Degraeve, contemporary artist. She is a Dutch woman married to a Georgian, and has been living in Georgia for 5 years at the time of the interview.
- ^{clx} Globalising Democracy Without a State, "*Weak Public, Strong Public, Global Constitutionalism*", Journal of International Studies, Volume 31, Number 3, 2002, Millennium Publishing Group, London School of Economics
- ^{clxi} Author's interview with Dr. David Darchashvili, Supervisor, Executive director of the Open Society -Georgia Foundation
- ^{clxii} Thomas Weber, "*Conflict Resolution and Gandhian Ethics, The Gandhi Peace Foundation*", New Delhi, 1991. p. 87
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- ^{clxiv} Ibid., p. 86
- ^{clxv} Hans Blorrrkvist: Social structure and political action: Does social capital matter?, Department of Government, Uppsala University, p. 27-32
- ^{clxvi} Maill, Hugh/ Woodhouse, Tom/Ramsbotham, Oliver, "*Contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*", polity Press, Cambridge, 1999 p. 10
- ^{clxvii} Online Magazine, Civil Georgia, "*U.S. Condemns Bolnisi Violence*", Civil Georgia, Tbilisi 2003-09-30, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article_elections.php?id=5023
- ^{clxviii} Vitali Silitski, "*The Unlikely Revolution*", Transitions Online, 12 December 2003, <http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=10&NrIssue=772&NrSection=1&NrArticle=11299>, accessed on 22 January 2004
- ^{clxix} Author's interview with Nana Kakabadze, Director of NGO, Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights
- ^{clxx} Author's interview with Emil Adelkhanov, Program Director, Caucasus institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
- ^{clxxi} Thomas Weber, "*Conflict Resolution and Gandhian Ethics, The Gandhi Peace Foundation*", New Delhi, 1991. p. 87
- ^{clxxii} Author's interview with Alexander Lomaia, Minister of Education and Science of Georgia. He was an executive director of Open Society Georgian Foundation during the revolution.

^{clxxiii} Amor's interview with Nino Makhashvili, Medical Director, Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation Torture Victims

^{clxxiv} As I have already mentioned in Chapter 2, ordinary people in Georgia always thought that they are remembered usually just before the elections for their votes.

^{clxxv} Statements Made by the Parliament of Georgia, *The Statement of the Chair of the Parliament of Georgia -Acting President of Georgia*, Parliament of Georgia, http://www.parliament.ge/statements/2003/parl_24_11_03_en.htm, accessed on 19 April 2005

^{clxxvi} Relatively the same situation appeared in Kyrgyzstan April 2005 where there was not leader or legal person to lead the country. Even during the following days the opposition could not agree accept temporary leader to implement order and law in the country. By Asian Karimov's stepping back his government simultaneously collapsed which observed with paralysing the state institutions and power structures.

^{clxxvii} Hans Blomkvist, *"Social structure and political action: Does social capital matter? "*, Department of Government, Uppsala University, p. 27-32

^{clxxviii} Dr David Darchashvili's email to Author, on 03 April 2005

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Summary

THE GEORGIAN ROSE REVOLUTION CHALLENGERS AND SUPPORTS FOR ENSURING THE NON-VIOLENT OUTCOME IN A POST-SOVIET SOCIETY

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Tramsø, Norway

The Georgian Revolution, popularly named the Rose Revolution, took place in Tbilisi on 23 November 2003. It began in the form of street protests in the capital of the country against the falsification of the November 2003 parliamentary election, and culminated in the storming of the Georgian Parliament and the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. The most astonishing feature of this revolution is that it was the first of its kind in a former Soviet country, and the starting point for a new generation of nonviolent revolutions in the countries who shared the same political culture in the past.

This research paper is a case-study about the Georgian revolution, and its primary aim is to discuss how the revolution could happen non-violently. The theoretical basis of the study is based on the theories of Gene Sharp, "the methods of nonviolent action, protest and persuasion for power and struggle", Johan Galtung, "triangle conflict theory" and Gandhi, "non-violent action by marching forces."

The Georgian revolution is the outcome of many factors, such as the political, economic and social situation in the country as well as the recent history and the personality of the leaders. These factors made the ground ready for the revolution to happen, but the research also shows that the strategy and tactics of the opposition movement played a decisive role for the nonviolent outcome. The most important challenge for the non-violent revolution was the danger of civil war, and losing control over the demonstrators. Meanwhile, there were supports for the revolution as well, the most important ones being external pressures and support, the media and the civil society. The research shows that the answer to the question 'what made the Georgian revolution nonviolent?', does not lie in one unique fact or reason, but rather a combination of factors, strategies and tactics. The November events had organizational and planning elements, but the success of the revolution was dependent on massive individual participation, showing that defending democracy is ultimately in the hands of the people. However, one not less important factor is Shevardnadze's contributions to his own fall. The Georgian Rose Revolution was nonviolent because it was a coup from inside as well as a revolution from outside.

Appendix I Interviewers

Akaki Minashvili	Co-founder	Kmara movement
Alexander Lomaia	Minister	The Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia
Ingrid Degraeve	Dutch woman married to a Georgian, and has been living in Georgia for 5 years at the time of the interview.	Contemporary Art
Dr. David Darchiashvili	The Executive Director Supervisor	Open Society Georgia Foundation
Dr. Marina Muskhelishvili	Political Science Division	Center for Social Studies
Emil Adelkhanov	Program Director	The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
Gia Bliadze	Military	Anonym
Georgi Khelashvili	Consultant	Parliament of Georgia
Georgi Kandelaki	Activist	Kmara movement
Georgi Shubutidze	Student	State University of Georgia
Ia Antatze	Journalist	Radio Freedom
Isa Qambar	Chairman	Musavat Party (Azerbaijan)
Jette Neisen	Danish researcher	Research field: "Georgian Society and Ethnicity"
Keto Kabiashvili	Activist	Kmara movement
Ksenia Kaqstsiashvili	Activist	Kmara movement
Levan Ramashvili	Chairman	Liberty institute
Michael Chachkhunashvili	Chairman of the Executive Board	Open Society Georgia Foundation
Nana Kakabadze	Chairman	Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights
Natela Sakhokia	Director	The Strategic Research Institute
Natia Zambakhidze	Program Leader	Rustavi 2 TV Channel
Nino Makhashvili	Medical Director	Georgian Centre For Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation of Torture Victims
Tamar Tomashvili	Program Coordinator	Georgian Young Lawyers Association
Tea Tutkharidze	Jurnalist	Kmara movement
Shavla Lavudze	Secretary	New Rights Party