The EU in the Eyes of Ukrainian General Public: Potential for EU Public Diplomacy?

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Abstract: This paper focuses on the public diplomacy (PD) practices of the EU—a supranational regional organisation confronted with two distinct challenges. First, the EU aims to reform its external action in order to become a global power and leader in the changing multipolar world. Second, it purports to fight the ongoing economic crisis that not only weakens the actual global capabilities of the EU, but damages its international image and reputation as a power and a leader. The paper assumes the potential of EU PD tools in meeting these challenges and tests this assumption in one case study of international public opinion on the EU in its immediate neighbourhood (Ukraine). Importantly, the study confronts an additional challenge: EU PD is described in the relevant literature to be a disjointed, under-resourced and overlooked policy area.

Keywords: EU, EU Neighbourhood Policy, public diplomacy, Ukraine
1. Introduction

A new, multipolar world of globalised practices is evidently “planting” the discipline of international relations with “seeds” of the previously unknown. Described by some researchers as “interpolar” (Grevi, 2009, p. 5), this world of networks and interconnections presents a challenge to international relations’ theoreticians and practitioners. Mutual interdependencies suggest an urgent search for the most effective cooperation strategies, a swift implementation of numerous credible “soft” power tools, and an increasingly pressing requirement to project positive international images and reputation. These strategies are needed by both state- and non-state global actors, including multilateral organisations, to attract and persuade external partners. This changing paradigm of international relations brings to the fore the notion of public diplomacy (PD), which is sometimes in concert with but more often in opposition to conventional diplomatic tools and approaches. Similar to traditional diplomacy, PD is about “the practice of influence” (Hayden, 2009, as cited in Walker, 2012, p. 18). However, public diplomacy is also strikingly different from classical diplomacy. Cowan and Cull (2008, p. 6), elaborating the PD concept, describe the phenomenon as “an international actor’s attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics”. Dasgupta (2011, p. 74) extended this definition calling for PD to be understood as engagement “with those outside government”. Jelisic (2012, p. 34) echoed this, stating PD is about “entering two-way communication and direct engagement not only with foreign governments, but also with other foreign audiences directly and/or via nongovernmental partners”. With traditional diplomacy seen as an elitist non-transparent activity, Proedrou and Frangonikolopulos (2012, p. 731) insist that PD has a potential to “show how people’s opinion can be influenced, arguments won, [and] perceptions changed”. As such, according to Dasgupta (2011, p. 78), the presumably desired outcome for an international actor—“an effective [PD] initiative”—depends on how successful the actor’s communication strategy is.

Examining findings of several surveys of general public opinion on the EU in Ukraine (each was conducted independently), this study aims to discuss how the EU’s reflective knowledge on external public opinion may contribute to its PD in one particular neighbouring country (Ukraine) as well as one particular geopolitical region (the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood). While the academic segment of the EU external imagery and perceptions is a growing area in the broader field of EU studies, scholarly insights into EU perceptions among international general public remain rare due to the costs involved in administering large-scale surveys.
In the field of the public opinion research in Ukraine, however, there are four striking exceptions:

1) The Razumkov Centre’s recurrent opinion polls on Ukraine’s opinion on the EU (2002–2012) (Razumkov Centre, n.d., a);
2) The EU-funded and conducted by EuropeAid Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI Countries and Territory project surveying Ukraine’s public and elite views on par with 14 other European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries (2010) (EuropeAid, 2009; 2010);
3) PEW Global Attitudes Project surveys in 2009 and 2011, which considered opinions of Ukrainians on the EU/Europe within broader topics of the end of the USSR and confidence in democracy (PEW, 2009; 2011);
4) FP7 project “EUMAGINE: Imagining Europe from Outside” (2011–2013), which aims to understand how people in Morocco, Senegal, Turkey, and Ukraine relate to the possibility of migration and how perceptions of human rights and democracy affect migration aspirations (EUMAGINE, 2011–2013).

The findings of these surveys form the empirical background of this paper which aims to answer a number of key questions: With the importance of continued bilateral relations being recognised on both the EU and Ukrainian sides, to what degree do expectations and perceptions of the EU exist in Ukraine? How do Ukrainians view the current content of the country’s relationship with the EU? Is the EU perceived as a significant player? If so, what kind? How are perceptions evolving?

PD conceptual frameworks inform this analysis. This paper starts with a description of these frameworks and then moves on to outlining the peculiarities of EU-Ukraine relations. The main findings of the surveys are then summarised and subsequently discussed within the context of the EU’s PD. The discussion also addresses the key questions outlined above.

1.1 International public opinion surveys and EU PD: conceptual framework

The changing global paradigms challenge academics and practitioners to redefine the phenomenon of PD. Taking the debate away from old-fashioned simplifications of the past (for example, ‘PD equals propaganda’), Cull (2008, pp. 31–32) talks about five conceptual elements of the PD process. These are listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting. Out of the five conceptual elements, listening is typically emphasised; in reality, listening is integral to each of the other elements. While some scholars note that PD “does not focus […] on the most critical and contested issues of global
politics” (Proedrou & Frangonikolopulos, 2012, p. 729), others argue that PD has different aims. It is about a chance for an international actor to “[t]alk widely, meet widely, be open and transparent” (Dasgupta, 2011, p. 79). But what if no one listens? To a surprise of many experts in the IR field, systematic listening to international publics is typically overlooked by the makers of foreign policy (Cull, 2008, p. 32).

From a practical point of view (especially when relationship-building is a priority), to achieve a successfully implemented transition from monologue mode to dialogue and collaboration (which, according to Cowan and Arsenault, 2008 is part of yet another analytical division within PD scholarship) one needs to employ effective and systematic listening skills. Those skills, as noted by Cowan and Arsenault (2008, pp. 16, 21), provide opportunities for critical and/or affirmative feedback and pave the way to productive participation in joint projects. The same authors regard Buber’s (1958) conceptual understanding of a ‘true dialogue’ where “control and dominance are minimised”, but “participants willingly and openly engage in true relationship-building exchanges” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 18). It should come with no surprise that weaker international actors are sceptical or even suspicious about stronger counterparts who base their communication on normative preaching (Leonard, 2002, pp. 6–7).

Arguably, listening practices could enhance the post-Lisbon EU’s monologue, dialogue and collaboration modes in the area of PD. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty benchmarked a new vision of the EU in the changing world—an aspiring “major actor in global affairs” (Emerson et al., 2011). This ambition triggered the reform of the EU foreign policy’s outreach, including not only the establishment of the new key post in the field (High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy) and the launch of a new institution (the European External Action Service [EEAS]), but also a renewed attention to EU PD. Ultimately designed to make the EU’s communal global performance efficient, transparent and attractive to third countries, EEAS is expected to “boost […] the EU’s cultural and public diplomacy activities” (Korski, 2008). The EU PD initiative was timely. Research into the pre-Lisbon EU PD (see Korski, 2008; Fiske de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005; Hendrickson, 2006; Ociepka & Ryniejska, 2005) pointed to a number of endemic problems. These included being “atomised and disjointed” (Korski, 2008) with many agencies within EU institutional architecture, as well as EU Member States’ bodies, conducting PD activities without proper coordination with each other. EU PD was also seen as a “Cinderella” of EU policy-making (Whitman, 2005) perceived to be under-staffed, under-resourced and cornered into secondary roles in EU international diplomacy. Finally, the EU PD is seen as over-ambitious. It aims to deal not only with international publics in its
immediate neighborhood (to the East and to the South) as well as far away from its borders, but also to communicate within the EU borders.

Importantly, attention towards systemic listening in EU PD was already advocated in the relevant pre-Lisbon studies. Lynch (2005, p. 15) once underlined that “research into foreign perceptions and attitudes” is one of the three areas (the other two are “communication and information strategies […] and cultural and educational actions”) where the EU is trying to make a difference in the context of its PD initiatives. The need for a systematic approach in providing assessment of EU global reception was repeatedly stressed by various scholars in the field (see Korski, 2008; Fiske de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005; Hendrikson, 2006; Ociepka & Ryniejska, 2005). Despite these calls, there has until recently been a deficit of scholarly and practical efforts to evaluate and fashion the EU general public views in third countries into foreign policy-making (Chaban et al., 2011; Chaban, 2013). This is mainly due to the sheer cost and cumbersome logistics of administering large-scale public surveys. However, the most recent research projects supported by the EU have started exploring international public opinion on the EU both close to and at the Union’s border and in more geographically distant locations. Among these, European Commission’s Framework 7 (FP7) projects of ‘Disaggregating Chinese Perception of the EU’ (2009–2011),¹ ‘EuroBroadMap’ (2009–2011)² and EUMAGINE (2011–2013).³ Ten-country survey of international opinion on the EU in Asia-Pacific was supported by a Jean Monnet Programme within project “The EU in Eyes of Asia-Pacific” (Chaban & Holland, 2008; Holland et al., 2007; Chaban et al., 2009; Holland & Chaban, 2010, for more publications see also UC, n.d.).⁴ Sponsored by EuropeAid, OPPOL study traced EU public perceptions in 14 countries in the EU’s 14 immediate neighborhoods. In addition to those EU-centred and EU-supported research projects, the EU perceptions after-Lisbon were also tracked in large-scale surveys on global trends administered by major social research groups (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005–2010; German Marshall Fund, 2012; PIPA/GlobeScan, 2004–2011, all online). However, these public polls did not exclusively focus on the EU. Finally, individual countries initiate their

¹ Surveyed 2,410 respondents in six urban areas of China.
² Surveyed 9,343 students in 18 European and third countries.
³ Surveyed 8,000 respondents from Ukraine, Turkey, Morocco, Senegal (2,000 respondents per country).
⁴ Surveyed 10,000 respondents in Japan, China, India, Russia, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia (1,000 respondents in each country). The project also features pre-Lisbon EU opinion surveys in Asia Pacific (Holland et al, 2007; Chaban & Holland, 2007; Chaban et al., 2009; Holland & Chaban, 2010).
own surveys of EU public opinion, for example Ukraine’s Razumkov Centre’s recurrent opinion polls on the EU (2002–2012) or a study of Israel’s public perceptions of the EU (Pardo, 2009; 2013; Razumkov Centre, 2011).

Acknowledging that there is a growing interest on the EU’s part towards public opinion in its Neighbourhood, this study evaluates the views on the post-Lisbon EU among citizens of one immediate neighbour—Ukraine. It also explores the potential of public opinion to EU PD in the region. To understand the surveys’ findings, the paper first outlines the current context of EU-Ukraine relations.

2. Ukraine and the EU: outlining the contexts

The EU’s political stance towards Ukraine as well as the latter’s involvement in the process of European integration have always been among topical issues in the broad academic field of international relations. Kuzio (2012, p. 396), for example, offers perhaps the most generalised vision on the cycles of EU-Ukraine relations during the last two decades. The distinguished British scholar talks about cycles of disinterest, partnership and disillusionment—all taking place in the period since the Ukrainian state gained independence from the collapsed Soviet Union. Stegniy (2011, pp. 50–51) noted the Ukrainian government’s habit of issuing a plethora of documents declaring “national commitment to the course of European integration”. Yet, in reality, this paperwork has not been backed up by reforms “to underpin Ukraine’s internal preparation for closer integration” with the EU (Stegniy, 2011). In the same context, Molchanov (2004, p. 452) comments on the enduring “special” linkages between Russia and Ukraine; in his view, this makes it hard for any “prudent politician [to make an attempt to] separate the two by the Schengen border”. Molchanov (2004, p. 454) also specifies that powerful Ukrainian elites who need the EU in order to get access to its “development aid and financial credits”, are not interested in the “advocacy of human rights and transparent business practices” requested by the EU in return.

Despite flowery official rhetoric, communication between the two partners is rather chaotic. Since the EU-Ukraine Action Plan is no longer in legal force (Stegniy, 2011, p. 55), the two parties are moving slowly towards the formalisation of the Association Agreement. Ukraine, one of the inaugural members of the UN, a member of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, is entering the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius with a strong hope to sign the Association Agreement with the EU.
Linas Linkevičius (2013), Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in his presiding capacity over the Council of the EU in the second half of 2013, stated that “the need is to mobilise all efforts during the remaining time towards signing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area)”. The widespread corruption in Ukraine (it currently occupies 144th place out of 176 nations in the 2012 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, sharing the spot with the Central African Republic, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Congo and Syria (Transparency International, 2012), compounded by the Tymoshenko case and the growing influence of the so-called ‘Family’ (a powerful politico-business group of decision-makers who have family or business ties with president Yanukovych), all contribute to making the process of communication between the EU and Ukraine increasingly cumbersome. It has been sarcastically noted that the EU, regardless of the many negative factors at play, may eventually conclude the Association Agreement with Yanukovych anyway, just to keep going through the “unbearable lightness of permanent integration” (Vernygora, 2012). Confusion in communication between the EU and Ukraine is further aggravated by existence of the ‘pro-Ukraine’ and ‘contra-Ukraine’ camps among the EU’s Member States (Kuzio, 2003) as well as an “apparent lack of understanding of what exactly the country’s ‘European choice’ means” (Molchanov, 2004, p. 465) among the Ukrainian population.

Using Molchanov’s argument as a starting point, this analysis turns to Ukraine’s public opinion on the EU. The decision of the Ukrainian public for or against ‘European choice’ will be governed by the perceptions of what the EU is and does. What kind of power does the EU represent for Ukraine? How is it seen to influence Ukraine in political, economic, normative, ethical, or transformative terms? How do such concepts and realities correspond to each other? The answers to these questions are critical. Through the prism of the ENP, the EU may be directly offering Ukraine a “course” on how the complicated puzzle of a more integrated Europe works. But is anybody in Ukraine willing to listen and learn? Moreover, the ENP in general and its Eastern Partnership Programme in particular could be ironically described as a vehicle for “promotion of the privilege and, to some extent, luck of a neighbouring country to be formally recognised by the EU as a neighbouring country” (Vernygora, 2012). But what does it mean for Ukrainian citizens who try to understand, justify and influence their country’s geo-political choice? This paper now turns to the main results of the four public opinion studies, which address EU post-Lisbon perceptions in Ukraine and track, as far as possible, the evolution of those perceptions.
3. Findings

3.1 Samples and timings of the surveys

This analysis overviews public opinion results collected by four difference social research groups. Those undertook the surveys of Ukrainian general public perceptions on the EU after the Lisbon Treaty and after the onset of the euro debt crisis. The OPPOL study in Ukraine had three waves of opinion polling: one in 2009 and two in 2010. The study surveyed 400 people (margin of error ± 5%) in four urban areas: Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Lviv. Razumkov Centre’s research, which has conducted recurrent polls on EU perceptions since 2002 till 2012, samples 2,000 respondents per survey (margin of error ± 2%) for each survey in all regions of Ukraine. PEW survey in 2011, involved 1,000 respondents (margin of error ± 3%). It featured a multistage cluster sample stratified by Ukraine’s four regions and proportional to population size and urban/rural population. Finally, the EUMAGINE project (2011–2013) was conducted in four specific research areas in Ukraine—Zbara (an area with high emigration), Novovodolazka (low emigration), Znamyanska (specifically analysed for the human rights situation) and Solomyansky rayon/Kyiv (immigration history). The project surveyed 2,000 respondents (500 in each area) with a margin of error ± 2% and followed up the poll with 80 qualitative interviews (20 in each location). All surveys dealt with the adult population (18 years and older). The inherent difficulty in comparison was aggravated by different methods of questionnaire delivery (face-to-face in the PEW and EUMAGINE studies, telephone in the OPPOL study); different size and geography samples, as well as different key research foci of each research project. Nevertheless, the samples are deemed to be sufficiently substantial to generalise about EU perceptions in Ukraine, and the similarities in findings discussed below confirm the validity of the data choice.

3.2 The EU in the life of Ukraine

In June 2012, the Razumkov Centre released the results of the longitudinal study measuring the attitude of Ukrainian citizens to foreign policy between 2002 and 2012 (Fig. 1).

5 Other countries surveyed were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Palestinian National Authority.
Respondents supported the strengthening of relations with both the EU and Russia, but preferred the former when asked to choose: 36.7 per cent of the respondents believed that the relations with EU should be decisive for Ukrainian foreign policy against 31 per cent who believed that Russia should have this role. In contrast, 8.1 per cent name other countries, and only 1 per cent selected the USA. EU integration being officially proclaimed as a “vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy” attracted support in Eastern Ukraine. However, according to Valeriy Chaly, the Deputy General of the Razumkov Centre, “[n]ow the popularity of these ideas in Eastern Ukraine is decreasing. This may have to do with the decrease in the rating of the ruling party” (Kommersant, 2012).

We hypothesize that the respondents’ choice in favor of the EU is a result of public perceptions of the EU as an economic powerhouse and an influential neighbor in Ukraine’s immediate neighborhood, able to exert political and normative pressures. While Razumkov Centre’s recurrent polls do not provide necessary information to test this hypothesis, the 2010 OPPOL study, 2011 EUMAGINE study together with PEW 2009 and 2011 polls contain some useful insights.
The OPPOL survey found out that the four “top” reasons why Ukraine is seen to benefit from the EU’s policies are of pragmatic economic character (Q10a: Why would you say that Ukraine has benefited from current EU policies?). EU investment in Ukraine was top of the list being chosen by 49 per cent of the OPPOL respondents. This was followed by allocation of aid resources (28%), promotion of trade (25%), and access for products and services (19%). Importantly, there was variation in perceptions according to the age of respondents. Those aged “40–54 (59%) and those over age 65 (55%) are more likely than respondents of other ages to see EU investment in Ukraine as a reason why the country has benefited from EU policies” (OPPOL, 2010, p. 14). Younger demographics—respondents under age 25 (34%), those aged 40–54 (36%) and those aged 55–64 (32%)—tend to mention allocation of development aid more often than other age groups (OPPOL, 2010).

The same OPPOL study also found that the economic themes led in the discussion of the EU’s role in Ukraine in the future (Q18: And for each of the following areas can you please tell me whether or not you think the EU should have a greater role to play in Ukraine?). When asked the latter question, around three quarters of the respondents saw that role in the areas of economic development (76%), trade (75%), and regional cooperation (73%). More than six in ten felt that the EU should play a greater role in a number of key areas, ranging from energy security (69%), external policy and foreign affairs (65%), environment and climate change (64%), to migration (63%), democracy (62%), security and defence (62%), and refugees/displaced persons (61%). The most controversial opinions on the EU’s roles surfaced in the areas of education and culture. In the case of education, 45 per cent agreed while 44 per cent disagreed; in the case of culture 37 per cent agreed against, 53 per cent disagreed.

### 3.3 The EU as a neighboring normative power

The OPPOL study also found the evidence for the perception of the EU as an important neighbor who helps to promote democracy as well as a partner with common values (Table 1). Three quarters of respondents, when asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements about the EU and relations with Ukraine, agreed that the EU and Ukraine are good neighbors and two-thirds considered the EU to be an important partner of Ukraine. Seven in ten agreed with the statement that the EU helps promote democracy, while two-thirds of respondents say that Ukraine and the EU have sufficient common values. The majority of respondents (64%) also agreed with a statement that Ukrainian Government is supporting the action of the EU in Ukraine (64%). Importantly, more than a half
the respondents acknowledged the EU’s normative influence in terms of peace and stability both in Ukraine and in the region. The EU’s level of involvement in Ukraine was deemed appropriate by half of the sample.

**Table 1. Agreement with statements about the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU and Ukraine are good neighbors</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU helps the promotion of democracy through its cooperation activity</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By helping Ukraine the EU is ensuring its own prosperity</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is an important partner of Ukraine</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine and the EU have sufficient common values to be able to cooperate</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ukrainian Government is supporting the action of the EU in Ukraine</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU can help bring peace and stability to Ukraine</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU can help bring peace and stability in the region surrounding Ukraine</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU has the appropriate level of involvement in Ukraine</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU finances development projects in Ukraine</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication from the EU does not take into account the reality of life in Ukraine</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is enough information on the EU available in Ukraine</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication from the EU about Ukraine is easy to understand</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q11: I am now going to read out a series of statements concerning the EU. Can you please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each statement?

Source: OPPOL, 2010, p. 16

Another survey, this time by PEW, tracked confidence in democracy and capitalism in the former USSR (cases of Ukraine, Russia and Lithuania). It found that the EU was perceived by Ukrainians as somewhat influential. When asked to evaluate the influence of the US, the EU and Russia on their respective countries, “a majority in Lithuania (62%) described the EU’s influence on their country as good, compared with only 40% of Ukrainians and 37% of...
Russians who said the same” (PEW, 2011). The same source showed the USA’s and Russia’s good influence on Ukraine noted by 24% and 46% of Ukrainian respondents, respectively.

While the PEW survey does not specify where that influence comes from, the OPPOL survey may provide some answers to that question. The OPPOL study registered visible perceptions of the EU in association with such norms as democracy, peace and human rights. Those are argued by the relevant literature (e.g., Manners, 2002) to be the core features of the EU’s “normative” and “soft” power identity the EU is aspiring to project onto its immediate neighbors (as well as distant international counterparts). As discussed above (Table 1), when respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements about the EU and relations with Ukraine, seven in ten believe that the EU helps promote democracy (70%), while a large number of survey participants also agree that that the EU can help in bringing peace and stability to Ukraine (57%) and that the EU can do the same but in the context of the region (55%).

While the norm of democracy was high on the OPPOL study’s list in 2009–2010, the PEW studies on attitudes towards democracy and capitalism in Ukraine 2009 and 2011 (as well as in Lithuania and Russia) discovered that over time general confidence in democracy and capitalism in these former Soviet Union titular republics has waned (Table 2). Moreover, the “acceptance of—and appetite for—democracy is much less evident today among the publics of the former Soviet titular republics of Russia and Ukraine, who lived the longest under communism” (PEW, 2009, p. 1).

Table 2. Approval of change to democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PEW, 2009, p. 1
Evidence that **peace** is a well recognized EU norm in Ukraine is found in the answers to the OPPOL’s question 17 about the EU’s role in various aspects of Ukrainian life (OPPOL, 2010, p. 17). Most respondents assessed the EU’s role in promoting peace in the country from a positive perspective (54%). This outstripped any other area of involvement, with ‘Fight against poverty’, ‘Education’, ‘Healthcare’ and ‘Growth of economy’ scoring 24%, 27%, 31%, and 33%, respectively. Yet, a significant proportion of respondents (from 32% to 52%) remained undecided. Those respondents had difficulties in describing the EU’s involvement in Ukrainian life either in a positive or negative terms.

**Table 3. Characteristics of the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q6a – Representative</th>
<th>Q6b – Most representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic prosperity</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and security</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law / transparency</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual freedom</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-fulfillment</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for other cultures</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of religion</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the media</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality between men and women</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (SPONTANEOUS)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know (SPONTANEOUS)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these (SPONTANEOUS)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Q6a: I am now going to read out a list of characteristics. I would like you to tell me which of these best represent the EU? Q6b: Of those characteristics you think represent the EU, which one do you think best represents it?*

*Source: OPPOL, 2010, p. 12*
The importance of the norm **human rights** in EU perceptions in Ukraine was picked up by yet another set of answers in the OPPOL questionnaire (Table 3). Defining the characteristics seen as the most suitable ones to describe the EU, respondents picked human rights as the second most visible feature of the EU, following the Union’s economic prosperity. Other norms, such as peace and security, democracy and solidarity, were noted by more than half of the sample. Importantly, when asked to select only one characteristic that is the most representative of the EU, economic prosperity topped the list (with 32%) followed by human rights and peace and security (each 10%).

The 2011 EUMAGINE poll, which studied Ukrainians’ perceptions of the EU in their link to possible migration to the Union, picked up on the Ukrainian publics’ recognition of a number of other norms (Bilan et al., 2012, p. 31). Among those, the **rule of law** (specifically, corruption in the EU was seen to be generally low in contrast to the situation in Ukraine), **good governance** (performance of the EU politician was rated high in contrast to the mistrust expressed by respondents to the Ukrainian politicians), **anti-discrimination** (gender equality was believed to be warranted more in the EU than in Ukraine), **liberty** (freedom of speech was recognized to be higher in the EU than in Ukraine) and **social solidarity** (in particular, social infrastructure in terms of education and healthcare was seen as better in the EU).

### 3.4 Attitude towards the EU

The three public opinion studies examined in this paper also explored the attitudes Ukrainian citizens have towards the EU. In Razumkov Centre’s study in 2006, respondents were asked to evaluate their attitude towards a number of countries and international organizations (on a scale from 0 to 10, where “0” means a very negative attitude, and “10”—the most positive attitude) (Table 4). The EU got a rating of 6.78. This is arguably a mixed message in that it is not wholly positive, but is nonetheless trending towards the positive end of the scale.

PEW’s 2011 survey (PEW, 2011, p. 6) concluded that two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the public in Ukraine (as well as in Lithuania and Russia) share generally positive views of the United States of America and the EU. Overall, the three nations demonstrated favourable predispositions towards the EU and the US (with Lithuanians being in lead to express positivity—78 per cent to the EU and 73 per cent to the US—compared to the ‘Ukrainian’ figures of 72% and 60%, respectively). In contrast to Lithuanians (65%), Ukrainians and Russians were more sceptical of NATO, showing favourability in 34 per
cent (Ukraine) and 37 per cent (Russia) of answers. Importantly, the EU receives positive marks in all three nations surveyed, with approximately seven out of ten respondents in Ukraine expressing positive views.

**Table 4. Evaluate your attitude towards the countries and international organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Average rating</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td><strong>6.78</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States of America</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The poll was held on October 19–26, 2006. The total of 2,006 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%.

Source: Razumkov Centre, 2006

The OPPOL study asked its respondents if the EU elicited a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image. A large number of respondents (46%) note that they have a very positive (10%) or fairly positive (36%) image of the EU. Just 5 per cent of respondents say that they have a very (1%) or fairly negative (4%) image of the EU. More than four in ten (46%) respondents have a neutral image of the EU and 2 per cent were not able to give an opinion (OPPOL, 2010, p. 12).

However, the same OPPOL study (2010, p. 15) found that the EU was also seen as indifferent, competitive and meddling in Ukraine’s affairs (Q10b: Why would you say that Ukraine has NOT benefited from current EU policies?). The theme of “not interested in our situation” (22%) was followed by “undermines local
economy” (20%), “interfering in how we do things” (15%), and “encourages people to leave Ukraine” (13%).

The 2011–2013 EUMAGINE project, which focused on EU perceptions in the light of migration motivations, found out that while the perceptions of Ukraine among the surveyed remained rather negative, the views on Europe/EU were rather positive (Bilan et al., 2012). The study found that these positive perceptions were mostly based on recognition of high standards and quality of life in Europe—an “omnipresent ‘El Dorado’ images of Europe” (Bilan et al., 2012). Yet, the project’s interviews that followed the polls revealed a growing public recognition of the economic problems in the EU due to the ongoing euro debt crisis. The study reported an increasing awareness of these economic troubles and thus more realistic views on the EU; it was no longer seen as a “dreamland” any more.

The attitudes towards the EU were also tested in the question asking if Ukraine need to join the EU. The Razumkov Centre’s ongoing polls indicate that the EU is held in high regard; the majority of respondents, year after year, think that Ukraine needs to join the EU (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Does Ukraine need to join the European Union? (Recurrent, 2002–2012)

Source: Razumkov Centre, 2011

The reason why Ukraine should join the EU could be based on the perceptions of the EU being an influential wealthy neighbor with certain values, but also on particular self-perceptions of Ukrainians as “Europeans”—along the lines “we have the right to belong!” In the Razumkov Centre’s survey, when asked “Is Ukraine a European country?”, more than 50 per cent of respondents saw
Ukraine as belonging to Europe mostly in geographical and historical terms, while economic dimensions were the least fitting (Table 5).

**Table 5. Is Ukraine a European country?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economically</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Razumkov Centre, n.d., b*

However, when asked if they personally consider themselves to be European and belong to the culture and the history of European community, majority of respondents (60.8%) answered in a negative way. Positive answers came from only the third of respondents—33.8 per cent. There seemed to be an age correlation: the older the respondents, the less “European” they felt about themselves (Figs. 3 & 4).

**Figure 3. Do you consider yourself to be European, to belong to the culture and the history of European community?**

*Source: Razumkov Centre, n.d., d*
Finally, Razumkov’s polls assessed the views if Ukraine (and respondents personally) will gain or lose if it joins the EU. While the majority of respondents (irrespective of the regions) believed that Ukraine will gain from EU membership—43.1 per cent (“gain”) versus 28.2 per cent (“lose”), leaving 28.8 per cent for “difficult to answer”, there was clear regional division in terms of personal gains: respondents from western and central Ukraine saw more personal gains, than their counterparts in the south and east who saw more personal losses if Ukraine joins the community (Fig. 5).

**Figure 4. Do you consider yourself to be a European?**

![Graph showing responses to the question of whether respondents consider themselves to be European.](image)

**Source:** Razumkov Centre, n.d., d

**Figure 5. Will you personally gain or lose if Ukraine joins the EU?**

![Graph showing personal gain, loss, and difficulty to answer in different regions of Ukraine.](image)

**Source:** Razumkov Centre, n.d., c
3.5 Knowledge about the EU

In addition to their focus on perceptions, the surveys also attempted to trace the level of awareness and sources of information about the EU. The level of knowledge about the EU in Ukraine was found to be low. The 2,000 respondents in the EUMAGINE study from the four regions concluded that people in Ukraine do not seem to be well informed about conditions in Europe (Bilan et al., 2012, p. 82). The OPPOL study echoed this finding: its survey showed that 62 per cent of the respondents are not familiar with the EU policies and institutions vis-à-vis one-third of the sample who declared that they were very or quite familiar with the EU. Moreover,

[Fire than half of respondents are aware that the EU provides Ukraine with financial support for development programmes. One in five does not believe that the EU provides such support and one-third say they do not know whether such support exists. Less than a third of respondents were able to name an EU programme in Ukraine. (OPPOL, 2010, p. 4)

This low level of awareness seems to match the perception on the information dissemination patterns. More than half (55%) of respondents in the OPPOL study disagreed that there is enough information on the EU available in Ukraine. More than one in four (43%) disagreed that communication from the EU about Ukraine is easy to understand (OPPOL, 2010, p. 15). Both television and Internet were identified by the OPPOL survey as the leading sources of information about the EU (OPPOL, 2010, p. 21).

However, the nature of those sources remained beyond the survey focus. According to Mykhajlo Pashkov, co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, “Ukrainians take information about the EU and the Customs Union first of all from Russian-language sources, then from the Ukrainian ones, and from the Western no more than 4 to 5 per cent” (Razumkov’s Centre, 2013). He also mentioned the lack of experience of personal presence of Ukrainians in the EU countries. Yet, the personal links do matter. The OPPOL study found that discussions with relatives, friends, and colleagues were the fifth most popular source of information about the EU (18%), and, even more importantly, friends and relatives were the most trusted source of information about the EU—68 per cent (OPPOL, 2010, p. 21). The two barriers (language and lack of personal connections) arguably lead to a set of new stereotypes and misconceptions about the EU. Among these Pashkov listed a misinformed view that after the EU Association Agreement is signed, “the EU military bases will...
be located in Ukraine or that Ukraine would turn into a radioactive waste dump” (Razumkov’s Centre, 2013).

4. Discussion: Challenges and opportunities for EU public diplomacy in Ukraine

The insights into the EU-related imagery among the Ukrainian public reveals an uncomfortable message of polarisation and ambiguity. This is a definite challenge for the three modes of EU PD (monologue, dialogue and collaboration) towards the Eastern Neighbourhood in general, and one of its main players, Ukraine.

As suggested by Cowan and Arsenault (2008, p. 13), the concept of monologue in PD is to “convey an idea a vision, or perspective and to present it eloquently and clearly”. Ideally, the EU PD activities on the monologue level should elicit an advanced level of understanding of the EU’s policies, identities and values among the targeted international public. Our findings lead to the conclusion that the EU’s monologue has been partially successful with Ukrainian general public. Several key messages about the EU’s “normative” and “soft” power on the world stage and in the region have been highlighted by the Ukrainians. The OPPOL survey demonstrated that norms such as peace, democracy and human rights entered the perceptions of the EU in Ukraine in a visible and positive way. Yet, the other two polls profiled more cautious results (this is possibly due to the different design of the questionnaire; specifically the OPPOL questionnaire contained a significant number of multiple choice questions with prescribed choices which was different from the questionnaires used by Razumkov Centre and PEW). Satisfaction with democracy was found to be waning in Ukraine over time (PEW surveys’ finding). The EUMAGINE face-to-face qualitative interviews, which complemented the public surveys, indeed found a growing scepticism towards the EU’s images of a “dreamland” and “El Dorado” due to the crisis. Nevertheless, despite the ongoing crisis, the four surveys confirmed that the EU was still seen by Ukrainians as a significant economic power and influential neighbor. This is of importance for EU PD—successes in the monologue outreach can later be used as the basis for two other modes—dialogue and collaboration.

The European Commission (2007) claimed that the EU PD objective is “clearly explaining the EU’s goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue [Authors’ italics] with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media”. General public surveys of the images
of the post-Lisbon EU revealed a potential for the EU PD dialogue mode. Specifically, the findings highlighted an overall positive popular predisposition towards the EU in Ukraine. Indeed, the attitudinal questions in the three surveys gauged predominately positive visions of the EU. This positive attitude seems to rest on the solid ground of recognised similarities—66 per cent of respondents in the OPPOL survey believed that Ukraine and the EU shared common values. However, even though positive views outweighed the negative ones, some ambiguity was present in the attitudes towards the EU. The surveys (OPPOL in particular) also painted the EU as an indifferent, competitive and meddling affluent neighbour. Ukrainian respondents were found by the OPPOL study to be reticent to allow EU influences in the spheres of education and cultures. The PEW survey demonstrated that the EU was seen only as somewhat influential counterpart. Arguably, these images are not conducive to a sincere, “true” dialogue. Importantly, the general public’s awareness of contentious issues in the interactions between the EU and their locations (including economic, political and other tensions and a range of cultural/civilizational issues) is significant. A “true” dialogue “should first and foremost be approached as a method for improving relationships and increasing understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or winning an argument” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 19).

Finally, our analysis suggests that Ukrainian public opinion presents both challenges and opportunities for the EU PD collaboration mode. Productive cross-national collaboration is based on a meaningful dialogue as well as on joint projects when individuals from different cultures “build or achieve something together” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 21). On the positive side, Ukrainian public opinion assigned the EU particular roles in national life. Moreover, the respondents positively endorsed Ukraine’s government’s cooperation with the EU. Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities were also perceived to be firmly associated with the EU (ahead of Russia and the USA). However, while Ukraine is seen to “belong to Europe”, this belonging is seen mostly in geographical and historical terms. In contrast, in terms of economic, political, social and even cultural life, Ukraine was not seen by the public to be “European”. Moreover, on a personal level, most Ukrainians do not see themselves as “Europeans”. However, this perception featured age-specific correlation—it was the older demographics that did not associate themselves with Europe. Finally, while Ukraine is seen to benefit from joining the EU as a member, there is a clear regional split in terms of personal perceptions of gains and losses—the former perspective dominated among the respondents from the west and centre of the country, and the latter in the south and east.
The insights into EU imagery among Ukrainian public prove the “relevance of communications, cultural policy, ideology, psychology and propaganda for the study of international affairs” (Scott-Smith, 2008, p. 173). Arguably, the findings indicated promises and challenges for the EU PD monologue, dialogue and collaboration activities in Ukraine. These findings could be instrumental for the EU’s PD within the framework of a newly established EEAS, especially when it formulates and conducts relations with the EU’s neighbouring countries. Future studies of EU PD in Ukraine may include a more systematic insight into where the information about the EU comes from as the relevant surveys demonstrated a low level of knowledge about the EU, its policies and institutions. Arguably, ignorance breeds stereotypes and misconceptions which can challenge positive perceptions. The OPPOL study identified television and Internet as the leading sources, yet more nuanced insights are needed about the relationship between political, economic and linguistic nature of the outlets and their content. More importantly, respondents’ first-hand experiences of life in modern Europe (e.g., travel to Europe and/or contacts with Europeans, or friends and family members living there (the so-called diaspora) are only addressed in a limited manner. Notably, the OPPOL study as well as the FP7 EUMAGINE project has started to explore these dimensions in EU perceptions. The assumption here is that personal links should not be underestimated by the EU PD, and, in this light, future surveys may also ask what those contacts have been doing in Europe (tourists, students, short-term, long-term or circular migrants, legal and possibly illegal). In Cull’s (2008, P. 47) view, the creation of relevant PD policies should consider refugees, migrants (both documented and illegal), and workers who “live in communities that exist simultaneously in both in the developed and developing world and spend time of the year in each”. These are individuals who possess first-hand experience of life in modern-day Europe, and thus they could become key players in EU PD collaboration efforts, serving as nodes of information that disseminate opinions of the EU within their specific personal and professional networks in their country of origin (Chaban et al., 2011).

Closer attention to the age-specific correlations in EU perceptions is yet another promising avenue of analysis for scholars and practitioners of EU PD in Ukraine. As discussed above, younger demographics in Ukraine profile slightly different patterns in perceptions, including a more pronounced self-identification as “being European”. Another direction of future research is to continue elaboration of the region-specific views on the EU, which provide a useful set of findings for EU PD in such a large and diverse country as Ukraine. Arguably, these self-visions are conducive to the future of the EU’s outreach to Ukraine both in public and traditional diplomacy terms.
5. Conclusions

The changing “interpolar” world of networks and interconnections demands new skills to succeed in diplomacy both traditional and public. Among those, there is an ability to conduct a dialogue-based monologue, to initiate and maintain a “true” dialogue and strike meaningful long-lasting collaborations. With traditional diplomacy getting “increasingly contested for its inherent lack of transparency” (Proedrou & Frangonikolopoulos, 2012, p. 731), public diplomacy offers analytical and practical tools to acquire, implement and reflect on those skills. This analysis demonstrated the value of systematic listening—one level of PD activities—to the international public to the conduct of international relations in general, and to a reforming EU PD in particular. While the EU-Ukraine official interactions are mired in contradictions and empty rhetoric, attentive listening to the Ukrainian general public reveals opportunities for both the EU and Ukraine. Systematic self-reflection is useful for Ukraine when it is formulating its geopolitical priorities. Nuanced understanding of what is appreciated and what is rejected in the EU’s normative identity, why and how the range of attitudes takes place, and how self-identification of “being European” feeds into perceptions of the EU provides an informed basis for the EU’s effective communication strategy with its important neighbour, Ukraine. This is becoming vital in the light of Ukraine’s declared aspirations to sign the Association Agreement with the EU—since the document includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement as well, the significance of systematic listening (for both Ukraine and the EU) is growing in the most dramatic way and as we speak.

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