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Title: The role of multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism; the case of Shanghai Cooperation organization

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ABBREVIATIONS

SCO – The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

UN – The United Nations

NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

US – The United States

CTC – The Counter-Terrorism Committee under the UN Security Council

ISAF – The International Security Assistance Force

EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

PfP – The Partnership for Peace

UNSCR – The United Nations Security Council resolution

CHG – The Council of Heads of Government of the SCO

CSTO – The Collective Security Treaty Organization

RATS – The Regional Antiterrorist Structure of the SCO

CRRF – The Collective Rapid Reaction Force of CSTO

CIS – The Commonwealth of Independent States

PRC – The People's Republic of China

OSCE – The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

CAR – The Central Asian Republics

HTI – Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami

CIS ATC – The CIS Anti-terrorism Center

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CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| ABBREVIATIONS----- | II |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ----- | III |
| ABSTRACT ----- | V |
| INTRODUCTION ----- | 1 |
| I CHAPTER.TERRORISM AS A TRANSNATIONAL THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY ----- | 10 |
| 1.1. The main features and definition of transnational terrorism ----- | 10 |
| 1.2. Causes of terrorist activity at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries ----- | 15 |
| 1.3. Characteristics of the development of transnational terrorism in modern conditions and the necessity for joint struggle against it ----- | 21 |
| II CHAPTER. MULTILATERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL ----- | 30 |
| 2.1. The role of the UN in the fight against terrorism as a universal intergovernmental organization ----- | 30 |
| 2.2. The anti-terrorist activities of NATO, as a regional military-political association - ----- | 37 |
| 2.3. International Anti-Terrorist Coalition as an example of anti-terrorism activities outside the framework of intergovernmental organizations ----- | 44 |
| III CHAPTER. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTITERRORIST VECTOR OF COOPERATION AS A BASIC DIRECTION OF SCO ACTIVITIES ----- | 52 |
| 3.1. Formation of the SCO as a full-fledged regional organization and the main areas of cooperation within the SCO ----- | 52 |
| 3.2. The SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism ----- ----- | 61 |
| 3.3. The place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism ----- | 71 |
| CONCLUSION ----- | 81 |
| REFERENCES ----- | 90 |

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the thesis is to reveal the role of multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism and to identify the place of the Shanghai Cooperation organization in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism. The object of the study is the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism. The subject of the study is the role of multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism; the place of the Shanghai Cooperation organization in this cooperation. In his work the author:

- revealed the characteristics of modern transnational terrorism in accordance with the criterion of the significance of these features for multilateral anti-terrorist struggle;
- traced the development of multilateral interstate cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism;
- reviewed the existing mechanisms to counter this threat within specific multilateral organizations, analyzed their functioning, assessed the compliance of the measures taken with the nature of the transnational terrorist threat and identified some problems in their activities;
- analyzed the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism, defined the place and role of the SCO in the multilateral struggle against transnational terrorism and showed the prospects for increasing the effectiveness of this organization in this direction.

As a result of the analysis of the activities of multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO and the SCO, it was possible to establish that the lack of a single and complete understanding of the specific nature of the threat of transnational terrorism is today the main barrier to effective interstate cooperation at all levels. Unfortunately, none of the analyzed multilateral associations has yet come to the realization that transnational terrorism poses a threat to the modern state-centered political system of the world, that is, ultimately, a threat to the existence of the national states that form these multilateral organizations.

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the topic. After the end of the cold war, the world community faced new challenges and security threats that were previously considered secondary, among which "transnational terrorism" occupies a special place, which can lead to destabilization of the international situation in the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, which became the most large-scale terrorist acts in the history of mankind, clearly demonstrated the unpreparedness of the world community to repel the threat of new transnational terrorism, which is fighting in many countries of the world and setting global goals.

The terrorist method, as an instrument of political struggle, has been used since ancient times. The internationalization of terrorist activities is also not an innovation, as terrorism has previously moved beyond national borders. Modern transnational terrorism poses a threat to the Westphalian system of national states, which has been the basis of interstate cooperation for more than 350 years. It is the threat of the destruction of the modern political system of the world that speaks about the possibility and necessity of the joint struggle of different states with transnational terrorism, which in the 21st century really became one of the global problems of world political development.

Thus, the world community has to solve several rather complex and interrelated tasks. First, it is necessary to fight the terrorist method itself, which is today the main object of multilateral and domestic efforts. This also includes the search for and prosecution of members of transnational terrorist organizations involved in the implementation or planning of terrorist acts. Secondly, in addition to combating the terrorist method, it is necessary to try to resolve the underlying political problems underlying transnational terrorism, connected with the existing contradictions of the current stage of world political development, so that the terrorists' alternative to the political system of the world will lose its attractiveness. This, in turn, will reduce the influx of new recruits for terrorist organizations and sharply reduce the number of sympathizers, as the latter will have the opportunity to

voice their concerns and put forward proposals through institutionalized channels of communication. Thus, we are talking about finding an acceptable option for the participation of all cultures and civilizations, including Islamic, in the process of global development.

The problem of transnational terrorism is firmly entrenched, as one of the central themes of the security agenda of the world's largest states and international organizations, which is evidence of the importance of counteracting this phenomenon at the present stage.

International organizations do not stand aside from the antiterrorist problem. Among them, one can highlight the work of the only universal organization in the world - the United Nations. The General Assembly adopted the first in the history of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which formulated the general provisions of the anti-terrorist struggle for the member countries of this organization.

In the list of priority areas of activity of many regional organizations, the problem of terrorism also occupies the top lines. In particular, at the NATO summit held in Riga in late November 2006, the Final Statement of the Heads of State or Government attending the meeting of the North Atlantic Council states: "We strongly condemn terrorism, no matter what it motivates, in any form, and we will fight with it together until it is necessary, in accordance with international law and the principles of the United Nations."

The European Union, as the leading multidirectional integration association in the European space, also perceives the problem of transnational terrorism as a serious threat to its member countries, which became especially evident after the terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 in Madrid. On 4-5 May 2006 in Vienna, the International Conference on International Security, organized by the Presidency of the European Union, Austria, adopted the Vienna Declaration on Partnership for Security, Part 2 of which, "On Combating Terrorism" states: "The recent terrorist atrocities only underscore the fact that it is no longer possible to distinguish between external and internal security, and terrorism itself is increasingly transnational in nature. As a

result, international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism must become an important element of external relations."

Multilateral efforts to combat transnational terrorism are being made in other regions of the world, in particular, in the Eurasian space, where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established in 2001, has already established itself as one of the leading players.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an international organization founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO is a multilateral association whose activities are aimed at ensuring security and maintaining stability in the vast Euro-Asian area, jointly opposing new challenges and threats, strengthening trade, economic and cultural-humanitarian cooperation.

The historic SCO summit in Astana on June 8-9, 2017 opened a new stage in the development of the Organization. One of its most important results was the granting of India and Pakistan the status of full members of the association. The entry into the SCO of two powerful and authoritative states of South Asia has expanded the potential and range of the Organization's work opportunities, including in the field of joint counteraction to traditional and new challenges and threats.

The vast area of the SCO, with a total population of almost 44% of the world population, poses the principal task of collective ensuring stability, effective counteraction to joint threats and security challenges along the whole contour of the zone of responsibility of the largest regional organization in the world today. Uniting the four nuclear powers - half of the world nuclear club - the format of the SCO is an additional pillar of the system of maintaining world strategic stability.

Terrorism poses a serious threat to the security and stability of Central Asia, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. Therefore, the SCO countries, considering their main task to combat this threat, express their common position and coordinate their efforts to combat them.

All of the above illustrates the importance attached to the problem of combating transnational terrorism, both at the national and international levels.

Terrorists of the XXI century, possessing a high degree of mobility, can strike their blow anywhere in the world and today virtually no country in the world can be immune from terrorist acts, just as no state can cope with this problem alone. The challenge facing the international community is extremely complex: it must try to prevent future terrorist attacks by improving the exchange of information and preventing terrorists from obtaining the means to fulfill them, and at the same time preventing the already prepared terrorist acts. Given the nature of transnational terrorism, none of these tasks can be resolved without intensive international cooperation, since many terrorist acts are planned in one country, implemented in another, and the perpetrators themselves are citizens of third countries.

The current understanding of the need for joint action to overcome the transnational terrorist threat is indeed a significant achievement. For example, during the Cold War, when the two superpowers actually controlled global political processes and sometimes provided explicit or implicit support to terrorist groups and movements, effective multilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism at the international level was difficult. The disintegration of the bipolar system gave new impetus to the development of international cooperation in new areas, including, in the antiterrorist sphere. For example, in the 1990s the UN adopted a number of new antiterrorist conventions. In addition, joint efforts have succeeded in sharply limiting the phenomenon of international terrorism with state support, which was developed in the 1980s.

However, in the same 1990's, national states did not attach much importance to the emergence of a new type of terrorism - transnational. It is the terrorist threat from well-organized transnational clandestine groups that is currently one of the main problems of global security. Terrorists of the 21st century, who have strong religious motivation as an ideological basis, are trying to inflict as much damage as possible. To achieve this, they can even try to obtain nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons.

In addition, transnational terrorism quite clearly demonstrated the imperfection of modern international security structures aimed at containing and repelling the

threat posed by national states. For a long time, terrorism was considered only as a problem of the internal security of each individual country, i.e. was, mainly, the object of attention of the internal security organs. Modern transnational terrorism clearly showed the limitations of this approach. Thus, today the issue on building up existing institutions for ensuring international security, and also, perhaps, creating new ones, whose aim will be not only a repulse of possible aggression on the part of states, but also protection from the external threat emanating from such non-state actor, as transnational terrorism. In this regard, it is necessary for states to establish cooperation in a new area for them.

The purpose of the thesis is to reveal the role of multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism and to identify the place of the Shanghai Cooperation organization in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism.

The tasks of the thesis. For achieving the goals, which set in the work, it was necessary to solve the following tasks:

- To identify the main features and definition of transnational terrorism;
- To reveal the causes of terrorist activity at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries;
- To identify the characteristics of the development of transnational terrorism in modern conditions and the necessity for joint struggle against it;
- To show the role of the UN in the fight against terrorism as a universal intergovernmental organization;
- To analyze the anti-terrorist activities of NATO, as a regional military-political association;
- To explore the main directions of activity of International Anti-Terrorist Coalition as an example of anti-terrorism activities outside the framework of intergovernmental organizations;
- To analyze the formation of the SCO as a full-fledged regional organization and to study the main areas of cooperation within the SCO;

- To reveal the essence the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism;
- To analyze the place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism.

The object of the study is the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism.

The subject of the study is the role of multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism; the place of the Shanghai Cooperation organization in this cooperation.

Analysis of the literature. In foreign scientific literature, the problem of international cooperation in combating the terrorist threat has long remained outside the field of view of researchers. In particular, until 1995, in one of the leading American journals on terrorism, "Terrorism and Political Violence", there was not a single article on the role of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism or international anti-terrorism cooperation in general. As Jan Lesser, an analyst at RAND Corporation, points out, "Most modern studies view terrorist political violence as an independent phenomenon, outside its geopolitical or strategic contexts." Lesser advocates a "central" strategy and a "multidimensional" approach, which will include not only direct responses to manifestations of terrorism, but also the formation of an international environment for rejecting this phenomenon.

The source database of the study is made up of official UN, NATO, EU and SCO documents, the study of which contributed to a better understanding of the essence of the problem, the positions of states and international organizations on this issue, and important trends in the development of international cooperation in combating terrorism. In addition, the basic documents of terrorist organizations, interviews with their leaders and followers are of interest.

The problem of terrorism, in connection with its development into one of the global problems of our time, has been devoted to a considerable amount of research. In many of them, the emphasis is more on specific aspects of the manifestation of terrorism (for example, the relationship between terrorism and international drug

trafficking, the problem of separating terrorist organizations from criminal ones, the possibility of terrorists using nuclear weapons, cyberterrorism, the maritime aspect of the fight against terrorism, the information aspect of the fight against terrorism and etc.) and, to a lesser extent, on issues of direct anti-terrorist activities.

Features of the development of the modern political system of the world and the problems of its adaptation to modern conditions were reflected in the works of A.D.Bogaturov, M.M.Lebedeva, A.Y.Melville, J.Naia, R.Cohen, J.Rosenau, and others. An alternative project of the world political system, advocated by transnational terrorists in place of the Western state-centric model that exists today, is devoted to the studies of M.M. Lebedeva, N.V.Zhdanov, A. Malashenko, V. Wagner, J. Esposito, B. Tibi.

Among the western studies of the problems of terrorism, we can mention the collective work edited by M. Krenshaw, in which many prominent Western experts on terrorism reveal the characteristics of the activities of the main terrorist organizations of the 20th century, as well as the two-volume encyclopedic work edited by M. Krenshaw and J. Pimlogg "Encyclopedia of World Terrorism ", Which is the most complete overview of the work on terrorism.

Among the peculiarities of transnational terrorism affecting the development of both national and international anti-terrorism measures, its transnational network structure is of particular interest. One of the fundamental works in this matter is the work of researchers from the American "RAND Corporation" J. Arkill, D. Ronfeldt and M. Zanini "Networks, network wars and terrorism of the information age". In addition, the work of E. Soloviev, M. Levitt, R. Paz, M. Sejman, D. Watts, the collective study edited by D. Rapoport and others are devoted to the analysis of terrorist networks.

The issues of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's activities in countering terrorism were reflected in the studies of I. N. Komissnoy, A. A. Kurtov, A. Lukin, E. Merkulova, A. Mochulsky, M. Shaikhutdinov, G. Gleason, and others.

Research questions:

1. What are the main directions of activity of International Anti-Terrorist Coalition?
2. What is the essence the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism?
3. What is the place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism?

The methodological and theoretical basis of the thesis. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is determined by the tasks listed above and is based on the principles of objectivity, concreteness, historicism, systemic character and the study of social phenomena. The paper uses qualitative research to understand the main causes and motivations of transnational terrorists and international organizations that are fighting it, in particular the SCO and to identify the main trends in multilateral cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism.

In addition, general scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis and comparative method have made it possible to comprehensively study multilateral cooperation as phenomena in the fight against transnational terrorism, to conduct a comparative analysis of the activities of various interstate organizations in the fight against transnational terrorism and to reveal the role of the SCO in this multilateral cooperation.

When using legal and normative methods, regulatory legal documents dealing with the issue of multilateral cooperation in combating transnational terrorism and its specific features were studied. In the study, the place and role of the SCO in the fight against transnational terrorism also used a variety of methodological tools, techniques and scientific approaches to such related disciplines as philosophy, sociology, political science and history, which allowed the author to effectively and holistically investigate the problem posed.

The novelty of the study. An analysis of the literature in this topic shows that there are a number of works in the world dedicated to the issue of combating transnational terrorism, the activities of international organizations that are struggling

with this global problem and at the same time researching the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc. But, such problems as the role of the SCO in counter-terrorism as an intergovernmental organization and the multilateral cooperation in fight against the transnational terrorism have not been investigated. These problems were scrutinized for the first time in this thesis. From this point of view, the scientific novelty of this work is determined. In his work the author:

- revealed the characteristics of modern transnational terrorism in accordance with the criterion of the significance of these features for multilateral anti-terrorist struggle;

- traced the development of multilateral interstate cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism;

- reviewed the existing mechanisms to counter this threat within specific multilateral organizations, analyzed their functioning, assessed the compliance of the measures taken with the nature of the transnational terrorist threat and identified some problems in their activities;

- analyzed the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism, defined the place and role of the SCO in the multilateral struggle against transnational terrorism and showed the prospects for increasing the effectiveness of this organization in this direction.

The theoretical and practical significance of the study is that the results contribute to the theoretical development of the approach to transnational terrorism and the identification of promising areas of research in this field, provide insight into the current state of multilateral antiterrorism cooperation at the global and regional levels, and identify the specifics of the participation of multilateral interstate institutions in the field of counteracting modern terrorism. The thesis is a new material for the preparation and teaching of courses on world politics and contemporary international relations.

The structure of the thesis. The structure of the thesis is determined by the purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an introduction, three chapters (including a total of 9 paragraphs) conclusions and references.

I CHAPTER. TERRORISM AS A TRANSNATIONAL THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY

1.1. The main features and definition of transnational terrorism

Transnational terrorism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. In the approach to the interpretation of this type of terrorism, many specialists often express opposing opinions. Even the name "transnational terrorism" is not universally accepted, as many authors use the terms international and transnational as synonyms (88, p.68), and in Azerbaijan Republic the modern terrorism is referred to primarily as international terrorism. There is also no single understanding of transnational terrorism at the international level, and in this work it is understood as terrorist acts aimed ultimately at destroying or destroying the modern political system of the world. Despite all the above difficulties in understanding transnational terrorism, one can nevertheless highlight some of its specific features.

First, the main goal of transnational terrorism is the reconstruction of the world in other, more just, in the opinion of terrorists, principles. Thus, transnational terrorism is a method of implementing an alternative global project of political development. For a terrorist group, this is a major task.

Secondly, the main actors of transnational terrorism are formally non-state organizations and groups (15, p.83). Basically, they carry out their activities on the territory of several states and have a sufficiently developed infrastructure, including government bodies, training camps for militants, etc. To structures of this type, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (58, p.58) can be classified.

Thirdly, transnational terrorism poses a threat to international law and order and security, which always damages not only several states, but the entire political system as a whole. An example of such activities can serve as hostage taking, among which are citizens of different countries, or hijacking aircraft. This, however, does not exclude the fact that transnational terrorism poses a threat to the internal security of the states in whose territory the direct terrorist attacks take place.

Fourthly, there is constant cooperation between individual terrorist organizations. In recent years, the practice of providing mutual assistance to each other by personnel, experience, military-technical means, etc., has been increasingly extended by terrorist organizations.

Speaking about multilateral cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism, it is useful to identify the main features that distinguish it from terrorism of the past. According to J. Nye, the development of modern transnational terrorism is determined by two groups of factors (45, p.5). First, it is scientific and technological progress. Modern civilization consists of complex high-tech systems and is practically unthinkable without their uninterrupted functioning. However, as they become more complex, these systems become more vulnerable and fragile. As a result, this leads to the fact that the infrastructure becomes "vulnerable to local accidents, which, in turn, can cause large-scale or catastrophic accidents" (39, p.138).

At the same time, progress "democratized technology", which made the tools of mass destruction more compact, cheaper and affordable for a wide range of individuals and groups. If before the bombs and watch mechanisms to them were bulky and expensive, now plastic explosives and digital timers to it are light and relatively cheap. As noted by J. Nye "Today, the cost of capturing an aircraft sometimes only slightly exceeds the price of an air ticket" (65, p.5).

In addition, the widespread introduction of information technology makes it possible to use relatively inexpensive means of communication, allowing groups formerly operating within the jurisdiction of national law enforcement agencies to become global. Thirty years ago the instant communication system was quite expensive and only structures financially financed, in particular, national states, large transnational corporations, etc., could afford them. Today, thanks to the Internet, global communication has become almost free for anyone with access to a modem and a telephone line (66, p.247). In addition, the emergence and widespread use of the Internet has seriously reduced the costs of searching for information and establishing the necessary contacts.

Secondly, this is a change in the motivation and organization of terrorist groups. Terrorists in the mid-twentieth century had, as a rule, specific political goals related to the change in the political regime in a particular country, or the separation of part of the territory for the implementation of which large-scale terrorist acts were of little use. By the end of the 20th century, radical organizations had a new large-scale task - the reconstruction of the modern world on the basis of supposedly Islamic religious values. Although nationalist and separatist terrorism continues to exist, the increased number of religiously motivated non-state terrorist groups with ambiguous goals that divide people into "believers" and others, leads to serious concern about the possible absence of any deterrent factors in the performance of terrorist acts, including with the use of weapons of mass destruction. As Walter Laqueur noted, "traditional terrorists, whether of left or right wing, or national separatist, did not seek serious destruction ... Since then, terrorists have become more violent and less selective (in choosing their attacks' goals)" (43, p.234). The organization of terrorist groups has also changed. For example, Al-Qaeda, which had several tens of thousands of supporters organized around weakly connected cells in more than 60 countries, is an unprecedented terrorist organization. But even in small networks it is now much more difficult to penetrate than into the hierarchical, almost military structures of terrorist organizations of the past.

Both groups of technological and ideological factors contributed to the fact that terrorism became, on the one hand, more deadly, and on the other, more resistant to attempts at counteraction.

The technological process made it possible for deviant groups and individuals to have such destructive possibilities as were formerly only for states and their armed forces. If in the past development of new destructive technologies required the concentration of powerful state resources, today this is no longer the case. The state's monopoly on the creation of new technologies seems to be also eroded.

One of the most important features of modern transnational terrorism is its Islamization. It is necessary to determine the reasons why transnational terrorists

derive their inspiration from Islam and why they propose to replace the existing system of national states with the Islamic caliphate.

Today, every fifth inhabitant of the land professes Islam. This religion is of a decentralized type, where many aspects of religious life remain at the discretion of the clerical authority at the local or regional levels, which allows us to interpret the Quran through various cultural prisms (48, p.78). However, Islam is not only a religion, but something more. As noted, for example, the famous American scholar of Islam J. Esposito "For most Muslims, Islam is a universal way of life ... Islam for them is inseparable from politics, legislation, education, public life and economics (24, p.156)." According to another researcher, Anwar Abd al-Malek, "Islam is more a social concept of the national order, social evolution, and progress than the ordinary religious movement" (24, p.156).

As writes A.B. Kudryavtsev, the majority of extremist groups acting under the banner of Islam, derive their origin from the Society of Muslim Brothers, which Hasan-ul-Banna founded in Egypt in the late 1920s (40). Having emerged as a religious organization for "correcting the morals" of Muslims, the "Muslim Brotherhood" quickly turned into a semblance of a political party with a clear ideology.

At the moment there are at least half a thousand sectarian sects, the most famous of which are Al Qaeda and the World Front against Jews and Crusaders, created by bin Laden in 1988 and 1998 respectively, Egyptian Al Jihad, "Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya", the "Ansar al-Islam", the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" operating in Iraq, etc. Extremism and terrorism in the Islamic world come not from Islam itself, but from the sum of factors that determine the favorable ground for terrorism in a number of states in this world.

In modern conditions, terrorism is also an instrument of struggle, but no longer tactical, as it was before, but of a strategic nature(70, p.49). International terrorists operating under the flag of radical Islam, in fact, offer the world a global project, an alternative to the Western one. According to Zeyno Baran, "... the West is trying to draw into a clash between two rival ideologies in the Islamic world. Supporters of the

first ideology believe that Islam can be combined with secular democracy and basic civil liberties. Supporters of the second are committed to the idea of replacing the existing world system with a new caliphate, i.e. global Islamic state "(2, p.53). Another important aspect of modern terrorism is the change in the structure and functioning of the group itself. In the past, terrorist organizations were closed, underground cells with a hierarchical structure, led by a leader, and the members of the organization were in constant contact with each other (9, p.413).

An important factor of modern terrorism is the development of mass media, including electronic media. It is thanks to the media that terrorists, after having committed one terrorist attack, cause a resonance all over the world and draw the attention of the entire world public to the defended goal. Without newspapers, radio and television, terrorists would not attract such attention and would not be able to create an atmosphere of fear. With the widespread use of mass media, it became possible to turn them into a tool for manipulating the mass consciousness. As S. Tsytsarev points out, "In the era of the domination of the media, terrorism has acquired completely new qualities. Therefore, for example, the murder of Emperor Paul I, which was an act of terrorism in order to change the political regime, and the murder of Ahmad Qadyrov are two completely different events ... Now terrorists are sure that they always have involuntary "allies" - the mass media information that everyone will show and all will be frightened. And the better the media work, the more information they give - the more effective the intimidation will be "(93). Perhaps that is why the terrorists began to conduct a kind of "show terror" (49, p.133), designed for the general public and "beautiful recognizability" (105), and not only to inflict maximum damage or harm. The specific "advertising" character of modern terrorism, characterized by the desire to spread panic among the masses, to direct the demonstrative effect of terror to the maximum number of people, can be attributed to the development factor of the media.

Modern terrorist acts are, as a rule, large-scale and with a large number of victims (32, p.59). Terrorism has become "blind" or massive. In part, this can be explained by the fact that in today's religiously motivated terrorism, there is a clear

distinction between "those who are with us and those who are against us." The latter, naturally, are subject to destruction. In addition, a democratic form of government presupposes the full power of the people. Accordingly, it is the population that should become the main object of terror, so that subsequently they make correct conclusions in the elections and referendums and obey the demands of terrorists.

In most of the high-profile terrorist attacks of recent years, as successful, and not, terrorist organizations have actively used suicide bombers. For the first time, Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka, and now actively used by both Palestinian terrorists and Chechens, suicide bombers are still a relatively new phenomenon in terrorism. (31, p.242) Previously, terrorists still tried to communicate their demands and stay alive. The use of suicide bombers is probably related to the toughening of the position of states towards terrorists, which consists in refusing to negotiate with them and the general tendency towards their physical destruction. Thus, the use of suicide bombers can be considered a response to increased measures to counter terrorists by the state.

1.2. Causes of terrorist activity at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries

The events of September 11, 2001 gave impetus to the fact that researchers, politicians, reviewers and experts began to discuss the causes of terrorist activities with renewed vigor. The commonplace of these analyzes was confusion with the motives of terrorists, assumptions about the conditions conducive to or leading to such actions, as well as general judgments about recommendations that would help eliminate the causes of terrorist activity. Such a search for answers to many questions of terrorist activity is quite understandable, especially given the fact that the participants in the antiterrorist coalition were faced with the question of developing measures to counter terrorism in the long term. Although the scale of the terrorist action of September 11 is unprecedented, the questions that the experts tried to find answers have already sounded more than once. There are many attempts to explain the causes of terrorism and they are valuable material necessary for understanding the nature of the current terrorist threat (11; 15).

After the disintegration of the bipolar system, international relations are in a transitional state. The erosion of the Westphalian state-centered political system of the world, on the basic principles of which international relations have existed for more than 350 years, leads to the emergence of new transnational actors of international relations, such as transnational corporations, non-governmental international organizations, intra-state regions and even individual individuals (46, p.77). The state, while remaining, of course, the leading actor on the world stage, no longer has a monopoly on international activity, as it was before. Moreover, a number of states are already losing their economic potential to large transnational companies (45, p.138). Thus, it becomes obvious that the state-centered political structure of the world requires, at a minimum, an adaptation to the current situation, and, as a maximum, a replacement for a new one that fully reflects the current state of affairs in the international sphere.

During this period of uncertainty about the future of the world political system, an alternative project of the world political system arises, designed to replace the Western model of the nation-state, which presupposes the creation of a global Islamic caliphate and promoted by terrorist methods. To date, there are a number of approaches to explaining the reasons for the emergence of this transnational terrorist movement in the Muslim world, but among the hypotheses put forward, there are three main approaches to which M.M. Lebedeva, analyzing the principles of the development of the conflicts of the XXI century, to which she also includes transnational terrorism (44, p.271).

The first proceeds from the existence between the Western and Islamic worlds of fundamental value irreconcilable contradictions. This hypothesis is based mainly on the idea of a possible intercivilizational conflict put forward by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 in the article "The Collision of Civilization?" (33; 34). The main idea of S. Huntington is that there is a growing and fundamental cultural as well as ideological incompatibility between the Christian and Muslim civilizations, which will eventually lead to the next big confrontation after the end of the Cold War, where on the one hand a

militant Islam, and on the other, the modernization model advocated by Western countries. If the origins of the current threat of transnational terrorism are indeed in the value plane, then it is unlikely to overcome this threat in the short term. If Huntington is right and a large-scale intercivilizational conflict, preceded by transnational terrorism, really comes, then in order to successfully cope with this problem, it is likely that the Western world will need to apply classical force methods of suppressing resistance. However, this solution to the problem will be correct only if the theory of S. Huntington is correct and the approaching intercivilizational conflict is exactly what we are now observing.

Close to the idea of S. Huntington about the "clash of civilizations", one can also assume that transnational terrorism is a reaction of rejection of the process of Westernization that is taking place in the world. It, unlike globalization, is a fairly old phenomenon, implying the spread of social, economic and political modern Western values and structures in the world (capitalism, rationalism, industrialization, bureaucracy, language, culture, etc.), first of all American. The processes of Westernization interfere with the development of local cultures, suppressing identity.

The actions of Islamic fundamentalism, ideologically fueling transnational terrorism, may be a reaction to an attempt to westernize the Muslim world from Western countries, and above all the United States. The aggravation of contradictions does not occur on an interdenominational basis, but as a result of a reaction to attempts to Westernize the Muslim world, which, as already noted, is increasingly tuned to the implementation of its own global alternative to the Western one (105).

The second hypothesis regarding the causes of the emergence of transnational terrorism is in the economic plane and assumes that it is a response to the growing gap between the "global North" and the "global South" and, in particular, the international forces of globalization (20). One of the forms of globalization is the process of the formation on a global scale of a single financial, information and economic space based on new, mainly computer technologies (23, p.62).

The main barrier to participation in this process is the low level of education and poverty, which is characteristic of the developing world and prevents it from

using the results of the globalization process. At the same time, the unity of the market provides a general and unprecedented sharpness of competition, in which the developed countries primarily benefit. As a result, modern processes lead to a deterioration in the conditions of the existence of the main (and at the same time all the time increasing) part of humanity due to the acceleration of the development and growth of the welfare of its absolute minority, the so-called. «Golden billion». Due to the peculiarities of historical development, most of the poor live in Muslim countries today. If the gap between 20% of the poorest and 20% of the richest parts of the world population in the XX century was 3 units, today it reached 86 (105). As a result, the modern world has become similar to a pyramid: the top is a group of highly developed industrial states, below is an average country. Together they make up only one-tenth of humanity. At the bottom of the pyramid is the rest, the "third" world, i.e. the remaining nine-tenths of the world's population. It is in the "third world" countries that the forces that perceive such civilizational construction as socially unfair appeared and became active. Unable to use legitimate methods of fighting the emerging world order, and because of its historical, political and social development, as well as the apparent superiority of the Western military machine, they choose the terrorist method, motivating it with the need to protect Islamic values. However, the connection directly with Islam is less obvious because it is more connected with the social and economic situation of Muslims, the conditions of their lives, which daily reproduce the nutrient medium for the growth and strengthening of the sense of injustice. Social stratification and political schism in societies around the world have discarded the majority of the population as social outcasts and have engendered a huge mass of marginal that create the basis for the formation of a transnational terrorist "international". Thus, terrorism against the US and the Western world can be seen as a form of protest against globalization, which Western countries are actively propagating, and a growing social and economic stratification. (16, p.54) However, one should not overestimate the significance of this factor, the more it should be absolutized. Muslim countries cannot be attributed, even purely geographically, to the "global South", they are located in the so-called buffer zone

between the "North" and "South". Transnational terrorism is born not by poverty and by the desire of the destitute to achieve a higher standard of living. As GI writes. Mirsky, "The problem of poverty and material backwardness does not occupy a central place in the ideology of extremists, and they themselves do not belong to the descendants of the poorest sections of the population" (38, p.213). The third proposed hypothesis boils down to the fact that the causes of transnational terrorism lie in the response to the hegemonic, unilateral and often unfair foreign policy of the United States, which causes discontent in many parts of the world (71, p.268). For example, M. Crenshaw believes that modern manifestations of terrorism are the result of the expansion of the civil war in the world system. In her view, the greater US exposure to transnational terrorism is the result of their growing influence abroad, and terrorist attacks on US interests are an attempt to achieve radical political changes in other countries. M. Crenshaw considers terrorist acts, and in particular the events of September 11, as "a strategic reaction to American influence in the context of a globalized civil war" (12, p.427). And the United States, which always supports Israel's position unconditionally, is also responsible for the fact that this conflict has not yet been resolved.

It is necessary to do colossal analytical work at the level of analysis of the international system in order to confirm or refute the hypotheses put forward. These areas of analysis have not been developed in large part because studies of terrorism and international relations hardly ever intersect, and different visions of problems and methods have led to the formation of established views and opinions prevailing in each of the areas of research.

Another important factor in the rise and spread of transnational terrorism is an aspect of the crisis of the Westphalian world model, as an expansion of the number of "failed states", only on paper being national states, and in practice, lost all the necessary attributes of statehood. That is, the danger first of all is not represented by "rogue states", as they, according to the state-centric model of the world, want to see in Washington, namely "failed states" that cannot provide control over their territory and where terrorists have complete freedom of action (31, p.37). The examples of

Sudan and Afghanistan have clearly shown that "failed states" may well become a haven for terrorist organizations. The term "failed state" has many interpretations, but the general definition is that it is a state that does not correspond to the characteristics described in Max Weber's definition. In addition to monitoring all "actions taking place" in his jurisdiction, Weber writes that "the claims of a modern state to a monopoly in the use of force are just as important as compulsory jurisdiction and organizational constancy"(118, p.158). "Failed states" cannot provide control over their own sovereign territory, which creates conditions for the emergence of internal sources of instability. As a rule, such states are characterized by deteriorating living standards, corruption, lack of civil society and underdeveloped services (81, p.129). Thus, it is not surprising that terrorist groups are particularly active in those states where the political regime cannot actively oppose them or, in the case of the Sudan and Afghanistan, even depends in part on them (94, p.232). Competent states should be responsible for violent acts that occur as a result of the presence on their territory of terrorist organizations. But the "failed states" themselves are more "hostages" of terrorists than the root causes of terrorist activity (60, p.93). Such states attract terrorists because of the high degree of autonomy of actions they provide to terrorist organizations on their territory. This happens in many respects contrary to the wishes of the states themselves, since they cannot effectively control their territory.

However, in the fight against transnational terrorism, one cannot concentrate exclusively on "failed" and "weak" states. Even if the state can consider itself relatively strong, this does not necessarily mean that it does not have separate territories with weak state control. That is why it is important to pay special attention to the so-called "unmanageable localities" or "uncontrolled territories" (3). The government of Israel calls them "X territories" (84, p.27). In the 1980s, the French researcher on terrorism, Kzawie Rofer, warned of imminent battles in the so-called "gray zones". He noted that uncontrolled territories, often marked on maps in gray, are "territories where the nation-state has completely disappeared, and the real power is in the hands of a coalition of militants and partisan detachments" (76, p.74). Although the "gray zones" are present in all regions of the world, the Arab world

becomes a region where "uncontrolled territories" and "failed states" appear more and more often.

Transnational terrorism is an extremely complex phenomenon, the causes of which are, of course, complex. However, the fact remains that transnational terrorists come forward with an alternative project of the world political order because they consider the existing order to be unfair, first of all in relation to the rapidly developing and actively growing Muslim community. The need for such a project, which transnational terrorists try to realize, can be caused both by irreconcilable inter-civilizational contradictions and by the growing gap between poor countries, many of which are in the Muslim world, and rich states that take advantage of the globalizing world, as well as unfair and hegemonic foreign policy of the United States in Muslim countries. The study of the causes of transnational terrorist activity will help the antiterrorist coalition to choose effective measures to combat terrorism. It is extremely important not to make separate conclusions on specific cases of terrorism, but to create a system of scientific research in order to assess the lessons of past antiterrorist campaigns through the prism of their possible application in the future. The best solution will be an attempt to overcome conceptual, disciplinary, cultural and, sometimes, ideological differences in order that antiterrorist measures be based on an objective analysis of transnational terrorism.

1.3. Characteristics of the development of transnational terrorism in modern conditions and the necessity for joint struggle against it

Modern terrorist organizations, in terms of their activities, can be divided into three levels(79, p.235). At the lowest level, which represents the least danger for the world community, there are terrorists conducting operations within one state. At the next level, there are regional organizations operating in more than one country. At the highest level, there are organizations active in many countries and regions and setting global goals that can only be achieved through active international action. Although

for the purposes of this work, the greatest interest is of a global level, it is worthwhile to consider lower levels of activity, since it is quite possible that terrorist groups will, for ideological or religious reasons, cooperate, as well as participate in organizations of global. Then all three levels will be considered in more detail.

Transnational terrorists. According to the information contained in the annual directory of the US State Department "Structures of World Terrorism 2003", six groups fall into this category(67, p.128):

1. The Abu Nidal Organization;
2. "al-Jemaah al-Islamiya" (Islamic group);
3. Hezbollah (The Party of God);
4. Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad);
5. The organization "Mujahidin-i Kalk";
6. Al-Qaeda.

It is these six groups that form the core of transnational terrorist activity. All these groups are radical, Islamist organizations that support the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state in the territory of modern Israel, and also advocate minimizing the participation of the US and Western countries in the affairs of the Middle East and the creation of a new world order with the domination of Muslim values. All of the above organizations operate globally, supported by a network of cells in many countries around the world. They have the opportunity to strike almost anywhere in the world and their ultimate goal - the implementation of an alternative world political system threatens the whole system of nation-states. With the development of modern technologies, such as the Internet, as well as the possibility of free movement in many countries, these groups form a "virtual nation" that possesses many instruments of power, including information, military and economic means. The above organizations connect radical Islamic views and rejection of Western culture.

Regional terrorists. Despite the fact that regional terrorists focus on their region and receive the lion's share of support from the population of neighboring countries, they nevertheless have connections both with terrorists at the global level and at the

state level. The international community still does not fully understand how interrelated all groups are at three levels, and in part, therefore, there is not yet a general understanding of the terrorist threat. Terrorist groups connect more than mere sympathy. They provide each other with financial, information and technological support in cases where it is beneficial to both parties. Terrorists at the regional level, although not as dangerous as global terrorists, remain the focus of attention of the world community, as effective measures to counter transnational terrorists should not bypass regional terrorist groups that can support them.

Intra-state terrorists. Terrorists at this level operate in the territory of one state and, therefore, should be the object of attention of law enforcement bodies or armed forces of the country in which they carry out their operations. But even state-level terrorists support terrorists at the regional and global levels. For example, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone allegedly sold smuggled diamonds to Al-Qaida, which it later resold for profit(26, p.93). Such mutually beneficial relations laid the foundation for possible further cooperation.

Terrorist organizations have several opportunities for establishing links with each other. First, these are explicit links, i.e. direct interaction and cooperation between terrorist groups. Secondly, hidden links that are difficult to identify and break(17, p.18)

Explicit connections. Terrorist organizations work together if this is in their common interest. They may have different ideologies, goals, opponents, financial sources, but there are also reasons for cooperation. This is followed by a brief description of the known obvious links between terrorist organizations.

Financial support. It can manifest itself in a variety of forms, from direct financial transfers to joint high-profit shadow business projects, like drug trafficking, arms trafficking or the illegal sale of diamonds. In addition, large financial revenues come from charitable organizations and legal enterprises that deal with money laundering(25, p.46).

Exchange of intelligence. Terrorist organizations sometimes exchange information on military operations of Western countries, their weaknesses, methods

of gathering information, opportunities to counter terrorism, political situation, etc. They exchange information in order to keep abreast of the latest developments and to clarify their further actions(50, p.125).

Team work. Terrorist organizations coordinated their actions to enhance the psychological effect of terrorist operations or to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-term, lengthy operations(17, p.19).

Providing shelters. Many terrorist organizations have training camps or operational bases close to each other. Such hideouts are also used by members of other, friendly terrorist organizations(84, p.27).

Exchange of materials and resources. Terrorists exchange information on the construction of bombs and the ways in which they are used. In addition, they transmit to each other and materials for making bombs. This is especially dangerous, given the fact that terrorists are trying to gain access to weapons of mass destruction(56, p.58).

Exchange of staff. Closely related organizations exchange operational staff for further training or use for intelligence purposes, including to master new methods, such as the transfer of encrypted and coded messages, falsification of documents or transfer under another's name. Hidden links between terrorist organizations are difficult to determine. That is why very much is based on assumptions(27).

Separation of opportunities. When one terrorist organization strikes, others can take advantage of the situation. For example, while the US coped with the consequences of the terrorist attacks of September, a terrorist organization or a terrorist sent out letters with anthrax disputes, thus demonstrating the possibility of an effective terrorist attack even in conditions of increased security measures(28, p.142).

Division of responsibility. One terrorist organization can perpetrate a terrorist act, and take another responsibility for it. This can be done in order to complicate the response process, to hide the real ones responsible for the attack and to draw attention to the organization that formally assumed responsibility(7, p.114).

"Public diplomacy". Some terrorist organizations have the capacity to access or influence the media to promote their goals or support other terrorist organizations(72, p.72).

Shared ideological views. The ideological leaders of one terrorist organization can show support to other terrorist organizations or call for general actions in support of certain values or against a common enemy(83, p.19).

While it is global terrorism that is the main threat to the international community, it is supported by terrorist organizations at lower levels. These connections are sometimes not always obvious and may require a large number of separate coordinated anti-terrorist actions at all three levels. It is in connection with the existence of such links that any antiterrorist strategy should be comprehensive.

To combat such a ramified terrorist network, it is necessary to understand the interrelationships that exist between different terrorist groups. Below are just three examples:

1. In November 2001, the US government announced the AL-Taqwa banking system as a terrorist organization because of "providing a mechanism for transferring money to Al-Qaeda" (95). Al-Taqwa itself also financed other terrorist groups, for example, Hamas. In fact, Al-Taqwa was not only initially created for donations by supporters of the Egyptian organization Muslim Brotherhood, but the members of Hamas and other persons seen in connection with Al-Qaeda were among its main shareholders (109). According to the testimony of US Deputy Secretary of Treasury Juan Zarate, "annual donations of 60 million US dollars for Hamas' needs passed through the bank accounts of Al-Taqwa Bank. Back in 1996, a report from the Italian intelligence service stated that Al-Taqwa was not only linked to Hamas and other Palestinian groups, but also to the Algerian terrorist organization The Armed Islamic Group and the Egyptian al-Jemaah al- Islamia"(108).

2. According to court documents, two people played a key role in the radicalization, training and financing of the cell of American Muslims in Portland, which later tried to enter Afghanistan through Hong Kong in order to fight against Al-Qaida and the Taliban Armed Forces. One of the leaders of the Portland cell was connected with Palestinian terrorism, and the other directly with Al Qaeda. According to court documents, Ali Khalid Steity, a supporter of Hamas, who underwent terrorist training in a camp in southern Lebanon, along with another

unknown member of the Portland cell, held classes on possession of small arms. Steithie himself had several firearms, "which was used by the members of the cell to teach shooting skills so that they could later help those forces that were in Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, including the al Qaeda militants(112, p.153). Co-founder of the World Aid Fund, closely associated with Al-Qaeda, co-operated with Steith Mohammed Abdirahman Harye. According to the FBI's written testimony, the members of the cell were secretly recorded on videotape at the time when Hari, an imam of the local mosque, instructed his followers to fight against American troops along with their Muslim brothers. Karye gave the cell members 2 thousand American dollars, which he received from parishioners of the mosque, to cover transportation costs. In other testimonies, Jeffrey Buttle, also a member of the cell from Portland, explains that on the eve of Steithi's arrest in October 2001, "Brown ordered groups that could not enter Afghanistan to return to the United States" (120).

3. In May 2003, a number of European countries, together with the United States, froze the accounts of the Al-Aqsa International Fund, an organization closely linked to Hamas, which used the funds of the fund to finance Palestinian militants, "spending as" donations to charity projects(111). "It is also interesting that the representative of Al-Aqsa in Yemen, Mohammed Ali Hasan al-Moayyad, was arrested not only for financing Hamas, but also for providing money, weapons, communications and recruits to Al-Qaeda. According to the report of the Israeli special services on the international activities of Hezbollah, the head of the section of the International Al-Aqsa Foundation in Holland reported that his office, together with the main branch of the organization in Germany, was collecting funds for Hezbollah(35).

The examples of the interaction of terrorist groups both explicit and implicit links between organizations of global, regional and state levels, discussed above. First, it is obvious financial support between different terrorist organizations of Islamist persuasion. It should be specially noted that, as with the Al-Takva bank accused of transferring money to Al-Qaida, Hamas, the Armed Islamic Group and

Al-Jemaah al-Islamiya, and with the International Al-Aksa Foundation, which donated money donated to charity, terrorist organizations, in particular Hamas, it is not a question of any shadow business to finance terrorist activities. Both organizations, before they were interested in law enforcement bodies, acted openly and were on the legal position. This is another reminder of the terrorists' ability to receive funding from legitimate sources, as well as the vulnerabilities and shortcomings of both the international banking system and the network of charitable Islamic organizations. Secondly, for example, in the case of the Portland cell in the United States, jointly created by representatives of Al-Qaeda and Hamas, there are cases of joint activities of terrorist organizations. The Portland group was trained to fight on the side of the Taliban in Afghanistan against a common enemy - the US and its armed forces, which is in the interests of both Al Qaeda and Hamas. But, of course, common denominators allowing cooperation with different Islamist terrorist organizations are common ideological views, which are the rejection of the Western model of the political organization of the world that is personified primarily by the United States, as well as by the local authorities under their influence. This, of course, is the key point, since the presence of common ideological positions will serve as a basis for further interaction of terrorist organizations at the global, regional and state levels.

The history of the fight against terrorism at the international level begins in the second half of the 1920s. XX century, when, in accordance with the decision of the First International Congress of Criminal Law (Brussels, 1926), held under the auspices of the International Association of Criminal Law, a series of conferences devoted to the problem of terrorism was held. The main areas of cooperation on combating terrorism at the state level were determined precisely in the course of these international forums.

The first such conference, held in 1927, adopted a document in which an attempt was made to disclose the notion of an international crime and to give a criminal-legal assessment of this phenomenon. It also stressed the need for criminal prosecution and punishment of persons for committing the most dangerous crimes

that threaten public security. One of the first steps in organizing international cooperation against terror was the adoption by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1937. Draft International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Acts of Terrorism. This convention has not been ratified and has not entered into force.

The Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1994, almost 60 years later, reiterated the need to strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism and reaffirmed the responsibility of States to take all possible measures to eliminate it.

But by the beginning of the 21st century it became clear that the threat of terrorism had grown to a global level, and the international community has not been able to cope with it yet. The global anti-terrorist war declared by the US can be considered an attempt to implement high-tech plans to change from outside regimes in the territories from which a real or virtual terrorist threat comes and the subsequent use of technologies to create a "new statehood" there. Examples of such actions were Afghanistan and Iraq. Leaving aside the whole complex of unavoidable social, economic, cultural and other consequences of US policy, it can be argued that in the field of international relations this policy has convincingly demonstrated all the weaknesses of the outgoing system of maintaining peace and security, as well as the pitfalls that complicate the process of forming a new world order . She proved, in particular, that the use of the armed forces cannot serve as a universal way of countering terrorism.

Judging by the conflicts in the Near and Middle East, the ability of the regular army to fight irregular terrorist groups is very limited. At the same time, it should be specially emphasized: today there is no evidence that the antiterrorist methods used by states contribute to the solution of the very problem of terrorism. Moreover, the use of military force can stimulate its development. It also generates a whole range of problems affecting interstate relations. All this sharply reduces the effectiveness of the "army" option and requires the search for other ways of countering terrorism.

The international community has come to the conclusion that, in addition to the already existing international instruments of the United Nations, and in order to create a unified legal framework for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, to work out a Comprehensive Convention on Combating International Terrorism. A corresponding initiative was put forward in 1996 by India at the 51st meeting of the UN General Assembly. Resolution "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", adopted at the 53rd session of the UN General Assembly in 1998.

Success in the fight against terrorism can only be achieved by joint efforts of representatives of interested countries. This would be facilitated by the holding on a regular basis of bilateral and multilateral meetings of heads of departments, special units, experts who are solving the tasks of countering terrorism. The creation of joint structures, joint preparation and holding of scientific conferences, meetings of specialists in the fight against terrorism are becoming topical.

Among the possible areas of international cooperation, we can note the holding of joint operational activities; exchange of technologies and experience in the production and use of technical and military means; development and improvement of the legislative framework and international legal norms on cooperation in the fight against terrorism; the definition of a system of principles and concepts necessary to determine common approaches to assessing events and problems related to terrorist activities in any country or region; development of legal norms regulating the use of the territory of another state for the release of hostages and actions against terrorists; determination of the place and role of the media with a view to shaping world public opinion in terms of intolerance towards terrorism and balanced submission of materials; enhancing the role of non-governmental organizations and independent experts in expanding international cooperation on combating terrorism.

II CHAPTER. MULTILATERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

2.1. The role of the UN in the fight against terrorism as a universal intergovernmental organization

Since its creating at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the UN has dealt with a wide range of issues affecting international stability and security. One of the main achievements of the UN during the Cold War period was that it could offer effective mechanisms for the relationship between the two superpowers that emerged in the world after the Second World War and prevent a major armed conflict between them. However, in the 1990s, the UN had to look for ways to counter a number of new threats to international security from internal conflicts in Europe, Africa and the former Soviet Union, as well as from the phenomenon of international terrorism. In the 1990s, the UN, like other international organizations established in the bipolar period of international relations, faced the challenge of reforming its activities and adapting to the new realities of the post-bipolar world. In particular, the UN began to pay more attention to the problems of terrorist activities in the world, although international terrorism was first attracted to it in 1948 after the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte in Palestine (47). During the 1990s, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the whole a number of states that support terrorist organizations and terrorist activities. These were mostly economic sanctions, the effectiveness of which, in many cases, was controversial. The events of September 11, 2001 forced the UN to drastically revise its tools for combating terrorism.

In the first months after the tragedies in New York and Washington, the UN and the US cooperated more than ever. The Security Council adopted a series of resolutions condemning these monstrous terrorist acts and opening the way for a military operation against terrorists and their hideout countries. It was not without the participation of the UN that a global antiterrorist coalition was formed, which included most of the world's countries, concerned about the growing opportunities for transnational terrorism. With the full support of the Security Council, the United

States and its allies carried out a military operation in Afghanistan, aimed at overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying the training camps of the international terrorist network Al-Qaeda in that country. It seemed that the global antiterrorist campaign would help the UN find its new mission, which had been talked about so much since the early 1990s. The fight against transnational terrorism could become one of those areas that, on the one hand, will unite different countries, and on the other, will help to reform the UN in accordance with the new realities of the post-bipolar world(77, p.147).

On the same day, when the terrorists captured planes rammed the towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington, the UN Security Council chairman, Permanent Representative of the French Republic to the United Nations, Jean-David Levitte, circulated a draft version of the resolution severely condemning this terrorist attack and already On September 12, resolution 1368 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council. Two weeks later, resolution No. 1373 was adopted obliging all 191 UN member states to adopt appropriate domestic legislation to prevent further manifestations of international terrorism (78). The US permanent representative to the United Nations, John Negroponte, called the UN "a faithful partner in troubled times" and characterized resolution No. 1373 as "the most significant separate contribution" of the UN to the fight against terrorism. Both of the above resolutions set a high standard for recognizing the legitimacy of military operations in response to acts of terrorism and a worldwide ban on terrorist activities was carried out.

Prior to the adoption of Resolution No. 1368, the use of force in response to terrorist acts was generally condemned by the UN General Assembly in accordance with the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States of 1981 and the Declaration on Enhancing the Efficiency of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force international relations of 1987 (47). In particular, the General Assembly, on the initiative of several Arab countries, as well as the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic

Conference, has repeatedly condemned all military actions of Israel in response to the terrorist acts carried out "the Liberation Army of Palestine".

Based on the right of self-defense of each state against acts of aggression and thus legitimizing the unilateral use of force in response to terrorist acts, the UN Security Council created a dangerous precedent by resolution 1368, which calls into question the general prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter.

This contradiction in the future should be the subject of consideration of experts on international law. In its letter informing the UN Security Council about the military actions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the United States is reporting that "Our investigation is at an early stage. We can find out that additional measures will be required for our self-defense against other organizations and other states" (14). This statement somewhat alarmed diplomats from different countries and experts in the field of international law, since the absence of a universally recognized definition of terrorism could lead to abuses by the United States. However, China and Russia quickly joined the US position. China considered that it would help him in solving the problem of Tibet, and Russia saw in this position a precedent in order to take the fight with the Chechen separatists outside the Russian Federation.

The consequences of the adoption of Resolution No. 1368 and its impact on the legality of the use of military force also poses a problem that can subsequently lead to legal conflicts between states. The Security Council had practically no opportunity to consider this issue in detail, since the resolution was adopted on September 12, i.e. only a day after the terrorist attacks that shocked the whole world.

On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1373, which required all UN member states to amend or adopt domestic legislation that would outlaw terrorist acts, including supporting and financing such acts; prohibiting the harboring of terrorists and providing them with any other assistance, including weapons; and also ordered operational cooperation with other states in meeting these requirements.

Some of the proposed measures are not new and have already been contained in two important conventions developed in the 1990s: the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which came into force in May 2001 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which by the time terrorist of the acts of 11 September had not yet entered into force (this happened in April 2002) (18). Prior to the events of 11 September, only Cuba and the United Kingdom ratified both conventions. After the adoption of resolution No. 1373 all provisions of both conventions became binding.

The implementation of the provisions of Resolution No. 1373 is monitored by the Counter-Terrorism Committee under the UN Security Council. The first chairman of the committee was the Permanent Representative of Great Britain to the United Nations, Jeremy Greenstock. During his presidency, Jeremy Greenstock stressed the technical nature of the work of the CTC, limiting its functions to "monitoring, analyzing and presenting facts for consideration by the Security Council". According to him, the purpose of the committee's work is "to help the world community improve mechanisms to prevent terrorists from gaining free space for their actions, money, support and shelter, and create a network for information exchange and a field of joint action" (17, p.73).

In September 2002, the UN Monitoring Group on Sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda reported that terrorist organizations still have access to a fair amount of financial and economic resources. In particular, her report says that although in the first days after the events of September 11, bank accounts were frozen for a total of 112 million, US dollars, in the following months, accounts were blocked only for a total of \$ 10 million. The conclusion of the report concludes that Al-Qaeda is more than viable in most parameters and is ready for new terrorist attacks at any time. (59, p.48)"

The same problems prevent the implementation of the provision on the prohibition of harboring terrorists included in resolution No. 1373(78). For example, in many countries border control in itself is a big problem, being weak and inefficient. A number of states cannot fully control their own territory on their own

and needs additional resources. The CTC with a small staff and rather modest budget simply does not have enough resources to provide the necessary assistance. Only if the CTC is given additional powers will it help countries to create mechanisms for the implementation of all antiterrorist legislation, which is particularly important in the global fight against terrorism:

In order to achieve this, the CTC should become a "permanent, international and professional expert body", which will work day by day with the Security Council and monitor the implementation of all provisions of resolution No. 1373. Such a body will be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the provisions of resolution No. 1373.

To date, the CTC has two major problems that can affect the quality of its work:

1. The CTC is not in a position to provide assistance to States independently. The committee can only tell the states how to solve these or other problems.

2. The CTC may become a body that duplicates the work of other UN entities, for example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime or other structures within the UN system that deal with various aspects of the terrorist threat(47, p.51).

Having ordered all the UN member states to adopt the appropriate legislation and carry out actions to combat terrorism on their territory and abroad, the UN Security Council has turned the fight against terrorism into a category of global development problems. Although the beginning is good and, perhaps, it is even the most effective way in the fight against terrorism at the international level, there are still a number of unresolved political problems.

Despite all the problems, the UN's activities in the fight against terrorism are continuing. In particular, the UN Secretary-General's Report "Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy" of April 27, 2006 provides an important framework for developing common approaches to the issue of combating terrorism. But on the basis of this report, and taking into account the revisions presented by Spain, Singapore and Pakistan, on September 8, 2006, the General Assembly adopted the first in the history of the United Nations Global

Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which formulated the main provisions of the anti-terrorist struggle for the UN member states. Based on the content of the above documents, it can be concluded that the United Nations has taken a course toward creating a universal atmosphere of non-acceptance of terrorism as a method of political struggle, regardless of its possible motivation. Most likely, it is in this area that the UN will be able to achieve the most significant results.

Member countries, however, have not yet been able to agree on a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which has been under discussion for several years. This is largely due to the contradictions regarding the development of a universal, acceptable definition of terrorism, primarily in connection with the desire of some members of the United Nations (Syria, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan) to extend the scope of the convention to the actions of the armed forces of states. Proposals of a number of states to withdraw from the convention whole categories of violent acts of a terrorist nature, on the contrary, are not legally justified and, moreover, politically dangerous. In many respects, in order to avoid this, the Security Council in September 2005 adopted resolution No. 1624, which emphasizes that no motivation should justify terrorism and calls for the commission of terrorist acts(119).

In the 1990s, the lack of faith on the part of the United States in the possibility of effective UN work in the post-bipolar period significantly devalued the role of this organization in international affairs. Washington did not see the UN as an effective mechanism for regulating the new system of international relations that developed after the end of the cold war and did not want to finance programs in which the US did not actively participate. Nevertheless, after the events of September 11, the UN attempted to join the international anti-terrorist struggle in the 21st century, supporting the US military operation in Afghanistan and obliging all member states to implement the previously reached agreements on antiterrorist issues. But to date, the UN has almost exhausted all its capabilities to counter transnational terrorism.

In order to effectively continue the efforts already made, significant changes are required, and, first of all, additional financial injections, including from the US.

Perhaps it is already time to move on to a new stage of development - the creation on the basis of the CTC of the UN Security Council of the International Anti-Terrorist Organization, the development of social programs aimed at preventing the spread, radical ideology of transnational terrorists among the poorest sections of the population of developing countries, aspiring to expand their anti-terrorist capabilities, but lacking the resources and experience. All of the above and much more can be implemented through the mechanisms of the UN. Undoubtedly, it still has to prove its importance in the new anti-terrorist campaign, and also to consolidate the key programs of the emerging integrated anti-terrorist strategy. Although this organization has been repeatedly criticized, it is the only universal international organization in the world and the largest in terms of the number of member countries. It is also important that her nearly sixty years of experience in solving the most acute problems of peace and security can become the basis for efforts to maintain peace and stability in the 21st century.

The UN, however, has not been able to formulate for its member countries a clear and clear understanding of the threat of modern transnational terrorism, which seeks to replace the existing state-centered political system of the world with the global Islamic caliphate. Perhaps, it is on this that it should focus its attention in the future, being the most representative and the only universal international organization in the world. In addition, the UN can help shape the international rejection of terrorism as a method of political struggle, which is noted, in particular, in the report of K. Annan(113).

On a practical level, the UN has reached the limit of its capabilities to date and its continued role in the fight against terrorism remains uncertain. Undoubtedly, the decision on the mandatory implementation of all UN anti-terrorism conventions and the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee under the Security Council, whose responsibilities include monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the conventions and resolutions on terrorist issues, have become important political decisions, but clearly insufficient. In particular, material constraints and a small number of employees do not allow the CTC to go beyond the analysis of country

reports and technical assistance to countries in need. In addition, the lack of both a mechanism for compelling to fulfill the requirements and encouraging countries to fulfill their requirements, inherent in all organizations as a whole, severely limits the impact of the UN, including on the issues of antiterrorist issues. Thus, the hopes that the international anti-terrorist campaign will help the UN find its place in the changing world and breathe new life into it are not justified.

2.2. The anti-terrorist activities of NATO, as a regional military-political association

In one of his articles, former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance George Robertson noted that "the events of September 11 turned terrorism from the problem of internal security into a real threat to international security" (51). In response to this new global security challenge, NATO is expanding its role in counter-terrorism activities. Although terrorism was an integral part of the expanded post-bipolar security agenda, to date it has become one of the main objects of the alliance's attention.

After the events of September 11, the dominance of antiterrorist tasks is quite clearly traced in the formation of the main goals and priorities of the North Atlantic Alliance. Less than twenty-four hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the US allies decided to launch, for the first time in history, the fifth article of the Washington Treaty, which states that "an attack on one member" of the alliance is "An attack on all members." Nevertheless, the North Atlantic alliance was not able to achieve active participation in the international anti-terrorist campaign under the auspices of the United States. During the operation in Afghanistan, the gap in military capabilities between the forces of the European NATO member countries and the United States led to the fact that the latter only attracted to the military operation certain countries on a bilateral basis (mainly those that had special operations capabilities), and not all countries of the North Atlantic

Alliance. And while some NATO members played an important role in defeating the Taliban regime, the military operation in Afghanistan was predominantly the success of the US military.

In January 2002, NATO forces were invited by the new Afghan government as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under the auspices of the United Nations. Since the deployment, international forces have been under the command of NATO member countries. "On August 11, 2002, NATO assumed command of the international security assistance forces and from that moment is responsible for coordinating and planning all actions(6). This is NATO's first operation outside its Euro-Atlantic zone of responsibility". The ISAF contingent was primarily tasked with assisting the Afghan Transitional Administration in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. In addition, the NATO contingent also helps the government of Afghanistan to create and develop its own law enforcement agencies. Provincial reconstruction teams have also been formed with the support of NATO in the field. These groups include both civilian specialists and military personnel whose tasks are to ensure the implementation of decisions of the central authorities in the Afghan provinces, as well as to create conditions for the safe implementation of the entire complex of activities for the revival of Afghanistan.

European countries fully supported the United States in their desire to rid Afghanistan of Al Qaeda, but the subsequent war in Iraq in 2003 exposed all the difficulties regarding the possibility of reaching an international consensus on the legitimate aims of anti-terrorist operations(64). NATO member countries have not been able to come to a common opinion as to whether a military operation in Iraq can be considered as part of the fight against international terrorism and whether the United States has the right to conduct military operations bypassing the UN Security Council. Moreover, the war in Iraq has greatly complicated the process of obtaining and retaining broad European and international support for anti-terrorist operations. According to I.N.Kuklina, the split of the alliance on the issue of the US military operation in Iraq destroys the image of NATO as "the most powerful and effective military machine in the world"(42, p.176).

Since September 2001, NATO has developed the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism and the military concept of protection from terrorism. The members of the alliance also committed to developing military capabilities that will help them conduct force operations against terrorists within the framework of the Prague initiatives and with the help of the established NATO Response Force. Initially, at the Prague Summit held in November 2002, the question of joining the alliance of new members was to be considered, but after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the main topic of the meeting was the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance itself, reflecting the need to adapt and seek an answer to the question changes in the international security environment, in particular, the increased threat of transnational terrorism, which has become especially pronounced after the events of September 11, 2001(114).

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have changed the international security environment, leaving two options for the future alliance: adapt to the new situation, especially in matters of organization, goals and objectives, in order to be in demand in a new security environment, or give way To other actors, which correspond to the realities of the current situation. This argument was advanced by a number of observers, including US Congress Senator Richard Jirapa, who noted that "if NATO cannot become effective in combating terrorism, our political leaders will be inclined to use another tool that meets today's requirements." Philip Gordon also follows this logic of reasoning, believing that "although the fight against terrorism changes the nature of NATO and carries many risks, it also demonstrates the relevance of NATO and gives an opportunity to renew the alliance whose future was in question, breathing new life into it."

There are two main areas within which NATO has the opportunity to provide military assistance in the fight against terrorism. The North Atlantic alliance can independently conduct combat operations under its own command, as it was during the campaign in Kosovo in 1999, or it can facilitate the operations of the "voluntary coalition", adding, if necessary, its troops to the main forces of the anti-terrorist coalition. There are also two main types of military operations, where NATO military

forces can provide significant assistance in the fight against terrorism. First, it is the direct conduct of military operations against terrorist groups and their supporters. Secondly, these are military operations aimed at maintaining peace, such as forcing peace, and maintaining stability, both at the national and regional levels, in areas of increased terrorist activity.

Based on this analysis, it is possible to create a small matrix relating to the possible military contribution of NATO to the campaign against terrorism, where four options for NATO military operations are possible. Based on this matrix, the US operation in Afghanistan "Enduring Freedom" will be considered as an international coalition operation with the support of NATO, and the deployment of an international security force as a peacekeeping operation already under the NATO command.

NATO has developed a military concept for protection against terrorism, emphasizing its readiness to conduct military operations in response to terrorist attacks or the threat of such attacks, and deploy its forces "where it is necessary to carry out such tasks."

In addition, the North Atlantic Alliance is developing the NATO Response Force - highly mobile, technologically advanced elite units, which must be deployed within five days and independently conduct operations within a month. These forces became fully operational at the end of November 2006, as announced at the NATO summit in Riga. According to preliminary data, these units are best prepared for conducting anti-terrorist operations. If this is the case, then NATO, if necessary, may have the opportunity to conduct independent anti-terrorist operations from the end of 2006 to the beginning of 2007. However, do not underestimate NATO's ability to conduct peacekeeping operations. Moreover, most likely, it is in this area that the US may need NATO assistance, given its previous experience.

In addition, we should not discount the existing special forces of NATO countries, including, in the opinion of US President George W. Bush, an important element of the capabilities of the North Atlantic alliance. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Special Forces from Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Turkey, Britain and Greece played an important role. "The special forces of these

countries often operated in various operations under the command of the United States, including the detection of hiding members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence gathering and advice to representatives of the Northern Alliance(38). In November 2001, Britain became the first NATO country to provide its special forces for Operation Enduring Freedom, but other countries soon followed suit. Particularly intensively the special forces of NATO member countries were used during Operation Anaconda in the mountains in the east of Afghanistan, as well as in other subsequent special operations.

The third sphere, within which NATO can make a serious contribution to the international campaign against terrorism, is the exchange of intelligence information. The North Atlantic alliance has established communication channels for the exchange of intelligence between its members. The seriousness of NATO's assistance in this area can be judged, if only at the request of the United States on October 4, 2001, for assistance from its allies on a number of issues. It is not surprising that the strengthening of the exchange of intelligence data has become one of the Alliance's top priorities. After the events of September 11, a reconnaissance unit was set up at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to analyze the level of the terrorist threat.

In addition, the exchange of intelligence information should not be limited to the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, signed by all EAPC members (26 NATO member countries and 20 partner countries) also includes provisions for improving the exchange of information. In addition, the alliance established the EAPC / PfP intelligence unit to facilitate the exchange of intelligence related to the terrorist threat(106).

The NATO Partnership for Peace program provides good opportunities for creating a whole range of important anti-terrorism areas of cooperation. Established in 1994 to promote interaction between NATO members and countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it was also a kind of "school" for those wishing to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, the nature and objectives of the Partnership have changed significantly over the past few years. For example, the ten

former members of the program are now full members of NATO, and the remaining partner countries can hardly expect to join in the near future. Thus, PfP can reorient its activities, which will not focus on preparing for full membership in NATO as before, but on developing cooperation in other areas. One of the possible directions for future cooperation can be precisely the fight against international terrorism.

It is obvious that NATO can make a significant contribution to the fight against international terrorism by organizing and promoting cooperation in four interrelated spheres: diplomatic, military, intelligence exchange and defense cooperation. If, within the framework of the fight against terrorism, the main efforts are aimed at improving international cooperation in the four areas listed above, and especially on the development of the exchange of intelligence information, then NATO has the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the international campaign against terrorism.

This became possible due to the fact that during the period of adaptation to the post-bipolar system of international relations, NATO was able to create such institutions as the EAPC, the Partnership for Peace, the Russia-NATO Council and the Mediterranean Dialogue. However, this does not mean that the North Atlantic alliance does not need a clearer design of its anti-terrorist activities.

If NATO really wants to take an active part in the fight against transnational terrorism, it must first of all come to a common understanding among its member countries as a threat to transnational terrorism for the modern political system of the world and the necessary political strategy to combat it. Without this, the whole future fate of NATO's counter-terrorism activities will be questioned. It is also necessary to determine the further possible mission of the alliance, as well as the possibility and feasibility of conducting transactions involving her outside the area of her responsibility. Here, much will depend on the mission in Afghanistan, in the event of a successful outcome, which is also not obvious today, NATO will be able to claim a big role in the international anti-terrorist campaign. In addition, at the operational level of the fight against the terrorist method of the alliance, it is necessary to take three key changes(114).

First, as analysis of NATO's activity after the events of September 11 showed, it is necessary to implement a joint assessment of intelligence information in order to overcome the differences arising in the rupture of the threat-response ratio. Michael Herman believes that a joint assessment of intelligence information, according to the principle of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, can facilitate both the adoption of joint foreign policy decisions and coalition actions. Thus, the creation of such a mechanism within NATO will not only contribute to reducing the gap in the threat-response ratio, but will also give an additional impetus to investment in the military sphere by the European member countries, which are so necessary for anti-terrorist operations.

Secondly, the alliance needs to revise its strategic concept so that the campaign against terrorism clearly appears as one of the priorities of the alliance. It can also help to reduce the gap between the threat and the response to it, since the very revision of the concept itself will require a comprehensive discussion of the nature of the terrorist threat and may lead to a more concrete and shared conception by all NATO countries. Such a discussion can lead to the development of an improved overall strategy to combat terrorism, since new counterterrorist activities and new forms of fighting terrorism can emerge in the process of discussion.

Thirdly, NATO must strengthen its capacity to conduct operations to maintain terrorism of the world. The North Atlantic alliance already has some experience in this area, however, much more needs to be done to develop opportunities to carry out such operations, which, in principle, can become an important contribution of the alliance in the fight against transnational terrorism. Nevertheless, most likely, NATO's participation in international antiterrorist cooperation will directly depend on Washington's choice of a strategy to combat terrorism. Here, of course, we are talking about a strategy to combat the terrorist method, since NATO does not yet understand: - the need to resolve and political problems of transnational terrorism. The US desire to act unilaterally led to the fact that NATO's anti-terrorist potential has so far remained, in fact, unclaimed. For Nicole Gnesotto, this serves as additional evidence that the North Atlantic alliance is simply unable to make a meaningful contribution to

the anti-terrorist struggle. If NATO wants to participate more actively in the international anti-terrorist campaign, then, first of all, it is necessary to enlist the support, including financial, of the US, since only they can give the North Atlantic Alliance a new impetus for active participation in the international campaign against terrorism.

2.3. International Anti-Terrorist Coalition as an example of anti-terrorism activities outside the framework of intergovernmental organizations

The International Antiterrorist Coalition, created after the events of September 11, is comparable in scale and task to the anti-Hitler coalition of the Second World War. UNSCR 1373, adopted unanimously on September 28, 2001, calls on all UN member states to cease all terrorist activities, its support, and take all necessary steps to ensure that terrorists are brought to justice. This resolution became a fundamental element of modern multilateral anti-terrorism cooperation, as it gave states the necessary legal and political tools for it. One hundred and thirty-six countries offered the United States military assistance in one form or another, forty six international organizations expressed their support, one hundred and forty-two countries of the world froze funds that supposedly should have been used to finance terrorism. Eighty-nine countries gave the US permission to fly over its territory, and fifty-nine countries announced their readiness to quarter, if necessary, US military bases on its territory. In October 2002, military headquarters of the forty-two countries of the world were stationed at the headquarters of the Central Command of the US Armed Forces, coordinating the activities of their military departments with the Pentagon.

This broad anti-terrorist coalition supported by many countries of the world has several characteristic features(5, p.157). First, the USA plays the leading role in it. Secondly, in addition to the struggle with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, this coalition was created to oppose the non-state actor, which is undoubtedly a new object for cooperation in modern history. Thirdly, the main goal of the coalition, at

least in the understanding of the United States, is both ambitious and somewhat ambiguous. First of all, we are talking about the total defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which, in principle, is a realistic task, even though it has not been fully implemented to date, and also to eradicate all types of international terrorism, which is most likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future term will not succeed. Fourthly, the coalition was formed spontaneously and is informal with no central governing bodies. Fifth, in its scope it surpasses most international organizations, with the possible exception of the UN and has a unique potential. Sixth, the military component, for all its importance, is not decisive, which distinguishes the modern anti-terrorist coalition from the classical military coalitions of the past.

Since September 2001, American officials have repeatedly declared the formation of an "anti-terrorist coalition". This phrase, however, is deceptive, since there is no single coalition against terrorism. Rather, we can talk about the existence of a multitude of coalitions operating in different spheres. They were formed ad hoc and many countries are members of several coalitions. Bilateral relations with the United States are the main driving factor for participation in coalitions and not all members contact each other on anti-terrorism issues. Nora Benzahel, in particular, allocates a military coalition, a financial coalition, a law enforcement coalition, a coalition for the exchange of intelligence and a coalition for the restoration of failed states. Each of these coalitions has different goals and tasks, different number of members and each, in itself, has only a relative value. Together they form a complex, interconnected network, the so-called "coalition of coalitions" and their activities both contribute to and hinder the activities of other coalitions(4). Further, all five coalitions will be examined in detail, as well as their comparative analysis.

The Military Coalition. Anti-terrorist efforts quite often require the armed forces to track down and destroy the alleged terrorist leaders. The military can also be used to deprive terrorists of shelters, as was clearly demonstrated during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The most popular for the fight against terrorism will be special forces, acting secretly, i.e. without conducting large-scale operations that can give out their presence(5).

In the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to dominate the military antiterrorist coalition, since no country in the world has such opportunities to move and supply its armed forces across the globe as the US has today. Nevertheless, the remaining members of the coalition will also be able to make an important contribution to the military aspect of the fight against terrorism.

First, a number of countries have highly efficient Special Forces, which can be used both separately and jointly with the American forces. For example, during the operation in Afghanistan, the Special Forces of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Turkey and the United Kingdom were actively used, which, under separate operations, were subordinated to the US military command. These units of different countries not only facilitated the fulfillment of tasks by the US Army, but also brought valuable experience during the operations.

Secondly, in the event of the need to conduct simultaneous intensive anti-terrorist operations in different parts of the world, the armed forces of the coalition members can, if necessary, replace American forces, thus releasing additional opportunities for the American army.

Thirdly, coalition members can provide access to their bases, the right to fly through their territory to facilitate the conduct of anti-terrorist operations, as well as provide other military support. In some cases, to gain power support, the US and its allies can work with non-state actors, as it was with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan(41). The use of local armed forces has the added advantage of better knowledge of the terrain and possible shelters for terrorists. Nevertheless, local armed forces can have their own interests, which run counter to the interests of the coalition members. It is precisely for the local forces not to pursue purely their own goals that the ground presence of a sufficient number of armed forces of the member countries of the coalition is necessary.

Financial Coalition. The search for and destruction of financial networks of terrorists seems to be an important, but at the same time extremely difficult task. First, as American terrorist expert Paul Pillar points out, "terrorism is cheap." Explosions in the underground garage of the World Trade Center in New York in

1993 cost, presumably, only 400 US dollars, and the total cost of preparation and implementation of the September 11 attacks is estimated at between 500 and 600 thousand US dollars (13). This is only a small part of those trillions of American dollars that pass through the world financial system every day. Such small amounts are very difficult to track and this task is further complicated by the fact that most of this money never gets into the international financial system at all. In the Arab world, for example, informal financial networks are popular, where money can be transferred anonymously without any unnecessary papers or using an assumed name. Financing of terrorism is also carried out through Islamic charitable organizations. Sometimes it is almost impossible to distinguish between funds that will go to support terrorism from those that really will be directed to charitable purposes. Thus, the financial coalition against terrorism is not stronger than its weakest link - those wishing to hide their financial transfers will aspire to those countries where there is no unnecessary paperwork and additional checks.

Efforts to combat the financing of terrorism are characterized by rapid action and wide coverage. International cooperation in countering the financing of terrorism is more transparent than any other coalition, with the possible exception of a military coalition, and the countries and organizations involved in the process of interaction agree with a set of basic principles that should underpin their efforts. The measures taken have already brought a certain result: according to the data of the US Treasury, by April 2004, the financial coalition participants had frozen more than \$ 200 million worth of funds, which supposedly were supposed to be used to finance terrorist activities.

Despite obvious successes, there are a number of problems that call into question the long-term success of the coalition. First, not all measures are executed as quickly as they are accepted. Researches of the US government, independent research centers and the United Nations show that governments of some countries of the world do not fulfill their obligations, as a result of which terrorists still receive and send the necessary funds for their activities. Secondly, terrorists prefer to transfer funds through flexible and informal systems, which are difficult to track, for example,

through the well-known informal system of bank transfers "hawala" (in translation - trust). Thirdly, the states of the world have not yet come to a common opinion as to which groups are terrorist, which in turn leads to the fact that financial prohibitions on certain terrorist groups are applied in some countries, but in others there is not. This can lead to the fact that terrorists will keep their money in those countries where their activities are treated with condescension, which, of course, will practically bring to nothing all the efforts of other countries to find and freeze the funds sent to terrorist activities. Fourthly, even if it becomes possible to eliminate these divergences and contradictions, it will still be impossible to understand which of the measures taken were most effective in combating the financing of terrorism, since there is no basis for comparison. Unfortunately, there is no way by which it could be reliably established that the measures taken to block financing prevented all the terrorist acts planned by transnational terrorists, but the mere fact of freezing large sums of money shows that Al Qaeda still has at its disposal, enough financial resources are available for large-scale terrorist attacks(17, p.92).

Because of all the above reasons, the financial coalition is likely to be the weakest of all antiterrorist coalitions. Efforts to find and freeze terrorists' funds are certainly important, but the means necessary for the terrorist act are so insignificant that terrorists, most likely, can easily assemble them, if necessary.

Law Enforcement Coalition. Anti-terrorist efforts require effective cooperation between law enforcement agencies of the countries of the world. The events of September 11 showed that terrorists often crossed the borders of national states, being trained in one country, planning attacks in another and carrying them out in the third. Democratic countries are especially vulnerable, since terrorists enjoy civil liberties that exist in democratic states in order to organize and plan their actions. A representative of the US administration noted that the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks deliberately chose Germany, Belgium and Great Britain for living, i.e. those countries where the liberal immigration system operates, the right to political asylum and other civil liberties(1).

International law enforcement cooperation makes an important contribution to the fight against terrorism, especially in the field of information exchange. Nevertheless, there are at least two important problems that can hamper effective cooperation in law enforcement. Firstly, many states cannot resolve the contradiction related to the fact that law enforcement agencies should both prevent terrorist acts and prosecute terrorists. Many countries decided to separate these two issues by creating an internal intelligence organization, whose responsibility is to prevent acts of terrorism, and entrusting law enforcement bodies with just prosecution. Secondly, different national standards also generate tension. Each country develops its standards on interrogation of suspects, on their content and on the procedures for prosecution. These standards, of course, vary and states will seek to avoid cooperation with those countries whose standards differ from those they have in the country.

For example, EU member states do not transfer suspects to countries where they may face the death penalty, which, in particular, affects the EU-US anti-terrorist cooperation. The maintenance of terrorist suspects on the US military base Guantanamo in Cuba is also a controversial issue, since in many countries it is believed that the US is obliged to keep them as prisoners of war, otherwise they violate the Geneva Conventions and other provisions of international law. In addition, persons conducting interrogations in undemocratic countries can apply methods prohibited in democratic countries, including torture. Such differences in standards are part of state sovereignty, but they can seriously complicate efforts to identify, search and prosecute alleged terrorists.

Coalition for the exchange of intelligence. The Coalition for the Exchange of Intelligence Information is perhaps one of the most important anti-terrorist coalitions. All coalitions seek to reduce the ability of terrorists to commit terrorist attacks, but convicted terrorists will find a way to obtain the necessary resources and find opportunities to commit a terrorist attack. The coalition for the exchange of intelligence data is the only one that can warn about the impending attack, which will allow countries to take preventive measures against persons wishing to carry out this attack. Nevertheless, the reluctance to disclose their sources of information has been

and remains an insurmountable problem. In addition, some countries are concerned that the information they provide can be accessed, both intentionally and accidentally, into untrustworthy hands.

The creation of a multilateral intelligence exchange seems unlikely today, because of the above problems it can be considered an unrealistic goal. However, there is reason to believe that agreements on the exchange of intelligence information will be signed on a bilateral basis on a specific issue, and perhaps even on individual cases(77, p.234).

Antiterrorist cooperation with foreign intelligence services will face the same risks as cooperation in the intelligence sphere on other issues. Some countries may not pay enough attention to persons who other states consider terrorists or potential terrorists. Persons conducting interrogations in different countries can ask different questions without receiving information that will be considered critical for other states. Foreign intelligence services may also be supported by supporters of terrorists who will transmit important information to them, including through international exchange. Despite all these problems, the coalition for the exchange of intelligence is key to preventing future terrorist attacks. The solution of these problems must be worked out on an individual basis between individual countries.

Coalition for the restoration of failed states. As noted earlier, terrorists often base their activities on "uncontrolled territories" or in "failed states", which are characterized by instability of the situation (107). Instability results from a number of factors, including the inability of the central government to control part of its territory (such as in Indonesia and Colombia), the total absence of a central government (as it was in the Sudan and Somalia) and the consequences of the military confrontation (as it was in Afghanistan). Such uncontrolled territories provide terrorists with opportunities to set up training camps, search for recruits, and conduct their activities without fear of getting into the field of law enforcement. The presence of unstable regions allows terrorists to supply the population with necessary things and services that the government cannot or does not want to provide, thus expanding its support base and the circle of potential recruits.

The Recovery Coalition is more amorphous than the other coalitions described above, since it includes different actors engaged in different activities and in many parts of the world. These actions are not always coordinated, which leads, in some areas, to undesirable duplication and unintentional oversight in others. Contributions to the coalition may include the provision of armed forces for peacekeeping operations, the financing of various development projects, and the provision of technical expertise in certain areas. National states can make an important contribution, but it is in this coalition that non-state actors have even greater opportunities than states. Many international and non-governmental organizations have a significant potential for providing short-term humanitarian assistance, as well as long-term assistance in sustainable development.

One of the main problems facing the recovery coalition is that, for success, it needs the commitment of long-term investment of resources, which is extremely difficult task even in the most favorable development of events. It is extremely difficult to transfer territories from the category of "unmanageable" to self-managed. Decisiveness on the part of states and international organizations may not be sufficient to overcome the problem of "uncontrolled territories", but it is obligatory for the efforts aimed at this to succeed(91, p.4).

The five above-mentioned coalitions form a complex and interconnected network. Their actions are of a different nature, but, nevertheless, these coalitions remain interdependent. Their specific tasks can transform with time, as terrorist groups also evolve. Members of each coalition can also change due to the fact that new tasks may require opportunities that existing members do not have. Even if the coalitions will change, they will, of course, be closely related to each other. Many countries will be members of several coalitions, as their national interests in the fight against terrorism will inevitably affect the various functional areas described above. Thus, anti-terrorist coalitions form a dynamic and adaptive network, solving different issues with different members, but at the same time remain interconnected and interdependent.

III CHAPTER. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTITERRORIST VECTOR OF COOPERATION AS A BASIC DIRECTION OF SCO ACTIVITIES

3.1. Formation of the SCO as a full-fledged regional organization and the main areas of cooperation within the SCO

The history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization began in 1996. On April 26, 1996, the leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai to work out a unified position on the whole range of problems of regional cooperation, as well as to strengthen confidence-building measures in the military sphere. As a result of the forum, the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Region in the Joint Border Area was signed.

In 1996-2000, the leaders of these countries (the "Shanghai Five") met alternately in Shanghai, Moscow, Alma-Ata, Bishkek and Dushanbe. The Dushanbe meeting in 2000 marked the end of the first round of meetings of the heads of state of the Shanghai Five.

In 1996 and 1997, the SCO was formed on the basis of agreements on building confidence in the military sphere and on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan, respectively.

At the meeting of the heads of the five states on June 15, 2001 in Shanghai, the leaders of the "Shanghai Five" accepted Uzbekistan into their ranks. On the same day, a declaration was signed on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the summit in St. Petersburg on June 7, 2002, the SCO Charter was adopted (entered into force on September 19, 2003) - the basic statutory document that fixes the goals, principles, structure and main directions of the Organization's activities.

It includes eight member states: India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The total territory of the SCO member

countries makes up 60% of the territory of Eurasia, the second part of the world population lives on it - 3 billion and 40 million people (122). The official working languages are Russian and Chinese. The headquarters of the organization is in Beijing.

In addition to the member states of the organization, the SCO includes four observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia), three candidates to the observer states (Bangladesh, Egypt, Syria) and six states with the status of "partner for dialogue" (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey and Sri Lanka).

Observer states include states that actively support the activities of the organization and aspire to become its full members. Mongolia became the first country to receive this status (at the summit in Tashkent in 2004) (96). The dialogue partner is a state that is not part of the region, but has the opportunity to participate in the summits of the organization. Previously, this status was granted to Sri Lanka and Belarus (at a summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009) (110).

For a comprehensive assessment of the SCO as a regional organization, it is necessary to consider its basic documents - the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, signed in 2001 in Shanghai, and the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, adopted in 2002 in St. Petersburg (122). They proclaimed the main objectives of the organization:

- 1) Strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborliness between participating countries;
- 2) To assist countries in their effective cooperation in the political, trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields, as well as in the fields of education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection;
- 3) Joint provision and maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region;
- 4) Advancement towards the creation of a democratic, just and rational new international political and economic order.

Over the seventeen years of its existence, the SCO has become an effective platform for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between participating

countries, united by common aspirations for peace and stability in the region. The SCO is not a closed alliance or a union of countries directed against other states and regions, but an open organization focused on broad international cooperation.

The SCO region can not a priori be considered as always and in all things prosperous. It is characterized by instability, political, economic and social problems, as well as permanent interethnic contradictions. In view of this, political and economic stabilization in this region, along with solving other problems, is a priority task of the SCO, which requires an integrated approach to the development of the organization and concentration of efforts in several key areas of cooperation.

Article 3 of the Charter of the SCO, adopted on June 7, 2002, declares 10 main areas of cooperation (123), but in practice the range of potential spheres of cooperation is much broader. At the same time, on a large range of issues, cooperation is only indicated in dotted lines or is only being declared, since in many areas there are difficulties with the practical implementation of activities.

So, China, considering the SCO in the future as an economic integration union, offers a whole range of concrete projects aimed at expanding and strengthening trade and economic relations between the countries of the region. It should be noted that a significant part of them is deliberately hampered by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, since it sees in these initiatives a danger to the Russian market.

The fact is that the mechanisms of interaction within the SCO framework in the economic sphere are still undeveloped and they often contradict one of the main goals of creating the SCO. In particular, the Charter states that economic interaction should lead to the creation of "favorable conditions for trade and investment with a view to the progressive realization of the free movement of goods, capital, services and technologies" (123), which essentially means development along the way of economic integration.

Already at the first meeting of the leaders of the SCO member states on September 14, 2001 in Almaty, a Memorandum was signed between the governments of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the main goals

and vectors of regional economic cooperation and the creation of favorable conditions in the sphere of trade and investment. Beginning in 2002, there were regular meetings of ministers responsible for the foreign economic and foreign trade activities of the organization. On September 23, 2003, the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) developed the "Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation Program", which outlined the main orientations and stages of interaction and economic integration for the period until 2020.

At the same time, joint working committees were formed: on electronic commerce, customs, technical procedures for assessing compliance, favoring investment, expanding transit potential, developing telecommunications technologies and fuel and energy complex. In 2004, in Bishkek, the SCO CHG adopted a plan of activities to implement this program, which included more than a hundred projects, spheres and areas of cooperation, and also provided mechanisms for their implementation.

A key moment in the development of cooperation within the framework of the SCO was the agreement reached in 2005 in Moscow on the preparation of concepts for "pilot" projects in the field of hydropower, the creation of fiber-optic communications, cooperation in the scientific, technical and agricultural fields. In 2006, the first "pilot" projects were launched in Dushanbe in such an important area as transportation, the question of developing the foundations of the functioning of the SCO Energy Club, more intensive interaction in the field of education and culture, expansion of ties in the spheres of health, tourism, development of youth contacts.

At an official meeting on 2 November 2007 in Tashkent, at the initiative of the Russian side, it was proposed to take the necessary measures to revise the "Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation Program". In particular, the most promising projects were focused on specific areas of interaction - infrastructure construction, transport, energy, high technologies - and with the active participation of the Business Council and the Interbank Association of the SCO.

In this regard, the Special Working Group on Customs Cooperation prepared the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters, signed in November 2007 (102). On October 30, 2008, in Astana, the heads of government signed the Protocol on the Exchange of Information on Control over the Movement of Energy Resources (73). Later, in 2009, the Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of Training and Advanced Training of Customs Officials was signed in Beijing (74).

At the SCO Ministerial Meeting on Foreign Economic and Foreign Trade Sphere, on October 22, 2010 in Moscow, the parties once again stressed the need to accelerate the implementation of the action plan for the implementation of the program. According to Zhao Huizhun, the leading research associate of the Institute for the Study of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the Academy of Social Sciences of China, the main task of economic interaction is "to realize the constant realization of goods, capital and free movement services and technologies until 2020" (39, p. 49).

Trade relations between the SCO countries are gradually expanding, and the volume of trade is constantly increasing. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Commerce of China, compared to 2008, China's financial assistance to the SCO member states reached \$ 960 million, having increased 26.3 times since 2003.

Regarding the energy sector, in 2007 the Ministry of Energy of Russia developed and presented to the SCO partners a draft Regulation on the SCO Energy Club, and in 2011 the idea of creating such a discussion forum was translated into a practical plane. As expected, the club will be an open, partly formal, multilateral coordination mechanism in the energy sector with the participation of governments, energy companies, financial institutions and specialized scientific organizations. As necessary, the club will coordinate the interests of each of the parties through contacts and consultations, develop energy strategies, expand cooperation in all areas of infrastructure construction.

In the sphere of finance, certain progress has also been made. Thus, at a meeting of the finance ministers and chairmen of the central banks of the SCO member countries in 2009. The need was stressed to accelerate the process of

agreeing the key principles for the functioning of the so-called SCO Special Account. In particular, the Russian position on this issue was based on the fact that the funds of the Special Account of the SCO should be designed for the conduct of feasibility studies of joint projects in various areas of cooperation, and can be allocated exclusively on the principle of urgency and credit repayment. The Chinese leadership, for its part, initiated the establishment of the SCO Development Bank.

In general, it should be noted that in recent years, the trend towards intensification of economic activity within the SCO has increased significantly. At the next meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in November 2010 in Dushanbe, dedicated to the prospects of cooperation in the economic sphere, the initiative was supported by V.V. Putin on the revision of the plan for the implementation of the "Program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation of the SCO member countries until 2020" and the development of a "road map" in which prospective economic projects would be listed, specific deadlines for their implementation were indicated and the agencies responsible for it were identified.

At the summit in Astana in June 2011, the leaders of the member states defined the vectors for the development of economic cooperation. In this connection, the final communique stressed that the priority course of the organization will always remain close interaction in the most important spheres of cooperation - such as security, economy and welfare of the population of the SCO countries. At the same time, one cannot but admit that economic cooperation within the SCO is the weakest sphere of activity of this organization. The realized multilateral economic projects, as a matter of fact, while are absent. The reports, as a rule, contain data on bilateral cooperation, implemented without the SCO.

Obviously, the connection to the SCO of such large national economies as the Indian and Pakistani economies can greatly stimulate the development of economic cooperation within the organization, give impetus to the start of the implementation of a number of important multilateral projects. Both countries have significant potential in the economic, cultural, scientific and educational spheres and are able to seriously strengthen the organization's positions in the world arena.

Russia proposes to create a Development Fund (or a special account) as a mechanism for financing initial pre-design work, mainly in such key areas as energy, transportation, high technology. As expected, the practical implementation of projects will be controlled by the Interbank Association of the SCO. This approach is explained by the position of a number of Russian ministries, according to which, in the event of a bank having a significant financial opportunities, China will inevitably dominate it, while Russian interests are more in line with the activities created within the framework of the Eurasian Development Bank, where the Russian share far exceeds the contributions of other participants. It can be assumed that it is in Russia's interests to contribute to the creation of the SCO Development Bank, in whose active capital China and Russia would contribute equal shares (as in the SCO budget) and therefore have an equal number of votes.

Cooperation in the field of security is a priority. The member countries of the organization signed the Convention against Terrorism (125), agreements on cooperation in the field of combating drugs and on cooperation in the fight against crime. A serious impulse to work together to combat illicit drug trafficking was given at the summit in Astana in June 2011, where a number of documents were adopted, in particular, the "SCO Antinarcotics Strategy for 2011-2016" and the Action Program for its implementation. Additional opportunities for active counteraction to the narcotic threat can be provided by cooperation between the SCO Secretariat and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In this connection, an appropriate Memorandum of Understanding was prepared, voiced and signed in Astana by the Secretary General of the SCO, M.S. Imanaliev and Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Director of the UNODC Yu.V. Fedotov (126).

Attention should be paid to the relationship of cultural interaction. For 17 years, SCO member countries have actively participated in strengthening cooperation in the fields of culture, education, health, science, sports and tourism, signed a number of documents on cooperation, laying the social foundation for the development of the organization as a whole.

The SCO initially positioned itself as an organization striving to actively develop contacts in the humanitarian sphere. This is evidenced by its Charter, which states that cooperation in the humanitarian field is one of the priorities of this organization. However, its real implementation began only in 2005, after an expert group on cultural cooperation was established at the meeting of the Ministers of Culture to implement the "Plan for Multilateral Cultural Cooperation within the SCO for 2005-2006."

Later, at the next meeting of the Ministers of Culture, the "Multilateral Cultural Cooperation Plan for 2007-2008" was adopted. During this period, humanitarian cooperation has really expanded and deepened. In addition, cooperation in the field of ecology is important. For example, in the vicinity of the Fergana Valley, radioactive waste burials are a big danger. Similar problems in the field of ecology are of concern to those states of the region that conduct their own activities in this direction. Kazakhstan is carrying out work to restore the Small Aral Sea, Uzbekistan - work to restore the ecosystem in order to secure mobile sands at the bottom of the exposed Aral Sea.

Thus, humanitarian cooperation within the framework of the SCO is unfolding in all directions with varying degrees of intensity. It has become, as reflected in the Declaration of the Five-Year Plan of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "one of the most important factors, guaranteeing the viability of the organization. The SCO can very well play the role of catalyst and an example for intercivilizational communication in the name of seeking solutions to problems that hamper the harmonization of relations in the world "(22).

One of the most controversial aspects in the activities of the SCO is military cooperation. On the one hand, such cooperation is not among the main priorities of the Shanghai Organization. On the other hand, it is of great practical interest for all participating countries, primarily for Russia and China. However, in Russia, military contacts the vast post-Soviet space is more associated with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which already has Collective Rapid Reaction Forces for these purposes. In China, military ties with Russia and the Central Asian republics at

the collective level are realized mainly with the use of the SCO potential. It is worth mentioning that there are no special structures involved in military planning and armed forces management within the SCO. To date, this is the prerogative of various consultations and meetings of the defense ministries and secretaries of security of the SCO countries. The practical side of such cooperation is the preparation and conduct of command post and tactical exercises, conducted at least once a year under the auspices of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO.

In the PRC, such teachings are approached with great enthusiasm, which is not difficult to see if one follows their evolution. So, back in October 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan within the SCO implemented a plan for such exercises on a bilateral basis. In August 2003, in the territory of China, under the auspices of the SCO, the multilateral counterterrorism exercise "Interaction" was already held, and in 2005, within the framework of the SCO in Northeast China, the Russian-Chinese military exercise "Peace Mission 2005" was held. However, the 2005 exercise was not just the first bilateral exercise of the armed forces of Russia and the PRC, but it was first implemented with the extensive application of the naval component, to which the Chinese specialists showed great interest.

Today, a new philosophy of development and integration within the SCO framework is obvious: the desire to create "decent living conditions for its citizens", the introduction of high social standards and the convergence of value guidelines. This requires the development of a joint socio-political and economic strategy for the modernization of the SCO member states, its filling with practical content and concrete projects on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The SCO was created as an organization to address border problems and security issues. Today, it is increasingly responsive to such contemporary challenges as globalization, the economic crisis, social instability, environmental problems. In the future, the SCO can become a real source and center of a "social and economic breakthrough" not only on a regional but also on a global scale. At the moment, the most important priority is the further social development of the SCO member states within the framework of a different speed movement towards regional integration.

3.2. The SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism

The whole set of factors affecting the creation of tension in the states of Eastern Eurasia located in the SCO space, especially in Central Asia, can be conditionally grouped into three main:

- The presence of separatist sentiments among large ethnic groups in a number of Eastern Eurasian states;
- The desire of radical religious organizations to realize the idea of uniting some Muslim countries of Central and East Asia into large Islamic caliphates or other state entities with a Sharia form of government;
- Insurgent speeches of certain forces fighting with existing regimes in individual countries.

At the same time, in some states the basis for the activities of the above forces is a combination of different motives, but they are united by the growing use of extremist and even terrorist methods of achieving the goals.

It should be specially emphasized that the activity of terrorist, extremist and separatist organizations in the SCO space is growing and, despite the measures taken to combat them, is building up the resource base. At the summit in June 2001 in Shanghai, the leaders of the six SCO member states were recognized as important not to delay with the introduction of the signed Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (115, p. 11). This document, containing agreed definitions of such complex international concepts and phenomena as terrorism, separatism and extremism, was aimed at practical cooperation of the participating countries in countering these negative and dangerous phenomena. It created good legal provisions for work on documents and other important and relevant areas of transnational anti-criminal cooperation, such as the illegal traffic in drugs, weapons, ammunition, etc. The Convention provides for the establishment of the SCO Anti-Terrorist Structure, operating on an ongoing basis, with its headquarters in Bishkek (in 2004 it was moved to Tashkent) (115, p. 6).

Subsequently, the decisions of the St. Petersburg summit held in 2002 laid the foundation for the development of the main line of interaction between the SCO member states - the counteraction to international terrorism, religious extremism, national separatism (the so-called "Central Asian triangle" or "three evils", in Chinese terminology). In this regard, ensuring the readiness of countries to repel the terrorist threat has become one of the main tasks of the SCO participants.

In October 2002, within the framework of the SCO, China and Kyrgyzstan jointly organized a bilateral antiterrorist military exercise. Beginning in August 2003, when the maneuvers "Interaction-2003" were held for the first time (in October 2009, the seventh exercises were held), the SCO countries almost every year conduct joint military exercises within the framework of the program to combat terrorism in Central Asia. At the military maneuvers "Interaction - 2009", which were held for the first time within the framework of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of CSTO of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the SCO member countries (except China) worked through crisis situations in cooperation with other participants wider coalition. In 2005, Russia and China held the Peace Mission 2005 in the territory of the PRC (10,000 servicemen of the two countries, including about 2,000 Russian, took part in them), and in 2004-2005, also a series of Russian-Indian (India had observer status in the SCO) land and naval military maneuvers. In July 2007, military exercises of all participants of the SCO "Peace Mission - 2007" were conducted on the territory of Russia (on the testing ground near Chebarkul) (115, p. 73).

During the summit in Tashkent in June 2004, the official opening ceremony of the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which is based in Tashkent (the executive committee started functioning in January 2004), was signed, and an agreement was signed between the SCO member states on cooperation in combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors (52, p. 193-194).

The PRC was the depositary of the agreement on the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure, which indicated the important role of China in organizing this activity. The

RATS is the SCO body, designed to facilitate coordination and interaction of the competent bodies of the parties in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. The main tasks and functions of the RATS are the development of proposals on combating terrorism, the assistance to competent authorities, the collection and analysis of information, the formation of a database on individuals and organizations that support terrorism, separatism and extremism, assistance in the preparation and conduct of operational search and other activities for combating these phenomena, maintaining contacts with international organizations (103, p. 41).

The SCO, developing its own approaches to the organization of the fight against terrorism, adheres to the principle of external openness, is ready to conduct a dialogue, exchange and cooperation with other countries and international organizations. In November 2002, at a meeting of the SCO foreign ministers, the SCO's Temporary Scheme for External Relations was adopted, according to which the SCO has the right to invite representatives of other countries and international organizations as a guest to a meeting of foreign ministers and consultations on foreign policy issues, and to send their representatives to participate in the events of other international organizations.

Already in 2003, official external contacts of the SCO on antiterrorist issues with various international organizations were initiated. Representatives of the SCO attended that year at a special meeting of the UN Security Council's Anti-Terrorism Commission (March 2003, New York), at the OSCE Dialogue Partners' Meeting (April 2003, Vienna), at the fifth UN High Level Meeting and Regional Organizations (July 2003 New York), at the OSCE Conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism (September 2003, Lisbon).

The new model of the security concept found by the "Shanghai Five" is the maximum reduction of armed forces and military activities in the border zone on the basis of mutual trust, through dialogue and consultations, strengthening transparency and strengthening friendly contacts, creating borders for good-neighborliness and friendship, and regional security on the basis of stimulating the relationship of cooperation - has been further developed.

We can now say that within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it has been possible to basically remove the problem of tension on the borders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China from the Pamirs to the shores of the Pacific Ocean; first of all, to create a system of confidence-building measures, first of all, in the military sphere, to think through and debug the system of combating manifestations of terrorism and extremism, to a large extent using measures to prevent these phenomena or stop them at an early stage, to create a forum for constant discussion and development of relations.

The content of the Organization's activities has come a long way - from resolving issues of a territorial and military nature to multi-disciplinary discussion, consultations and concerted concrete measures on a wide range of issues, including international terrorism, extremism and separatism, drug trafficking and other threats to regional stability and security. The fulfillment of plans and programs adopted by the SCO serves the development of the economy, raising the living standards of the population of the region and strengthening the security of the CAR states. The effectiveness of the multilateral structures created to combat terrorism, extremism, separatism, drug trafficking and other manifestations of cross-border crime is increasing. This model of a new type of security is united in spirit with five principles of peaceful coexistence and other generally accepted norms of international relations.

"In recent years," said I. Zvyagelskaya, an expert at the Information and Analytical Center for Studying Social and Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Territory, "the hierarchy of security challenges in Eastern Eurasia has been quite clearly defined. They can be divided into two groups. The first includes those threats and challenges that are not so much intra-regional as the external nature. These include drug trafficking, arms smuggling, the activities of extremist groups using terrorist methods and receiving support from abroad. All these threats belong to a non-traditional series, but, judging by everything, they will dominate the future in the system of international relations in and around Central Asia.

The second group, fraught with instability, is the disproportion in the economy, the increase in social inequality against the backdrop of increasing corruption, the

problems of water scarcity and the reduction in some areas of land suitable for agriculture, poverty. Many of the above security challenges are not at all diseases of the Central Asian states. According to experts, they are typical for other post-Soviet republics, including Russia, where the problems of corruption and social inequality are quite acute. The socio-political group of reasons capable of causing instability creates opportunities for mobilizing the population of various kinds of radical groups "(103, p. 196).

Of course, the expert believes, in different countries the situation looks different, but the prospects for internal destabilization to some extent exist everywhere. At the same time, negative external impact can be productive in conditions when a very significant potential for dissatisfaction has been created in a particular state; there are forces that are relatively easy to mobilize. That is why there are reasons to believe that the internal security challenges in Central Asia play a greater role at this stage than external ones (103, p. 196).

The new geopolitical role of the SCO is largely determined by the Islamic factor, which has a significant impact on the situation both in the region and in Eurasia as a whole. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of new independent states in this region, as in other parts of Eurasia, an intensive process of revival of Islam began, while maintaining the secular nature of state power, preventing the politicization of religion and trying to bring elements of democracy and liberalism into public relations.

During the transit period, the countries of Central Asia, as well as to some extent Russia and China, faced a number of similar political problems related to the stability of their societies and the elites' ability to ensure the peaceful development of their states. The historical traditions and mentality of the peoples hamper the development of democratic principles. There is also a deep distrust of the so-called Western democracy, especially in the variants implanted in the SCO space and in other regions by the United States.

Of course, democracy is not a panacea for the emergence of people in leading positions who are not very suitable for fulfilling the mission of leaders for the whole

people. But no less dangerous is the underestimation of the importance of developing democratic institutions (certainly taking into account the specifics of each country), capable of rectifying the situation evolutionarily.

That is why in scientific circles and in the political sphere there is a search for optimal options for the progressive development of social relations. In Russia and Kazakhstan, for example, the terms "sovereign democracy" and "managed democracy" have come into use, which reflect the fears of the ruling regimes that the struggle for democracy and the power struggle will eventually turn into one and the same.

On the one hand, such terminology can be seen as a reflection of the degree of development of democratic processes in society, and, on the other hand, as an understanding by the elite that it is in this form of democracy, in its manageability and protection from destructive influence from outside, that, in the opinion of the majority of the population, guarantee of preventing political upheavals, which at this stage is more important for him than uncontrollable and unprotected by state instruments freedom.

This is all the more important because a number of rigidly structured radical organizations and movements operate in the states of Central Asia, among which currently the most serious position is taken by such a radical movement as Hizb ul-Tahrir al Islami (HTI). HTI is opposed to the very idea of secular power, which in accordance with its postulates everywhere should replace the caliphate, opposes market relations, democracy, tolerance, dialogue of cultures. At first, HTI was limited to the distribution of leaflets and printed publications, propaganda and mobilization activities. Later, especially after the explosions in Tashkent in 2004, the transition to terrorist methods became evident. The key to the influence of the Tahrists is the patronage networks they have created. The habitual dependence on the community, the clan, the family, and the system of loyalty built along these lines, sometimes holds the adherents of Islamism no less firmly than the actual ideological content of the activities of the Tahrists.

At the same time, Islamists do not recognize national isolation, they do not need customs, borders, strong governments. People who are tired of the confrontation of clans, the rupture due to the emergence of state borders of ties with relatives and friends, deprived of the usual occupations, can perceive the slogan of a single Muslim space as a desirable alternative.

"Any social and political protest in the conditions of a traditional society," Zvyagelskaya believes, "can easily saddle forces that have nothing to do with democracy, which under the slogans of social justice can sweep away the emerging liberal institutions by choosing the path of eastern despotism. This will mean overturning the region in the past, the link between Central Asia and the gray zone in Afghanistan, the choice of new geopolitical landmarks, etc. "(103, p. 201).

In the current situation, Afghanistan is the most problematic country - the source of one of the most significant threats to stability in the Central Asian region. Formed here after the "overthrow" of the Taliban regime by NATO, the provisional Afghan administration only partially fulfilled its tasks - under the guidance of US advisers and with the support of NATO troops it ensured the adoption of a new state constitution, the holding of elections and the re-election of the president of the country, the formation of the government, political arena "Taliban" as an influential force, neither in the country, nor in the region as a whole could not. Full control of Kabul situation throughout the country, even with the help of NATO forces, after almost a decade has not been established.

The leaders of ethnic clans, as well as field commanders, retain their independence in different parts of Afghanistan and determine the situation in the country more than the central government and "peacekeepers". Thus, the main tasks - the destruction of Al-Qaeda and the defeat of the Taliban - were unresolved. On the contrary, both organizations quickly regained their strength after striking them in 2001 and 2002. Moreover, the Taliban are building up resistance and are switching from separate diversionary attacks to conducting whole operations. A serious danger is the "Talibanization" of Pakistan. It is known that the headquarters of Al-Qaeda is in the north of Pakistan, in Waziristan, which in early 2007 the Taliban was declared

a "free Islamic territory" and announced the establishment of a new Islamic state there.

The military political formations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan have turned into centers of Islamist terrorism. In 2007, the Taliban adopted a tactic of Shaheed movements. Attempt on February 27, 2007. US Vice President R. Cheney in Kabul, for example, was executed using an Afghan shahid. The return of control by the Taliban over much of southern Afghanistan could lead to the fall of the existing regime in Pakistan, which proved unable to prevent the proclamation of a non-controlled Islamic state on part of its territory. And this is fraught with the transition of Pakistan with its nuclear arsenal to the control of radical Islamists. The presence in Pakistan of nuclear weapons combined with the unpredictability of its political development and direct involvement in the Afghan problem poses a security threat that extends far beyond the Central Asian region.

In the context of broader contacts of the region's population with the inhabitants of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the militants operating in them, radical ideas can give impetus to the growth of local radicalism, the emergence and strengthening of extremist groups. For Central Asian republics with a predominantly Muslim population, the problem of counteracting the ideology of religious fanaticism and extremism, which captures and poisons the consciousness of the younger generation in the first place, turns it into an obedient tool in the hands of various terrorist groups and movements.

A special place in the activities of the SCO is the fight against the increase in drug trafficking in Central Asia and through it. It should be noted that after the fall of the Taliban power in Afghanistan in 2001, the flow of drugs only increased. In 2002, the SCO recognized the useful creation of an anti-drug security system along the perimeter of Afghanistan's borders. However, it was not possible to create a sufficiently harmonious international system of drug control. Therefore, in 2004, within the framework of the SCO, an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking was signed.

Experts estimate that more than 90% of opium entering the world drug market is exported from Afghanistan. Despite military operations, opium poppy is grown in Afghanistan in areas over 190,000 hectares, including in areas controlled by NATO troops. According to the Russian Federation State Drug Control Service, there are about 50 laboratories producing heroin in Afghanistan, with a capacity of about 30 kg per day. Most of them are located in remote mountain areas. Among them there are even mobile. They work well-trained chemists, who are often representatives of other, including European, states. The supply of these laboratories with raw materials and the organization of export of finished products are established quite clearly. According to the UN report, almost half of the drug production falls on 2 of the 33 Afghan provinces - Nangarhar and Helmand, exactly where the American and British troops are located (92, p. 119-121).

The measures taken in Afghanistan to combat drug trafficking are clearly not enough. The flow of drugs from there is increasing. According to UN estimates, drugs now go in three main directions. The first by their volume is the so-called western route - Iran, Turkey and the Balkans (40% of drugs produced in the country). The second place belongs to the southern - Pakistani direction (36%). The third route is the northern route - the states of Central Asia, China and Russia (24%) (92, p. 121-122).

There are still differences in the Russian and Western approaches to the strategy of combating the Afghan drug expansion. The West believed that this struggle should be fought, first of all, in Afghanistan itself by strengthening the central government, its law enforcement bodies and the restoration of normal agriculture. Its representatives also urge Moscow to use its special relations with the Northern Alliance and send Afghan drug policemen trained in Russia to its zone to step up work in this direction in the north of the country.

Russia, more deeply assessing the state of affairs in Afghanistan, offers a way to create around it "belts" that block the path of drug trafficking. At that, the first "shielding belt" should be continuous and located along the borders of Afghanistan, and the second - to become such a "belt" on the Russian-Kazakh border and the

Caspian, on the Indo-Pakistani, Iranian-Turkish borders and in some other places. This opinion was repeatedly expressed at various special conferences on this issue (92, p. 123).

However, it is possible to achieve an effect in this matter only by concerted and integrated use of all available means in the fight against drug trafficking. It is necessary to intensify the implementation of activities for which the West is acting, reinforcing them by harsh NATO control of the identified internal Afghan transport corridors for the movement of drugs through the installation of specialized checkpoints at their nodes and regular raids on the destruction of heroin laboratories and poppy fields. Unquestionably, it will be necessary to create the "belts of barriers" offered by Russia.

Of course, all this will require considerable costs, but because in this case, cooperation of all interested states, including European ones, is needed. To some extent, they will require the recruitment of military contingents of the countries concerned, as well as the use of operational data of their security agencies possessing information on places of production and storage, routes and methods of transportation, wholesale distribution and retail sale of Afghan drugs. And most importantly, the implementation of such plans should be carried out under a single, systematic and effective international management and control, for example, the Department of Drugs and the Fight against Organized Crime of the United Nations. This is the only way to avoid or reduce the subjectivity of some states in this matter, as well as to prevent the emergence and rooting of corruption, both among personnel and in its governing bodies in the countries concerned (60, p.58).

In connection with this at the current stage, the fight against drug trafficking remains one of the SCO's top priorities. In general, Afghanistan today retains many contradictions that directly affect the situation in the countries of the region, which require long-term creative work to overcome. One of the real ways to give it a positive impetus can and should be the activation of the activities of the SCO contact group and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

3.3. The place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism

There are a large number of common threats, such as transnational terrorism or drug trafficking, which require the cooperation of all countries and organizations of the modern world. These common threats are on the agenda of all major regional structures, including the SCO, CSTO and NATO. In fact, all regional organizations have overlapping tasks related to these threats. Therefore, we can say that there is definitely room for cooperation, but the question arises whether these regional organizations can build a successful dialogue with each other?

There are some attempts by these regional institutions to develop contacts with other regional organizations. On April 21, 2005, the ASEAN Secretariat signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). ASEAN and the SCO Secretariats intend to focus on the priority area of combating international crime, which includes terrorism, drug control, arms smuggling, money laundering and human trafficking. Other areas of cooperation are economics and finance, tourism, the environment and the management of natural resources, social development and energy (124).

In October 2007, the CSTO signed an agreement with the SCO in the capital of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, in order to expand cooperation on security issues, organized crime and illicit drug trafficking(122).

Despite the often denied military nature of the SCO, as well as the differences between its members in the armed forces and the degree of their cooperation on security issues, five recent events indicate that the SCO is developing into a more mature security organization:

- First, military and political functions were combined. For the first time the meeting of political leaders at the highest level (Bishkek 2007) coincided with the conduct of military exercises (Peace Mission of the SCO 2007). Prior to this, high-ranking officials who observed military exercises

SCO, there were only ministers of defense. The heads of state attended the military exercises for the first time in the history of the SCO and had to demonstrate the growing importance of military cooperation in the SCO, as well as signaling their determination to jointly monitor the security situation in the region;

- Secondly, a change in attitude towards the concept of military assistance. Perhaps the most significant transformation in the field of security policy was the scenario of the Peace Mission 2007 exercises, in which military assistance played a central role. One of the vital components of a full-fledged security organization, to which the CSTO also belongs, is military mutual assistance. Although it is now impossible to note any signs that such an article will be included in the SCO political documents, the scenario of the "Peace Mission-2007" nevertheless demonstrated the actual application of the concept of military assistance;

- Thirdly, since 2002, the SCO military exercises have become more and more ambitious, having passed in their development the path from bilateral or multilateral formats to a united one involving all the members of the SCO. At the same time, this format concerned not only the fight against terrorism, but also the issues of ensuring external security. In addition, even before the Bishkek summit, on June 27, 2007, the SCO defense ministers reached an agreement on joint maneuvers. According to Kyrgyz Defense Minister Ismail Isakov, this agreement will become a long-term organizational and legal basis for such actions in the future;

- Fourthly, the Shanghai Summit of 2006 confirmed that in case of a threat to peace in the region, as well as stability and security, the SCO members are entitled to hold immediate joint consultations in order to find the most effective response to this or that emergency situation. In addition, the intention was expressed to develop a mechanism for responding to threats to regional peace, as well as to explore the establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention within the SCO itself. The desire to continue work on creating security mechanisms, similar to what can be found in NATO, was reiterated during the Bishkek summit in 2007(21).

The basic documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization show that the fundamental interests of its member countries are aimed at uniting efforts in

maintaining stability in the region through the creation of a reliable system of regional security.

- The SCO intends, firstly, to confront the long-term threat of the spread of extremism and terrorism in Central Asia. This threat in many cases takes on an Islamist tinge and, as experience shows, is able to have a serious impact on the radicalization of public consciousness in the countries of the region that are affected by conflict zones in neighboring states.

- Secondly, a number of urgent tasks to ensure both regional and national security of each SCO state include the issue of taking tough measures to combat drug trafficking. Central Asia is actually at the crossroads of world drug trafficking routes, which also contributes to the illegal sale of weapons, which is done by emissaries of Islamist terrorist organizations.

- Thirdly, the SCO is developing a strategy and tactics to study and develop measures to create an atmosphere of stability in conflict situations that arise in Central Asia and are caused "mainly by the competition of world forces for influence in the region" (53).

Representatives of such international structures as the UN, the EU, the CSTO, the SCO, NATO, etc. are active in Central Asia, which partly fulfill the functions of developing regional security measures. It is quite difficult to appreciate their efforts in this field positively, not only because their effectiveness is affected by disunity and inconsistency caused by political, ideological and economic disagreements. Each of these structures is distinguished by its own approach to solving essentially the same problems, which is explained by the goals laid down by the founders when creating the appropriate unions and associations. NATO is a military-political organization, the goal is the protection of freedom and democracy. The main objectives declared by the EU are: the introduction of European citizenship; ensuring freedom, security and the rule of law; promoting economic and social progress; strengthening the role of Europe in the world. The SCO stated that its goals are to strengthen mutual trust and good-neighborliness between participating countries; assistance to their effective cooperation in political, trade-economic, scientific-technical and cultural spheres;

joint provision and maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region; promotion to the creation of a democratic, just and rational new international political and economic order.

If we proceed from the contents of the documents of each structure, it seems that any of them is an example of selfless service to the noblest goals. This is - at first glance. In fact, NATO, led by the United States of America, first, prefers a paramilitary approach to solving problems (primarily their own). Secondly, the overwhelming majority of the EU member states are simultaneously members of NATO. And although Europe is located at a fairly considerable distance from Central Asia, it does not serve as an obstacle for the members of the Alliance to transfer their military contingents to places where, according to his leadership, there is a threat to Western democracy.

Washington covers its interests in Central Asia very attractively, formulating them as a permanent support for democratic institutions, local NGOs and independent media. However, the latest developments show that the measures for "democratization" are increasingly combined with the unceremonious expansion of a diverse American presence. In fact, it is the practice of improving the methods of establishing world domination, implemented by the integrated planning of the military-political and economic strategy and implemented with the help of all kinds of "non-governmental organizations".

Despite the significant changes taking place in our rapidly transforming world, NATO leadership is still convinced (and trying to convince others) that the Alliance is non-alternative in world politics, that only it is an effective tool for introducing "democratic values" far beyond its zone responsibility, in particular in Central Asia. The implementation of such unipolar views is fraught with unpredictable consequences.

The high activity of the United States and NATO in the region also aims to consolidate its military presence, which is facilitated by numerous programs and agreements in bilateral and multilateral formats designed to "tie" the states of the region to the policy of the Alliance, which seeks to control their transport and transit

potential. The issue of the possibility of using NATO as an instrument of energy security is being urged.

The researchers note that the presence of NATO armed forces in Central Asia can also be considered as a kind of base for controlling the neighboring countries (88), allegedly representing a certain danger to the interests of the West. There is an obvious desire for NATO to become a key geopolitical and military player in Central Asia using the already established framework (the mechanism of cooperation through the Partnership for Peace program, the legal framework for relations with the Central Asian countries, and military-political interaction).

The SCO does not declare itself (and is not) a military-political organization. It also does not include "sins" in the sense of "promoting democracy" through military intervention in the internal affairs of other states (as opposed to NATO). At the initiative of the US, the alliance's armies have been taking part in the campaign to plant a "new world order" with weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq for the past almost 16 years under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

In general, since the formation of the Shanghai Five, five states included in the Shanghai Five managed to achieve the following:

- agreed on the boundary problems, concluded the "Agreement on strengthening confidence in the military area in the border area" (1996) (99), which is known as the "Shanghai Declaration" and the "Agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area", signed on the second meeting of the Shanghai Five in Moscow (1997) (100). These agreements have raised the level of trust between the five participating countries, increased the level of cooperation between the border services, established mutual control over the border zone, and the countries agreed to inform each other about the situation at the borders. Having solved the problems with China, it is not yet possible to consolidate by signing the corresponding agreement on the junction point of the three Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;

- The following structures have been established in the SCO structure for coordination of efforts in the sphere of security and development: Meeting of heads

of law enforcement agencies, border agencies, defense ministers, foreign ministers, ministers for emergency situations;

- The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed (2001) (104);

- The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO with the Executive Committee in Tashkent, Uzbekistan was created and started working. In the RATS SCO, a mechanism has been set up for meetings of secretaries of the Security Councils of member states;

- A contact group "SCO - Afghanistan" has been established which is another important historic step in maintaining peace and stability in the region ";

- Also on issues of security and development, contacts have been established with such international structures as, with the UN Security Council and with the UN Committee on Combating Terrorism, the OSCE, the CIS Antiterrorist Center (ATC);

- An agreement on cooperation in combating the illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances was signed.

Thus, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created a set of mechanisms and arrangements capable of regulating the security processes in the region. Putting in the head - the fight against the "three forces of evil" the organization began to take shape in a structural and legal manner. First, in 2001 the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed. There were clear definitions of the relevant terms (104).

In June 2002, at the summit in St. Petersburg, an Agreement was signed between the SCO member states on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is designed to facilitate coordination and interaction of the competent bodies of the SCO parties in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. The RATS is a permanent body of the SCO with its headquarters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. If necessary, the Council of Heads of State of the SCO member states may establish RATS offices in the territory of any of the member countries. Financing of this organization is carried out from the means of the

SCO budget and today it is about 1 million US dollars. The RATS Council includes 30 people, including seven from Russia.

The main objectives of the RATS are the development of proposals and recommendations on the development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, as well as the assistance of member states in combating new threats. RATS will also collect, analyze information and form a databank for international terrorist and extremist organizations, their leaders, structures and individuals involved in these organizations. In addition, the RATS is expected to analyze the status and trends of the spread of terrorism and extremism, as well as gather information on non-governmental organizations and individuals supporting terrorists(101).

Work is also underway to create a "List of terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations whose activities are prohibited in the territories of the SCO member states." At the same time, there is no common understanding of which organizations are considered terrorist and which threaten national security. The final formulation of single (common) lists of terrorist and extremist organizations is hampered by national differences. Thus, the activities of the Islamic Party of Turkestan and the Organization for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan are banned in 3 states, Al Qaeda and the Taliban of Afghanistan - 4, and the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan "And" Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami "- in five (39).

According to the Director of the RATS V. Kasymov: "The RATS is an international organization with diplomatic status, which consists of two bodies - the executive committee and the council of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, which meets twice a year and determines strategic directions of activities and planned events" (68).

For the executive committee of the RATS three directions are defined: information and analytical support of the activities of the competent bodies of the parties; coordination of activities to combat terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as international legal activities. In information and analytical activities, the main task is to create a unified databank for international terrorist organizations and their members. To date, the RATS executive committee has fulfilled the mandate of the

heads of state to create a list of terrorist organizations and persons involved in the commission of terrorist acts and who participated in the preparation of these crimes(68).

It is important to note that the RATS is not an analog of Interpol, but a coordinating body designed to ensure the interaction of the competent bodies and services of the six countries.

As the Permanent Representative of Russia at the SCO Secretariat G. Logvinov believes: "you cannot immediately expect that the RATS will start working with full measure now. The problem is that the documents signed with regard to the RATS must still be ratified, and the procedure for transferring confidential information to the international bodies should be worked out"(37).

The RATS has a work plan for the coming years (approved at the last meeting of the RATS Council), as the Cooperation Program of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism for 2007-2009 was approved at the sixth meeting of the RATS in March 2006. In addition, in order to strengthen cooperation in the field of security and to improve the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism and protection of the common interests of the SCO states, it was considered appropriate to continue joint anti-terrorist exercises with the participation of law enforcement bodies and special services aimed at strengthening coordination in the fight against the abovementioned threats. Such exercises have been held regularly since August 2003. Last exercises "East-antiterror-2006" were held in March 2006 on the territory of Uzbekistan (114). Special units, law enforcement agencies and other law enforcement agencies were involved in the exercises. As noted in the RATS SCO "The basis for the plan of the exercises was the task of working out the actions to find and neutralize the terrorists who are carrying out plans for preparing and committing large-scale terrorist actions on important state facilities with a view to destabilizing the political and social situation in the Central Asian states" (116).

Obviously, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, from the first days of its existence, began to fulfill its duties systematically and effectively to implement the principle "Russia, China and Central Asia - a zone free from terror"(97).

The previously mentioned directions, goals and tasks of the Eurasian integration cooperation of the SCO member states in ensuring interaction and compromise of the interests of the economy, politics, defense, security were considered at the SCO summit in Astana on June 9, 2017.

In the speech at the SCO Summit in 2017, in Astana, the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin defined the strategic tasks of the SCO in the field of regional and international security. He stressed that the priority for the SCO has always been and is to ensure security and stability on the external borders of member states by honest and constructive unification of the efforts of all countries on the basis of strict observance of international law(85).

Also, Vladimir Putin noted that along with eliminating the social and economic causes that give rise to terrorism, it is necessary to do everything to neutralize the ideology of terrorism with the increasing role of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure. With the mediation of Russia, Turkey and Iran, a series of regular international meetings were held in Astana to work out agreements on a cease-fire between Syrian government troops and the armed opposition. This was a real chance to give impetus to the inter-Syrian negotiation process in Geneva. The key to ensuring regional stability is the state of affairs in Afghanistan, which could be facilitated by the restoration of the activity of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group suspended in 2009 (85).

The ideas of the International Cooperation Forum "One Belt - One Way" will be gradually realized in Beijing on May 14-15, 2017, including by coordinating international, regional and national projects focused on cooperation for sustainable development based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. President of Russia V.V. Putin stressed the importance of uniting the potentials of the EEMP, the SCO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the China One-Way One Way initiative to link integration projects in Eurasia, positively assessing in this

context the decisions taken at the summit, especially the accession of India and Pakistan to SCO.

In conclusion, I want to say that the SCO's antiterrorist orientation is clearly seen in ensuring security. Clear development of this type of struggle is evident in comparison with other aspects of security. Other areas of cooperation in providing security have not been adequately developed or developed at all. For the development of other areas, it is clearly necessary to create special permanent bodies like the RATS.

Non-priority security problems remain so far only on paper, no practical steps have been taken. The task of giving the SCO universality is reduced only to combating the three forces of evil and economic cooperation. The real universality of the SCO in fulfilling those broad objectives and goals, which are written in its basic documents, is not observed.

The SCO so far only declares its intentions and slowly creates structures for their implementation, ensures future activity by legal consolidation. There were no great practical steps except in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, the Shanghai organization does not have the capacity to maintain security in other areas. Possessing good potential, the SCO is slowly and reluctantly moving from one problem to another. Cautiousness of actions and non-forcing in decision-making does not yet ensure the implementation of the announced steps, many decisions are officially postponed for the future. All this can be explained only by the lack of resources - financial resources. Most of the SCO members are poor countries, the SCO budget does not correspond to the universality and scope of the announced goals and objectives. The SCO simply does not have the money, develop all that it wants and needs. But the organization nevertheless systematically tries to take its place in providing security against the three forces of evil, which it obviously manages.

CONCLUSION

In the course of this work, a wide range of aspects of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism was analyzed. Within the framework of the dissertation research, transnational terrorist activity is considered as a threat to the modern state-centered political system of the world. The author also substantiates the urgency and political importance of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against transnational terrorism in order to overcome the development of the crisis of the existing political system of the world. The results obtained in the work contribute to the theoretical development of the approach to transnational terrorism and the identification of promising areas of research in this field, give an idea of the current state of multilateral antiterrorist cooperation. Despite the fact that the general definition of transnational terrorism at the international level as a basis for legal counteraction to the terrorist threat to date, due to the existing insurmountable differences between different countries, is not yet developed, it's very need is controversial, since multilateral anti-terrorist activities can and without a legally rigorous definition, as, for example, this is happening at the present time. In particular, one of the prominent theoreticians of the school of neoliberalism R. Cohen, believes that in the short term, terrorism will be defined "inductively and operationally - as acts of unlawful violence that an overwhelming number of countries of the anti-terrorist coalition consider illegitimate". Thus, until the legally rigorous definition of terrorism in the international arena is reached, it must be condemned by all countries of the world as an unauthorized method of conducting political struggle, including in the international arena.

Close attention was also paid to identifying the characteristics of modern transnational terrorism, taking into account their importance for multilateral anti-terrorist actions of states. As a result of the analysis it was shown that terrorism, developing throughout the history of mankind, today, under the influence of objective global processes of globalization and scientific and technological progress, has become a fundamentally new phenomenon. Modern transnational terrorism poses a

truly global task of changing the existing political system of the world and replacing it with another, based on separate provisions of Islam. It is the possibility of destroying the modern system of international relations, which has existed for more than 350 years and is today the universal basis of relations between the states of the whole world, should become a rallying factor for all countries in overcoming the transnational terrorist threat in the 21st century. This is the main and fundamental feature of transnational terrorism, taking into account that states must conduct their own, including multilateral, anti-terrorist policies. Other features of modern transnational terrorism identified during the study include the use of individual postulates of the Islamic religion, as the ideological basis of terror and the future world political system in the form of a world Islamic caliphate, the transformation of terrorism from the tactical method of political struggle into a strategic, long-term plan for realizing the idea of a just , in their opinion, the world order, the transformation of the structure and methods of functioning of terrorist groups, strengthening the importance of the media for creating an atmosphere of terror among the population, as well as the "advertising nature" of the terrorist acts themselves, their large-scale nature, the use of "suicide bombers", etc.

As a result of the analysis of the activities of multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO and the SCO, it was possible to establish that the lack of a single and complete understanding of the specific nature of the threat of transnational terrorism is today the main barrier to effective interstate cooperation at all levels. Unfortunately, none of the analyzed multilateral associations has yet come to the realization that transnational terrorism poses a threat to the modern state-centered political system of the world, that is, ultimately, a threat to the existence of the national states that form these multilateral organizations. The most vulnerable should feel first of all Muslim states, because, according to transnational terrorists, they act on the orders of Western countries and are subject to replacement by truly Islamic regimes. In the long term, terrorists are trying to make the whole world become a global Islamic caliphate, as a result of which the political system of peace with the

national state as a structural unit, as well as the whole system of principles for building internal and external political relations, will disappear.

The analysis of practical actions to combat terrorism, taken after the events of September 11, including in the framework of multilateral institutions, showed that they are aimed primarily at preventing terrorist activity as such and condemning it as an unjust method of political struggle. In addition, a whole range of law enforcement, law enforcement, financial and economic and other measures are taken to prevent any further terrorist activity. These practical actions, of course, were necessary at the initial stage of the formation of a new antiterrorist policy of states, including, among other things, a demonstration of their determination and political will. However, only counteraction to the terrorist method is not able to solve the problem of transnational terrorism. After all, terrorism was and remains, first of all, a phenomenon of the political sphere. Thus, without an attempt to resolve the political problems that led to the emergence of transnational terrorism, the fight against it will never be fully successful. As M.M. Lebedev, "if the various conditions that give rise to the social base of terrorism (for example, the elimination of significant social inequalities, including between the " global North "and the" global South ") are nevertheless taken into account in the development of counter-terrorism measures, then the problem of building the political system of the world more adequate to contemporary realities in general, is practically not among the issues of counteraction under consideration "(44).

To effectively combat terrorism, it is necessary to create the whole complex of anti-terrorist measures around the central political element - the modernized political system of the world. "It is based on this that it is necessary to build military, psychological, economic and other measures to combat terrorism." To date, as long as it can be stated that the states do not have a complete understanding of the entire range of actions necessary to eliminate the transnational terrorist threat. In addition, it will also be necessary to find an acceptable formula for all, so that attempts to reform the political system of the world, if they are made in the near future, do not look like

a concession to terrorists, but viewed as an objective necessity of the current stage of world development.

The work explored the multilateral efforts of states in the fight against terrorism on the example of the UN, NATO, the multilateral anti-terrorist coalition outside the framework of institutionalized international associations and the SCO.

Among international organizations with a global agenda, the UN, perhaps, should focus its efforts on the formation of a single international legal field to combat the terrorist method. To date, the measures taken by the UN to counter terrorism are not very effective, as they are mainly limited to recommendations, appeals and condemnation of terrorist activities. The lack of effective measures to combat terrorism by the United Nations is primarily due to financial and organizational reasons - the organization neither has the means nor the human resources to provide real and effective assistance in the fight against the terrorist method. So far, the UN can offer both to individual countries and international organizations, general support in identifying from them problematic, in terms of terrorist activities, areas. Some steps towards overcoming this problem were made by the EU, which in cooperation with the CTC of the UN Security Council created a program of targeted assistance to countries in need of financial injections to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council resolutions. However, the main task of the UN is seen in creating a global atmosphere of universal rejection of terrorism as such, which is an important condition for a successful campaign to combat transnational terrorism. In particular, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in September 2006 is aimed at this, which sets out the general provisions of the anti-terrorist struggle for all member countries of this organization, among which the inadmissibility of the terrorist method is emphasized, regardless of the arguments that may be cited in his justification.

As to the solution of the political problems underlying transnational terrorism, the presence of a large number of member countries with different ideas about the problems of world political development is unlikely to allow the UN to come to any

common opinion on the necessary measures for changing the modern political system of the world in soon.

In addition, NATO can make a significant contribution to the fight against international terrorism by organizing and promoting cooperation in four interrelated spheres: diplomatic, military, intelligence exchange and defense cooperation. If, within the framework of the fight against terrorism, the main efforts are aimed at improving international cooperation in the four areas listed above, and especially on the development of the exchange of intelligence information, NATO has the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the international campaign against terrorism. This became possible due to the fact that during the period of adaptation to the post-bipolar system of international relations, NATO was able to create such institutions as the EAPC, the Partnership for Peace, the Russia-NATO Council and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

However, this does not mean that the North Atlantic alliance does not need a clearer design of its anti-terrorist activities. If NATO really wants to take an active part in the fight against transnational terrorism, it must first of all come to a common understanding among its member countries as a threat to transnational terrorism for the modern political system of the world and a necessary political strategy to combat it. Without this, the whole future fate of NATO's counter-terrorism activities will be questioned.

The international antiterrorist coalition, which is an informal union of states, can also play an important role in the anti-terrorist campaign, in the opinion of the author. In the face of a single threat of a revision of the modern world-political system, the participating states of the coalition have a higher motivation for cooperation than ever. And although the activity of the coalition, or rather of the coalition complex, is also being built around the fight against the terrorist method, in the future it is the informal structure and the voluntary principle of participation that can help in the search for new directions of activity, which can also resolve the political problems underlying transnational terrorism. The possibility of attracting a wide range of non-state entities is also an additional advantage. However, it is

necessary that the states understand the complexity of the problem and the importance of its coordinated decision, and the coalition should be as representative as possible.

As already noted, the fight against terrorism cannot be based only on countering the terrorist method, although efforts in this direction, especially at the initial stage, are a prerequisite for further steps in countering terrorism, as it is necessary to address the political problems underlying the transnational terrorism. Without this, any attempt to counter the political phenomenon, which is transnational terrorism, will ultimately be only partially effective. Thus, the future formula for a successful anti-terrorist struggle against transnational terrorism must be twofold: on the one hand, efforts are needed to adapt the modern political system of the world to the realities of today so that all its elements, including the Muslim world, included in the world political processes, on the other hand, these actions need to be accompanied by a set of measures to prevent terrorist activities, the punishment for which must be inevitable regardless of its motivation.

To achieve maximum effectiveness in this direction at the multilateral level, it is necessary to build, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of functions, a complex coordinated system of interaction between interstate organizations and associations, so that their activities within the framework of the global antiterrorist campaign give the best result.

Today, a new philosophy of development and integration within the SCO framework is obvious: the desire to create "decent living conditions for its citizens", the introduction of high social standards and the convergence of value guidelines. This requires the development of a joint socio-political and economic strategy for the modernization of the SCO member states, its filling with practical content and concrete projects on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

The SCO was created as an organization to address border problems and security issues. Today, it is increasingly responsive to such contemporary challenges as globalization, the economic crisis, social instability, environmental problems. In

the future, the SCO can become a real source and center of a "social and economic breakthrough" not only on a regional but also on a global scale.

At the moment, the most important priority is the further social development of the SCO member states within the framework of a different speed movement towards regional integration.

The whole set of factors affecting the creation of tension in the states of Eastern Eurasia located in the SCO space, especially in Central Asia, can be conditionally grouped into three main:

- The presence of separatist sentiments among large ethnic groups in a number of Eastern Eurasian states;
- The desire of radical religious organizations to realize the idea of uniting some Muslim countries of Central and East Asia into large Islamic caliphates or other state entities with a Sharia form of government;
- Insurgent speeches of certain forces fighting with existing regimes in individual countries.

At the same time, in some states the basis for the activities of the above forces is a combination of different motives, but they are united by the growing use of extremist and even terrorist methods of achieving the goals.

At the summit in June 2001 in Shanghai, the leaders of the six SCO member states were recognized as important not to delay with the implementation of the signed Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. This document, containing agreed definitions of such complex international concepts and phenomena as terrorism, separatism and extremism, was aimed at practical cooperation of the participating countries in countering these negative and dangerous phenomena.

Subsequently, the decisions of the St. Petersburg summit held in 2002 laid the foundation for the development of the main line of interaction between the SCO member states - the counteraction to international terrorism, religious extremism, national separatism (the so-called "Central Asian triangle" or "three evils"), In

Chinese terminology). In this regard, ensuring the readiness of countries to repel the terrorist threat has become one of the main tasks of the SCO participants.

In June 2002, at the summit in St. Petersburg, an Agreement was signed between the SCO member states on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is designed to facilitate coordination and interaction of the competent bodies of the SCO parties in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. The RATS is a permanent body of the SCO with its headquarters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. If necessary, the Council of Heads of State of the SCO member states may establish RATS offices in the territory of any of the member countries. Financing of this organization is carried out from the means of the SCO budget and today it is about 1 million US dollars. The RATS Council includes 30 people, including seven from Russia.

The main objectives of the RATS are the development of proposals and recommendations on the development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, as well as the assistance of member states in combating new threats. RATS will also collect, analyze information and form a databank for international terrorist and extremist organizations, their leaders, structures and individuals involved in these organizations. In addition, the RATS is expected to analyze the status and trends of the spread of terrorism and extremism, as well as gather information on non-governmental organizations and individuals supporting terrorists.

In conclusion, I want to say that the SCO's antiterrorist orientation is clearly seen in ensuring security. Clear development of this type of struggle is evident in comparison with other aspects of security. Other areas of cooperation in providing security have not been adequately developed or developed at all. For the development of other areas, it is clearly necessary to create special permanent bodies like the RATS.

The SCO so far only declares its intentions and slowly creates structures for their implementation, ensures future activity by legal consolidation. There were no great practical steps except in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, the Shanghai organization does not have the capacity to maintain security in other areas.

Possessing good potential, the SCO is slowly and reluctantly moving from one problem to another. Cautiousness of actions and non-forcing in decision-making does not yet ensure the implementation of the announced steps, many decisions are officially postponed for the future. All this can be explained only by the lack of resources - financial resources. Most of the SCO members are poor countries, the SCO budget does not correspond to the universality and scope of the announced goals and objectives. The SCO simply does not have the money, develop all that it wants and needs. But the organization nevertheless systematically tries to take its place in providing security against the three forces of evil, which it obviously manages.

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