THE CAUCASUS AS A CATALYST OF THE WEST-EAST RELATIONS

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Diplomacy in today's Russian foreign policy has given up its place to a growing political extremism and sometimes even to undisguised threats. Speaking in Beijing before his resignation. Mr. Yeltsin said: "Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear Weapons, but Clinton decided to Ilex his muscles. ... I want to say to Clinton that he should not forget in what kind of world he lives. ... We (Russia and China) will dictate to the world how to live/.." How about that? All he laeked was Khruchev's shoe for a repeat of that shabby history. Six months in power of Mr. Putin have made a great change in the world's understanding of Russia as a country, once striving for integration to the world community and to transform itself to a democracy. In short time Mr. Putin has succeeded in things that communists were carefully avoiding during decades of their rule aiming Russia's foreign policy toward open confrontation with the West. In this connection, how does one not remember the speech of Russian nationalist Zshirinov ski in the Russian Parliament a few years ago. saving: "We can have everything we want. All we need is to brandish our nuclear cudgel. Nobody will dare to refuse." This brutish logic, that Russians were laughing at yesterday, today underlines Russian foreign policy. If we say the Caucasus has become a catalyst fortius change, we would not be mistaken. But we would be incorrect lo say that the Caucasus is a cause of this change. The cause is the Russian people themselves, who could not rise above die level of Zshivinovski'-s political consciousness. "The peavi of Russian umpire", as the Caucasus was named by Russian Empefof Nicholas 11. this mountainous area between the Black and Caspian Seas has everything to attract the world's attention. This time it is not its

uiik|iic beauty.. its pastoral landscapes, its thousand-foot high slum peaks, the ancient traces ami monuments of human civili/alion. the (ens of miles ol \ irgih sand beaches, its lakes and do/ens hot and cold mineral artesian springs. I his time it is the huge hydrocarbon reserves found in its Caspian region. I his discover) can make the Caucasus a prosperous region ii'i the near future. And the only explanation win the Caucasus, where reserves of oil and gas are much less than those of Central Asia, has become a bloodiest arena in Eurasia, the arena of concentration ol non-regional powers, is that the Caucasus is a master key to Asia. including' its posi-So\ iet Central area. The geographical peculiarity of the Central Asian eounirics. which occupied almost hall ol the former I SSK's southern frontiers, has after the collapse of the lallei become a cause of their comparative isolation from the developed democratic countries and from the world's consumer markets. I heir location in the "arc of instability", with Russia on the north. China on the east. Afghanistan. I'akisian and Iran on the south, has forced the Central Asian countries to seek an alternative route td connect their oil and gas reserves to a market. I he projected rev ival of the ancient Silk Road, proposed by the West in the pretext of I RACK A (Transportation Corridor I mropc-C aueasus-Asia). has become such an aliernative. An agreement, signed at the European Summit among Turkey. Cieoigia. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the construction of oil and gas pipelines, connecting Central Asian and Caucasian energy reserves with the world's market, has turned the new Silk Road, the alternative possibility., into a future reality. At the same lime, this agreement put in doubt Russia's plan to plus the role of 'the Caucasian dam across this energy slrcam. Openly ignoring and violating the signed Treaty on Security in Europe* Russia has unleashed the war in the North Caucasus and concentrated here a huge amount of heavy armament, explaining to the world that this is a necessary anli-tciToii.st action. It is hard to agree with such a point even if conditionally count all Chechen people as terrorists.

Concerning the huge Russian expenditure on this war. Mr. Putin hopes that it will be recouped with interest after Russia return to domination in the Caucasus. Inleashing war in Chechnia. keeping seats ol the local conflicts hot. annum various minorities inside

Caucasian countries and pushing them to "national liberation movements", establishing the Moscow- Yerevan Teheran military-political axis, turning independent Armenia into the Russian military arsenal, establishing hostile relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan -this is an incomplete list of Russia's steps toward a policy of "cutting or controlling the future Caspian energy stream. If we divide IR \< T C A into its regional sections, we will have the following Mlheme: Central Asia - Caspian Sea - Caucasus - Turkey -Mediterranean Sea. In this scheme only the last two are located out side of the post-Soviet area, out of Russia's influence. The most important link in this chain of pipelines is the Caucasian, more precisely Azerbaijani and Georgian. It is the link concentrating of all the collected Caspian energy branches in one place lor further pumping toward Turkey, out of post-Soviet geography. The war in C'hechnia has to be viewed only as Russia's clearing the way to this future main oil and gas pipe line.

further Russian leverage in the Caucasus may also be put in uioiion soon. I he "liberation movement" of the minorities inside the liny countries of Azerbaijan and Georgia is one. The most vulnerable of the two is Georgia, which still has not managed to liberate its soil from Russian military bases, and has recently experienced Russia's direct military intervention within its border with Chechnia.

The next Russian steps in this pipeline chain can be expected in the direction of increasing pressure against the construction of gas and oil pipelines under the Caspian Sea. opening once again the **question** about the legality of using this water basin. In this issue. Russia has a strong supporter in its historical ally - Iran, which considers itself as the best option in the transport of the Caspian hydrocarbons.

To weaken the commercial profit i>l" the TRAGI CA. Russia and Iran arc creating alternative energy and transportation solutions for energy producing countries and energy consumers, for instance. Iran, which has its own huge gas reserves, offers neighboring Turkmenistan to buy its gas. attempting to decrease the supply of Turkmenistan's yas into the I RAC I C A pipeline. Russia is doing the same, by signing on with Turkey in the "Hlue Stream" project, which could cover Turkey's need for gas by supplying it from Russia through the

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pipeline planed for construction under the Black Sea. Once built, it will put in serious doubt the commercial profitability of constructing a similar pipeline under the Caspian Sea. The last link in the 1 RACECA project is the Central Asian region. To create obstacles for this project here. Russia is using its influence in Kasakhstan, home of the richest Caspian oil reserves. In this connection, we would not be mistaken predicting Russia's use of its ethnic majority within Kasakhstan to put pressure against their government's decision to participate in TRACECA. directing its oil How to the north. Early signs of this scheme already can be seen in the growing dissatisfaction of citizens of Pavlodar and Ust-Kamenogorsk, the Russian populated regional centers in northern Kasakhstan, which with only a little support by Russia can be easily turned into a separatist movement.

These are just a few of many other examples of how Russia has tried, and may try in the future to return to its domination in the Caucasian-Central Asian region.

Unlike the West, Russia has nothing to offer this region except all kinds of armaments. For example, Azerbaijan repeatedly protested Russia's illegal allocation within Armenia of one billion dollars worth of heavy armament. Russia finally responded by offering to "liquidate the injustice" and to allocate the same amount of armaments into Azerbaijani soil. This is how Russia understands justice. The full-scale war going in the Caucasus has already reached the borders of the independent states of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Yet their fragile security hasn't have an adequate help from the West, fully depending on the dubious belief that Russia will not openly confront with its former satellites. What is not dubious is the point that Russia wants to deliver to the world - it's prepared to do whatever it takes to return to domination in the post-Soviet area. If the West repeats President Wilson's mistake in the beginning of the 20-th century, refusing to recognize the independence of the Trans-Caucasian countries and allowing the Bohheviks to capture the whole region, world will have a new National-Socialist Empire, which will grow as strong, as the conquered wealth of Caucasian and Central Asian regions will make it possible. The "new vocabulary" created by Russian politicians, where independent countries are called "newly independent states" in the

"near abroad" ol' Russia, shows dial the imperialistic mentality still dominates in their approach to neighboring countries. It is lime for the West to understand that the value of "independence" has nothing to do with time, and that "abroad" has nothing to do with distance. A country may either be independent or not. and from the geographical point of view, has to be somebody's "near abroad", meaning, be somebody's neighbor. Millions of people in the Caucasus and **Central** Asia hope and wait lor the time when the West will arrive at the same conclusion.

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QAFQAZ QƏRB-ŞƏRQ ƏLAQƏLƏRİNDƏ KATALİZATOR KİMİ

Rüfət KƏRİMOV

(Posi-Sowl arasclırınaları v j nuxLvıivv.ıthrarrası .thu/.t. Arch International.

Boston, ABŞ)

Rusiya xarici siyasetinin bugünkü diplomatiyasmın yerindo arlan siyasi ekstremizm vo bozon hotta açıq - askar hodolor mövcuddur.

İsteta vermomişdon ovvol Pekindoki çıxışında conab Yeltsin "Rusiya hor cür nüvo silahına malikdir. Klinton iso qollarına giic vermok qoranna golibdir. ...Mon Klintona demok isloyirom ki. o hansı dünyada yaşadığını unutmamalıdır... Biz (Rusiya vo Cin) dünyaya neco yaşamağı dikto edocoyik...** - dedi. Neco fikirdir? Miskin latixi tokrar etmok övün onda yalnız Nriişşovun cokmosi çatışmadı. Conab Potinin hakimiyyotdo olduğu allı ay orzindo dünyanın Rusiyaya. ülkenin bir zaman dünya birliyi ilo iniegrasiya uğrunda mübarizosino vo demokratiya yolunu tutmasına ınünasibotindo büyük dönüş yaratdı. Rus millotçisi Jirinovskinin bir neco il ovvol Rusiya parlamentindoki "Biz istodiyimiz hor bir şeyo malik ola bilorik. Bizo yalnız nüvo doyonoyini işo salmaq lazımdır. Keç kimin etiraz etmoyo cüreti catmayacaqdır" sözlerini neco xatuTamamaq ular?

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Rusların dünən güldüyü bu mənasız məntiq bu gün Rusiya xarici siyasetini səciyyələndirir. Rus imperatoru II Nikolay Qafqazı Rus İmperiyasının mirvarisi adlandırırdı. Qara dəniz və Xəzər dənizi arasındaki bu dağlıq ərazi dünyanın diqqətini cəlb edən hər bir şeyə malikdir. Qafqazın neft və gaz ehtiyatlarının Mərkəzi Asiya ilə müqayisədə çox az olmasına baxmayaraq, bu bölgə Avrasiyanın qanlı döyüş meydanına, qeyri-regional qüwələrin cəmləşdiyi sahəyə çevri-lib. Bunun yegano izahı Qafqazın post- Sovet dövründən mərkəzi ərazidə yerləşmosi və Asiyaya qapısının açan olmasıdır. Mərkəzi Asiya ölkələrinin şimalda Rusiya, şərqdə Çin, cənubda Əfqanıstan, Pakistan və İran ilə "mütərəddid qövs" də yerləşməsi Mərkəzi Asiya ölkələrini öz neft və gaz ehtiyatlarını dünya bazarına çıxarmaq üçün alternativ marşurut axtarmağa məcbur etdi. Qərb tərəfindən TRACECA* adlanan planlı bərpa olunmuş qədim İpək Yolu belə bir alternativ oldu. Avropa Biniiyinin Sammitində Türkiyə, Gürcüstan, Azerbaycan vo Türkmenistan arasında Mərkəzi Asiya və Qafqaz enerji ehtiyatlarını dünya bazanna çıxaran neft və qaz boru kəmərinin tikintisi barodo imzalanmış razılıq yeni İpək Yolunu, alternativ imkanı, gələcək reallığa çevirdi. Rusiya Avropada Təhlükəsizlik Müqavilə-sinə açıq-aşkar etinasızlıq göstərib, onu kobudcasına pozaraq, Şimali Qafqazda miiharibəyə başladı. Saysızhesabsız ağır silahları oraya topladı vo bunun terrora qarsı vacib is olduğunu dünyaya izah etdi. Hotta bütün çeçen xalqı, şərti olaraq, tenorçu kimi hesablansa belə, bu mövqe ilo razılaşmaq çətindir.

Bu müharibəyə çəkilən külli miqdarda xorclərə gəlincə, Putin ümid edir ki, Rusiya Qafqazda hakimiyyəto qayıtdıqdan sonra gələn gəlir bu pulların yerini dolduracaqdır.

Əgər biz TRACECA-nı onun bölgələri üzrə bölsək, bu sxemi ala-rıq: Mərkəzi Asiya - Xəzər denizi - Qafqaz - Türkiyə - Arahq də-nizi. Bu sxemdə yalnız sonuncu iki bölge post-Sovet ərazisindən, Ru-siyanın təsirindən kənarda qahr. Bu boru zəncirində ən mühüm həlqə Qafqaz, daha qəqiqi, Azerbaycan ve Gürcüstandır. TRACECA-nın

 $TRACECA \ (Transportation \ Corridor \ Europe \ - \ Caucasus \ - Asia \ (Avropa \ - \ Qafqaz \ - Asiya \ Nəqliyyat \ Dəhlizi))$

commersiya gəlirini azaltmaq üçün Rusiya və İran enerji istehsal edən ölkələr və enerji istehlakçıları üçün alternativ enerji və nəqletmə üsulu yaradırlar. Məsələn, zəngin qaz ehtiyatı olan İran qonşu Turk-mənistana, ona qaz satmasını təklif edərək, TRACECA boru kornerine gelen Türkmenistan qazının hecmini azaltmağa cəhd edir. Türkiye ile "Blue stream" (Mavi axın) layihəsini imzalamaqla, Rusiya da eyni işi görür.

Qafqazda geden açıq muharibe, artıq, müstəqil dövlətlər olan Azerbaycan ve Gürcüstanın sərhədlərinə çatmışdır. Hele, şübhəli inama, Rusiyanın keçmiş əlaltılarına qarşı açıq-aşkar çıxmayacağına ümid eden bu dövlətlərin kövrək təhlükəsizliyi Qərbdən kifayet qədər kömek almamışdır.

Qərb üçün başa düşmeyin vaxtı çatmışdır ki, "müstəqillik" anlayışının zamanla ve "xaric" anlayışının mesafe ile heç bir əlaqəsi yox-dur. Ölke ya müstəqil olmalıdır, ya da yox, coğrafi nöqteyi- nəzərdən o, kiminse "yaxın xarici", yeni kiminse qonşusu ola biler.

Qafqazın ve Merkezi Asiyanın milyonlarla ehalisi ümid edir və Qərbin hemin neticeye gələcəyi vaxtı gözləyir.